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τ. E. PAGE, c.u., trrr.p. 
E. CAPPS, pu.p., 1.1... W. H. D. ROUSE, trrr.p. 
L. A. POST, m.a. E. H. WARMINGTON, ».a. 




PAUL SHOREY, Px.D., LL.D., Lrrr.D, 






Pau ¥TeARVIAL aaa 

van“os . Ἢ 
eo στι ΠΣ 



Wane activ ed, so far as his failing 
would baht gic ae Thee for publication this the 
second volume of his translation of the Republic of Plato, 
Professor Shorey passed away on April 24, 1934, in the 
seventy-eighth year of his life. In justice to him as 
well as to the many thousands of readers who will study 
and cherish this last and perhaps the greatest scholarly 
work of the distinguished Platonist, the Editors of the 
Loeb Classical Library desire to place on record here a 
brief statement of the pertinent facts relating to the com- 
position and the proof-revision of this volume. Behind 
the bare narrative lies a record of unwavering courage 
in the face of fast-approaching death on the part of the 
veteran scholar and of dauntless determination both to 
achieve a long-cherished purpose and to fulfil an obligation 
entered into many years before with his friend Dr. James 
Loeb and his collaborators in the editing of the Library; 
and the Editors thought it right to offer this volume to the 
public as nearly as possible approximating to the condition 
in which the latest proofs passed under the author’s eye. 
The translation had been finished and was in Professor 
Shorey’s hands in proof form for about two years and had 
been partially, though not finally, revised by him. The 
Introduction was dictated by him, paragraph by para- 
graph, in the scant hours of work permitted him by his 

ἡ ivasny after his first break-down in December 1933. 

e same is true of those notes accompanying the trans- 
lation which are of an interpretative, literary or philo- 
sophical character. The many notes on Platonic diction 
and on matters of Greek grammar and idiom were in 
large part compiled from Professor Shorey’s jottings on 
the well-filled margins of his desk-copy of the Republic by 
his research secretary, Miss Stella Lange, who had assisted 



him in that capacity during the preparation of What 
Plato Said, to which important work she added many 
references in the notes of this volume. The critical notes 
under the text were added by Miss Lange during the 
revision of the proofs, often from notes hho by ee hon 
pena himself. te 

‘The assembling in the form of copy for the printer of all 
the material which is found in the a uetan end notes 
has been the work of Miss Lange, undertaken at the 
request of Mrs. Shorey ; and she has read all the galley 
and page proofs of the volume in co-operation with Dr. 
Page and myself. Miss Lange’s familiarity with her 
teacher’s Platonic studies, his methods of work, his views 
on the interpretation of passages of peculiar difficulty 
has rendered her co-operation invaluable, and generou: 
acknowledgements are due to her for her fidelity to the 
heavy task which she willingly undertook. ΩΝ 

To the writer of these words it would have been ἃ grate- 
ful task, had this been an ABRFOB SNA place, to add a per- 
sonal tribute to his colleague of many years at the Uni- 
versity of Chicago, The familiar correspondence which 
grew out of their renewed relationship during the prepara- 
tion of the two volumes of the Republic has illuminated fo: 
him in unexpected ways the life of tremendous and mg | 
activities of the great scholar and humanist during the 
years which for the ordinary man would have been a 
period of decreasing labours, The ἡ ΑΕ Υ. and scholarly 

roductivity of Professor Shorey in these later years falls 
ttle short of heroism. But the readers of this interpre- 
tation of the Republic who would know more about the 
remarkable man and his life are referred to the review of 
his career which introduces the July 1934 number of | 
Classical Philology, the journal which he edited for twenty- 
five years, and especially to President George Norlin’s 
eloquent appreciation of “ Paul Shorey the Teacher,” on 
pp. 188-191. 

For the Editors 
September 18, 1984. 




ον Note ee ew 

_ Inrropuction ... 

pene Mie Pext 

Jet The Translation . 


‘ Boox IX. " 7 . 
ett. ρει peathints 
ΠΤ, Inpex or Names ae 

TI. Inpex or Supsects . 4 - _ 

pa ἐν si “ag 
OP ἐς teste 


Tuere is a sufficient outline of the Republic in the 
introduction to the first volume. Here it remains 
to consider more argumentatively certain topics of 
_ the last five books which were treated summarily 
_ there. They may be listed as (1) the theory of ideas 
and the idea of good, (2) the higher education and 
_ Plato’s attitude toward science, (3) some further 
_ details of Plato’s political theories, (4) the logic and 
logy of the main ethical argument of the 
lic, (5) the banishment of poetry, (6) the con- 
eluding myth. 
eae as metaphysics, Plato’s theory of ideas Te Theeey 
is, technically speaking, the deliberate and conscious τ 
hypostatization of all concepts—the affirmation that 
every abstract general notion of the human mind is 
also somehow, somewhere, in some sense, an objective 
entity, a real thing, outside of any mind. Some 
-philologians and some sensitive aesthetic critics 
object to the use of the words concept and hypo- 
statization in this connexion. They have a right 
to their personal distaste, but it contributes nothing 
to the interpretation of Plato. Both words convey 
definite meanings to students of philosophy and 
there are no words that can replace them. The 
Socratic dialogues are in fact largely concerned with 
the definition of concepts, general or abstract ideas, 


τὰ ee ee ee Te 


aii a almaentan 



general terms, Begriffe, call them what you will, 
and some convenient synonym for this meaning is 
indispensable in any rational discussion of Plato’s 
philosophy. The Platonic word eidos may have 
retained some of the associations of physical form, 
and the modern psychology of the concept may 
involve in some cases a more developed logic than 
Plato possessed. - The word eidos or idea in Hero- 
dotus, Thucydides, Democritus, the Hippocratic 
corpus and Isocrates* may show the meaning con- 
cept or Begriff imperfectly freed from the association 
of physical form, but that does not justify the in- 
ference that it was never so freed in Plato. The 
terminology of the transcendental idea is indis- 
tinguishable from the terminology of the concept 
and the definition.’ It is impossible to say at what 
point the metaphysical doctrine emerges in the minor 
dialogues, or—on the, I believe, mistaken hypothesis 
that the later dialogues abandon it—just when the 
change took place. The logic of the definition in 
the minor dialogues implies a practically sufficient 
notion of the nature of a concept,° and it is sophistry 

2 Cf. Shorey, De Platonis Idearum Doctrina, Munich, 
1884, p. 1, and review of A. E. Taylor’s Varia Socratica, in 
Class. Phil. vi.,1911, pp.361 ff.; Ritter, Newe Untersuchungen, 
Munich, hg 228-326 ; Lewis Campbell, The Theaetetus 
of Plato, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1883, pp. 268-269; C. M. Gillespie, 
“* The Use of Hidos and Jdea in Hippocrates,” Class. 
Quarterly, vi., 1912, pp. 178-203; Zeller, ii. 14, pp, 658, n. 2 
and 661, n. 1; Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 248 ff.; Fried- 
lander, Platon, i. pp. 16 ff. 

® Cf. What Plato Said, p. 75. 

¢ It is hard to understand the acceptance by several 
scholars of Stenzel’s view that the concept and consequent! 
the idea is a late discovery in the Platonic dialogues, a result 
in fact of the analyses of the Sophist. He must take concept 



_to try to suppress so plain a fact by capitalizing the 
word Form and insisting that Plato always or till 
‘his. latest works visualized the ““ Forms” as types. 
_ He did for some purposes and for others he did not, 
_ and he always knew what he was doing. The ideas, 
_as I have often pointed out, are ideals, types, or 

_ hypostatized concepts or simply concepts according 
_ to the purpose and the context.* 
_ Many interpreters of Plato seem to assume that 

philosophy is, like mathematics or chemistry, a pro- 

in, some very esoteric si cance. For to common sense 
ine Reno lainer that the concept is implied in 
to define ethical terms and that it distinctly 
with the terminology at least of the idea in 
sid caineeall es of Plato and especially in the Buthyphro. 
Stenzel’s shonght seems to be that the concept involves 
that predication can be fully understood only 
after the analysis of sentence structure in the Sophist and the 
discovery of the meaning of “is.” But surely the conscious 
analysis of sentence structure and the function of the copula 
-is one thing and the correct use of predication, of propositions 
and the conyersion of propositions and their combination in 
virtual is another. All the elements of a sound 
logic are present in Plato’s minor dialogues. They are 
correctly loyed in inductive and deductive reasoning, in 
the quest for itions and in the testing of them when 
1 Stenzel means that the nature of the concept, of 
the τ ελταῤ δ μἄα of abstractions is not definitively understood 
in dialogues his postulate proves or demands too 
much. The ultimate nature of the concept is still debated 
to-day. But for all practical purposes of common sense any © 
one as consistently οὐδε γέ ἔοι ἀρῶ define abstract and 
πὐτρέδαν aiid whee plies ἃ a0 logic’ the teatiig οὗ 
definitions proposed, a sufficient notion of the-concept. 
And anyone who a ends the concept may go on to 
Bspostaline it_either an instinctive tendency of human 
§ ~ glen: speech, or ith conscious metaphysics as Plato 

eo σασμδυ.... 

[ἡ * Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 27 Ἐξ. 
δ VOL. II ὃ χὶ 


gressive science ; that Plato, though a great artist, 
was a primitive thinker whose methods and opinions 
have only an historical interest to-day ; and that his 
doctrine of ideas is the endeavour of an immature 
mind to deal with a problem which. modern psych- 
ology or the common sense of any dissertation- 
writing philologian can settle in a paragraph. These 
assumptions close the door to any real understand- 
ing of Plato’s philosophy. ‘The ultimate nature of 
general ideas, of abstract and conceptual thought in 
relation both to the human mind and to the uni- 
verse is as much a matter of debate to-day as it was 
in the age of the schoolmen. This plain fact. of 
literary history is not affected by the opinion of a 
certain number of materialists and behaviourists that 
the matter is quite simple and that there is or ought 
to be no problem. They may or may not be right. 
But the discussion continues, as any bibliography of 
psychology and philosophy will show. he entire 
literature of the “ meaning of meaning” and of 
“imageless thought” is a renewal of the contro- 
versy in other terms. 

A great many thinkers are not satisfied with the 
simple evasion of Aristotle that the human mind is 
“such ” as to be able to experience this, namely the 
separation in thought of things inseparable in ex- 
perience. They cannot find any enlightenment in 
the modern tautology that a general idea is an image 
of a particular idea plus a feeling of generality. And 
they are not convinced that the movements of the 
body, even if we concede that they run exactly 
parallel to the movements of the mind, really explain 
them. And if we turn to the other side of the 
problem we find that many of the leaders of modern 



ics and mathematics are unable to conceive and 
to admit that there is nothing in the objective 
universe corresponding to the ideas, the concepts, 
the laws, the principles by which they get their 
_ The Platonic theory of ideas is a convenient short- 
hand, symbolic expression of the opinions that I have 
_ thus summarized. If we disregard the rhetoric 
_and physical imagery of the m by which Plato 
_ exalts the importance of the doctrine or makes it 
_ the expression of the ideal for ethics, politics and 
aesthetics, all that it affirms is, first, that conceptual 
thought is a distinct and differentiated prerogative 
_ of man not sufficiently accounted for by the structure 
of his body and the sensations which he shares with 
the animals ; and second, that there must be some- 
in the universe, something in the nature of 
ὃ » that corresponds to our concepts and our 
ideals—to the principles, for example, of ethics and 
mathematics. These affirmations of Plato are primi- 
tive animism only in the sense in which the same could 
be said of the beliefs of some of the greatest mathe- 
_ maticians and physicists of to-day or of Matthew 
_ Arnold when he talks of a power not ourselves that 
makes for righteousness. This is not reading modern 
philosophies into Plato. It is merely giving him 
credit. for knowing and intending what he in fact 
says. The opposite interpretation underrates_ his 
intelligence and really does read into his writings 
modern ideas, the notions, namely, of modern anthro- 
pologists as. to how savages think. Gomperz’ 
_ comparison. of the doctrine of ideas to Iroquois 
_ animism (iii. 323; cf. iii. 1-2), Ogden and Richards’ 
_ designation of the ideas as “‘ name-souls” (The Meaning 



of Meaning, p. 45), Jowett’s illustration of what he 
deems hair-splitting refinements in Plato by the 
“ distinction so plentiful in savage languages,” Corn- 
ford’s fancy (From Religion to Philosophy, p. 254) that 
“the idea is a group-soul related to its group as a 
mystery-demon like Dionysus is related to the group 
of worshippers, his thiasos,” and all similar utter- 
ances are uncritical, whatever airs of science or 
pseudo-science they assume. The relevant illustra- 
tions of Plato’s doctrine of ideas are to be sought 
in the most subtle debates of the schoolmen, or in 
modern psychological and epistemological literature’ 
about the meaning of meaning.* Te 

There were, of course, some other more special con- 
siderations that determined Plato’s deliberate and 
defiant hypostatization of all concepts. It accepted 
a natural tendency of the human, and not merely of 
the primitive, mind, and rendered it harmless by apply- 
ing it consistently to everything. If all concepts are 
hypostatized, the result for practical logic and for 
everything except metaphysics and ultimate epistem- 
ological psychology is to leave concepts where they 
were, as indispensable instruments of human think- 
ing. The hypostatization of abstractions operated 
practically as a short answer to the sophisms of crude 
nominalists who obstructed ordinary reasoning by 
raising ultimate objections to the validity of all ab- 
stractions or general terms. This motive is distinctly 
apparent in Plato’s writings and there is a strong 
presumption that he was conscious of it. Ὁ 

However that may be, Plato did in fact, partly as a 
matter of imaginative style, partly as a matter of 

* See Shorey in Proceedings of the Sixth International 
Congress of Philosophy, pp. 579-583. 


metaphysics, speak of concepts as if they were real 
ybjects. He did, as his writings conclusively show, 
_hypostatize all concepts, and all attempts to show 
that he hypostatized only a few of the sublimer or 
more dignified concepts are a@ priori improbable 
hi use they deprive the doctrine of all rational 
_ meaning and consistency,* and they are also refuted 
by the 


by incontrovertible evidence of the dialogues 
‘themselves. Plato affirms this monstrous paradox, 
_ not because he is a naive thinker unacquainted with 
_ the elementary psychology of abstraction and general- 
_ ization,” but because, as we have said, he regards it 
as the most convenient expression of his rejection 
i all materialistic and relativistic philosophies ° and 
of all crude nominalism.4 He recognized that the 
_ doctrine is a paradox hard to accept but also hard to 
_ reject. But he deliberately affirmed it as the most 
‘convenient alternative to inacceptable or unworkable 
_ philosophies.’ He perhaps, as we have already sug- 
_ gested, justified this procedure to himself, and we 
_ may certainly justify it for him, by the reflection that 
_ the theory is no more of a paradox than that involved 
_ in every theology and ultimately in all science and 
philosophy except the crudest dogmatic materialism. 

_ And we may find further confirmation of this opinion 
in the fact that both the metaphysics and the tran- 
_ scendental physics of the past two decades discover 

© Cf. Aristot. Met. 1043 Ὁ 21 and 991 b 6; Ross, i. pp. 192 
and 199; and What Plato Said, p. 584. 

» Cf. Charmides 158 2, Phaedo 96 5, What Plato Said, 
ΟΡ. 533, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 47-48. 

© Cf, Cratyl. 440 B-c. 

4 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 574. 

* Cf. What Plato Said, p. 586, on Parmen. 135 c. 

7 Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 39, 268, 574. 




more helpful analogies in the Platonic theory of ideas 
and in Plato’s applications of it to the philosophy of 
nature than they do in any other philosophy of the 
past. ᾿ 

In disregard of these considerations many critics in 
every age, and notably Natorp and Stewart in ours, 
have tried to free Plato from the stigma of paradox or 
naiveté by trying to show that this uncompromising 
realism (in the proper medieval sense of the word) is 
not to be taken seriously, and that it was only a 
poetic and emphatic form of conceptualism. This, as 
we have seen, is at the best a halftruth. All Platonic 
ideas are also concepts, but we cannot infer that they 
were only concepts.* For many purposes of logic, 
ethics and politics Plato practically treats them as 
concepts. Why not? No reasonable writer ob- 
trudes his ultimate metaphysics into everything. 
And Plato is always particularly careful to distinguish 
metaphysical hypotheses and their imaginative em- 
bodiments in myth and allegory from the simple 
truths of a working logic and a practical ethics which 
are all that he dogmatically affirms.® But he always 
affirms the metaphysical idea when challenged. To 
this extent Natorp and those who agree with him 
are right. But they pay too high a price for their 
rightness on this point when they insist on deducing 
all Plato’s opinions from his ontology, and obtrude 
the metaphysical idea into passages where the doc- 
trine at the most lends rhetorical and poetical eolour- 
ing to the practical affirmation of the necessity of 
concepts and the value of ideals. 

* See Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 30, What Plato Said, 
p. 585, on Parmen. 132 5, 

» Cf. Meno 81 v-r and What Plato Said, p. 515, on Meno 
86 B. 


_ An example will perhaps make these distinctions 
more: plain. Plato in the Republic (501) says that 
his philosophic statesman will contemplate the divine 
pattern of justice as an artist looks away to his model, 
and that like the artist he will frequently glance from 
the copy that he is producing to the model and back 
again to the copy.? This may reasonably be under- 
stood as only a heightened way of saying that the 
true statesman must be guided by definite concep- 
tions and strive for the realization of clearly ap- 

-prehended ideals. The fact that Plato, the meta- 

Ephysician, believed the transcendental reality of the 

idea to be a necessary assumption of ultimate epistem- 

ΤῊΝ adds nothing to the practical meaning of this 

passage. When in the Phaedrus, however (247 pb, 
_ 249 B-c), Plato says that every human soul has beheld: 

} “the idea of justice in pre-natal vision, since otherwise 
it would not have the power to reduce the confused 
multiplicity of sensation to the unities of conceptual 
“thought, he is clothing in mythical garb an epistem- 

_ ological argument for the reality of the transcend- 
_ ental idea, and he is not, as in the Republic passage, 
thinking mainly of the explicit affirmation that the 
_ true statesman must havesubmitted toa higher educa- 
_ tion in conceptual thinking and have thus framed in 
his mind ideals to guide his practice. The historian 

οὗ philosophy who, without calling attention to this 
- distinction, merely cites the two passages together 

_in a footnote, only confuses the uncritical reader. 

_ But again in the Parmenides (135 a-c), the Sophist 
(246-247), the Cratylus (439 v f.; of. What Plato Said, 
pp. 266-267), the Politicus (283-284, What Plato Said, 

ΟΡ. 309), the Timaeus (51-52 and What Plato Said, p. 

* Cf. What Plato Said, p. 458, on Euthyphro 6 π. 


613 on 28 a-s), there are passages in which, without 
mythical dress, and with no specific reference to the 
practical value of concepts and ideals, Plato postulates 
the transcendental ideas as an epistemological neces- 
sity, and the only escape from materialism and the 
flux of relativity. No legerdemain of interpretation 
or speculations about the chronology of the evolution 
of Plato’s thought can explain away these passages, 
and the interpreter who realizes that some virtual 
equivalent of the Platonic idea is still to-day the alter- 
native to thorough-going and unequivocal material- 
ism will not desire to explain them away. 
All that is needed in order to understand Plato 
and to do justice to him as a rational philosopher is 
to remember again? that, though the doctrine of ideas 
is always in the background of his mind and would 
always be reaffirmed on a challenge, he is not always 
thinking explicitly of it when he is speaking of 
logic, ethics, or politics, and we need not think of it 
in order to enjoy his art or apprehend his meaning. 
The transcendental idea, for example, is not needed 
in the Republic except for the characterization of the 
philosophic mind and the higher education of the 
Platonic rulers.? It is not indispensable even there. 
The concept will serve. The philosopher is he who 
ean think and reason consecutively in abstractions.° 

4 See supra, p. xvi. 

> Of. Vol. I. pp. xl-xli, and What Plato Said, pp. 226-227. 
It is also used in an intentionally crude form to confirm the 
banishment of the poets. The poet does not deal in essential 
truth, he copies the copy of the reality. Cf. infra, p. lsii, 
on 596 a ff. and What Plato Said, p. 249. Stenzel’s 
justification of this (Platon der Erzieher, p. 175) by the 
consideration that good joiners’ work involves mathematics 
seems fanciful and is certainly not in Plato’s text. 

¢ Supra, Vol. I. pp. 516 ff. 


The curriculum of the higher education is designed to 
develop this faculty in those naturally fitted to re- 
ceive it. The thought and the practical conclusions 
will not be affected if we treat the accompanying 
bolic rhetoric as surplusage. Such statements as 
that the philosopher is concerned with pure being,” 
dwells in a world of light,* is devoted to the most 
blessed part of reality,? satisfies and fills the continent 
part of his soul,* undoubtedly suggest the meta- 
physical background of Plato’s thought and the 
emotional and imaginative connotations of his ideas. 
But in the context of the Republic they are little 
more than an expression of the intensity of Plato’s 
feeling about his political and educational ideas. 

It is obvious that the concept or idea is in many 
eloquent Platonic passages an ideal, a type, a pattern, 
to which aesthetic, moral and social experience may 
approximate but which they never perfectly realize, 
just as mathematical conceptions are ideals never 
actually met with in the world of sense’ It is 
possible, though not probable, that in some of the 
minor dialogues we get glimpses of a stage of Plato's 
youthful thought in which, though he already uses, 
in speaking of the concept or the definition, much of 
the terminology associated with the doctrine of ideas, 

« Cf. supra, Vol. I. pp. 516-517, 520-521, What Plato Said, 
pp. 233-234. 

δ ATT a ff., 479 £, 484 5, 486 a, 500 5. 

© 517 B, 518 a, 518 c, 520 v. 4 526 Ε, 

* Rep. 586 8, Gorg. 493 B. 

7 Phaedo 74 4. For the threefold aspect of the Platonic 
ideas in metaphysics, logic and aesthetics see my Unity of 
Plato’s Thought, p. 27, and T. E. Jessup, ‘‘ The Metaphysics 
of Plato,” Journ. of Philos. Studies (1930), pp. 41-42. See 
supra, Vol. I. pp. 504*505. 



he has not yet consciously and systematically hyposta- 
tized the concept.* These and similar qualifications 
and speculative possibilities do not in the least alter 
the fact that throughout the main body of his work 
Plato is ready to affirm the metaphysical theory of 
the hypostatized idea whenever the issue is raised,? 
and there is not an iota of evidence in his own writings 
that he ever abandoned or altered the doctrine, how- 
ever much he varied the metaphors and the terms in 
which he expressed it. Itis quite certain that he did 
not, except in obviously mythical or poetical passages, 
say more of the ideas than that they exist and that 
they are in some sense real.° He did not say that 
they are the thoughts of God.¢ There is no indica- 
tion in his writings that he said that they are numbers.® 

* See Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 31, What Plato Said, 
p- 458. 
Ὁ Cf. supra, pp. xvi and xviii. Pie 

¢ Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 28 and p. 29, n. 188. 

4 This Neoplatonic doctrine—based on ἃ misinterpretation 
of such passages as Rep. 597 B f.—was adopted by many 
Christian fathers and mediaeval scholars. Cf. Alcinous 
in Hermann, Plato, vi. p. 163; Baumgartner, Philos. des 
Alanus de Insulis, Ὁ. 54; Zeller ii. 14, p. 664, n. 5; Taylor, 
Mediaeval Mind, ii. pp. 485-486 ; Webb, Studies in the 
Hist. of Nat..Theol. p. 241 ; Harris, Duns Scotus, ii. p. 195: 
C. G. Field, The Origin and Development of Plato’s Theory 
of Ideas, pp. 21-22; Otto Kluge, Darstellung u. Beur- 
teilung der Einwendungen des Aristot. gegen die Plat. Ideen- 
lehre, p. 24. 

It is very difficult to argue with those who attribute this 
doctrine of ideas and numbers to Plato. Sometimes they 
seem to affirm it only on the authority of Aristotle, which they 
admit is in most cases hopelessly confused with his statements 
about Speusippus and Xenocrates and other members of the 
Academy. Sometimes they seem to admit that the doctrine 
is not to be found in Plato’s extant writings. Sometimes 
they hint rather than say that certain passages of the Philebus 








Ve aoe aia 


And he never admitted that they are only thoughts in 
the human mind,* though for practical purposes, as 
we have said, they may usually be treated as such 
when no metaphysical issue is involved. 

It ought not to be necessary to debate these ques- 
tions further. The only question open to debate 
is the extent of Plato’s consciousness of what some 
critics think the modern meanings that I have read 
into him. The question of course is not whether he 

and the Timaeus s that Plato’s mind was working in 
this direction, though they are usually too cautious now to 
affirm anything positive about Philebus 15-16 Ὁ, or Timaeus 
53 8. I have more than once shown that there is no difficulty 
in treating numerical ideas precisely like other ideas in rer 
relation. to concretes. The number five is to five appre δὰ 
sie sh is to red apples. It is present with them. I have 
peatedly collected and interpreted the Platonic passages 
(of What Pia y misled uncritical students of the Academy 
-" Plato Said, p. 605, and infra on 525 pv, 526 a). 
the distinction that there is only one idea while there 
ie. many numbers of the same kind is quite pointless. There 
is one idea of redness that is metaphysically or teleologically 
really present entire in many red and there is one 
idea of five or fiveness which is similarly present in many 
groups of five. There is no more difficulty about the fives 
that are present as factors in ten, fifteen, twenty, and twenty- 
five than there is about any other ideas that may mingle 
with or enter into the definition of another idea. The whole 
_theory is a piece of scholastic ἐπετανθεῖλμε: to which a sound 
interpretation of what Plato says lendsno support. And there 
is no space and no need to transcribe here the exhaustive 
collections of Robin (La Théorie platonicienne des Idées et 
des Nombres d’aprés Aristote) or Ross’s ng tt summaries 
of them in his commentary on Aristotle’s ἐποί μα. μεοράς:- 

If Plato’s mind was really working such con- 
clusions, why is there no hint of them in. in his huge work of the 
‘Laws, or—if we grant them genuine for the sake of the 
argument—in the Epistles ὃ 

* Cf. Parmen. 132 8-c, and What Plato Said, p. 585, and 
ibid. p. 594 on Soph. 250 8, Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 30. 



could feel all the associations and connotations of the 
modern words in which we have to express his mean- 
ing, but whether his meaning is on the whole sub- 
stantially that which I have attributed to him. 

The obvious conclusion is that we can infer nothing 
as to the composition or date of the Republic from the 
fact that the ideas are not mentioned where there 
is no reason for mentioning them, and that all hypo- 
theses that different stages of the evolution of Plato’s 
thought are indicated by the various aspects in which 
the ideas are presented when they are mentioned are 
uncritical.*| There is no occasion for the metaphysical 
doctrine of ideas in the first four books. But the 
general concept, the type, the ideal are referred to 
in language which could be understood of the ideas. 
The fact that it does not necessarily have to be so 
understood is no proof that the doctrine was not 
present to Plato’s mind at the time. 

In the fifth, sixth, and seventh books the theory is 
explicitly enunciated,’ illustrated by imagery and 
applied to education. There is even a much disputed 
but certain anticipation of the later doctrine that 
while the idea is a unity its relation to things and to 
other ideas seems to break it up into a plurality.° 

The uncompromising statement of the subject in 
the tenth book is sometimes taken to represent an 
earlier and more naive form of the doctrine. But the 
style of the passage is evidently that of a defiant 
affirmation of the whole length of the paradox, or 
rather perhaps of an expert explaining the matter to 

« Cf. What Plato Said, p. 560, Unity of Plato’s Thought, 
p. 35 and n. 238. 

> 476 af. Cf. Vol. 1. pp. 516-517, 505 a ff., 517 5 ff. 

¢ Cf. 476 a, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 34. 




laymen.* » The fact that the argument of the third 
man is distinctly mentioned in the same connexion is 
in itself evidence that the passage does not represent 
an earlier and more primitive stage of Plato’s thought. 
For the third man is mentioned in the Parmenides.” 
But there would not be much profit in further discus- 
sion of hypotheses that have no basis in the text of 
Plato ὅν the philosophical probabilities of the case. 

All that has been said of the ideas in general applies The Ideaor 
to the idea of good. It is the hypostatization of the °° 
concept “ good.’’ Its significance in the Platonic 
system is that of its importance in human thought, 
In ethics it is what modern ethical philosophy calls 
the sanction. In politics it is the ideal, whatever it 
may be; of social welfare. In theology and the phil- 
osophy of nature it is the teleological principle, the 

ign that implies a designing mind in the universe. 

The first of these meanings is predominant in the 
minor dialogues where all problems and all attempted 
definitions point to an unknown good so consistently 
and systematically that Plato must have been aware 
of the reference... The second meaning is most 
prominent in the Republic, but there is explicit refer- 
- ence to the first and to the discussions of the minor 
dialogues... In any case, ethical and social good are 
not sharply separable in Plato. 

Theidea of good is nowhere defined, but its supreme 
importance and all of its meanings are symbolized in 
the images of the sun and the cave. Its main mean- 

“Οὗ 597 a Gs Ὑ ἂν δόξειε τοῖς περὶ τοὺς τοιούσδε Χόγους 

> 159 &-133 4. Cf. infra on 597 c. 

* See What Plato Said, pp. 71-73, with marginal references 



ing for the Republic is the ideal of social welfare on 
which the statesman, as opposed to the opportunist 
politician, must fix his eye, and which he can appre- 
hend only by a long course of higher education which 
will enable him to grasp it. Plato rightly feels that 
no other definition is possible or desirable unless the 
entire polity of the Republic was to be taken as its 
definition. The Timaeus is the poetical embodiment 
of the third meaning, though single phrases of the 
Republic glance at it.t If there is a beneficent 
creator, his purpose, his idea of good, is the chief 
cause of the existence of the world and the best key 
to the understanding of it. 

I am not attributing these three meanings of the 
good to Plato by an imposed symmetry of my own. 
It is what Plato himself says and the chief problem 
of my interpretation is not to understand Plato 
but to account for the failure to recognize his plain 
meaning. . 

In view of my repeated expositions of Plato’s 
doctrine of the idea of good there would be little 
point in attempting here once more to set it forth in 
a smooth, consecutive, literary statement.’ It will be 
more to my purpose to enumerate in the briefest, 
baldest, most explicit fashion some of my reasons for 
feeling that I have been misunderstood, and that the 
definite issues raised by my arguments have never 

« Cf. infra, pp. xxv and 102. 

> See my paper, “‘ The Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic,” 
University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology, vol. i. 
(1895), pp. 188-239; my article, “Summum Bonum,”’ in 
Hastings’ Encycl. of Relig. and Ethics, vol. xii. pp. 44-48 ; 
my review of Jowett and Campbell’s Republic, The Nation, 
61, 1895, pp. 83-84; Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 17 and π, 
94; What Plato Said, pp. 71-72, 230 ff., 534 on Phaedo 99 a, 



‘been met. I have never intended to deny that 
_ Plato’s language about the idea of good is in large 

part the language of poetry and religion, that he 
intends to suggest by it the ineffable and infinite 
unknowable beyond our ken, and that his eloquence 
has been a source of inspiration to many readers who 
eare little for his dialectics and for the critical inter- 
_ pretation of his specific thought. What I have been 
_ trying to say is that the mere repetition of Plato’s 
rhetoric or the attempt to better it in our own para- 
phrases will not contribute much to the interpretation 
of the precise meaning of the passages of the Republic 
in question, assuming that in addition to their in- 
‘spirational value they are intended to convey some 
definite meaning and are not merely ejaculations 
thrown out at an infinite object. 

In the first place, then, since all Platonic ideas 
are hypostatized concepts the hypostatization of the 
idea of good is presumably irrelevant to its main 
significance for the ethical and political thought of 
the Republic. It does, of course, suggest the meta- 
physical background of Plato’s thought; there are 
a few sentences in which it involves the goodness 
which teleologists discover in the structure of the 
universe and in the designs of its creator, the theme 
of the Timaeus;% and since goodness is the chief 
attribute of God in religious literature from the New 
‘Testament to Whittier’s hymn, there is a certain 
plausibility in identifying it with God himself. But 
the text of Plato, and especially the text of the 
_ Republic, does not justify any of these extensions of 
_ the idea if taken absolutely. The idea of good is 
_ undoubtedly the most important of ideas, but it is 

« Cf. on 508 Β and 509 8; Zeller ii. 1‘, pp. 687-688. 


not true that it is the most comprehensive in the 
sense that all other ideas are deduced from it,* as in 
some Platonizing pantheistic philosophies they are 
deduced from the idea of Being. There is no hint 
of such deduction in Plato’s writings. It is only 
teleological ideas in ethics, politics and cosmogony 
that are referred to the idea of good as the common 
generalization or idea that includes them all. Even 
the ideas are not in Plato’s own reasoning deduced 
from the idea of good. It is merely said that a 
scientific moralist, a true statesman, will be able so 
to deduce them, and that the higher education is 
designed to give him this ability.. In Republic 534 
B-c, the dialectician is he who is able ἑκάστου... 
λόγον . .. διδόναι and the idea of good is a special 
example of the ἕκαστον. It is not said that the man 
who does not know the idea of good does not know 
any other idea, but that he does not know ἄλλο 
ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν. 

It is not even true that Plato’s philosophic ethics 
is deduced from the idea of good. He only says that 
the ethics of the guardians will be so deduced. So 
far as Plato himself expounds a scientific ethics it rests 
on the preferability of the intellectual life and the 
comparative worthlessness of the pleasures of sense.” 
The idea of good in the dialogues is a regulative not 
a substantive concept. 

Whatever its religious suggestions it cannot in 
any metaphysical or literal sense be identified. with 
the Deity.© The idea of God was taken by Plato 

« Cf. my review of Paul Hinneberg, Die Kultur der 
Gegenwart, Class. Phil. vi. p. 108. 

ὃ φ; Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 24, and infra, pp. lvi f. 

¢ Cf. my Idea of Good, gp. 188-189, Unity of Plato’s 
Thought, n. 94, What Plato Said, p. 231. 



_/from the religion of the Greek people and purified 
by criticism. The idea of good came to him on an 
_ altogether different line of thought. It is the out- 
‘come of those Socratic quests for definitions of 
ethical virtues and social ends which always break 
down because the interlocutors are never able to 
discover the sanction which makes the proposed 

_ virtue or end a good and desirable thing.* 
__ When these misapprehensions are cleared away I 
_ trust that I shall not any longer be misunderstood if 
_ Isay that the chief and essential meaning of the idea 
of good inthe Republic is ‘* precisely” that conception 
_ of anultimate sanction for ethics and politics which 
i minor dialogues sought in vain. Plato does not 
_ profess to have discovered it in the Republic except 
_ so far as it is implied in the entire ethical, social and 
“political ideals of his reformed state. He intention- 
sally and wisely refuses to define it in a formula.® 
_ He merely affirms that it is something which can be 
apprehended only by those who have received the 
‘training and the discipline of his higher education. 
᾿ς ® For the idea of good and God ef. also V. Brochard, “ Les 
_’Mythes dans la philos. de Platon,” L’ Année Philos., 1900, p. 
11; Pierre Bovet, Le Dieu de Piaton, Paris, 1902, p. 177 ; 
' eder, Platos philosophische Entwicklung, pp. 237, 381 f.; 
Zeller, Phil. ἃ. Gr. ii. 1*, p. 718, n. 1, pp. 667, 694, 707 ff. ; 
_ Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics (Eng. tr.), ii. p. 327 ; 
Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. pp. 85 and 211; Inge, The Philo- 
2 of Plotinus, ii. p. 126; Gustave ider, Die Ἶ 
Ἀμαρία, p- 109; Taylor, Plato, pp... 8ὅ-89: Adam, 
aie itality of Platonism, pp. 22 and 132; The Religious 
_ Teachers ὁ eece, pp. 442 f., with my review in Philos. 
Rev. vol. 18, pp. 62-63; Apelt, Beitrage zur Geschichte der 
_ griechischen Philos., Vorrede, p. vi.; H. Tietzel, Die Idee 

_ des Guten in Platons Staat und der Gottesbegriff, Progr. 
 Wetzlar, 1894. ad 

" Cf. infra on 506 x, p. 95, note αὶ 
VOL, II δ Xxvii 


The consummation of this education is characterized 
briefly and soberly as a vision, just as in the Sym- 
posium the long ascent of the scale of beauty cul- 
minates in a vision which alone makes life worth 
living. This language expresses the intensity of 
Plato’s feeling about the intellectual life and his 
own ethical and social ideals, but it does not make 
him a visionary or a mystic in the ordinary sense of 
the words. vi 

If the interpretation here outlined is in itself a 
rational sequence of thought and makes sense of 
what Plato says, it surely creates a presumption 
which cannot be rebutted by evading issues and 
charging me with insensibility to Plato's deeper 
religious and mystic meanings. It can be refuted 
only by giving specific answers to specific arguments 
and testing them by the texts. The interpretation 
of the images, symbols, allegories (the synonym 
does not matter) of the sun, the divided line and 
the cave, provides the chief test, as the too literal 
acceptance of them is perhaps the main cause of 

The aptness of the sun as a symbol of Plato’s idea 
of good might be illustrated by many quotations 
from modern poetry and from the literature of sun- 
worship.’ It would be interesting to compare what 
Plato says of the sun as the primal source of light, 
heat, life, growth, all things, with the language of 
modern science. Herbert Spencer, for example, 
innocently says (First Principles of a New System of 
Philos., 1865, Amer. ed. p. 454): ‘‘ Until I recently 

* Rep. 516 5, 517 B-c, Symp. 210 8 ff. Cf. Rep. 500 B-c, 
» Cf. infra, pp. 100-101, on 508 a. 



consulted his Outlines of Astronomy on another ques- 
tion I was not aware that so far back as 1833 Sir 
John Herschel had enunciated the doctrine that 
“the sun’s rays are the ultimate source of almost 
every motion which takes place on the surface of the 
earth.’ ” Another line of illustration would lead 
‘through the Latin poet Manilius and Plotinus to 
Goethe’s “ War’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft.” ¢ 
‘This thought might be extended to include modern 
‘debates on the nice preadjustment of the eye to 
its function of vision. Does it, or does it not, imply 
a creator and a design? Lastly, Plato’s statement 
that, as the sun is the source of light, but is not itself 
light (508 8), so the idea of good is not knowledge or 
being but the cause of both and something that is 
beyond and transcends being—this superhuman 
hyperbole (509 B-c) is the source of all so-called 
negative theologies and transcendental metaphysics 
_from Philo and Plotinus to the present day. 
_ But our present concern is not with these things 
but with the direct evidence that the idea of good 
is essentially for the interpretation of the Republic 
what modern ethical theory calls the sanction. One 
sentence I admit seems to identify the idea of good 
with God. The sun, it is said, is that which the Good 
created in the visible world to be its symbol and 
analogue. This would seem to identify the idea of 
good with the Demiurgos of the Timaeus, who is 
both the supreme God and a personification of the 
idea of good or the principle of teleology in nature. 
But we have already seen that it is uncritical to 
Tee Plato’s language about God, a word which 
accepts from traditional religion and employs as 

“ΟἹ infra, p. 101, note δ. on 508 8. 



freely for edification and the rejection of militant 
atheism as Matthew Arnold does. Moreover, there 
are other sentences in this part of the Republic which, 
if pressed, are irreconcilable with the identification 
of the idea of good with God. In any case, apart from 
one ortwo sentences of vague and disputable meaning, 
the acceptance of the idea of good as the sanction more 
nearly lends an intelligible and reasonable meaning 
to everything that Plato says than does any other 
interpretation. On this view, then, I repeat, the 
idea of good is simply the hypostatization of what 
the idea of good means for common sense in modern 
usage. It is the good purpose in some mind able 
to execute its purposes. It is what such a mind 
conceives to be the supreme end to which all other 
ends are subordinated and referred. bas: baopetd 

The divided line and the cave are also images and 
symbols employed to bring out certain other aspects: 
of the theory of ideas and of the idea of good in 
particular. ‘The main object common to both is to 
put the thought “ Alles vergingliche ist nur ein 
Gleichnis ” into a proportion. The four terms of such 
a proportion may be secured either by invention or by 
forcing special meanings on some of the terms. In 
the case of the cave, the cave itself, the fettered 
prisoners, the fire and the apparatus by which the 
shadows of graven images are cast on the wall of the 
cave are clearly inventions. There is a real analogy 
between the release of the prisoners with their ascent 
to the light of day (515 c ff.) and the Soeratie elenchus 
which releases the mind and draws it up from a world 
of sense to the world of thought (517 B-c). | But it is 
obvious that all the details of the imagery cannot be 
pressed and that we need not ask too curiously to 




_ what in Plato’s serious thought every touch that fills 
_ out the picture corresponds. 
᾿ On my interpretation critics have likewise erred by 
refusing to admit a similar qualification of their too 
iteral acceptance of the image of the divided line. 
| The proportion: ideas are to things as things are to 
their ections in mirrors or in water, has only three 
ἢ terms. The fourth term is found in mathematical 
_ ideas, which in their use in education and in respect 
of the method by which the mind deals with them are 
; in some sort intermediate between ideas and things. 
We thus get our proportion. But in the description 
_of it Plato is careful to distinguish the mathematical 
i only by the method of their treatment in science, 
not in dialectics, and not as entities of another kind. 
This raises the presumption that Plato, as usual, 
knows what he is doing and does not intend to dis- 
_ tinguish objectively mathematical ideas as ideas from 
_ other ideas. I support this presumption by pointing 
_ out that in the later and final interpretation of 
_ the line Plato names the objective correlates of the 
_ mental processes corresponding to three divisions 
__ of the line but omits the fourth on the pretext that 
_ it would take too long. (Cf..on 534.4.) He names 
_ the mathematical attitude of mind or method but 
does not name its objects as something distinct from 
_ ideas or a distinct kind of ideas. I go on to show that 
_ there is no evidence in the Platonic writings for the 
_ doctrine that mathematical ideas differ in themselves 
_ from other concepts, and that the testimony of Aris- 
_ totle is too confused to prove anything.* These 
_ assumptions raise a definite issue which can only be 
_ met by equally definite arguments. Instead of that 
: = Cf. supra, pp. xx-xxi, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 82 f. 


critics rebuke me for attributing insincerity to Plato, 
or at the best they ask, How could Aristotle be mis- 
taken? ney 6 

Plato himself regards all literature except dia- 
lectics as a form of play and much that passes for 
dialectics as conscious or unconscious jesting. When- 
ever he himself employs imagery, symbolism and 
myth or an eristic dialectic he is careful to warn us © 
that it is not to be taken too literally or seriously,* 
and he usually points out just how much of his 
apparent conclusions it is necessary to accept for the 
carrying on of the argument. Now the particular 
synonyms I employ to describe this characteristic 
trait of Plato’s method and style are obviously ir- 
relevant to my main argument. Yet if in view of 
the frequency of the idea and word παίζειν in Plato 
I express the thought that the intermediate place of 
mathematical ideas in the proportion of the divided 
line is not to be taken literally and add that the 
ambiguous coinage εἰκασία, or conjecture, is a term 
of disparagement playfully thrown in to secure sym- 
metry of subdivision in the two worlds and to suggest 
a depth below the lowest depth,® I am sternly told 
that “ It is surely a strange reading of the character 
of Plato as a seeker after truth to maintain that in 
the very heart of his greatest work and at the v 
core of the problem of knowledge he should disturb 
and confuse those who are seeking to understand his 
doctrine with a little wholly uncalled-for ἡ playful- 
ness,’ even though it should be for the sake of 
‘symmetry.’”’* Now I am quite willing to sub- 

® Cf. infra on 539 c, p. 227, note d. ~ 

> Idea of Good, p. 229. 

¢ H. J. Paton, Plato’s Theory of EIK ASIA, Aristotelian 
Society, 1922, p. 69. 


stitute some other expression for “‘ playfully thrown 
in.” But my precise expression, I repeat, is not the 
point. Plato in fact does here, as elsewhere, resort 
to artificial constructions and inventions in order to 
ex} the relation between the ideas and what we 
call realities by proportion. The εἰκόνες and <ixacia 
are in fact introduced here to complete the symmetry 
of such a proportion and to suggest ironical disparage- 
_ment of the inferior type of thought. They contri- 
_ bute nothing further to the solution of the “ problem 
_of knowledge.” To recognize this plain fact is not to 
impugn the character of Plato, and to rebuke my 
_ frivolity with solemn eloquence is no answer to my 
argument. Plato himself never thinks it incompat- 
_ ible with a serious search for truth to mingle jest with 
_ earnest and seriousness with irony. 
Similarly of the ἀνυπόθετον (510 B). It obviously 
suggests to modern interpreters the metaphysical first 
principle, the Unconditioned, the absolute ground, 
the noumenon, call it what you will. Plato himself 
“may have been willing to let the word convey such 
_ overtones, and those who are not interested in his 
_ precise meanings may stop there and cry with Rous- 
_seau, “O Mighty Being!” But it is also equally 
obvious that the ἀνυπόθετον has a definite and less 
_ purely emotional meaning in its context. It ex- 

presses Plato’sdistinction between themanof science, 
_ who starts from assumptions that he does not allow 
_ to be questioned (510 c-p), and the philosopher or 
_ Platonic dialectician, who is able and willing to carry 

the discussion back, not necessarily always to a meta- 
_ physical first principle, but at least to a proposition on 
_ which both parties to the argument agree and which 
_ therefore is not arbitrarily assumed as an hypothesis 



by the questioner. This meaning could be illustrated 
by the Crito, in which it is said that all discussion is 
vain without such a starting-point of agreement.? . It 
is the essential meaning of the passage in the Phaedo 
(101 p-r), where ἱκανόν, the adequate, the sufficient, 
is for all practical purposes a virtual synonym of the 
ἀνυπόθετον, though it does not suggest the possible 
metaphysical connotations of the word... 

Now this distinction between dialectics or philo- 
sophy and the sciences is repeatedly borrowed by 
Aristotle ὃ and even retains much of its validity under 
the changed conditions of modern thought. , There 
will always be these two ways of thinking and these 
two types of mind. The passage, then, makes good 
sense so interpreted and. lends a rational meaning 
to the ἀνυπόθετον without denying the mystic over- 
tones which are all that seem to interest some inter- 
preters of Plato. ) 

To return to the political and social idea of good. 
Plato’s conception of ultimate good in this sense must 
be gathered from his writings as a whole. Neither — 
in the Republic nor elsewhere does. he commit. him- 
self to a defining formula of social welfare. . It is 
enough for his purpose to emphasize the distinction. 
between the statesman and the politician and describe 
the education and the way of life that will produce 
the statesman and develop in him the ideals and the 
unity of purpose that distinguish him, But it would 
not be difficult to gather Plato’s general conception 
of political and social good from the Republic and the 
Laws and certain passages of the Gorgias and Poli- 
ticus. The true statesman’s chief aim will be not 

4. Crito 49 νυ, infra, p. 175, note c, on 527 E. 
» Cf. infra, p. 111. 



wealth and power and amusements, but the virtue of 
_ the citizens. A sober disciplined life is preferable 
_ to the unlimited license and expansiveness of an im- 
_ perialistic -and decadent. democracy. The: states- 
_man’s chief instruments for realizing his ideals will 
be the as eee education and what to-day is called 

_ Is this plain common sense, then, all that is meant 
by Plato’s idealistic eloquence and the imagery of the 
sun, the divided line and the cave ? 1 never meant 
to say that it is all, but it is the central core of 
without which Plato’s transcendentalism is 
nly a rhapsody of words. If nature is more than 
an nag pe Be himself be- 
lieves: and believes indispensable to morality and 
social order, his purposes, his idea of good, or, meta- 
_ physically or mythologically speaking, the idea of 
_ good which he contemplates as a pattern,’ becomes 
the first, and chief cause of the ordered world, and 
_ such understanding of his purposes as is possible for 
__ us is a better explanation of things than the material 
_ instruments that serve his ends.*__ This is the type of 
_ explanation that the Socrates of the Phaedo desires 
but cannot discover and that the Timaeus ventures 
_ to present only in mythical and poetical form.’ It 
_ has little place in the Republic, though we may sup- 
_ pose it to be in the background of Plato’s mind and to 
_ be suggested by his allegories. The idea of good in 
᾿ _ * Gorg. 513 τέ, 517 B-c, 504 υ»-Ὲ. Laws 705 ν»-ῈΣ24 695 5.6, 
ira. 309-310, Unit if Plato 62, n, 481 
if -310, Unity ὁ i . 62, ἢ, : 
Laws and Rep. passim. 7 a sain μέσων νῷ 
_ * Cf. What Plato Said, p. 613 on Tim. 28 a-n. 
4 Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 329, 346-347. 
* Gf. my Idea of Good, p. 232, 

- δ᾽" Ἂν IA τάν, IIE te A Ee ay Pil 



this sense, like the heat and light of the sun, is both 
the cause of the things we think “ real ” and the con- 
dition of our apprehension and understanding of 
them. It is not the substance of things; it is not 
their “ being,” but something apart from and tran- 
scending “ being ”’ in the ordinary sense of the word 
(509 B). But the allegory and the transcendental 
language apply equally well to the ethical and poli- 
tical ideas which are the chief theme of the Republic, 
and it is not necessary to look further. The cause of 
any political or social institution is the purpose or 
idea of good in some controlling mind, and, as Cole- 
ridge said and Mill repeated after him, the best way 
to understand any human institution or contrivance 
is to appreciate that purpose. That will throw a 
flood of light on everything.* . 

I have never meant to deny the mystic and meta- 
physical suggestions of Plato’s language. I have 
merely tried to bring out the residuum of practical 
and intelligible meaning for the political and ethical 
philosophy of the Republic. It is a meaning that is 
still true to-day, and it is the only interpretation that 
makes intelligible sense of what Plato says. That 
surely creates a presumption which can be met only 
by definite arguments. | 

Whatever the more remote suggestions of the idea 
of good for general or ethical philosophy, this its 
simple practical meaning for the Republic is clearly 
indicated by Plato himself. It symbolizes the distine- 
tion between the ideal statesman and the politician 
of decadent Athens and marks the purpose and goal 
of all the studies of the Platonic higher education. 
The guardians have already received in a purified 

Cf. my Idea of Good, p. 227, 


‘ form the normal Greek education in gymnastics and 
“music,” described in the Protagoras, 325 c ff., and 
_ virtually repeated in the education prescribed for the 
_ entire citizenship in the Laws. The product of this 
_ Platonic elementary and secondary education would 
_ bea band of healthy, wholesome, sunburnt boys and 
; girls, who, in Ruskin’s phrase, “ have had all the 
_ nonsense boxed and raced and spun out of them.” 
They would have dipped into fewer books than our 
_ graduates, but they would know a few of the world’s 
_ greatest books by heart, they would have no theory 
_ of art or sentimentality about it, but their taste 
_ would have been refined, almost to infallibility, by 
_ hearing only the best music and seeing only the best 
_ statues. They would have heard of fewer things 
but would know what they did know perfectly. 
They would have never studied a text-book of civies, 
ethics, or “‘ sociology,’’ but the essential principles 
of obedience, patriotism, modesty, order, temperance, 
ἃ manners, would have been so instilled into them 
that the possibility of violating them would hardly 
occur to theirminds. They would not only be strong 
‘and healthy, but through gymnastics, choral singing 
᾿ς and dancing, and military drill, would have acquired 
__ the mastery of their bodies and a dignified and grace- 
~ But already i in the age of the sophists Athens had 
become too sophisticated for her ambitious youth to 
_ remain content with this simple old Greek education 
_ however reformed and idealized. There was a de- 
mand for a higher university education, which was 

_ met first by the sophists, and then in the next 

_ generation by Plato himself and his great rival, the 
orator Isocrates, who conducted academies side by 



side in Athens for forty years. The content of this 
higher education is given in every age by the know- 
ledge of thatage. Whatelse canit be? These Greek 
teachers did not offer ‘‘electives”’ in the chemistry 
of the carbon compounds, or the origin of Shintoism 
in Japan, or the evolution of the English novel from 
Tom Jones to Ulysses, for the simple reason that these 
interesting branches of study had not yet been de- 
veloped. The sophists taught a practical theory of 
polities and business and the new art of rhetoric, 
promising to make ‘their pupils effective speakers 
and shrewd men of affairs.¢ The publicist Isocrates 
taught what he knew, the application of this sophistic 
doctrine to the composition of more serious political 
and ethical essays. Plato taught what we should 
call ethics, sociology and philosophy, but what he 
called dialectics—the closely reasoned argumentative 
discussion of problems of ethics, politics, social life, 
philosophy and religion. f 
But with wider experience Plato came to feel that 
the “Socratic method” of plunging mere lads 
directly into these difficult questions was unwise. 
It was doubtless stimulating ; but it unsettled their 
moral faith, confused their minds, and converted 
them into pert and precocious disputants.? | Dia- 
lectics demanded a preparatory training in some 
simpler methods of close, consecutive, abstract 
thinking. This preparation Plato found in the new 
sciences of arithmetic and geometry and in the 
sciences which he was among the first to constitute 
or predict—the sciences of mathematical astronomy, 

* Of. Protag. 318-319, Gorg. 452 τ, 456-457, 
> Cf, infra, p. 220, note a, on 537 pv ff. 



,and acoustics.* By these studies the youth- 
ful mind could be gradually lifted out of the region 
_ of loose pictorial thinking, habituated to the thin 
_ pure:air of abstractions, taught the essential nature 
of definitions, axioms, principles, and rules of logic, 
and made capable of following with continuous 
attention long trains of reasoning. We value 
mathematics and the exact sciences largely for their 
_ practical applications.? In the Republic Plato prized 
them as the indispensable preparation for equally 
severe abstract thinking about the more complex 
and difficult: problems of life, morals and society.* 
In his Republic he combines this idea drawn from 
the practice of his own school with his fundamental 
political and social ideal, the government of mankind 
_ by the really wise, and not by the politicians who 
. _ happen ἰο get the votes. ' We need not stop to ask 

eB mecthen a Utopia designed for a small Greek city is. 
Η applicable to:a democracy of 120 millions inhabiting 
ἜΣ Ὁ three million square miles. We are 
_ concerned with the ideal and its embodiment in a 
_ theory of education. 
_ The Platonic rulers are chosen by a process of 
_ progressive selection through ever higher educa- 
_ tional tests applied to young men and women who 
_ have stood most successfully the tests of the lower 

_ education.4 Through arithmetic, geometry, and astro- 

a : Cf. notes on Book vii. 521 ff., esp. on 521 c, 523 a; 527 a. 

on 525 c. 
pa Spencer speaks of “ Social science . . . the 
_ science κῶς, σαν tereat all others in subtlety and complexity ; 
7 the highest intelligence alone can master .. 
J —the science now taught to undergraduates who have not 
__Feceived the Platonic preparation. 
* Cf. 587 a, B,D: 

Ι XXXix 


nomy, mechanics and acoustics, so far as these admit: 
of mathematical treatment, they are led up to the 
final test in ethics and sociology, which is not speech- 
making or slumming, or the running of university 
settlements, but the power of close, exact, consecu- 
tive reasoning about complex moral phenomena. It 
must not be forgotten, however, that this theoretical 
discipline is supplemented by many years of practical 
experience in minor offices of administration.® 

The consummation of it all is described pédetically 
as the “ vision of the idea of good ᾿᾿ (540 a)—which, 
however, as we have seen, turns out to mean for all 
practical purposes the apprehension of some rational 
unified conception of the social aim and human well- 
being, and the consistent relating of all particular 
beliefs and measures to that ideal—a thing which 
can be achieved only by the most highly disciplined 
intelligence. For in Plato’s time as in ours the 
opinions of the average man are not so unified and 
connected, but jostle one another in hopeless con- 
fusion in his brain. Plato’s conception of the higher 
education, then, may be summed up in a sentence : 
‘* Until a man is able to abstract and define rationally 
his idea of good, and unless he can run the gauntlet. 
of all objections and is ready to meet them, not by 
appeals to opinion but to absolute truth, never 
faltering at any stage of the argument—unless he 
can do all this he knows neither the idea of good nor 
any other good. He apprehends only a shadow of 
opinion, not true and real knowledge.” ὃ 

Starting from the sound psychological principle 
that the old-fashioned rote recitation of a text-book 

« Cf. 539 £-540 a. 
> See Rep. 534 s-c and notes. 



isan abomination, that verbal knowledge is no know- 
_ ledge, that the concrete must precede the abstract, 
_ that we must visualize before we theorize, and 
_ apprehend objects before we analyse relations, we 
_ have in practice abandoned altogether the attempt 
_ to teach young people hard consecutive abstract 
_ thinking. We scorn to drill them in the old- 
_ fashioned studies that developed this power, such 
_ as grammatical analysis, “ parsing,” puzzling prob- 
_ lemsin arithmetic, algebra, or mechanics, elementary 
_ logic,—mental science, as it was called,—and the 
exact, if incomplete, methods of the orthodox 
_ political economy ; and instead of this we encourage 
~ them to have and express opinions about large and 
_ vague questions of literary criticism, aesthetics, 
_ ethics and social reform. A true apprehension of 
_ Plato’s ideal of education would not swing the 
_ pendulum back again to the other extreme, but it 
_ would help us to realize that no multiplication of 
_ entertaining knowledge, and no refinements of the 
_ new psychology, can alter the fact that all instruction 
_ is wasted on a flabby mind, and that true education, 
_ while it will not neglect entertainment, useful know- 
_ ledge, and the training of the eye and hand, will 
_always consist largely in the development of firm, 
hard, intellectual muscle. The studies best adapted 
_ to this end will always retain a value independent 
_ of practical utility or superficial attractiveness ; for 
_ tochange the figure and adapt Plato’s own language : 
: ΒΥ such studies the eye of the mind, more precious 
than a thousand bodily eyes, is purged and quickened 
_and made more keen for whatever truth higher 
education or life or business may present to it 
(527 p-z). 


The Four 


Plato’s own account of the curriculum of his higher 
education ought to be a sufficient answer to the 
charge that in the training of his guardians he — 
manifests an anti-scientific spirit. It is only by — 

wresting phrases from their context and refusing to 

make allowances for the quality of Plato’s rhetoric 
that the imputation of hostility to modern experi- 
mental science can be fastened upon him. As I 
have shown elsewhere» and point out again in the 
notes, Plato is (1) using scientific studies to develop — 
the faculty of abstract reasoning; (2) incidentally 
predicting the mathematical astronomy and physics — 
of the future.° Both purposes tempt him to hammer 
his main point with Emersonian emphasis and to 
surprise attention with Ruskinian boutades in order to — 
mark more clearly the distinction between himself 
and contemporary empiricists. Hence his satire of — 
the substitution of experiment for mathematics in — 
acoustics (531 a-B), and the intentional epigram- 
matic extravagance of his “‘ leave the stars alone” 
(530 B). It is uncritical to quote these sentences 
apart from their entire context and treat them as 
if they were a deliberate and systematic attack on 
modern experimental science. DOR st 

The description of the four degenerate types of 
state in the eighth book relieves the strain of dia- — 
lectiecs and the tedium of continuous argument by 
one of the most brilliant pieces of writing in Plato. 
Macaulay says it is “‘. . . beyond all criticism. I 

« Cf. on 529 a, 530.8. 

> “Platonism and the History of Science,” Am. Philos. 
Soc. Proc. lxvi. pp. 171 f., What Plato Said, pp. 235-236 

° Cf. on 530 B. 



ember’nothing in Greek philosophy superior to 
this ia "profundity, ingenuity and eloquence.” It 
serves to lead up to the embodiment in the 
tyrant span seachigeind argument that the unhappi- 
ness of the worst man matches the misery of the worst 
ate. The objections to the book or to its place in 
the economy of the Republic raised by Aristotle and 
thers are mostly captious irrelevances.” 
~» The transition from the ideal state is resumed at 
tl t where it was interrupted at the beginning 
οἱ the fifth book, and it is pretended that Books V., 
VI. and VII; are a digression, though they are 
obviously an indispensable part of the Republic.° 
Matter-of-fact critics have argued that an ideal 
or perfect state would contain within itself no seeds 
of destruction and could not decay. But as Plato 
himself said, the philosophic state is a pattern or 
ideal which retains its value even if imperfectly 
realized. tis a fundamental Platonic principle that 
only the divine is eternal and unchangeable.? All 
aie and material things are subject to change. 
universe itself is only as good as the Demiurgos 
‘able to make it, and the created gods are pre- 
igerved from destruction only by his sustaining will. 
The riddle of the * “nuptial ” number that deter- 
8 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1316 a 1f. ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ λέγεται μὲν 
περὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐ μέντοι λέγεται καλῶς, 

Which is rather cool after all his borrowings from Rep. viii. 
in the preceding pages. And in ata dee: rg a 

de Platon, p. 42. 

I. on 449 a-s. 

lg I. p. xvi, What Plato Said, p. 225. 

f. on 499 τ and What Plato Said, p. 564. 

Cf. a 207-208, Rep. vii. on the heavens, 530 B. 
im. 37 D, 41 cp, What Pilato Said, p. 335. - 

VOL. ΠῚ d xliii 


mines the beginning of the decline has never been’ 
solved to the satisfaction of a majority of competent 
critics. The solution would contribute something ἕο. 
our knowledge of early Greek mathematical termin-_ 
ology but nothing to our understanding of Plato’s 
thought. Emerson’s definitive word about it is, 
“ He (Plato) sometimes throws a little mathematical 
dust into our eyes.” The “‘ meaning ” of the number 
is simply Burke’s statement (iv. p. 312) in Regicide 
Peace, p. 2, “1 doubt whether the history of man- 
kind is yet complete enough, if ever it can be so, to 
furnish grounds for a sure theory on the internal 
causes which necessarily affect the fortune of a 
state.”* But though the ultimate causes of de- 

* For Aristotle’s opinion ef. Pol. 1316 a 5 ff. For dis- 
cussions of the number cf. Zeller, Phil. ἃ. Gr. ii. 14, pp. 
857-860; Jowett’s translation of the Republic (1888), pp. 
exxx ff.; Adam, Republic, vol. ii. pp. 264-312 ; Ueberweg- 
Praechter, Philos. des -Altertums (1926), 94* ff; Paul 
Tannery, ‘‘ Le Nombre Nuptial dans Platon,’’ Rev. Philos. i., 
1876, pp. 170-188; Georg Albert, Die platonische Zahl, 
Wien, 1896, and “ Der Sinn der plat. Zahl,’’ Philologus, vol. 
66 (1907), pp. 153-156 ; J. Dupuis, “ Le Nombre Géométrique 
de Platon,” Annuaire de l’ Assoc. des Et. grecques, vol. 18, 
τ Σ Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, pp. 47-48. Cf. 
also Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. p. 336, C. Ritter, Platons 
Stellung zu den Aufgaben der ριξε μας ας ὁ yp. 91-94; 
Friedlander, Platon, i. p. 108; G. Kafka in ee Ae 73, 
pp. 109-121; Ὁ. B. Monro in Class. Rev. vi. (1892) pp. 
152-156; and Adam, ibid. pp. 240-244, and xvi. pp. 17-23; 
Fr. Hultsch in Phil. Woch. xii. (1892) pp. 1256-1258. Cf. 
further Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 25 “ It is to 
be observed that Plato’s ‘ perfect year’ is also 36,000 solar 
years (Adam’s Republic, vol. ii. p. 302), and that it is probably 
connected with the precession of the equinoxes”’; Carl 
Vering, Platons Staat, p. 167 ‘‘ Den Biologen wird die 
Zahlenmystik Platons an die Mendelschen Vererbungs- 
tabellen erinnern, durch welche die geniale Ahnung Platons, 
dass es zahlenmissig darstellbare Vererbungsgesetze geben 



_ generation escape our ken, Plato mentions a practical 
that is of considerable significance to-day. 
_ Revolutions are due to the divisions and discords of 
the dominant and educated classes. The allegory 
_ of the four metals is kept up. The decline begins 
_ when the rulers no — breed true and the gold 
_ is mixed with base alloy.’ 
_ The limitation of the degenerate types of state to 
_ four is conscious and artistic. It should not be used 
_ to prove Plato's impatience of facts. There are end- 
Tess minor varieties of social and political structure 
_ among the barbarians (544 c-p). Plato leaves it to 
_ Aristotle and the political and social science de 
_ ments of the American universities to collect them.¢ Ρ̓ 
The sequence, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and 
2 does not always reproduce the actual history 
_of cities of Greece, but it anticipates many of the 
vicissitudes of modern history more suggestively than 
_ Aristotle’s laborious collection of instances.¢ " Plato 
_ occasionally forgets himself or lets himself go in con- 
pay satire or allusion that points to Athens 

ΥΝΣ nach mehr als 2000 Jahren ihre wissenschaftliche 
i ea hat.” Cf. Baudrillart, J. Bodin 

et son temps, Ὁ . A tout cela Bodin ajoute des 
- ealculs ce 8 ag sur la durée des empires, sur le nombre 
nuptial . . 

” Rep. δ45 Ὁ, Laws 683 π, 682 ᾿-Ἔ, Class. Phil. xvii. 
pp. 154-155. Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1305 a 39. 

> 5478. Cf. 415 a-B. 
__ * Aristotle says that there are not only more kinds of 
government than these, but there are many sub-species of 
each. Cf. Aristot. Pol. vi., 1288 ff., 1279 Ὁ, 1329 a 8, 1289 a 8, 
Newman, vol. i. pp. 494 ff., and also Unity of Plato's Thought, 

. 62-63. 

"ὦ The case of the French Revolution and the rise of 
Napoleon is one of the most outstanding examples. 

The Ethical 


rather than to any one of his four or five types.* But 
the consistency of his hypothesis is sufficiently main- 
tained to satisfy any reasonable reader. The in- 
dividual types corresponding to the four political 
patterns are the earliest and among the best system- 
atic character-sketches in extant European literature 
and may be counted among the sources of the 
Characters of Theophrastus and their successors.” 

Book [X. sums up and concludes the main ethical 
argument of the Republic. This is not the place for 
a systematic exposition of the Platonic ethies. 
Ethical philosophy as distinguished from exhortation 
and the code can always be stated in the form of a 
discussion of the validity of the moral law and the 
motives for obedience to it, in other words, the quest 
for the sanction.° But this mode of statement is 
especially suited to ages of so-called enlightenment 
and transition when the very, existence of a moral] 
law or its binding force is challenged, whether seri- 
ously or as an intellectual game. ry eyaqnrs: 

Such in Plato’s opinion was the age in which he 
lived. The main drift of the speculations of the 
pre-Socratic philosophers had been in the direction of 
materialism if not exactly atheism.? The populariza- 

« Of., e.g., 549 c and 553 a with Adam’s notes, 551 B, 
556 ε΄ 562 νυ, 563 c, 565 B. 

> Cf. also Matthew Arnold’s description of the Barbarians 
and the Philistines in Culture and Anarchy. 

° Of. Mill, Diss. and Dise. iii. p. 300 “The question con- 
cerning the swnmum bonum or what is the same thing, 
concerning the foundation of morality,” ete. . at 

4 This has recently been denied. But the essential truth 
of the generalization is not appreciably affected by a few 
eens whose religious, ethical and spiritual purpose is 
doubtful. Ὧν 



_ tion of these ideas by the so-called sophists and their 
i tion to education, morals, politics and criticism 
of life had further tended to do away with all tradi- 
tional moral and religious checks upon instinct and 
individualism. And the embittered class conflicts 
_and the long demoralization of the thirty years’ war 
had completed the work of moral and spiritual dis- 
in 1.2 The Greeks had lost their old stand- 
_ards and had acquired no new, more philosophic, prin- 
_ ciples to take their place.’ Plato’s ears were dinned, 
he said, by the negations of materialists, atheists, 
_relativists, and immoralists.¢ How to answer them 
was the chief problem of his ethical philosophy. To 
_satirize these immoralists or to depict their defeat 
in argument was one of the main motives of his 
_ dramatic art.? 

_- The evidence in support of Plato’s interpretation 
of contemporary Greek life and thought has been- 
i collected from Aristophanes, Euripides, 
and Thucydides, the fragments of the sophists and 
_the pre-Socratics and Plato’s own writings.? This 
conservative view of the Greek “ enlightenment” 
has in turn often been challenged by modern his- 
_torians of liberal or radical tendencies, a Grote, a 

, - a See T. R. Glover, Democracy in the Ancient World, pp. 
ty! met ΤᾺ supra, Vol. I. p. xxxvi; What Plato Said, pp. 6, 
es? & Rep. 538 c-£. 
_ © Cf. Rep. 358 c, Protag. 333 c, Euthydem. 279 8, Phileb. 
es Gorg. 470 vp, Laws 662 c, 885 v, Soph. 265 c, Phaedo 

4 Cf. Gorg. 527 a-, Rep. i., Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 25. 
-? CF What Plato Said, p. 503, on Gorg. 461 c, for references, 
and ibid. pp. 137, 145, 215 ff., 392-393, also W. Jaeger, 
“Die griechische Staatsethik im Zeitalter des Platon,” Die 
Antike, Bd. x. Heft 1, esp. p. 8. 



Mill, a Gomperz, and their followers.¢ The inter- 
preter of the Republic need only note the sincerity 
and intensity of Plato’s conviction and its effect 
upon the form of his presentation of ethics. 

A complete study of the Platonic ethics would i in- 
corporate many other ideas drawn from the Prot- 

agoras, the Philebus, the Laws, the minor Socratic © 

dialogues, and perhaps from the Phaedrus and 

Symposium.” But the two chief ethical dialogues, © 
the Gorgias and the Republic, are cast in the form — 

of an answer to dogmatic and unabashed ethical 

nihilism. What is to be said to an uncompromising — 

immoralist ? [5 it possible to convince him, or failing 

that, to refute or seem to refute him to the edifica- 

tion of the bystander? 5 The serious aim of both 
Gorgias and Republic is to convince and refute, but 
there are parts of the Gorgias and of the first book 

of the Republic in which the chief dramatic purpose — 
is the exhibition of Socrates’ superiority in argument 

to the sceptic. 

Many commentators ancient and modern object 3 

that Plato has not proved his case. They are not 
necessarily such immoralists as Plato had in mind. 
Such moralists as Grote, Mill and Leslie Stephen say 
that all men of goodwill would like to believe in the 
identity of virtue and happiness, but that the facts 
of experience are against it.? It is at best a general 

9 Cf., ¢.g., Greek Thinkers, vol. i. ch. iv., esp. pp. 403-411. 

> See International Journal of Ethics, Jan. 1929, pp. 
232-933; What Plato Said, pp. 317, and 364; Unity of 
Plato’s Thought, pp. 9-27. 

¢ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 141. 

4 Cf., ¢.9., Science of "Bihies, pp. 397-398, 434, and the 
whole problem of the book of Job. Cf. also Sidgwick, 
Method of Ethics, pp. 172-173. 




tendency or probability, not an invariable rule. 
yden is not sure that the law can always be verified 
on individuals, but is half humorously certain that it 
infallibly applies to nations, because in their case 
Providence is too deeply engaged. 
_ The problem is too large to be incidentally solved 
by a commentator on the Republic. It is, as Plato 
himself would admit, partly a question of faith,? 
_and partly of the kind of evidence that is admitted 
as relevant. “‘ Do you ask for sanctions?” exclaims 
John Morley. ‘‘ One whose conscience has been 
strengthened from youth in this faith can know no 
greater bitterness than the stain cast by a wrong act 
_. .. and the discords that have become the ruling 
harmony of his days.” That is the kind of evidence 
to which Plato appeals when he argues that his 

ΝΡ B98, 5. Lemon, T2890 νας Oa eae 
Arno God and the Bible, chap. iii. p. 136: “‘ These truths 
. . . are the matter of an immense experience which is still 
going forward.... But if any man is so entirely without 
affinity for them .. . for him Literature and Dogma was not 

__° Of. also Morley, Rousseau, ii. 280, Voltaire, p. 293; 
Faguet, Pour qu'on lise Platon, pp. 99-101, 138 ; Gomperz, 
Greek Thinkers, iv. 257-258, 293-294; Huxley, Science and 
Hebrew Tradition, p. 339, and the entire controversy arisi 
out of his Evolution and Ethics; Arcesilas apud “ἰλύος κα 
Les Sceptiques grees, p. 171. Cf. George Eliot’s novels passim, 
and Mill’s “ Those whose conscientious feelings are so weak 
as to allow of their asking this question,’’ which is practically 
equivalent to Shaftesbury’s “* If any gentleman asks why he 
should not wear a dirty shirt I reply that he must be a very 
dirty gentleman to ask the question.” Cf. also Cicero, De 
iis, iii. 29; Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, passim, 
¢.g. 426 ff., and the arguments of Hazlitt, Macaulay and 
Gthiers inst the Utilitarians. Such passages are a con- 
¢clusive answer to the objection that Plato has not proved his 



guardians will find more happiness in duty fulfilled 
than they would by grasping at what are commonly 
thought the good things of life. It is an argument 
that will not appeal to men of stunted moral sensi- — 
bilities. The issue is, as Plato says, whether they are 
the best judges. The question has always been 
debated and always will be debatable, and there is 
little to add to the considerations on either side which 
Cicero develops in his perpetual reargument of the 
Stoic paradox, that virtue alone suffices for a happy 
life, and that the sage will be happy on. the rack. 
Matthew Arnold, Emerson and George Eliot. are as 
fixed in the faith as Plato. Experience, says Arnold, 
is perpetually sending the denier who says in his 
heart, There is no God, back to school to learn. his 
lesson better.° The writers most in vogue to-day 
would agree with Mill and Leslie Stephen, if not wit 

Thrasymachus and Callicles.? It is not necessary to 
determine this controversy in order to justify the 
Republic. To condemn the Republic because it is not 
a demonstration that leaves no room for doubt is to 
affirm that the question is not worth discussing, or 
that Plato’s treatment of it falls short of what could 
reasonably be expected. If it is not a proof, has any 
one come nearer to a demonstration ? ὁ sion 

@ Rep. 419-420. Cf. Vol. I. pp. 314-315. 

> Cf. Rep. 580 τὸ ff., Laws 658-659, 

© God and the Bible, p. xxxv. ‘ 

2 Brochard, La Morale de Platon, says: ‘‘Aucun moraliste 
moderne n’entreprendrait de défendre la doctrine de Platon, 
qui apparait comme une gageure.”’ Cf. Westermarck, Origin 
and Development of Moral Ideas, i. pp. 17, 18, 321, and passim. 

© Of. Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 354: “ Evolution 
implies that there must be at least an approximate coincidence, 
and there is no apparent a priori reason why the coincidence 
should not be indefinitely close.” 



As to the desirability of the attempt, Plato thought 
_ that it is not safe to expose young minds to the un- 
_ answered propaganda of philosophies of immoralism 
and relativity. And recent experience of an amoral 
and irreligious education of the masses has not yet 
proved him wrong.* He believed in his own argu- 
_ ments and in the doctrine which he taught. But 
_ apart from that he also believed that civilized society 
would disintegrate if morality were not effectively 
_ preached.’ The charge hinted by Aristotle (Eth. x., 
_ 1172a 34-35) and often repeated that this implies the 
“economy of truth ’’ © and the inner or double doc- 
_ trineis sufficiently refuted by the depth and intensity 
_ of Plato’s own “adamantine’”’ moral faith.4 . But 
_ however that may be, the question which he asks in 
_ his Laws still brings heart-searchings to the parent 
_ who has inherited a conscience from a generation 
that had not been swept from its moorings ; What is 
_ a father to tell his son?* But I cannot give more 
to these eternal controversies and must turn 
_ to the direct summing-up of Plato’s argument in the 
_ ninth book. 
_ Plato sums up the conclusions of the Republic in 
three formal. arguments. The first is the broad 

_ * See my article in the June, 1934, number of the Atlantic 

Monthly, pp. 722-723. 

- ® Cf. Laws 890 v, 907 c, 718 Ὁ. 

_ * Laws 663. c-p (What Plato Said, p. 364) may imply 
*“ economy *’ in theology, but not in ethical religion. Cf. also 
What Plato Said, p. 626, and Isoc. Antid. 283 καὶ ταῦτα 

_ kal ταῖς ἀληθείαις οὕτως ἔχει καὶ συμφέρει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον 

λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν. Cf. Harnack, Hist. of Dogma, pp. 183- 

184: “ Gregory of Nazianzus speaks of a necessary and 

: οἰκονομηθῆναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 

2 Cf. Rep. 618 5, Laws 662 5. 

* Cf. Laws 662 v-663 a, What Plato Said, p. 364. 



analogy between the individual and the state, which 
runs Srongh the entire work.? Plato feels that here 
he is not only clinching the subject, but finally 
grappling with the problem debated in the pete γρρα 
and to which he returns in the Laws. He is gat 

ing up all his forces for a defiant reply to the im- 
moralist and ethical nihilist. The result is an elabora- 
tion, an intensity, an insistency, a repetition that are 
offensive to readers who feel distaste for aie 
that savours of moral didacticism. 

The argumentative force of such an analogy is the 
cumulative impression of the detail that makes: it 
plausible. Plato points the application of this argu- 
ment by a psychological portrait of the typical tyran- 
nical man, developed out of the democratic man as 
the democrat was developed from the oligarch. The 
literary symmetry strains the logic a little, for while 
the democratic man is the typical citizen of a demo- 
cracy, the typical citizen of a tyranny is not the tyrant 
himself, but any one of those whom he oppresses. 
But it does not matter. To heighten his effect Plato 
describes first the soul of the man destined to become 
a Greek tyrant, and then the intensification of all 
_ its defects and miseries by the actual possession 
and exercise of usurped power. 

Latent in all men are lawless instinets and appetites 

which reason and disciplined emotion hold in check, 
but which are sometimes revealed in dreams (57 18 ἢ). 
In the tyrannical soul these lower propensities are 
unleashed. The censor, to borrow the language of 
a fashionable modern psychology, is dethroned, all 
control is abolished and the soul is at the mercy of 
the instincts of the night. Plato depicts the rake’s 

9 Cf. Vol. I. p. xxxv. 


"progress: of what again in modern terminology we 
_ may call the typical gangster and boss in a lawless 
_ democracy. He is the son of a democratic father, 
_ but, unlike his father, does not settle down into a 

mise between the caprices of un- 
desire and the principles of tradition (572 p). 
_ Inhim desire grown great, a monstrous Eros, a ruling 
_ passion, with its attendant train of appetites, usurps 
_ the throne and seizes the empty citadel of the mind, 
_ yaecant of the only true guardians, the precepts of 
_ eulture and right reason (573 a). He wastes his 
r portion of the family inheritance, encroaches on the 

of his brothers, and if further advances are 
refused him does not shrink from the last outrage 
_ that Greek conservatism attributed to the “ younger 
generation ’—and “strikes his father.”"* He be- 
_ eomeés the chosen leader of a gang of like-minded 
_ roisterers from whom he is distinguished only by a 
f more enterprising spirit and the greater strength of 
τ ὐτιλαριο, okidesize:in hic souls and the gang, 
_ if few, terrorize the city with crime (575 a-s), 
_ if many, strike the father- and mother-land, over- 
throw the constitution and establish a tyranny 


‘A modern moralist might improve the text that 
the gangster lives in an atmosphere of greed, sus- 
B viccon and fear, and is destined finally to be shot 
_ by an ambitious rival. Plato, speaking in terms of 
_ Greek experience, makes the “tyrannical man ”’ ful- 
_ fil his nature and perfect his type by becoming an 
actual tyrant of a Greek city. And he then de- 
‘scribes, perhaps in reminiscence of his own observa- 
tions at the court of Dionysius at Syracuse, and in 

* 574¢c. Of. Aristoph. Clouds 1321 ff., 1421 ff. 


ΩΝ --. eS ων 


οξσωαρααξ μὴ ian 


prophetic anticipation of Caligula and Louis Napoleon, 
the hell of suspicion, fear and insatiate and un- 
satisfied desires in which such a tyrant lives.¢ As 
the city which he misrules is, for all the splendour of 
the court and the courtiers, as a whole the most 
miserable of states, so is he, to the eye that can 
penetrate the dazzling disguise of pomp and power, 
“the farced title running ‘fore the king,” the most 
miserable of men (577-579). + SOT AT SaaS 
It is obvions that Plato forces the note a little 
in the interest of his thesis. In actual history the 
tyrant need not be the sensualist of Plato’s descrip- 
tion. He may be only a cold-blooded, hard-headed 
Machiavellian,—in Plato’s language a lover of honour 
and victory, not a lover of the pleasures that money 
purchases. But these cavils of a meticulous logic are 
beside the mark. The real argument, as we have 
said, is the psychological analysis and the facts of 
Greek experience that lend plausibility to the ana- 
logy. It prepares us to receive the more strictly 
philosophic and scientific arguments that are to 
follow. . 
The gist of the second argument is that the intel- 
lectual, the philosopher, has necessarily experienced 
all three kinds of pleasure in his life, while the repre- 
sentatives of the two other types have no experience 
of the pleasures of pure intelligence (581-582). To this 
is added the consideration that the organ or instru- 
ment of all such judgements, reason and rational 

« Of. Tacitus, Ann. vi. 6 “neque frustra praestantissimus 
sapientiae firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum 
mentes, posse aspici laniatus et ictus, quando ut corpora 
verberibus, ita saevitia, libidine, malis consultis animus 



‘speech, is the special possession of the philosopher 
(582 4). This argument is never mentioned again 
by Plato and is by many critics, including Leslie 
Stephen,* rejected as a fallacy. But John Stuart 
Mill accepts and makes use of it. 
The issue thus raised is really the old question of 
a distinction of quality and value in pleasure. No 
one can judge or prescribe another’s pleasure, it is 
argued ; pleasure qua pleasure admits no differences.” 
But is there any such thing as pleasure qua pleasure ὃ 
Are there not always inseparable accompaniments 
_and consequences? And though the hog may be 
sole judge of his own pleasures, is it on the whole as 
desirable or as pleasurable to be a hog as a man? ὅ 
There is room for interminable argument, for the 
entire problem of relativity is involved. If all judge- 
ments are relative, Plato elsewhere argues, we are 
committed to chaos. The dog-faced baboon, and 
not man or God, is the measure of all things. The 
very existence of the arts and the sciences pre- 
_ supposes that things are measured against standards 
and not merely against one another. Thus, though 
the argument is not repeated by Plato in this form, 
it suggests and implies most of the fundamental 
questions of his ethical philosophy. 
“τα He calls it “a familiar short cut to the desired con- 
clusion ” (Science of Ethics, p. 399). Cf. also Sidgwick, 
re πρίν p. 148 
494 © (What Plato Said, p. 508) and 499 85. 
me too ; Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, p- 400. 
© Cf. Phileb. 6 B, What Plato Said, p. 611. There is no 
μα ἴο rhe 0 or quote here the Poe against the utili- 
ee ne a 
4 Cf. Theaet. 161 c, Laws 716 ἘΣ ; 
. ἐν Politicus 284 B-c, 285 a-s. 



The third argument, drawn from the negativity of 
the pleasure of sense, is the basis of the Platonic 
ethics, so far as it is an arguable doctrine. It is 
necessary to dwell upon this point, for it is commonly 
said that Plato’s ethical philosophy is deduced from 
the idea of good.* That is true only from one oe 
special point of view. The idea of good, as we 
seen, is a postulate of the logic of ethics and of the 
higher education of the philosopher. It is a blank 

cheque that supports the credit of the system but — 

which is not filled in. No virtue and no particular 
“good” is adequately defined until it is explicitly 
related to an idea of good (505 a, 506 a). It may 
be defined provisionally and sufficiently for a given 
purpose in terms of psychology or tradition or with 
a tacit reference to an implied conception of good 
(504 a-B). But nowhere in Plato’s writings are de- 
finite controversial arguments or substantive prin- 
ciples of ethical philosophy or rules of practice de- 

duced from the idea of good. It is merely said that — 

an ethical philosophy is not complete until we have 
decided what is our sanction. 
But such principles are deduced from the negativity 

of the ‘‘lower”’ pleasures throughout Plato’s writings.? : 

This supplies the missing link in the argument, of the 

Protagoras that virtue and happiness depend on the © 
correct estimate of pleasures and pains.° The doc- — 

trine is implied in the Phaedo (83-84), | It is distinctly 
suggested in the Gorgias (493 ff.). It crowns the 

«ΟἹ W. H. Fairbrother, “‘ The Relation of Ethics to 
Metaphysics,’ Mind, xiii., 1904, p. 43; Martineau, Types 
of Ethical Theory, 1886, p. xxvi. Cf. supra, p. xxvi. 

> Cf. supra, p. Xxvi. 

. Of. What Plato Said, pp. 130-131. 



_ argument of the Republic (583 Β ff.). It is elaborated 
_ in the Philebus in order to reach a final settlement 
_ of the controversy dramatized in the Gorgias. It is 
_ tacitly employed in the endeavour of the Lams (660 
_ E-663 £) to attach a practicable edifying conclusion 
_ to the utilitarian arguments of the Protagoras. The 
_ statement of the doctrine in the Republic, though 
_ briefer than that of the Philebus, touches on all the 
_ €ssential points, as the notes will show. It cannot be 
_ proved to be either a résumé or an imperfect anticipa- 
_ tion of the developed theory. It cannot be used to 
_ date the ninth book of the Republic relatively to the 
_ Philebus.* ) 

ΟΠ I am not here speaking of the absolute truth of 
_ the doctrine, but only of its demonstrable relation 
ἕο Plato’s ethical philosophy. As I have elsewhere 
_ said, Plato teaches that sensuous pleasures are in 
_ their nature impure and illusory, They are precon- 
_ ditioned by, and mixed with, desire, want,. pain. 
_ “ Surgit amari aliquid ” is ever true of them. They 
_ are the relief of an uneasiness, the scratching of an 
_ itch, the filling of a vacuum.’ To treat them as real, 
_ or to make them one’s aim (except so far as our 
_ human estate requires), is to seek happiness in a pro- 

_ _* Though the Philebus is in fact later than the Republic, as 
_ Mill said long before style statistics were thought of. 
᾿ ὃ Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 24. 

__ © Already in the Gorgias, 493 Ἐ, 494 c and the Phaedrus 
_ 258 © ὧν προλυπηθῆναι δεῖ ἢ μηδὲ ἡσθῆναι, etc.; Rep. 584 
_ 4-8. It has even been argued that the Phaedrus 
takes for granted the fuller discussion of the Philebus 

oa H. Thompson, Phaedrus, ad loc.), and why not? 

Anything may be argued if the dialogues are Sup 

: Bicerow out of one another and not out of Plato’s 



cess rather than a state,? in becoming rather than in 
being. It is to bind oneself to the wheel of Ixion 
and pour water into the bottomless jar of the 
Danaids.® Far happier, far more pleasurable, is the 
life that consistently aims at few and calm pleasures, 
to which the sensualist would hardly give the name, 
a life which he would regard as torpor or death. 
Both the physiology and the psychology of this 
doctrine have been impugned. It has been argued 
that, up to the point of fatigue, the action of healthy 
nerves involves no pain, and must yield a surplus 
of positive sensuous pleasure. It is urged that the 
present uneasiness of appetite is normally more than 
counterbalanced by the anticipation of immediate 
satisfaction. Such arguments will carry no weight 
with those who accept Plato’s main contention, that 
the satisfactions of sense and ambition, however 
“necessary,” have no real worth, and that to seek 
our true life in them is to weave and unweave the 
futile web of Penelope. Whatever qualifications 
modern psychology may attach to the doctrine, it is 
the logical basis of Plato’s ethics. The unfeigned 

α Phileb. 53 ς ff., 54 virtually =Gorg. 493 Ὁ. Cf. What 
Plato Said, pp. 322-323. The literal-minded objection of 
Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1174 Ὁ, and some moderns, that pleasure 
is not literally = κίνησις, is beside the point. Py 

δ Gorg. 493 B τετρημένος πίθος, etc., Phaedo 84 a ἀν- 
ἤνυτον ἔργον. . . Πηνελόπης ἱστόν, Gorg. 507 B, Phileb. 
54 τ. 

¢ Phaedo 64 B, Gorg..492 ©, Phileb. 54 Ἑ καί φασι ζῆν οὐκ 
ἂν δέξασθαι, ete. In Laws 733, 734 5, the hedonistic calculus 
of the Protagoras is retained, but is applied not directly to 
the individual acts, but to types of life. The life of moderate 
pleasures is a priori the more pleasurable because it neces- 
sarily yields a more favourable balance than the life of intense 




ee ee 


recognition of the inherent worthlessness of the lower 
ures removes at once the motive and the lures 
to evil.* It is the chief link in the proof that virtue 
is happiness. It insures the domination of reason 
over feeling and appetite. It moulds man into 
that likeness to the divine pattern which is Plato’s 
expression for the ethical ideal,’ for the divine life 
_knows neither pleasure nor pain.* It is the serious 
argument that explains Plato’s repudiation of the 
hedonistic formulas of the Protagoras¢ and justifies 
the noble anti-hedonistic rhetoric of the Gorgias, 
‘the PhaedoJ and the Philebus (in fine). 
~ Regarded as a logical system, then, and meta- 
physics apart, the Platonic ethics is not to be de- 
duced from the idea of good. It is best studied and 
expounded under a few simple heads : (1) illustrations 
in the minor dialogues of the necessity and the diffi- 
culty of defining ethical terms; (2) the search for 
arguments that will convince, or at least confute, the 
ethical nihilism of a war-weary, cynical and over- 
enlightened generation—for proof, in short, that 
virtue and happiness coincide; (3) the attempt to 
find a compromise between the necessity of acknow- 
ledging the truth in a certain sense of hedonistic 
utilitarianism and our justifiable idealistic distaste 
for that way of describing the moral life; (4) as an 
essential part of the argument of both (2) and (3), the 
ctl of the comparative worthlessness of the 

_* Phaedo 66 c, Rep. 586 a-n, 588. 
δ Theaetet. 176 5 ff., Laws 716 Ὁ, 728 a-B, Rep. 352 a-z, 
612 x, Philed. 39 x. " 
τ © Phileb. 33 5. 
ὦ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 500. 
* 512 p-x, What Plato Said, p. 149. 
4 69 a, What Plato Said, pp. 171 and 174. 

VOL. II e lix 


lower or sensual pleasures, which, except so far as 
necessary, are bought at too high a price, because 
they are preconditioned by pain.* So 

These categories are not of my invention. They are 
the topies on which ethical discussion actually turns 

in the dialogues. The Republic supplies ample illus- — 
tration of all these topics. The first book, like the | 

Gorgias, dramatizes Socrates’ dialectic superiority 

to the immoralist. The second book restates the — 

issue in its most fundamental form. The fourth book 

resumes and for practical purposes provisionally — 

solves the puzzles of the definition of the virtues in the 

minor Socratic dialogues. The allegory of the idea οὗ 
good, rightly understood, shows what Plato meant in © 
these minor dialogues by making the failure to define — 
virtue always turn on the inability to discover the — 
“good.” The ninth book, as we have seen, sums up © 
the argument and adds a sufficiently explicit exposi- — 

tion of the doctrine of the negativity of pleasure, 

which, as the Philebus shows, is the indispensable basis — 

of the scientific and calculating ethics postulated in 
the Protagoras. 

But true virtue is something more than argument, — 

and its mood, as an eloquent passage of the Phaedo 
protests, is not that of the prudential, calculating 
reason.’ And so the argument of the ninth book, 
like that of the fourth, culminates in an appeal through 

imagery and analogy to the imaginative reason and — 

the soul. There (444-445) it was urged that the health 
and harmony of the soul must be still more indispens- 

* See my review of Lodge in International Journal of 

Ethics, xxxix. pp. 232-233, and for the ethical argument — 

of the Republic as a whole my ‘‘ Idea of Justice in Plato’s 

Republic,” The Ethical Record, January 1890, pp. 185-199. 
> Phaedo 69 a f., What Plato Said, p. 500. 



able to true happiness than that of the body. And 
we saw that the most scientific of modern ethical 
y ies is finally forced back upon the same 
y.2 In the conclusion of the ninth book the 
motif recurs with still greater elaboration and in a 
_ more eloquent climax. Every animal of the barn- 
,Plato says in anticipation of Emerson and Freud, 
found lodgement within this external sheath of 
ity. And the: issue for every human soul is 
Roubethér it Bisacsn to foster the snake, the lion and 
i _ the ape, or the man, the mind, and the god within the 
_ mind.’ Surely the wiser choice is that which values 
ἱ all the so-called goods, for which men scramble and 
t contend, only as they tend to preserve or destroy the 
_ true constitution and health of the soul. This polity 
_ of the sober and righteous soul is the symbol of that 
_ City of God which may exist nowhere on earth but 
on which as a pattern laid up in heaven he who will 
med fix his eyes and constitute himself its citizen. 

ἫΝ A characteristic feature of Plato’s art both in great The Banish- 
_ and little matters is the climax after the apparent Poctry. 
 climax.?. The tenth book of the Republic, which is in 
asense an appendix, adds the climax of the originally 
_ disavowed religious sanction of immortality to that of 
_ the appeal to the imaginative reason. _ The interven- 
ing digression in defence of the banishment of the 
ts is in effect, if not in Plato’s conscious intention, 

_ arelieving interval of calm between the two peaks of 

feeling. For the rest, the deeper psychology of the 

» © * Cf. Vol, I. p. xvi. 
ye . 589 τ. Cf. Tim. 90 4-8, 
pt? : of Vol. I. pp. xlii-xliii. 

f. supra, Vol. 1. pp. xxi-xxii, What Plato Said, pp. 140, 
189, 248, ‘ales Ρ. 104. 



philosophic books and the theory of ideas expounded 
there invited a reconsideration of the subject and 
provided arguments based, not on the content of the 
Homeric epic, but on the essential nature of poetry 
and its influence. ra tis 

‘The two arguments that have exercised the de- 
fenders of poetry from Aristotle to Arnold @ are that 
poetry is not truth but imitation, a copy of a copy, 
and that poetry fosters emotion and so weakens the 
salutary control of feeling by the reason and the will. 
In support of the first the theory of ideas is invoked 
in a form so intentionally simplified that it has given 
rise to the fantastic hypothesis that this book must 
represent an earlier period of Plato’s philosophy.’ 
God made one idea of a couch. The artisan copies it 
in many material couches. The artist with words or 
colours copies, not the idea, but the copy. This argu- 
ment of course could be and has been answered in its 
own terms by the claim of Browning’s Fra Lippo 
Lippi that the genius of the artist does directly appre- 
hend the idea or essence of things and reveal it to 
those who can see only through his eyes.° But the 
real question whether art deals with truth or appear- 
ance is independent of Plato’s half-serious formulation 
of it in the language of the theory of ideas. It is 
still debated, and it is the business of the interpreters 
of Plato to understand, not necessarily to pronounce 

The question whether poetry’s chief function is to 

@ Sidney’s Defense of Poesy is probably the most familiar. 

> Cf. What Plato Said, p. 249, supra, Ὁ. xviii. 

° For, don’t you mark, we’re made so that we love 

First when we see them painted, things we have passed 

Perhaps a hundred times nor cared to see ; 
And so they are better, painted—better to us. 


‘> el 


_ stimulate and exercise emotion, or to relieve, purge,* 
refine, purify, sublimate and exalt it, likewise raises 
_an issue which still divides psychologists, educators 
critics. Its determination perhaps involves a 
great and deliberate choice in the acceptance and 
anagement of life as a whole. Plato’s decision to 
; the honeyed Muse from his ideal city repre- 
παν only one aspect of his many-sided nature. It is 
obviously not, as is sometimes absurdly said, an 
_ expression of his insensibility to Hellenic poetry and 
art. It was his own sensitiveness that made him fear 
its power. He himself wrote verse in youth. His 
: the invention of his myths and the poetic 
peseerr. his prose rank him with the world’s major 
_poets.° He quotes poetry with exquisite and fond 
_aptness throughout his writings. And there are no 
more wistful w words than his reluctant dismissal of the 
supreme poet, the author and source of all these 
ties of epic and tragedy, the Ionian father of the 
Brest Hower’ ¢ However, Plato’s ethical convictions 
_gave him the courage of Guyon (Faery Queene, τι. xii. 

83) in dealing with these enchantments : 

᾿ς 4 Aristotle’s doctrine of κάθαρσι. Cf. my review of 

Finsler, ‘‘ Platon und die aristotelische Poetik,” Class, Phil. 

Grek’ 461-462 : also The Nation, xc. (1910) p. 319; Sikes, 

View oe of Poetry, pp. 118-125. 
τ ϑ °F Fried Plato Said, pp. 17 ff. 
Friedlander, Platon, i. pp. 196 and 200; Sidney, in 
ΠΩ Men of Letters, Ὁ. 150 “ Of all the philosophers he 
most poetical ; ” Chesterton, The Resurrection of Rome, 
57 “ But when we remember that the great poet Plato (as 
must be called) banished poets from his Republic, we have 
_aglimmer of why the great Greek Emperor banished sculptors 
from his empire. 
Patan ae Plato Said, pp. 7-9; Unity of Plato’s Thought, 
pp. 81-82. 
* Rep. 607 c-p: ef. What Plato Said, p. 250. 


of Immorta- 


But all those pleasaunt bowres and Pallace brave 
Guyon broke downe with rigour pittilesse; _ 
Ne ought their goodly workmanship might save 
Them from the tempest of his wrathfulnesse.* — 
The guerdons of righteousness, worldly or other- 
worldly, were explicitly excluded in the original 
formulation of the question whether justice is or is 
not intrinsically its own reward. But now, having 
proved his case independently of these, Plato thinks 
that no one can fairly object if he points out that in 
fact honesty is usually the best policy even in this 
world, and that there is good hope that the legends 
of a life and judgement to come are in essence true. 
There are hints of a life after death earlier in 
the Republic.? And nothing can be inferred from 
Glaucon’s perhaps affected surprise at Socrates’ offer 
to prove it. The immortality of the soul as an article 


of faith and hope, a sanction of moral law, an inspira- 

tion of poetry, will be treated lightly by no student of | 

humanity. But there is a certain lack of intellectual 
seriousness in taking it seriously as a thesis of meta- 
physical demonstration.* Plato’s belief in immortal- 
ity was a conviction of the psychological and moral 
impossibility of sheer materialism, and a broad faith 
in the unseen, the spiritual, the ideal. The logical 
obstacles to a positive demonstration of personal 
immortality were as obvious to him as they are to 
his critics.’ The immortality of the individual soul 

® See also my review of Pater, Plato and Platonism in The 
Dial, xiv. (1893) p. 211. 

» Cf. Bk, ii., esp. 367 B-x. 

“ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 251. 

4 Cf. 330 p-x and Vol. I. p. 16. 

ὁ Cf, What Plato Said, pp. 180, 177, 535. 

7 See my review of Gaye, The Platonic Conception of 
Immortality, in Philos. Rev. xiv., 1905, pp. 590-595. 


Set se el pe ce te cee neal ἐν. ee ee ee 


_ is for Plato a pious hope @ and an ethical postulate ὃ 
_ rather than a demonstrable certainty. _He essays 
_ various demonstrations, but nearly always in con- 
_ nexion with a myth, and of all the proofs attempted 
_ but one is repeated.? -In the Apology Socrates, 
_ addressing his judges, affects to leave the question 
open. But we cannot infer from this that the 
_ Apology antedates Plato’s belief in immortality, and 
Socrates’ language in Crito 54 Β is precisely in the 
_ tone of the Gorgzas and the Phaedo’ 
_ Immortality was affirmed before Plato by Pyth- 
_ agorean and Orphic mystics, and in the magnificent 
_ poetry of Pindar’s Second Olympian Ode it is distinctly 
associated with a doctrine of future rewards and 
punishments. But Plato was the first great writer 
_ to enforce it by philosophical arguments, or impress 
_ it upon the imagination by vivid eschatological myths. _ 
And the Platonic dialogues, as Rohde shows,’ re- 
mained the chief source of the hopes and aspirations 
οὗ the educated minority throughout subsequent 
antiquity. Plato’s name was the symbol and rally- 
_ing point of the entire religious and philosophic 
᾿ς * Phaedo 114 τη χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ, Gorg. 
34 a-s, Phaedo 67 B. - 
_ ὃ Rep. 608.c ff., Laws 881 Α, 967 pv-z, 959 a-B; with τὸν 
; τε ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὄντως ἀθάνατον [εἶναι] ψυχήν ef. 
115 ΤῈ, and with the idea, 959 5, that the only 
at the bar of Hades is a just life in this world, cf. 
ἢ . 522 σ-Ὁ, 526 Ἐ, Crito 54 85. 
᾿ς * Phaedo 85 c τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ 
ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι. Cf. 107 ν-8, Tim. 72 υ, 
Meno 86 ν-5, Phaedr. 265 c. 
4 That based on the theory that the soul is the source of all 
_motion, Phaedr. 245 ὁ ff., Laws 893 5 ff. 
_ 440». Cf. also Phaedo 91 8. 
_ * Cratylus 403 p-£ implies the doctrine of Phaedo 67, 68. 
- * PP 5th and 6th ed., vol. ii. p. 265. N 


opposition to the dogmatic materialism of the — 
Epicureans and of the positive wing of the Peri- 
patetics. Cicero and Plutarch were in this his © 
disciples. The more wistful and religious spirits of 
Stoicism—a Seneca, a Marcus Aurelius—came more _ 
and more to see in Platonism the hopeful “ alterna- 
tive” of the great perhaps. Neo-Platonists and 
Neo-Pythagoreans never grew weary of expanding 
and allegorizing the great myths of the Gorgias, 
Phaedo, and Republic. They were directly or in- 
directly the chief inspiration of the sixth book of 
the Aeneid, and in the majority of later sepulchral 
epigrams that express the hope of immortality a 
Platonic colouring is perceptible. All this was due 
far more to the spell of Plato’s genius than to the 
force of his arguments. That the soul is the principle 
of motion (Phaedr. 245 c ff., Laws 893 B ff.), that it 
must have pre-existed because its apprehension of 
the ideas is reminiscence (Phaedo 72 & ff.), that it 
could be destroyed only by its own specific evil, 
injustice, which does not in fact destroy it (Rep. 
608-611), that it cannot cease to exist because the 
idea of life which is essentially present with it will 
not admit its opposite (Phaedo 105 p-r)—these argu- 
ments may convince metaphysicians, but they will 
not stir the “ emotion of conviction ”’ that is fostered 
by the serene confidence of Socrates in the hour of 
death (Phaedo 114-118), by the vivid vision of the © 
scarred and naked ‘soul shivering at the bar of 
Rhadamanthus (Gorg. 524 pv-£), by the detailed — 
verisimilitude of the message brought back by the 
‘“ Angel from there,” Er, the son of Armenius (Hep. 
614 B ff.). 

The Epicureans and the more austere Stoics 



censured this mythological symbolism as unworthy 
of a philosopher; and Emerson contrasts Plato’s 
license of affirmation with the self-restraint of the 
_ Author of Christianity, who refused to entertain the 
_ populace with that picture. But Plato has antici- 
_ pated their criticism, saying in substance: No 
_ reasonable man will affirm that these things are 
_ precisely as I have described them. But since the 
soul is immortal, something of the kind must be true, 
and we ought to repeat and croon it over to ourselves 
_in order to keep faith and hope alive (Phaedo 114 p). 
_ This plea could be rejected only by those who are 
_ willing to affirm that Plato’s poetical imaginings have 
been more harmful in the encouragement of super- 
_ stition than helpful in the maintenance of religious 
_ hope and moral faith.* 
_ But what of the metaphysical arguments? Did 
Plato himself take them seriously ? And are they, 
therefore, to be taken seriously by the interpreters 
of his philosophy? Are they essential links in a 
? Can we find in them clues to the progress 
_and development of his thought and even date the 
dialogues with their aid? It is not necessary to 
_ answer these questions here. On the validity of the 
_ arguments it would be idle to waste words. Some of 
them, reinforced by the Theaetetus, may help to show 
_ theinadequacy of a dogmatic materialistic psychology. 
At the most they prove the eternity of something 
other than “ matter”? which may be called “ soul.” 
They do not prove the immortality of the individual 
soul, which is nevertheless plainly taken as proved 
in the eschatological myths and their ethical applica- 

_ ® Cf. my article in the June, 1934, number of the Atlantic 
Monthly, Ὁ. 721. 



tions. That the supreme dialectician, Plato, was him- 
self unaware of that which is so readily perceived by 
every puny whipster who thinks to get his sword is 
to me unthinkable. A semblance of precedent proof 
was essential even to the literary effect of the con- 
cluding myths. And Plato himself in the Laws has 
warned us that an affirmative answer to some questions 
is required for the salvation of society and the moral 
government of mankind.4 recet er fee 
But the myth itself is the really significant ex- 
pression of Plato’s hope and faith, and of its influence, 
hardly less than that of some national religions, upon 
the souls of men. After enumerating the blessings 
that normally attend the old age of the righteous 
man in this world, he says, we may fitly allow our 
imagination to dwell upon the rewards that await 
him in the world to come. ὌΠ 
The enormous literature of the Platonic myths? 
deals partly with their conjectural sources, partly 
with their place and function in Plato’s art and philo- 
sophy, and too little with the framework of definite 
meaning as distinguished from the remoter and more 
fanciful suggestions with which the ingenuity of 
commentators has sometimes obscured it. Leaying 
the translation and the notes to speak for themselves, 
I need here say only a few words on this last point. 
« Of. supra, p. li. δ 
> Chey θὴ Γ Couturat, De mythis Platonicis, Stewart, 
The Myths of Plato, with my review in Journal of Philos., 
Psy. and Scientific Method, 3, pp. 495-498; P. Frutiger, Les 
Mythes de Platon; Karl Reinhardt, Platons Mythen, Bonn, 
1927 ; Friedlander, Platon, i. pp. 199 ff.; W. Willi, Versuch 
einer Grundlegung der platonischen Mythopoiie; J. Tate, 
** Socrates and the Myths,” Class. Quarterly, xxvii. (April 
1933) pp. 74-80; V. Brochard, ‘‘ Les Mythes dans la philo- 
sophie de Platon,” L’ Année Philos., 1900, pp. 1-13. 



it I may use without entirely adopting Professor 
Stewart’s sper between myth and allegory, the 
“distin feature of the Platonic myth is that it 

embodies and reconciles the conflicting excellences 

= both—the transcendental feeling, the poetic 
mysticism of the true myth and the, to Professor 
‘wart, almost offensive lucidity of the allegory. 
In this it only exalts and intensifies a feature of 
lato’s style as a whole. He is unique in his power 
te “a con “ile: formal dialectic and deliberate rhetoric 
wit tion and sincerity of feeling. He 
mnounces the effect that he intends to produce and 
oduces it in defiance of the psychology of Goethe’s 
* Da ΓΒΕ man Absicht und man wird verstimmt.” 
He can pour his imagination, his poetry, his mysti- 
ism, aa exhortation, and his edification into a pre- 
determined logical mould. He modulates from one 
chord bite the other at the precise moment when 
atiety begins.* He starts from a definition, pro- 
s by analysis and division through firstlies and 
ρα δα to perorations that sweep ain emotional 
_ reader off his feet and make him forget or deny the 
dialectic that conducted him to the mount of vision. 
As Emerson puts it, ““ He points and quibbles ; and 
and by comes a sentence that moves the sea and 

a ὅν. nee δα 
7: ὰ 


a ἢ τι Ὁ 

a Ὁ ὙΥὐὙῊ 
Ρ ᾿ 4 «ἃ we 

«5 6.9.5 Phaedo 115 a, ΤΊ £-78 a, Euthyphro 6 s-c, 11 
> . 507 £. The little sermons scattered through the 
Law. ss have the same effect. Cf. in Goethe’s Faust the chorus 
_ of angels followed by the devil. Cf. Carl Vering, Platons 
Bt at, p. 7 “ Ein Dialog Platons wirkt niemals ermiidend ; 
edesmal greift der Dichter Platon sofort ein, wenn der 
: durch ein schweres Problem dem Leser hart 
mgesetzt hat.”’ Cf. also Sikes, Greek View of Poetry, p. 128. 
7 Ch, e.g., Symp. 211-212, Gorgias, in fine, Phaedo 114 c, 
ἴ Des in fine. 


The definite thoughts embodied in the myth of Er — 

the son of Armenius belong to Plato’s permanent 
stock of opinions and do not differ appreciably from 

those of his other myths or the implied conclusions of — 

his arguments.* The saving faith in immortality and — 

judgement to come cannot rest on scientific demon- 
stration only. It needs the confirmations of imagina- 
tion, intuition, vision, revelation. The universe is a 
wonderful place whose structure is known to us only 
imperfectly and in part. Symbols are the fit expres- 
sion of our dim apprehensions of its infinite possi- 
bilities. Heaven and hell are symbols of the most 
vital of all divisions, that which separates the virtuous 
from the vicious will. Purgatory may mark the dis- 
tinction between remediable and curable wrong and 
that which admits of no pardon.’ They are perhaps 
states of mind rather than places, but imagination 
may use what our imperfect science knows or divines 
of the world beneath our feet or the universe above 


our heads to give them a local habitation and a — 

name, and our fancy may play in like manner with 
the ultimate unanswerable questions of philosophy : 
Whence comes evil’? and are our willsfree?? Ifthe 
soul is immortal and lives through endless transforma- 
tions and transmigrations, it may be that the evil 
which baffles us here had its origin in some defect of 
will in worlds before the man (Rep. 613 4). Perhaps 
a great choice was offered to us and we chose wrong 
under the influence of mistaken ideas acquired in 

a former misspent life (618-619). Whatever the — 

@ Of. the notes on 614 ff. 
» Cf. What Plato Said, p. 536, on Phaedo 113 τὸ and 1138, 
¢ Of. What Plato Said, p. 578, on Theaet. 176 a. 
4 Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 644-645, on Laws 904 c. 



_measure of truth in these fancies two principles of 
5 and morals stand fast. God is blameless 
_ (617 £), and we must always blame rather ourselves.* 
Οὐχ wills are somehow ours to make them his ; though 

> must think of the sins of others as due solely to 

gnorance.” It matters not that the Aristotelians 
ll argue that this is reasoning in a circle.° We 
know and must believe that virtue is free (617 ©). 
And all the divinations of the soul and all the pro- 
founder interpretations of experience reiterate the 
lesson that the way of life that will present us fearless 
at the bar of eternal justice is the way that will yield 
the truest happiness here.? If we hold to that faith, 
then both in our earthly pilgrimage and in all the 
dventures of the soul hereafter, with us it will be 

: “ἡ 

< Tue Text 

' _ As regards the text I have little to add to what was 
Said in the first volume, except a few qualifications to 
avoid misunderstanding. I have tried to be a little 

‘more careful than I was in the first volume in correct- 
_ing minor inconsistencies due to the reprinting of the 

ubner text of Hermann. But the opportunities 
lich these might afford to captious criticism do not 
the least affect the main principle or its applica- 
‘tions. That is simply that the variations between the 

Φ» Cf. Laws 727 5, Rep. 619 c, Phaedo 90 ν, Cratyl. 411 ς, 

ὃ Cf. Protag. 345 ν-Ὲ, 358 c-p, Laws 734 8, and What Plato 
Said, p. 640, on 860 ἢ. 

at Bras ot Eth. 1114 Ὁ 19. 

od . 6291 ο. Cf. Gorg. 526 p-z, Phaedo 114 π. 


πο -- 


chief modern editions rarely make any difference for 
Plato’s thought or even for his style, and that the 

decision between different readings in the case of — 

Plato should usually turn, noton any scientific ἘΣ | 

of text criticism, but on knowledge of P 

to and © 

knowledge of the Greek language. To put it drasti- _ 

cally : for all practical purposes of the student of the 
Greek language, literature and philosophy, Her- 
mann’s text of the Republic is quite as good as the 

be constructed from the critical notes in Wilamowitz’ 
appendix. Hermann’s judgement on questions of 
Greek idiom and Platonic usage was quite as good as 
theirs. This is not meant as an illiberal disparage- 

ment of the great and indispensable special disciplines — 

of text criticism and palaeography. It is merely a 
commonsense vindication of the intellectual right of 
those who prefer to do so to approach the study of 
Plato from another point of view. 


As regards the translation, I impenitently reaffirm 
the principles that I stated in the preface to the first 
volume—whatever errors of judgement I may commit 
in their application. Much of the Republic can be 
made easy reading for any literate reader. But some 
of the subtler and more metaphysical passages can be 
translated in that way only at the cost of misrepre- 
sentation of the meaning. In order to bring out the 
real significance of Plato’s thought it is sometimes 
necessary to translate the same phrase in two ways, 
sometimes to vary a phrase which Plato repeats or 



more scientific text of Burnet or the text that might — 


rep eat a synonym which he prefers to vary. It is 
en desirable to use two words to suggest the two- 
fold associations of one. To take the simplest ex- 
ample, it is even more misleading to translate eidos 
_“ Form ” than it is to translate it “idea ”—“ idea or 
form” (without a capital letter) is less likely to be 
_ misunderstood. 
_ Again, Plato did not write in the smooth, even 
style which Dionysius of Halicarnassus admired in 
Lysias and Matthew Arnold in Addison, and it is not 
_ the business of the translator to clothe him in the 
; varb of that style. 
_ Provided the meaning is plain and the emphasis 
right, he allows himself unlimited freedom in ana- 
_coluthons, short cuts, sharp corners, ellipses and 
_ generally in what I have elsewhere called illogical 
idiom. Anyone who does not like that style should 
_ give his days and nights to the study of Isocrates and 
_Lysias. According to his mood and the context 
to’s style ranges from Attic simplicity to meta- 
physical abstraction, from high-flown poetical prose 
to plain colloquial diction. And his colloquialism, 
though usually kept within the bounds of Attic ur- 
banity, is not lacking in Aristophanic touches which, 
if rightly rendered, shock the taste of critics who 
approach him with a stronger sense of the dignity of 
philosophy than they have of Greek idiom. In defer- 
_ ence to friendly criticism I have generally suppressed 
or transferred to footnotes my attempts to reproduce 
this feature of Plato’s style. But I am not convinced. 
‘As Taine aptly says (Life and Letters, p. 53), “ M. 
ousin’s elegant Plato is not at all like the easy ... 
ut always natural Plato of reality. He would shock 
ops if we saw him as he is.” 



he shih wT tet iy 
i 5 ee 

ἤτον, ἀν ΕΣ = Abate ths τὰ ‘SYK 
AW Berta ane qn tint Yo, 

cet ae ® ip Te es bite , ΕΟ; ΓΕ 

> tee ἀρ ον 

gt sims ad Bi ‘Ris a3dwae 
Rpt ne gb Sot ‘bafitsitnly Wed 
δ ;-- fjirit’ PA τὰ Beth eo ein ei! 
Mig Bajo Lis ates oat wots Jeet Ἔ 
Distoxle 9} a Sulla oil Foe or Wisi. 90 4 

ae i: bitk ἜΗ δ ΠΝ bist ἢ, ot ie pi 
ok va dest 3: 4 PB Bit: al ΟΥ̓" 

; S207 "esitond Ϊ ΠΝ ἐξ ἢ- Galt πὰ μι. nck ὙΠ ; 
πος, ameilyiipollos = bak noth I are aed 
δος π᾿ τα ΠΤ Α Yo ahoued, οἷν. righ MY J tt uileg 
eee oily 2 cathogs 12 δῆς τολεῖτα τὶ ‘panos! 10, 
5 diberesbizris Vacsiear yaad toon Ὶ ere 

ὁ ὧν 15 vii lb, att “ies 



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tei: bearssqqu2 eas xo oad μεμα Tey 
= i eschew at of attack i, ‘Fee ἃ atontodinet! Sax (5) 
peg Σ dsosni amon Sart ak ᾿ 10k Uh δ τ... otal De sactaat 
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¢ 7 onallte vi He 
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tsa) mourn Oxx ΡΝ H16 Ta dO τὰ 

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ry ἘΥΤ' “ΕΥ _. εἴ - τ > = 9 

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St. T. IL p. 
484 1. Oi μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, 

καὶ of μὴ διὰ μακροῦ τινὸς διεξελθόντος" λόγο ' 
μόγις πως ἀνεφάνησαν οἵ εἰσιν ἑκάτεροι. “lows 
γάρ, ἔφη, διὰ βραχέος οὐ ῥάδιον. Οὐ φαίνεται, 
εἶπον" ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιόνως φανῆναι et 
περὶ τούτου μόνου ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ, πολλὰ τὰ 
λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατόψεσθαι. τί διαφέρει. 7 
B Bios δίκαιος ἀδίκου. Τί οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο͵ 
ἡμῖν; Τί δ᾽ ἄλλο, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἣ ἣ τὸ ἑξῆς; ἐπε 57) 
φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ Ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως. 
ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν 
1 διεξελθόντος ADM, διεξελθόντες F. 

ee Ν 

® The argument is slightly personified. ΟἿ on 503 a. ‘ 
> It is captious to object that the actual discussion of the 

philosopher occupies only a few pages. 
¢ This is the main theme of the Republic, of which Plato 

never loses sight. 




τυ 107 


τ 15 
y sn4i 

pee) τ Ὁ ee CHARACTERS 
σι OST tye ᾿ 
Socrates, Graucox, Poremarcuus, THRASYMACHUS, 
SRISABYH ris. ι 
᾿ Averrantus, CEPHALUS 

Ἦ .." Ἐπ πα, 

| ὐλολ BOOK VI 

. “So now, Glaucon,’’I said,“ our argument after 
inding® along? and weary way has at last made clear 
Ὁ us who are the philosophers or lovers of wisdom 
nd who are not.” ‘‘ Yes,” he said, “a shorter way 
perhaps not feasible.” ‘‘ Apparently not,” I said. 
‘I at any rate, think that the matter would have 
n made still plainer if we had had nothing but this 
speak of, and if there were not so many things left 

Ἢ our purpose ὅ of discerning the difference be- 
‘the just and the unjust life requires us to 
scuss.”” “* What, then,” he said, “ comes next?” 
What else,” said I, “ but the next in order? Since 
6 philosophers are those who are capable of appre- 
ending that which is eternal and unchanging,* while 
jose who are incapable of this, but lose themselves and 

= ORR τον τ΄ στο’ 
i ν 

OS FT τ τ; 

4 For κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος cf. Phaedo 78 c, Soph. 
48 4, Tim. 41 τ, 82 8, Epin. 982 and π᾿ 


πολλοῖς Kat παντοίως ἴσχουσι πλανώμενοι od φιλό- — 
σοῴφοι, ποτέρους δὴ δεῖ πόλεως ἡγεμόνας εἶναι; 
Πῶς οὖν λέγοντες ἂν αὐτό, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγοιμεν; 

« / Μ > > 4 ‘ , 
Οπότεροι ἄν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, δυνατοὶ φαίνωνται 
φυλάξαι νόμους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα πόλεων, 
C τούτους καθιστάναι φύλακας. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη. Τόδε 
δέ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, dpa δῆλον, εἴτε τυφλὸν εἴτε ὀξὺ 
ὁρῶντα χρὴ φύλακα τηρεῖν ὁτιοῦν; Kai πῶς, 
ἔφη, οὐ δῆλον; Ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν 
διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἑκάστου ἐστερημέ- 
νοι τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ 
ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὥ ὥσπερ γ γραφεῖς 
εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κἀκεῖσε ἀεὶ 
ἀναφέροντές τε καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἷόν τε ἀκριβέ- 
D στατα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε 
πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν τίθεσθαί τε, ἐὰν δέῃ 
τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σώζειν; Οὐ 
μὰ τὸν Δία, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρει. Τούτους 
οὖν μᾶλλον φύλακας στησόμεθα, ἢ ἢ τοὺς ἐγνωκότας 
μὲν ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν, ἐμπειρίᾳ δὲ μηδὲν ἐκείνων͵ 
ἐλλείποντας μηδ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει. ᾿ἀρετῆς 
ὑστεροῦντας; Ἄτοπον μέντ᾽ ἄν, ἔφη, εἴη ἄλλους 
αἱρεῖσθαι, et γε τἄλλα μὴ ἐλλείποιντο: τούτῳ γὰρ 
485 αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἂν προέ οιεν.. Οὐκοῦν 
τοῦτο δὴ λέγωμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἷοί τ᾽ ἔσονται οὗ 

τ ὁ δὲ 89, note hk, on 505 c, 
Bune vi. 39, “Matt. xv. 14, John xix. 39-41. 
4 Of Polit. 277 8, 277 pf., ete., Soph. 226 c, Par 
132 Ὁ. Ν 
4 ἀποβλέποντες belongs to the terminology of the ideas 
Cf. supra 472 c, Cratyl. 389 a, Gorg. 503 ©, Tim. 28.4, 
Prot. 354 ο, and my What Plato Said, p. 458 on Buthyph. 6 Ἐν 



wander* amid the multiplicities of multifarious things, 
are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to 

_ be the leaders in a state?” “‘ What, then,” he said, 
_“ would be a fair statement of the matter?”’ “ Which- 
_ ever,’ I said, “ appear competent to guard the laws 
and pursuits of society, these we should establish as 
-guardians.”’ “ Right,’”’ he said. “Is this, then,” said 
I,“ clear, whether the guardian who is to keep watch 
over anything ought to be blind or keen of sight ?”’ 
“Of course it is clear,” he said. “‘ Do you think, 
then, that there is any appreciable difference between 

_ the blind? and those who are veritably deprived of the 
knowledge of the veritable being of things, those who 
have no vivid pattern ¢ in their souls and so cannot, 
85 painters look to their models, fix their eyes? on 
_ the absolute truth, and always with reference to that 
ideal and in the exactest possible contemplation of 
it establish in this world also the laws of the beautiful, 
the just and the good, when that is needful, or guard 
and preserve those that are established?” “No, 
by heaven,” he said, ‘‘ there is not much difference.” 
“Shall we, then, appoint these blind souls as our 
. ee cas than those who have learned to know 
e ideal reality of things and who do not fall short 
of the others in experience ὁ and are not second to 
them in any part of virtue?” “Τὸ would be strange 
indeed,” he said, “ to choose others than the philo- 
sophers, provided they were not deficient in those 
other respects, for this very knowledge of the ideal 
would perhaps be the greatest of superiorities.” 
“ Then what we have to say is how it would be pos- 
sible for the same persons to have both qualifications, 

© Of. infra 539 x, 521 2, Phileb. 62. Cf. Introd. p. x1; 
Apelt, Republic, p. 490. 
5 . 


αὐτοὶ κἀκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα ἔχειν; ; Udvv μὲν οὖν. Ὃ 
τοίνυν ἀρχόμενοι. τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἐλέγομεν, τὴν 
φύσιν αὐτῶν πρῶτον δεῖν καταμαθεῖν: καὶ οἶμαι, 
ἐὰν ἐκείνην ἱκανῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν, ὁμολογήσειν καὶ 
ὅτι οἷοί τε ταῦτα ἔχειν οἱ αὐτοί, ὅτι τε οὐκ ἄλλους 
πόλεων ἡγεμόνας δεῖ εἶναι ἢ τούτους. Πῶς; 

II. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν φιλοσόφων φύσεων πέρι 
Β ὡμολογήσθω ἡμῖν, ὅτι μαθήματός γε ἀεὶ ἐρῶσιν, 
ὃ ἂν αὐτοῖς δηλοῖ ἐ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς. ἀεὶ οὔσης 
καὶ μὴ πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. 
\ ‘Quoroynabw. Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ὅτι. πάσης 
αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε σμικροῦ οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε τιμιω- 
τέρου οὔτε ἀτιμοτέρου μέρους ἑκόντες ἀφίενται, 
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν. περί τε τῶν φιλοτίμων καὶ 
ἐρωτικῶν διήλθομεν. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. Tdde 
τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει εἰ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς 
Ο τούτῳ ἐν τῇ φύσει, ot ἂν μέλλωσιν ἔσεσθαι οἵους 
ἐλέγομεν. Τὸ ποῖον; Τὴν ἀψεύδειαν καὶ τὸ 
ἑκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσδέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος, 

ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, τὴν δ᾽ ἀλήθειαν στέργειν. Εἰκός | Υ᾽ i 

ἔφη. Οὐ μόνον ye, ὦ φίλε, εἰκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα 
ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐρωτικῶς του φύσει ἔχοντα πᾶν τὸ 
ξυγγενές τε καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν παιδικῶν ἀγαπᾶν. 
᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη. Ἦ οὖν οἰκειότερον σοφίᾳ τι ἀλη- 
θείας ἂν εὕροις; Kat πῶς; ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Ἢ οὖν 
δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ 

4“ Lit. “‘is not made to wander by generation and decay.” 
Cf. Crat. 411 c, Phaedo 95 π, whence Aristotle took his title. 
See Class. Phil. xvii. (1922) pp. 334-352. 

> Supra 474 c-p. 

5 For similar expressions cf. 519 B, Laws 656 8, - 965 Cc, 
Symp. 200 A. 

4 ‘This and many other passages prove Plato’s high regard 


"ρον ee 


ξ ΨΥ Γ Ρ 

I SO ge Leg 




isitnot?” “Quite so.” “‘ Then, as we were saying 
δὲ the beginning of this discussion, the first thing to 
understand is the nature that they must have from 
᾿ birth ; and I think that if we sufficiently agree on this 
cut also agree that the combination of qualities 
_that we seek belongs to the same persons, and that 
_we need no others for guardians of states than these.” 
“ How so?” 
~ II. “We must accept as agreed this trait of the 
philosophical nature, that it is ever enamoured of the 
_kind of knowledge which reveals to them something of 
that essence which is eternal, and is not wandering 
between the two poles of generation and decay.*” 
_“ Let us take that as agreed.” “‘ And, further,” said I, 
™* that their desire is for the whole of it and that they 
do not willingly renounce a small or a great, a more 
precious or a less honoured, part of it. That was the 
point of our former illustration ὃ drawn from lovers and 
men covetous of honour.” “‘ You are right,” he said. 
ἢ Consider, then, next whether the men who are to 
meet our requirements must not have this further 
quality in their natures.” “‘ What quality?” “ The 
irit of truthfulness, reluctance to admit falsehood 
in any form, the hatred of it and the love of truth.” 
It is likely,” he said. “It is not only likely, my 
friend, but there is every necessity 5 that he who is by 
‘Mature enamoured of anything should cherish all that 
is akin and pertaining to the object of his love.” 
“Right,” he said. ‘‘ Could you find anything more 
akin to wisdom than truth*?” “Impossible,” he 
‘said. “Then can the same nature be a lover of 
for the truth. C/. Laws 730 c, 861 p, Crat. 428 p, supra 
“382. In 389 8 he only permits falsehood to the rulers as 

a drastic remedy to be used with care for edification. C7. 
‘Vol. I. on 382 cand νυ. 



Ὁ φιλοψευδῆ; Οὐδαμῶς ye. Tov ἄρα τῷ ὄντ 
φιλομαθῆ πάσης ἀληθείας δεῖ εὐθὺς ἐκ νέου ὅ τι 
μάλιστα ὀρέγεσθαι. Παντελῶς γε. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν 
ὅτῳ γε εἰς ἕν τι αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι σφόδρα ῥέπουσιν, 
ἴσμεν που ὅτι εἰς τἄλλα τούτῳ ἀσθενέστεραι, 
ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα ἐκεῖσε ἀπωχετευμένον. Τί “μήν; : 
Ὧι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον 
ἐρρυήκασι, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, οἶμαι, ἡδονὴν. av- 
τῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἶεν ἄν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος 
ἐκλείποιεν, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ᾽ ἀληθῶς φιλό- 

E σοφός τις εἴη. Μεγάλη ἀνάγκη. Σώφρων μὴν ὅ 
γε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῇ φιλοχρήματος: ὧν γὰρ 
ἕνεκα χρήματα μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης σπουδάζεται, 
ἄλλῳ τινὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἢ τούτῳ προσήκει σπουδάζειν. 
Οὕτως. Καὶ μήν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν 

486 κρίνειν μέλλῃς φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μή. Τὸ 
ποῖον; Μή σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας" 
ἐναντιώτατον γάρ που σμικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ 
τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ 

᾿ ἀνθρωπίνου. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη. *He οὖν ὑπάρ- 
| yer διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν 
χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα 


α For this figure cf. Laws 844 a and 736'8, Eurip. Suppl. : 
1111 παρεκτρέποντες ὀχετόν, Empedocles, Dielst 195 λόγου — 
λόγον ἐξοχετεύων i ucretius ii. 365 “derivare queunt απὶ- 
mum ἢ; and for the idea of. also Laws 643 c-p. é 

» Of. my Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 45-46, esp. n. 330, 
followed by Apelt, Republic, pp. 490-491. Cf. also Fried 
lander, Platon, ii. pp. 579-580, 584. 

¢ For πεπλασμένως cf. Soph. 216 c μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλλ᾽ ὄντως 

4 Of. Theaet. 144. τὸ χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα. 

8 aan 


a : 


wisdom and of falsehood?” “By no means.” 
“ Then the true lover of knowledge must, from child- 
_ hood up, be most of all a striver after truth in every 
form.”’ “‘ By all means.” “‘ But, again, we surely 
are aware that when in a man the desires ira 
strongly to any one thing, they are weakened for 
Behe shines: It is as if the atom had been diverted 
into another channel.*”’ “Surely.” “So, when a 
man’s desires have been taught to flow in the channel 
of learning and all that sort of thing, they will be con- 
cerned, I presume, with the pleasures of the soul in 
itself, and will be indifferent to those of which the body 
is the instrument,” if the man is a true and not asham © 
_ philosopher.” “Thatis quitenecessary.”’ ““Suchaman 
_ will be temperate and by no means greedy for wealth; 
for the things for the sake of which money and great 
expenditure are eagerly sought others may take 
seriously, but not he.” “It isso.’ “ And there is 
_ this further point to be considered in distinguishing 
the philosophical from the unphilosophical nature.” 
ᾧ t point?” “You must not overlook any 
_ touch of illiberality.¢ For nothing can be more con- 
_ trary than such pettiness to the quality of a soul that 
is ever to seek integrity and wholeness? in all things 
human and divine.” “ Mosttrue,”hesaid. “Do you 
think that a mind habituated to thoughts of grandeur 
and the contemplation of all time and all existence 

hie Cf. Goethe’s “Im Ganzen, Guten, Schénen resolut zu 

4 Cf. Theaet. 174 τ, of the philosopher, εἰς ἄπασαν εἰωθὼς 
τὴν γῆν βλέπειν, and 173 Ἐ, infra 500 B-c. Cf. Mare. Aurel: 
vii. 35, Livy xxiv. 34 “ Archimedes is erat unicus spectator 
eaeli siderumque,” Mayor, Cic. De nat. deor. ii. p. 128. 

For πᾶς χρόνος ef. infra 498 νυ, 608 c, Phaedo 107 c, Gorg. 
525 c, Apol. 40 π, Tim. 36 ©, 478, 90 v. Cf. Isoe. i. 11, 
Pindar, Pyth. i. 46. 



τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον. βίον; ᾿Αδύνατον, 
| Βἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἡγήσεται 
ὁ τοιοῦτος; Ἥκιστά γε. Δειλῇ δὴ καὶ ἀνελευ- 
θέρῳ φύσει ΚΣ γπ ἡ ἀληθινῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ 
ἂν μετείη. Ov μοι δοκεῖ. Τί οὖν; 6 κόσμ ς καὶ 
μὴ φιλοχρήματος μηδ᾽ ἀνελεύθερος μηδ᾽ ald 
μηδὲ δειλὸς ἔσθ᾽ ὅπῃ ἂν δυσσύμβολος ἢ ἢ ἄδικος 
γένοιτο; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Καὶ τοῦτο δὴ: υχὴν σκοπῶν 
φιλόσοφον καὶ μὴ εὐθὺς νέου ὄντος ἐπισκέψει, εἰ 
ἄρα δικαία, τε καὶ ἥμερος ἢ “δυσκοινώνητος καὶ 
ἀγρία. άνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε παρα- 
Οσλείψεις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι. Τὸ ποῖον; Ἐὐμαθὴς ἢ 7) δυσ- 
μαθής. ἢ προσδοκᾷς ποτέ τινά rT ἱκανῶς ἂν 
στέρξαι, ὃ πράττων ἂν ἀλγῶν τε πράττοι καὶ μόγις 
σμικρὸν ἀνύτων; Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. Τί δ᾽; εἰ 
μηδὲν ὧν μάθοι. σώζειν δύναιτο, λήθης ὧν wide? 
dp’ av olds τ᾽ εἴη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι; Καὶ 
πῶς; ᾿Ανόνητα δὴ πονῶν οὐκ, οἴει, ἀναγκασθή- 
σεται τελευτῶν αὑτόν τε μισεῖν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην 
D πρᾶξιν; Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; ᾿Επιλήσμονα ἄρα ψυχὴν ἐν ἐν 
ταῖς ἱκανῶς φιλοσόφοις μή ποτε ἐγκρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ 
μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι. Ἰαντάπασι 
μὲν οὖν. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐ μὴν τό γε τῆς ἀμούσου τε καὶ . 
ἀσχήμονος φύσεως ἄλλοσέ ποι ἂν φαῖμεν ελκαμη Π ἢ 


a Cf. Aristot. Hth. Nic. 1123 Ὁ 32, the great-souled man, 
ᾧ γ᾽ οὐδὲν μέγαν Diog. Laert. vii. 128 πάντων ὑπεράνω, Cic. 
De fin. iii. 8 “infra se omnia humana ducens.’”’ Cf. infra 
on 500 B-c. 

For similar pessimistic utterances about human life and 
mankind cf. 604 5-ο, 496 »-π, 500 B-c, 516 p, Laws 808 Β. 
Cf. also Laws 708 2-709 5. 

> Cf. Vol. I. pp. 200 f. on 386 s-c; Laws 727 τ, 828 τ, 
881 a, Gorg. 522 x, Phaedo 77 x, Crito 43 B, eve 35 A, 



can deem this life of man a thing of great concern*?” 
2 ible,” saidhe. ““Hence such a man will not 

Be, eath to be terrible?®” ‘‘ Least of all.” 
a cowardly and illiberal spirit, it seems, could 
have no part in genuine philosophy.” “ I think not.” 
“What then? Could a man of orderly spirit, not a 
lover: of money, not illiberal, nor a braggart nor a 
_ coward, ever prove unjust, or a driver of hard bar- 
_ gains?” “ἢ Impossible.”’ “‘ This too, then, is a 
point that in your discrimination of the philosophic 
ie unphilosophic soul you will observe—whether 
Soh is from youth up just and gentle or unsocial 
tae ὰ Assuredly.” “ΝΟΥ will you over- 
Lick “this, I fancy.” “What ?” ‘Whether he is 
- quick or slow tolearn. Ordo you suppose that anyone 
ἀρ Στὸ αν, love a task which he performed pain- 
little result‘ from much toil?” “That 
ah τς be.” “And if he could not keep what he 
learned, being steeped in oblivion,’ could he fail to 
_be void of knowledge?” ‘‘ How could he?” “‘ And 
so, having all his labour for naught, will he not finally 
be constrained toloathe himself and that occupation?” 
“ΟΥ̓ course.” ‘“‘ The forgetful soul, then, we must 
not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but 
we require a good memory.” “ By all means.’ 
_~ But assuredly we should not say that the want of 
ony and seemliness in a nature conduces to 
anything else than the want of measure and propor- 

40c. Cf. Spinoza’s “ There .is nothing of which the free 
man thinks so little as de 
_ © Cf. supra, Vol. I. on 442 x. ¢ Of. 375 ἃ 
“ΟἹ Laches 189 s-B ἀηδῶς μανθάνων. 
; ~ Theaet. 144 2. 
9 Of. Theaet. 144 B λήθης γέμοντες. Cf. Cleopatra’s “Oh, 
“my oblivion is a very Antony” (Ant. and Cleo. t. iii. 90). 



εἰς ἀμετρίαν. Τί “μήν; ᾿Αλήθειαν δὲ ἀμετρίᾳ 
ἡγεῖ ξυγγενῆ εἶναι ἢ ἐμμετρίᾳ; ᾿Εμμετρίᾳ.. Ἔμ- 
μετρον ἄρα καὶ εὔχαριν ζητῶμεν πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις 
διάνοιαν φύσει, ἣν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν ἑ ἑκά- 
E στου τὸ αὐτοφυὲς εὐάγωγον παρέξει. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; 
Τί οὖν; μή πῃ δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα 
ἕκαστα διεληλυθέναι καὶ ἑπόμενα ἀλλήλοις τῇ 
μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄντος ἱκανῶς τε καὶ τελέως ψυχῇ 

487 μεταλήψεσθαι; ᾿Αναγκαιότατα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 

Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπῃ μέμψει τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὃ μή 
ποτ᾽ ἄν τις οἷός τε γένοιτο ἱκανῶς ἐπιτηδεῦσαι, 
εἰ μὴ φύσει εἴη μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπής, 
εὔχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ ξυγγενὴς ἀληθείας, δικαιο- 
σύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης; Οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὁ Μῶμος, 
ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο. ᾿Αλλ᾽, ἦν. δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
τελειωθεῖσι τοῖς τοιούτοις παιδείᾳ τε καὶ ἡλικίᾳ 
dpa οὐ μόνοις ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις; 

Ill. Καὶ ὁ ᾿Αδείμαντος, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, 

‘ A a 7 > \ Ἅ es 3 ” > - 
Β πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν οἷός τ᾽ εἴη ἀντειπεῖν" 
ἀλλὰ yap τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες 

4 ἰδέαν is not exactly “‘idea.’”’ Cf. Cratyl. 889.5, What 
Plato Said, p. 458 on Euthyph. 6 Ὁ, ibid. p. 560 on Rep. 
369 a and p. 585 on Parmen. 130 c-p. Cf. Class. Phil. xx. 
(1925) p. 347. 

> Lit. “following one upon the other.” Cf. Tim. 27 ¢ 
ἑπομένως, Laws 844 8. 

© μεγαλοπρεπής is frequently ironical in Plato, but not here. 

For the list of qualities of the ideal student ef. also 503 Ὁ, 
Theaet. 144 a-p, and Friedlander, Platon, ii. p.418. Cf. Laws 
709 © on the qualifications of the young tyrant, and Cic. 
Tusc. v. 24, with Renaissance literature on education. 

4 The god of censure, who finds fault with the gods in 
Lucian’s cainlogues) Cf. Overbeck, Schriftquellen, p. 208, 


ee ee 

wh oe 

Se ae 


tion.” “Certainly.” ‘‘ And do you think that truth 
is akin to measure and proportion or to dispropor- 
tion?” “Τὸ proportion.” ‘Then in addition to 
our other requirements we look for a mind endowed 
with measure and grace, whose native disposition will 
πρὶ it easily guided to the aspect of the ideal* reality 
in all things.” “ Assuredly.” “Tell me, then, is 
there any flaw in the argument? Have we not 
_ proved the qualities enumerated to be necessary and 
compatible with one another for the soul that is to 
have asufficient and perfect apprehension of reality?” 
“Nay, most necessary,” he said. “15 there any 
fault, then, that you can find with a pursuit which a 
“man could not properly practise unless he were by 
nature of good memory, quick apprehension, magni- 
ficent,° gracious, friendly and akin to truth, justice, 
bravery and sobriety?” ““ Momus 4? himself,” he said, 
“could not find fault with such a combination.” 
“Well, then,” said I, “when men of this sort are 
perfected by education and maturity of age, would 
you not entrust the state solely to them ?” 
_ Ul. And Adeimantus said, “No one, Socrates, 
would be able to controvert these statements of yours. 
But, all the same, those who occasionally hear you ¢ 

n. 1091, Otto, p. 227, 5.υ. Momus. Cf. Callimachus, fr. 70; 

and Anth. Pal. xvi. 262. 3-4: 

ν᾿ αὐτὸς ὁ Μῶμος 

4 φθέγξεται, “Axpnros, Zed πάτερ, ἡ σοφίη, 

“ Momus himself will cry out ‘ Father Zeus, this was perfect 

51}. (L.C.L. translation.) Stallbaum refers to Erasmus, 

Chiliad, i. 5. 75 and interpreters on Aristaenet. Epist. i. 1, 

p. 239, ed. Boissonade. 

_* Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 35, n. 236, and What 
Plato Said, p. 468 on Crito 46 8. A speaker in Plato may 
_ thus refer to any fundamental Platonic doctrine. Wilamo- 
witz’ suggested emendation (Platon, ii. p. 205) ἃ ἂν λέγῃς is 
_ due to a misunderstanding of this. 



ἑκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις" ἡγοῦνται δι’ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ 
ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ᾽ 
ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρώτημα “σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἀθροι- 
σθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς. τῶν λόγων 
μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἄνα a 
νεσθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν. δεινῶν οἱ 
μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅ 
Ο τι φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφεῖς τελευτῶντες ἀποκλεί- 
εσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγωσιν ὑπὸ πεττείας αὖ 
ταύτης τινὸς ἑτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλ᾽ ἐν Bae 
ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον rar ἔχε 
λέγω δ᾽ εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἀποβλέψας. νῦν yap a 
ἄν τίς σοι λόγῳ μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τὸ 
ἐρωτώμενον ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἔργῳ δὲ ὁρᾶν, ὅσοι ἂν 

* A locus classicus for Plato’s anticipation of objections. 
Cf. 475 5, Theaet. 166 λ-π, Rep. 609 c, 438-439, and Apelt, 
Bapublic, Ῥ. 492. Plato does it more tactfully than Isocrates, 

e.g. Demon. 44. 

> Cf. Apelt, Aufsdtze, p. 73, Minto, Logie, Induction and 
Deduction, pp. 4 ff.; also Gorg. 461 τ, 462 a, Soph 230 B. 

¢ Cf. Phaedrus 262 5. 

4 Cf. supra 451 a, and Theaet. 166 s, 168 a, infra 5346 
ἀπτῶτ t. 

¢ Of. Phaedr. 262 5, Cleitophon 410 a, Gorg. 495 a, schol., 
rods πρώτους λόγους τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ δηλονότι, Gorg. 457 Ἕ ols τὸ 
πρῶτον ἔλεγες, and also Agathon in Symp. 901 8. 

7 For this figure ef. Laws 739 a, 820 c-p, 903 Ὁ, Srycag 
395 a-s, Hipparchus 229 π, Eurip. ‘Supp 1. 409. 

Aristotle, Soph. El. 165 a 10 ff., borrows the nietaphor) ‘but 
his ψῆφοι are those of book-keeping or reckoning. of os 
Dem. De cor. 227 f. 

9 Cf. Hipp. Minor 369 πε] and Grote ii. ΕΣ Ὡ “Though 
Hippias admits each successive step he still mistrusts the 
conclusion’; also Apelt, p. 492, supra 357 a-8 and Laws — 
903 a βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, and also Hipparchus 232 B nt 



argue thus feel in this way *: They think that owing 
ἕο their inexperience in the πον of question and 
_ answer ὃ they are at every question led astray ° a little 
_ bit by the argument, and when these bits are accumu- 
| ated : at the conclusion of the discussion mighty is their 

_fall¢ and the apparent contradiction of what they at 
first said*; and that just as by expert draught-players’ 
_ the unskilled are finally shut in and cannot make a 
move, so they are finally blocked and have their 
mouths stopped by this other game of draughts 
played not with counters but with words; yet the 
_ truth is not affected by that outcome.’ I say this 
_ with reference to the present case, for in this instance 
_ ong might say that he is unable in words to contend 
against you at each question, but that when it comes 
_ to facts” he sees that of those who turn to philosophy,‘ 

the idea that dialectic constrains rather than persuades. In 
_ the Jon, 533 c, Ion says he cannot ἀντιλέγειν, but the fact 
“remains that he knows Homer but not other wees Cf. also 
3 p. The virtually anticipates Bacon’s Novum 
_ Organum, App. XIII. “ (syllogismus) . . . assensum itaque 
_ constringit, non res.” Cf. Cie. De fin. iv. 3, Tuse. i. 8. 16, 
and the proverbial οὐ yap πείσεις, οὐδ᾽ ἣν πείσῃς, Aristoph, 
Plutus 600. 
__*® See Soph. 234 & for a different application of the same 
_ idea. There is no change of opinion. The commonplace 
_ Greek contrast of word and deed, theory and fact, is valid 
_ against eristic but not against dialectic. See What Plato 
_ Said, p. 534 on Phaedo 99 ©, and supra on 473 4; also What 
lato Said, p. 625 on Laws 636 a. 
_ _A favourite formula of Aristotle runs, ‘This is true in 
4 and is confirmed by facts.” Cf. Eth. Nic. 1099 Ὁ 25, 
1123 Ὁ 22, 1131 a 13, Pol. 1323 a 39-b 6, 1326 a 25 and 29, 
| 1334 a 5-6. A 
4 * Scholars in politics cut a sorry figure. For this popular 
view of philosophers ef. Theaet. 173 ὁ ff., 174 c-p, Gorg. 484- 
ΡΝ c, Phaedo 64 Β. Cf. also Isoc. passim, σι. Antid. 250, 



ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὁρμήσαντες μὴ τοῦ πεπαιδεῦσθαι 
Ὁ ἕνεκα ἁψάμενοι νέοι ὄντες ἀπαλλάττωνται, ἀλλὰ 
μακρότερον ἐνδιατρίψωσι, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ 
πάνυ ἀλλοκότους γιγνομένους, ἵνα μὴ παμπονή- 
ρους εἴπωμεν, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας 
ὅμως τοῦτό γε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος οὗ σὺ 
ἐπαινεῖς πάσχοντας, ἀχρήστους ταῖς πόλεσι yeyvo- 
μένους. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, Οἴει οὖν, εἶπον, τοὺς 
ταῦτα λέγοντας ψεύδεσθαι; Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, 
E ἀλλὰ τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούοιμι. ᾿Ακούοις 
ἄν, ὅτι “ἔμοιγε φαίνονται τἀληθῆ λέγειν. Πῶς οὖν, 
ἔφη, εὖ ἔχει λέγειν, ὅ ὅτι οὐ πρότερον κακῶν παῦε 
σονται αἱ πόλεις, πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐταῖς οἱ φιλόσοφοι 
ἄρξωσιν, ovs ἀχρήστους ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι; 
᾿Ερωτᾷς, ν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐρώτημα δεόμενον ἀποκρί- 
σεως δι᾿ εἰκόνος “λεγομένης. Σὺ δέ γε, ἔφη, οἶμαι, 
οὐκ εἴωθας du’ εἰκόνων λέγειν. 
IV. Elev, εἶπον: σκώπτεις ΤΕ Βλη δ ε εἰς 
λόγον οὕτω δυσαπόδεικτον; ἄκουε by τῆς 
488 εἰκόνος, ἵν᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον ions, ὡς pvtise εἰκάζω. 
οὕτω γὰρ χαλεπὸν τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων, ὃ 
πρὸς τὰς πόλεις πεπόνθασιν, ὥστε οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ἕν 
οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοιοῦτον πεπονθός, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐκ πολ- 
λῶν αὐτὸ ξυναγαγεῖν εἰκάζοντα καὶ ἀπολογού- 

« The perfect tense is ironical in Crat. 3848, serious in 
Laws 670 a-8. In Gorg. 485 « it is replaced by ὅσον ἸδΑ δέίας 


Ἵ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 506 on Gorg. 484 ο. 

¢ Cf. Buthydem. 306 π, Protag. 346 a, and for the idea 
without the word, Soph. 216 c. 

@ Cf. Eurip. Medea 299, and on 489 B. 

¢ Cf. supra 487 a. In Euthydem. 307 8 Plato uses. both 
ἐπιτήδευμα and πρᾶγμα. 



not merely touching upon it to complete their educa- 
* and dropping it while still young, but lingering 
_long® in the study of it, the majority become 
anks,° not to say rascals, and those accounted the 
finest spirits among them are still rendered useless? to 
‘society by the pursuit ὁ which youcommend.” AndI, 
hearing this, said, “ Do you think that they are 

I en in saying so?”’ “I don’t know,” said 
he, “ but I would gladly hear your opinion.” “‘ You 
may hear, then, that ] think that what they say is 
true.””» “ How, then,” he replied, “can it be right 
to say that our cities will never be freed from their 
evils until the philosophers, whom we admit to be 
seless to them, become their rulers?” ‘‘ Your 
estion,” I said. “ requires an answer expressed in 
ἃ comparison or parable” “And you,” he said, “of 
course, are not accustomed to speak in comparisons!” 
_ IV. “ So,” said I, “ you are making fun of me after 
driving me into such an impasse of argument. But, 
the same, hear my comparison so that you may 

ill better see how I strain after’ imagery. For so 
ruel is the condition of the better sort in relation to 
the state that there is nosingle thing” like it in nature. 
But to find a likeness for it and a defence for them 
Gne must bring together many things in such a com- 

ae! Cf. a 517 pv, Laws 644 c, Symp. 215 a with Bury’s 
Cf. parable of the great beast infra 493, and of 
many-headed beast, 588-589. 
_ * The word γλίσχρως is untranslatable, and often mis- 
1 In 553 ¢ it means “ stingily *; in Cratyl. 414 Ὁ 
itis used of a strained etymology, and so in 435 c, usually 
1 tood; in Crito 53 πὶ of clinging to life; ef. Phaedo 
117 ας in Plutarch, De Is. et Osir. 28 of a straine allegory 
nd ibid. 75 of a strained resemblance; in Aristoph. Peace 
of a dog. λ Cf. Laws 747 5. 

VOL. II c 17 


Β ἐ ἐν τῇ νηϊ πάντας, ὑπόκωφον δὲ καὶ ὁρῶντα 

Ο διδακτὸν ἑτοίμους κατατέμνειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ αὐτῷ 


μενὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, οἷον οἱ γραφεῖς tn a: 

Kal τὰ τοιαῦτα μιγνύντες γράφουσι. νόησον γὰρ 
τοιουτονὶ γενόμενον εἴτε πολλῶν ψεῶν πέρι εἴτε 

μιᾶς" ναύκληρον μεγέθει μὲν καὶ ῥώ HT] ὑπὲρ beet | 

αύτως βραχύ τι καὶ γιγνώσκοντα περὶ peace 
ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, τοὺς δὲ ναύτας στασιάζοντας πρὸς 
ἀλλήλους περὶ τῆς κυβερνήσεως, ἕκαστον οἰόμενον. 
δεῖν κυβερνᾶν, μήτε μαθόντα πώποτε τὴν τέχνην 
μήτε ἔχοντα ἀποδεῖξαι διδάσκαλον ἑαυτοῦ μηδὲ 
χρόνον ἐν ᾧ ἐμάνθανε, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φάσκοντας, 
μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λέγοντα ὡς 

ἀεὶ τῷ ναυκλήρῳ περικεχύσθαι Ascuisians καὶ 


« Of. Horace, Ars Poetica, init.; What Plato Said, p. ὁ 
on Phaedr. 229 p-®, and infra 588 cf. The expression | 
still used, or revived, in Modern Greek newspapers. “Γ᾿ 

» The syntax of this famous allegory is anacoluthic and 
perhaps uncertain: but there need be no doubt about the 
meaning. Cf. my article in the Classical Review, xx. (1906 Ε᾿ 

p. 947. 

to Ἂ, commends the allegory, Methods and Results, 
᾿ 313. . also Carlyle’s famous metaphor of the 
oubling Cons Horn by ballot. Cf. Class. Phil. ix. (1914 

p. 362. 

“ The Athenian demos, as portrayed e.g. in Aristophanes” 
Knights 40 ff. and passim. Cf. Aristot. ‘Finet. 1408 35 καὶ 
ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιος ναυκλήρῳ ἰσχυρῷ a ehane δέ, 
Polyb. vi. 44 ἀεὶ γάρ ποτε τὸν τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων δῆμον παραπλήσιον 
εἶναι τοῖς ἀδεσπότοις σκάφεσι, etc. Cf. the old sailor in Joseph 
Conrad’s Chance, ch. i. ‘‘ No ship navigated . . in the 
happy-go-lucky manner . . . would ever arrive into port.” 
or ‘the figure of the ship of state ef. Polit. 302 a ff., 
299 5, Euthydem. 291 Ὁ, Aesch. Seven against Thebes 2-3, 
Theognis 670-685, Horace, Odes i. 15 with my note, Urwick, 



bination as painters mix when they portray goat- 
‘stags ® and similar creatures. ὃ Conceive this sort of 
thing happening either on many ships or on one: 
Picture a shipmaster ¢ in height and strength surpass- 
‘ing all others on the ship, but who is slightly deaf? 
of similarly impaired vision, and whose know- 
of navigation is on a par with? his sight and 
hearing. Conceive the sailors to be wrangling with 
‘one another for control of the helm, each claimi 
‘that it is his right to steer though he has never learned 
the art and cannot point out his teacher’ or any time 
when he studied it. And what is more, they affirm 
that it cannot be taught at all,’ but they are ready to 
nake mincemeat of anyone” who says that it can be 
taught, and meanwhile they are always clustered 
about‘ the shipmasier importuning him and sticking 
‘The Message of Plato, pp. 110-111, Ruskin, Time and 
Tide i ‘That the governing authority should be in the 
ἢ of a true and trained pilot is as clear and as constant. 
Tn none of these conditions is there any difference between 
‘a nation and a boat’s company.” Cf. Longfellow’s. The 
Building of the Ship, in fine. Cf. Laws 758 a, 945 ς. 
_ For the criticism of democracy by a figure ¢f. also Polit. 
991 & ff. 
_ * Cf, Aristoph. Knights 42-44. 
_* Cf. 390 c, 426 v, 498 5, Theaetet. 167 8, and Milton’s 
unknown and like esteemed,” Comus 630. 
_ ? For this and similar checks on pretenders to knowledge 
ef. Laches 185 ©, 186 a and c, Ale. I. 109 Ὁ and Gorg. 514 8-c. 
αὶ Plato of course believed that virtue or the political art 
an be taught in a reformed state, but practically was not 
at Athens. Cf. Unity of Plato's Thought, p. 14, 
on 518 p, What Plato Said, pp. 70 and 511, Newman, 
Aristot. Pol. p. 397, Thompson on Meno 70 a. 
_* A hint of the fate of Socrates. Cf. infra 517 a, 494 8, 




| D pev καλοῦντας καὶ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἐπιστάμενον 


πάντα ποιοῦντας, ὅπως ἂν σφίσι τὸ yee 
ἐπιτρέψῃ, ἐνίοτε δ᾽ ἂν μὴ πείθωσιν ἀλλὰ 
μᾶλλον, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἢ ἢ ἀποκτεινύντας ἢ 
βάλλοντας ἐκ τῆς νεώς, τὸν δὲ ἐνναῖον bar 

μανδραγόρᾳ ἢ μέθῃ ἤ τινι an ῳ ξύμμορῖξα 
τῆς νεὼς ἄρχειν χρωμένους τοῖς ἐνοῦσι 
τάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους πλεῖν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, δ: 
τοιούτους, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπαινοῦντας ναυτικὸν 

τὰ κατὰ ναῦν, ὃς ἂν ξυλλαμβάνειν δεινὸς. ἢ, ὅπως 
ἄρξουσιν ἢ ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι. τὸν ναύκληρον, 
τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ψέγοντας ὡς ἄχ , τοῦ δὲ 
ἀληθινοῦ κυβερνήτου πέρι μηδ᾽ ὁ ἀὐκίννίθες ieee t 
ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, ond 

1 ératovras q, ératovres AFDM. ea 

* For the idiom πάντα ποιεῖν of. a 8 c, infra 504 D-x, 
571 c, 575 Ἐ, 494 π, Gorg. 479 c, Phaedr. 252 E, Apol. 39 . 
and, slightly varied, Eurip. Heracleidae 841. . 
Ὁ The word ἐκβάλλοντας helps the obvious allegory, for ἶ 
also means banish. 
“ Here figurative. Cf. Gorg. 482 x, Theaet: 165% “Inf i 
615 πὶ it is used literally. h, 5:6 Te 
4 Cf. Polit. 297 x. The expression is slightly ironical. 
Such is frequently the tone of γενναῖος in Plato. Of. Rep. 
454 a, 363 a, 544 c, 348 c, Hipp. Min. 370 , Soph. bee 

Hipp. Maj. 290 x, Polit. 274 x. A 
4 Cf. Polit. 302 a, Laws 906 B, Jebb on Soph. An is 
189-190. Ὁ ΨἘΪ 
5 AOE I OEE iv. 26, vi. 69, vii. 95. Cs Sa 
eo 427 ©, Laws 905 c, Pryx. 396 £, Aristoph. Knights 229, 
either here nor in p-£ can ὅπως with the future mean 
‘in what way,” and all interpretations based on that 
caine are plainly wrong. The expression in both cases 
refers to getting control. τς 838 5, Laws 757 Ὁ, 714 0, 

962 p-r, Xen. Rep. Lac. 14.5. Cf. Class. Phil. ix. mie 
Pp. 358 and 362. . " 
* For τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον cf. Ale. 11. 145 ¢. LADOVas 



at nothing 5 to induce him to turn over the helm to 
the a. And sometimes, if they fail and others get | 
s ear, they put the others to death or cast them out? | 
m the ship, and then, after binding 5 and stupefying | 
the worthy shipmaster ὦ with mandragora or intoxica- 
tion or otherwise, they take command of the ship, | 
nsume its stores and, drinking and feasting, make | 
a voyage ὁ of it as is to be expected / from such, | 
as if that were not enough, they praise and cele-| 
brate as a navigator, a pilot, a master of shipcraft, | 
‘the man who is most cunning to lend a hand? in per- | 
‘suading or constraining the shipmaster to let them, 
οὐ while the man who lacks this craft‘ they censure _ 
useless. They have no suspicion’ that the true 
must give his attention* to the time of the year, | 

Rs The ppl. must refer to the sailors; hence the acc. (see 
or note ΄ 

i> W. the text and the amount of probable anacoluthon 
‘sentence, the meaning is that the unruly sailors (the 
mob) have no true conception of the state of mind of the 
‘Teal pilot (the philosophic statesman), and that it is he 
᾿ pting Sidgwick’s ofoudyy for the ms. οἰόμενοι in Ἐ) who 
f not believe that the trick of getting possession of the 
; is an art, or that, if it were, he could afford time to 
practise it. Those who read οἰόμενοι attribute the idea of the 
‘incompatibility of the two things to the sailors. But that 
overlooks the points I have already made about ὅπως, and 
een is in any case improbable, because the sentence as 
a le is concerned with the attitude of the true pilot 

), which may be represented by the words of Burke 

to his constituents, ‘I could hardly serve you as I have done 

court you too.” 

Cf. Sidgwick, ““On a Passage in Plato’s Republic,” 
of Philology, v. pp. 274-276, and my notes in A.J.P. 

Ῥ. 364 and xvi. p. 234. 

ΠΣ For the force of the article ef. Thucyd. ii. 65 τὸ ἐπέφθονον 

t, and my article in T.A.P.A. 1893, p. 81, n. 6. C7. 

also Charm. 156 © and Rep. 496 r. 



καὶ ὡρῶν καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἄστρων καὶ henge ' 
καὶ πάντων τῶν τῇ τέχνῃ προσηκόντων, εἰ μέλλει, 

τῷ ὄντι νεὼς ἀρχικὸς ἔσεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει 

E ἐάν τέ τινες βούλωνται ἐάν τε μή, μήτε τέχνην τού- 
του ΠΩ μελέτην οἰομένῳ' δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν, 
ἅμα καὶ τὴν ταις τὐρενο αν τοιούτων δὴ περὶ τὰς 
ναῦς 14 hota TOV ὡς ἘΣ RopcPaugeeer, οὐχ 
ἡγεῖ dv τῷ ὄντι μετεωροσκόπον τε καὶ ᾿ ἀδολέσχην 
489 καὶ ἄχρηστόν σφισι καλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς 
οὕτω κατεσκευασμέναις ναυσὶ Pres | Kat 

μάλα, ἔφη ὁ ᾿Αδείμαντος. Od δή, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οἶμαι 

δεῖσθαί σε ἐξεταζομένην τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ταῖς 
πόλεσι πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φιλοσόφους τὴν διά- 
θεσιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ μανθάνειν ὃ λέγω. Καὶ μάλα, 
ἔφη. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἐκεῖνον τὸν θαυμάζοντα, 
ὅτι οἱ φιλόσοφοι οὐ τιμῶνται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, 
δίδασκέ τε τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ πειρῶ πείθειν, ὅτι πολὺ 
Β ἂν θαυμαστότερον ἦν, εἰ ἐτιμῶντο. ᾿Αλλὰ διδάξω, 
1 οἰομένῳ Sidgwick : οἰόμενοι Mss. 



the seasons, the sky, the winds, the stars, and all 
that ins to his art if he is to be a true ruler of a 
ship, and that he does not believe that there is any 
art or science of seizing the helm @ with or without the 
consent of others, or any possibility of mastering this 
alleged art ὃ and the practice of it at the same time 
with the science of navigation. With such goings-on 
aboard ship do. you not think that the real pilot 
‘would in very deed ° be called a star-gazer, an idle 
babbler, a useless fellow, by the sailors in ships 
‘managed after this fashion?’ ‘‘ Quite so,” said 
Adeimantus. “ You take my meaning, I presume, 
-and do not require us to put the comparison to the 
proof? and show that the condition’ we have described 
is the exact counterpart of the relation of the state 
‘to the true philosophers.”’ “It is indeed,’’ he said. 
“ To begin with, then, teach this parable’ to the man 
ee is surprised that philosophers are not honoured 
in our cities, and try to convince him that it would 
be far more surprising if they were honoured.” “1 


also Class. Rev. xx. (1906) p. 247. See too Cic. De or. i. 4 
“neque aliquod praeceptum artis esse arbitrarentur,”’ and 

infra 518 νυ. 

_ * τῷ ὄντι verifies the allusion to the charge that Socrates 

was a babbler and a star-gazer or weather-prophet. Cf. 
225 v, Polit. 299 5, and What Plato Said, p. 527 on 

do 70 c; Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 1480. 

_# Plato like some modern writers is conscious of his own 

imagery and frequently interprets his own symbols. Cf, 

517 «-s, 531 B, 588 B, Gorg. 493 Ὁ, 517 pv, Phaedo 87 8, 

Laws 644 c, Meno 72 s-8, Tim. 19 8, Polit. 297 ε. Gf. 

also the cases where he says he cannot tell what it is but 

4 what it is like, ¢.g. Rep. 506 2, Phaedr. 246 s, Symp. 

215 4 5, 

Bg — and ἕξις are not discriminated by Plato as by 


ΟἿ Cf. 476 v-r. 


ἔφη. Kal ὅτι τοίνυν τἀληθῆ λέγει, ὡς" “ἄχρηστοι 


τοῖς πολλοῖς οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι. τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ: 
τῆς μέντοι ἀχρηστίας τοὺς. μὴ χρωμένους 1 κέλευε, 
αἰτιᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει 
φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἄρχεσθαι ὑφ᾽ 
αὑτοῦ, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων 
θύρας i ἰέναι, ἀλλ᾽ 6 τοῦτο κομψευσάμενος ἐψεύσατο, 
τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν, ἐάν τε πλούσιος ἐάν. τε 
πένης κάμνῃ, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπὶ ἰατρῶν θύρας 
ἰέναι καὶ πάντα τὸν ἄρχεσθαι δεόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ 
ἄρχειν δυναμένου, οὐ τὸν ἄρχοντα δεῖσθαι τῶν dpxo- 
μένων ἄρχεσθαι, οὗ ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τι ὄφελος. hh 
ἀλλὰ τοὺς viv πολιτικοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀπεικάζων οἷς 
ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν ναύταις οὐχ ἁμαρτήσει, καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ 
τούτων ἀχρήστους λεγομένους καὶ μετεωρολέσχας 

iY iets 

* This passage illustrates one of the most interesti 
characteristics of Plato’s style, namely the representation 
thought as adventure or action. This procedure is, or was, 
familiar to modern readers in Matthew Arnold’s account in 
God and the Bible of his quest for the meaning of God, which 
in turn is imitated in°Mr. Updegraff’s New Word. It lends 
vivacity and interest to Pascal’s Provinciales and 
other examples of it can be found in modern literature. | 
classical instance of it in Plato is Socrates’ narrative in the 
Phaedo of his search for a satisfactory explanation of natural 
phenomena, 96 a ff. In the Sophist the argument is re 
sented as an effort to track and capture the sophist. 
the figure of the hunt is common in the dialogues (ef. supr 
Vol. ae 365). Cf. also Rep, 455 a-s, 474 B, 588 οὖν 
612 c, ΠΝ 291 a-B, 293 a, Phileb. 24 a ff., 43 a, 44 D, 
45 a, Laws 892 p-r, Theaet. 169 pv, 180 8, 196 D, Polit. 
265 8, ete. 

> Cf. 487 vy. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 3 



will teach him,” 6 he said. “‘ And say to him further: 
You are right in affirming that the finest spirits 
among the philosophers are of no service to the multi- 
_ tude. But bid him blame for this uselessness,? not the 

liar. But the true nature of things is that whether 
_ the sick man be rich or poor he must needs go to the 
_ door of the physician, and everyone who needs to be; 
_ governed? to the door of the man who knows how to 

_ govern, not that the ruler should implore his natural | 
_ subjects to let themselves be ruled, if he is really good | 

ing our present political rulers to the sort of sailors we 
were just describing, and those whom these call useless | 


ἢ we am not sure that I do not think this the fault of our com- 
munity rather than of the men of culture.” 

_ © For the idiom φύσιν ἔχει cf. 473 a, Herod. ii. 45, Dem. 
ii. 26. Similarly ἔχει λόγον, Rep. 378 £, 491 v, 564 a, 610 a, 
Phaedo 62 8 Ὁ, Gorg. 501 a, etc. 

ἃ This saying was attributed to Simonides. Cf. schol. 
. Hermann, 0, vol. vi. p. 346, Joel, Der echte und der 
ische Sokrates, ii p. 81, Aristot. Rhet. 1391 a 8. 
eS haedr. 245 a ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας, Thompson on Phaedr. 
. E, supra 364 B ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας, Laws 953 τὸ ἐπὶ ras 
τῶν πλουσίων καὶ σοφῶν θύρας, and for the idea cf. also infra 
ἶ a and Theaet. 170 a, Timon of Athens tv. iii. 17 “ΤῊς 
᾿ pate ducks to the golden fool.” 

__ * For Plato’s attitude toward the epigrams of the Pre- 
erates ef. Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 68-69. 

ad κοΐ Theaet. 170 Β and infra 590 c-p. 

᾿ς ® For the idiom with ὄφελος ef. 530 c, 567 B, Euthyphro 
48, Apol. 36 c, Crito 46 a, Euthydem. 289 a, Soph. O.C. 
_ 259, where it is varied. 

» 25 

for anything.’ But you will make no mistake in liken- | 

_ finer spirits, but those who do not know how to make | 
e of them. For it is not the natural 5 course of | 
things that the pilot should beg the sailors to be | 
a. by him or that wise men should go to the | 
_ doors of the rich.? The author of that epigram ὃ wasa | 


τοῖς ws ἀληθῶς κυβερνήταις. ᾿Ορθότατα, ἔφη. 
Ἔκ τε τοίνυν τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ῥάδιον. 
εὐδοκιμεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτήδευμα ὑπὸ τῶν 
D τἀναντία ἐπιτηδευόντων, πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη καὶ 
ἰσχυροτάτη διαβολὴ γίγνεται φιλοσοφίᾳ διὰ τοὺς 
τὰ τοιαῦτα φάσκοντας ἐπιτηδεύειν, ods 8) σὺ φὴς 
τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγειν ὦ ὡς παμπόνηροι 
οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ἰόντων ἐπ᾽ αὐτήν, οἱ δὲ ἐπι- 
εικέστατοι ἄχρηστοι, καὶ ἐγὼ συνεχώρησα ἀληθῆ 

σε λέγειν. ἢ γάρ; Ναί. 

V. Οὐκοῦν τῆς μὲν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἀχρηστίας τὴν 
αἰτίαν διεληλύθαμεν; Καὶ μάλα. Τῆς δὲ τῶν 
πολλῶν πονηρίας τὴν ἀνάγκην βούλει τὸ μετὰ 
τοῦτο διέλθωμεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ τούτου φιλοσοφία 

Ε αἰτία, ἂν δυνώμεθα, πειραθῶμεν δεῖξαι; Πάνυ 
μὲν οὖν. ᾿Ακούωμεν δὴ καὶ λέγωμεν ἐκεῖθεν 
ἀναμνησθέντες, ὅθεν διῇμεν τὴν φύσιν, οἷον ἀνάγ- 

490 κὴ φῦναι τὸν καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐσόμενον. ἡγεῖτο 
δ᾽ αὐτῷ, εἰ νῷ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἣν 
διώκειν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει ἢ Cov 
ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς. Ἦν 
γὰρ οὕτω λεγόμενον. Οὐκοῦν ἕν μὲν τοῦτο 
σφόδρα οὕτω παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς νῦν δοκουμένοις 
περὶ αὐτοῦ; Kai μάλα, ἔφη. “Ap” οὖν δὴ οὐ 

μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ὃν SRNR 

« Cf. Theaet. 178 ο, nat speak of unworthy philosophers ? 
and infra 495 ὁ ff. 

> Possibly “ wooers.” Of. 347 c, 5218. Plato frequently 
employs the ey σέ of physical love in speaking 
philosophy. Cf. infra 495-496, 490 s, Theaet. 148 & ff., 
Phaedo 66 ©, Meno 70 8, Phaedr, 266 3, etc. 

° Cf. Theaet. 169 τ. 



and star-gazing ideologists to the true pilots.” 
“ Just so,” he said. ‘“‘ Hence, and under these con- 
ditions, we cannot expect that the noblest pursuit 
should be highly esteemed by those whose way of 
life is quite the contrary. But far the greatest and 
chief disparagement of philosophy is brought upon 
it by the pretenders * to that way of life, those whom 
you had in mind when you affirmed that the accuser 
of philosophy says that the majority of her followers ὃ 
are rascals and the better sort useless, while I ad- 
‘mitted ° that what you said wastrue. Is not that so?” 
66 Yes. ᾽ν" 

ΙΥΝ, “ Have we not, then, explained the cause of 
ithe iusclessness of the better sort?” “γε have.” 
“ Shall we next set forth the inevitableness of the 
Pdegencracy of the majority, and try to show if we 
ean that philosophy is not to be blamed for this 
either ὃ “‘ By all means.” “ Let us begin, then, 
what we have to say and hear by recalling the start- 
ing-point of our description of the nature which he 
who is to be ascholar and gentleman “ must have from 
birth. The leader of the choir for him, if you recol- 
lect, was truth. That he was to seek always and 
' altogether, on pain of ¢ being an impostor without part 
or lot in true philosophy.” “‘ Yes, that was said.” 
“Ts not this one point quite contrary to the prevailing 
opinion about him?” “ Itisindeed,” he said. ‘* Will 
it not be a fair plea in his defence to say that it was 
the nature of the real lover of knowledge to strive 
_ 4 The quality of the καλὸς κἀγαθός gave rise to the abstrac- 
" καλοκἀγαθία used for the moral ideal in the Eudemian 

thics. Cf. Isoc. Demon. 6, 13, and 51,. Stewart on Eth. 
Nie. 1124 a 4 (p. 339) and 1179 b 10 (p. 460). 

__ * For 4=“ or else” cf. Prot. 323 a and c, Phaedr. 237 c, 
239 a, 245 v, Gorg. 494 a, Crat. 426 n, etc. 



εἴη dys ιλλᾶσθαι ὅ γε ὄντως φιλομαθής, καὶ οὐκ 
Β ἐπιμένοι ἐπὶ “Τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς ἑκά- 
στοις, ἀλλ᾽ ἴοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιτο οὐδ᾽ ἀπολήγοι 
τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῆς 
φύσεως ἅψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι 
τοῦ τοιούτου" προσήκει δὲ ξυγγενεῖ" ᾧ πλησιάσας 
καὶ μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι. ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλή- 
θειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῴη καὶ τρέφοιτο. καὶ 
οὕτω λήγοι ὠδῖνος, πρὶν δ᾽ ov. Ὥς οἷόν Ce ἔφη, ͵ 
μετριώτατα. Τί οὖν; τούτῳ τι μετέσται ψεῦ os ἢ 
Ca ἀγαπᾶν ἢ πᾶν τοὐναντίον μισεῖν; Μισεῖν, ἔφη. 
᾿Ηγουμένης δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἄν ποτε, οἶμαι, 
φαῖμεν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθῆσαι. Πῶς 
γάρ; “AA ὑγιές τε καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος, ᾧ καὶ 
σωφροσύνην ἕπεσθαι. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη. Καὶ δὴ τὸν 
ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χορὸν τί bet πάλιν 
ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν; μέμνησαι γάρ 
που, ὅτι ξυνέβη προσῆκον τούτοις ἀνδρεία, μεγα- 
λοπρέπεια, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη: καὶ σοῦ ἐπιλα- 
D βομένου, ὅτι πᾶς μὲν ἀναγκασθήσεται ὁμολογεῖν 
οἷς λέγομεν, ἐάσας δὲ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς αὐτοὺς 
ἀποβλέψας περὶ ὧν 6 λόγος, φαίη ὁρᾶν αὐτῶν 
τοὺς μὲν ἀχρήστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς, 
πᾶσαν κακίαν, τῆς διαβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπισκο- — 

ee ee ἂν γκωάδον δα 

2 Similar metaphors for contact, approach and intercourse 
with the truth are frequent in Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. 
For Plato ef. Campbell on Theaet. 1508 and 1864. Cf.also 
supra on 489 pv. Ι 

>Cf. Phaedo 65 © f., Symp. 211 £-212 a. Ἷ 

¢ Lit. “δα nourished.” Cf. Protag. 313 c-p, Soph. 2238, 
Phaedr. 248 8. ae 

4 A Platonic and Neoplatonic metaphor. Cf. Theaet, 
148 £ ἢ, 151 a, and passim, Symp. 206 8, Hpist. ii. 313 ne 
Epictet. ‘Diss. i. 9. 11. 



_ emulously for true being and that he would not linger 
_ over the many particulars that are opined to be real, 

_ but would hold on his way, and the edge of his passion 
_ would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he 
_ came into touch with? thenature of each thing in itself 
_ by that part of his soul to which it belongs ὃ tolay hold 
_ on that kind of reality—the part akin to it, namely— 
_ and through that approaching it, and consorting with 
_ reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, 
_ attain to knowledge and truly live and στον," and so 
᾿ find surcease from his travail? of soul, but not before?” 
_ “No plea could be fairer.” ‘* Well, then, will such a 
_ man love falsehood, or, quite the contrary, hate it?” 
_ “ Hate it,” he said. \* When truth led the way, no 
_ choir? of evils, we, I fancy, would say, could ever follow 
_ inits train.” ‘How could it?” ‘But rather asound 
__ and just character, which is accompanied by temper- 
_ ance.” “Right,” he said. “‘ What need, then, of re- 
ἰ peating from the beginning our proof of the nec 
_ order of the choir that attends on the philosophical 
ἢ nature? You surely remember that we found per- 
_ taining to such a nature courage, grandeur of soul, 

Ἰ Se tolearn,memory,f And when you interposed 
_ the objection that though everybody will be com- 
_ pelled to admit our statements,’ yet, if we abandoned 
_ mere words and fixed our eyes on the persons to whom 

the words referred, everyone would say that he actu- 
_ ally saw some of them to be useless and most of them 
_ base with all baseness, it was in our search for the 
__ * For the figurative use of the word χορός cf. 560 Ez, 
_ 580 8, Euthydem. 279 c, Theaet. 173 B. 

_~ * For the list of virtues ¢f. supra on 487 A. 
ὁ Cf. for the use of the dative Polit. 258 a συγχωρεῖς οὖν 

t Pile ν- 
Σ οἷς λέγει, Phaedo 100 c τῇ τοιᾷδε αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς, Horace, Sat. 
5 ‘ii. 8. 305 “ stultum me fateor, liceat concedere veris.” 


ποῦντες ἐπὶ τούτῳ νῦν γεγόναμεν, τί ποθ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ 
κακοί, καὶ τούτου δὴ ἕνεκα πάλιν ἀνειλήφαμεν. τὴν 

τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν καὶ ἐξ Goeyieys 
E ὡρισάμεθα. "Ἔστιν, ἔφη, ταῦτα. 
VI. Ταύτης δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῆς pope δεῖ 
θεάσασθαι τὰς φθοράς, ὡς διόλλυται ἐν πολλοῖς, 
σμικρὸν δέ τι ἐκφεύγει, οὗς δὴ καὶ οὐ πονηρούς, 
ἀχρήστους δὲ »κκαλοῦσι- καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ τὰς 
49] μιμουμένας ταύτην καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα, καθιστα- q 
μένας αὐτῆς, οἷαι οὖσαι φύσεις ψυχῶν εἰς ἀνάξιον — 
καὶ μεῖζον ἑαυτῶν ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπιτήδευμα, - πολ 
λαχῇ πλημμελοῦσαι, πανταχῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας 
δόξαν οἵαν λέγεις φιλοσοφίᾳ προσῆψαν.. Τίνας. δέ, 
ἔφη, τὰς διαφθορὰς λέγεις; ᾿Ἔγώ σοι, εἶπον, ἂν 
οἷός τε γένωμαι, πειράσομαι διελθεῖν. τόδε μὲν 
οὖν, οἶμαι, πᾶς ἡμῖν ὁμολογήσει, τοιαύτην. φύσιν 
καὶ πάντα ἔχουσαν, ὅσα προσετάξαμεν νῦν δή, 
Β εἰ τελέως μέλλοι φιλόσοφος ᾿ γενέσθαι, ὀλιγάκις 
ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι καὶ ὀλίγας" ἢ οὐκ οἴει; 
Σφόδρα γε. Τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων σκόπει ὡς 
πολλοὶ ὄλεθροι καὶ μεγάλοι. Tives δή; “Ὁ μὲν 
πάντων θαυμαστότατον ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι ἕν ἕκαστον ! 
ὧν ἐπῃνέσαμεν τῆς φύσεως ἀπόλλυσι τὴν, ἔχουσαν 
ψυχὴν καὶ ἀποσπᾷ φιλοσοφίας" λέγω δὲ ἀνδρείαν, 
σωφροσύνην, καὶ πάντα ἃ διήλθομεν. λτοπον, 
Ο ἔφη, ἀκοῦσαι. “Ete τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πρὸς 

“Τα petit nombre des élus. Cf. infra 496 κ-5 and Phaedo 
69 c-p, Matt. xx. 16, xxii. 14. ; 
ὃ For the Greek double use of ἄξιος and ἀνάξιος ef. Laws 
943 ©, Aesch. Ag, 1527. Cf. “ How. worthily he died who 
died unworthily ’’ and Wyatt’s line “ Disdain me not with- 
out desert,”’ ee. 



- eause of this ill-repute that we came to the present 
question: Why is it that the majority are bad? 
_ And, for the sake of this, we took up again the nature 
_ of the true philosophers and defined what it must 

_ necessaril be?” ‘ That is so,’ ’ he said. 

_VI. “ We have, then,” I said, “ to contemplate the 
of the corruption of this nature in the majority, 

_ while a small part escapes,? even those whom men 

“call not bad but useless ; and after that in turn we are 
to observe those who imitate this nature and usurp 

_ its pursuits and see what types of souls they are that 

_ thus entering upon a way of life which is too high ὃ for 

them and exceeds their powers, by the many dis- 

ec cords and disharmonies of their conduct everywhere 

and among all men bring upon philosophy the repute 

pot which you speak.” “ Of what corruptions are you 

Ὁ “J will try,” I said, “ to explain them 

_to you ifI can. I think everyone will grant us this 

t, that a nature such as we just now postulated 

for the perfect philosopher is a rare growth among 
en and is found in only afew. Don’t you think so?” 

b- Most emphatically.” ‘‘ Observe, then, the number 
_ and magnitude of the things that operate to destroy 

ese few.” ‘‘ What are they?” “‘ The most sur- 
rising fact of all is that each of the gifts of nature 
which we praise tends to corrupt the soul of its pos- 

“sessor and divert it from philosophy. I am speaking 

of bravery, sobriety, and the entire list.°” “‘ That does 

sound like a paradox,” said he. “‘Furthermore,’’ said I, 

_, * Cf. Burton, Anatomy, i. 1 “This St. Austin acknow- 
ledgeth of himself in his humble confessions, promptness of 
wit, memory, eloquence, they were God’s good gifts, but he 
_ did not use them to his glo 

ξ Cf. Meno 88 a-c, and pst Ep. vy. 7 “ multa bona 


nobis nocent.”’ 




τούτοις τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ πάντα φθείρει καὶ ἀπο- 
σπᾷ, κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχὺς σώματος καὶ 
ξυγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τού- 
τῶν οἰκεῖα" ἔχεις γὰρ τὸν τύπον ὧν λέγω. "Ἔχω, 
ἔφη’ καὶ ἡδέως γ᾽ ἂν ἀκριβέστερον ἃ λέγεις πυθοΐ: 
μην. Λαβοῦ τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅλου αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς, 
καί σοι εὔδηλόν τε φανεῖται καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπα δόξει 
τὰ προειρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν. Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, 

Ὁ κελεύεις; Ι]αντός, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, σπέρματος πέρι 7 
a Ὁ 7 

φυτοῦ, εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων, ἴσμεν, ὅτι TO 
μὴ τυχὸν τροφῆς ἧς προσήκει ἑκάστῳ μηδ᾽ ὥρας 
μηδὲ τόπου, ὅσῳ ἂν ἐρρωμενέστερον 7, τοσούτῳ 
πλειόνων ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων: ἀγαθῷ γάρ που 
κακὸν ἐναντιώτερον ἢ τῷ μὴ ἀγαθῷ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; 
Ἔχει δή, οἶμαι, λόγον, τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἐν 
ἀλλοτριωτέρᾳ οὖσαν τροφῇ κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς 
φαύλης. "Ἔχει. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ ᾿ΑἈδεί- 

Ε μαντε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφυε- 

στάτας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας διαφερόντως 
κακὰς γίγνεσθαι; ἢ οἷει τὰ μεγάλα ἀδικήματα 
καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ 
ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως τροφῇ διολομένης γίγνεσθαι, 

* Cf. What Plato Said, p. 479 on Charm. 158 a. For 
“goods” ef. ibid. p. 629 on Laws 697 8. The minor or 
earlier dialogues constantly lead up to the point that goods 
are no good divorced from wisdom, or the art to use them 
rightly, or the political or royal art, or the art that will make 
us happy. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 71. 

» This is for Plato’s purpose a sufficiently clear statement — 

of the distinction between contradictory and contrary op- 
position. Plato never drew out an Aristotelian or modern 
logician’s table of the opposition of propositions. But it is 
a misunderstanding of Greek idiom or of his style to say 
that he never got clear on the matter. He always understood 


μῆς, Ὡς. et 

_? ea ee > 


“all the so-called goods * corrupt and divert, beauty 
_and wealth and strength of body and powerful family 
‘connexions in the city and all things akin to them— 
"you get my general meaning?” “I do,”’ he said, “ and 
I would gladly hear a more precise statement of it.” 
“Well,” said I, “grasp it rightly as a general proposition 
and the matter will be clear and the preceding state- 
‘ment will not seem to yousostrange.” “‘ Howdo you 
bid me proceed?” he said. “γε know it to be univer- 
sally true of every seed and growth, whether vegetable 
or animal, that the more vigorous it is the more it 
alls short of its proper perfection when deprived 
of the food, the season, the place that suits it. For 
evil ismore opposed tothe good than tothe not-good.?” 
‘Of course.”” “‘Soitis, 1 take it, natural that the best 
ature should fare worse° than the inferior under con- 
ditions of nurture unsuited toit.” ‘‘Itis.” “‘ Then,” 
said I, “ Adeimantus, shall we not similarly affirm that 
the best endowed souls become worse than the others 
under a bad education ? Or do you suppose that great 
crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight 
nature“ and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its 
Cf. Symp. 202 a-z, and supra on 437 ν- 8, What Plato 
te 595 on Soph, 257 xB, and ibid. p. 563 on Rep. 

; ἢ ) B " 

Ὁ “Corruptio optimi pessima.”’ - Cf. 495 ν-8, Xen. Mem. 
. 2. 24, iv. 1. 3-4, Dante, Inferno, vi. 106: 

ἢ Ed Pi ame: Ritorna a tua scienza 

: e vuol, τ ea la cosa ἃ pit: perfetta, 

‘ Pit senta il bene e cosi la doglienza. 

Cf. Livy xxxviii. 17 “ generosius in sua quidquid sede gigni- 
ir: insitum alienae terrae in id quo alitur, natura vertente 
degenerat,”’ Pausanias vii. 17. 3. 

Cf. 495; La Rochefoucauld, Maz. 130 “la faiblesse 
le seul défaut qu’on ne saurait corriger’’ and 467 “la 
blesse est plus opposée ἃ la vertu que le vice.” 

VOL, II D 33 



ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε ἀγαθῶν οὔτε κακῶν 
αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσεσθαι; Οὔκ, ἀλλά, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, οὕτως. 
2 Ἣν τοίνυν ἔθεμεν τοῦ φιλοσόφου φύσιν, ἂν μέν, 
οἶμαι, μαθήσεως προσηκούσης τύχῃ, εἰς πᾶσαν 
ἀρετὴν ἀνάγκη αὐξανομένην ἀφικνεῖσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ 
μὴ ἐν προσηκούσῃ σπαρεῖσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα 
τρέφηται, εἰς πάντα τἀναντία αὖ, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτῇ 
βοηθήσας θεῶν τύχῃ. ἢ καὶ σὺ ἡγεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ 
πολλοί, διαφθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν 
νέους, διαφθείροντας δέ τινας σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς, 
ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα 

Β λέγοντας μεγίστους μὲν εἶναι σοφιστάς, παιδεύειν 

δὲ τελεώτατα καὶ ἀπεργάζεσθαι οἵους βούλονται 
εἶναι καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ 
a , / > a σ 
γυναῖκας; Πότε δή; ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Ὅταν, εἶπον, 
, 3 ’ ¢ ΜΕΝ > , 
ξυγκαθεζόμενοι ἀθρόοι οἱ πολλοὶ" εἰς ἐκκλησίας 
ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἢ τινα 
» \ 7 uA ‘ ~ / 
ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλογον ξὺν πολλῷ θορύβῳ 

1 οἱ πολλοὶ Hermann: πολλοὶ Μ88., οἱ secl. Cobet. 

«Ὁ, infra 497 Β, Tim. 42 "Ὁ. be 

> This is the θεῖα μοῖρα of 493 a and Meno 99 5. Cf. What 
Plato Said, p. 517. 2 

¢ See What Plato Said, pp. 12 ff. and on Meno 93-94. Plato 
again anticipates many of his modern critics. Cf, Grote’s 
defence of the sophists passim, and Mill, Utility of Religion 
(Three Essays on Religion, pp. 78, 84 ff.). 

4 ἰδιωτικούς refers to individual sophists as opposed to the 
great sophist of public opinion. Cf. 492 τ, 493 a, 494 a. 

6 For καὶ ἄξιον λόγου ef. Huthydem. 279 c, Laches 192 a, 
Laws 908 8, supra 445 c, Thucyd. ii. 54. 5, Aristot. Pol. 
1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, De part. an. 654 a 13, Demosth. v. 16, 
Isoe. vi. 56. 

t Cf. Gorg. 490 5, Emerson, Self-Reliance: “It is easy 
. . . to brook the rage of the cultivated classes. . . . 
But .. . when the unintelligent brute force that lies at the 





nurture, while a weak nature will never be the cause 
of anything great, either for good or evil?’ “ No,” 
he said, “that is the case.” ‘‘ Then the nature 
_ which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives 
_ the proper teaching, must needs grow and attain to 
consummate excellence, but, ifit be sown? and planted 
and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome 
will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to 
_ the rescue.’ Or are you too one of the multitude who 
believe that there are young men who are corrupted 

y the sophists,° and that there are sophists in private 
life who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning,’ 
and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this 
_ strain who are the chief sophists and educate most 
effectively and mould to their own heart’s desire 

oung and old, men and women?” “ When?.”’ said 
he. “ Why, when,” I said, “ the multitude are seated 
together’ in assemblies or in court-rooms or theatres 
or camps or any other public gathering of a crowd, 

bottom of society is made to growl and mow, it needs the 
habit of magnanimity and religion to treat it godlike asa 
trifle of no concernment,” Carlyle, French volution: 
“Great is the combined voice of men. ... He who can 
resist that has his footing somewhere beyond time.” 
For the public as the great sophist ef. Brimley, Essays, 

. 224 (The Angel in the House): “The miserable view of 
ife and its purposes which society instils into its youth of 
both sexes, being still, as in Plato’s time, the sophist par 
excellence of which all individual talking and writing sophists 
are but feeble copies.”” Cf. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr.‘ τι. 1. 601 “* Die 
sophistische Ethik ist seiner Ansicht nach die einfache Kon- 
Sequenz der Gewéhnlichen.’”’ This is denied by some recent 
critics. The question is a logomachy. Of course there is 
more than one sophistic ethics. Cf. Mill, Dissertations and 
Discussions, iv. pp. 247 ff., 263 ff., 275. 

For Plato’s attitude toward the sophists see also Polit. 
303 ο, Phaedr. 260 c,*What Plato Said, pp. 14-15, 158. 



τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, τὰ 
δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν, ὑπερβαλλόντως ἑκάτερα, καὶ ἐκ- 
Ο βοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες, πρὸς δ᾽ αὐτοῖς al τε 
πέτραι καὶ ὃ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὦσιν ἐπηχοῦντες 
διπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ 
ἐπαίνου. ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ λεγόμενον, 
τίνα οἴει καρδίαν ἴσχειν; ἢ ποίαν ἂν αὐτῷ παι- 
δείαν ἰδιωτικὴν ἀνθέξειν, ἣν οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσαν 
ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου ψόγου ἢ ἐπαίνου οἰχήσεσθαι 
φερομένην κατὰ ῥοῦν, ἧ ἂν οὗτος φέρῃ, καὶ 
φήσειν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τούτοις καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι, 
D καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσειν ἅπερ ἂν οὗτοι, καὶ ἔσεσθαι 
τοιοῦτον; IloAAy, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνάγκη. 

VII. Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὔπω τὴν μεγίστην 
ἀνάγκην εἰρήκαμεν. Ilolav; ἔφη. “Hv ἔργῳ προσ- 
τιθέασι, λόγῳ μὴ πείθοντες, οὗτοι of παιδευταί — 
τε καὶ σοφισταί. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὅτι τὸν μὴ πειθό- 
μενον ἀτιμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις 
κολάζουσιν; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα. Τίνα οὖν 
ἄλλον σοφιστὴν οἴει ἢ ποίους ἰδιωτικοὺς λόγους 

E ἐναντία τούτοις τείνοντας κρατήσειν; Οἶμαι μὲν 
οὐδένα, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐ γάρ, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ 
ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλὴ ἄνοια. οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε 
γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται [ἄλλο ἢ] ἀλλοῖον 
ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν 

1 ἄλλο ἢ was added by Hermann, unnecessarily. 

2 Cf. Eurip. Orest. 901, they shouted ὡς καλῶς λέγοι, 
also Huthydem. 303 8 οἱ κίονες, 276 B and Ὁ, Shorey on 
Horace, Odes i. 20.7 ‘‘datus in theatro cum tibi plausus,” and 
also the account of the moulding process in Protag. 323-326. 

» What would be his plight, his state of mind; how would 

he feel? Cf. Shorey in Class. Phil. y. (1910) pp. 220-221, 
Iliad xxiv. 367, Theognis 748 καὶ τίνα θυμὸν ἔχων; Symp. 



and with loud uproar censure some of the things that 
are said and done and approve others, both in excess, 
_ with full-throated clamour and clapping of hands, 
and thereto the rocks and the region round about 
re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the 
praise.* In such case how do you think the young 
man’s heart, as the saying is, is moved within him?? 
What private teaching do you think will hold out and 
not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and 
applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will 
affirm ° the same things that they do to be honourable 
and base, and will do as they do, and be even 
such asthey?” “That is quite inevitable, Socrates,” 
he said. 

VII. “ And, moreover,” I said, “‘ we have not yet 
mentioned the chief necessity and compulsion.” 
“Whatisit?” saidhe. “That which these ‘educators’ 
and sophists impose by action when their words fail to 
convince. Don’t you know that they chastise the 
recalcitrant with loss of civic rights and fines and 
death?” “They most emphatically do,” he said. 
“ What other sophist, then, or what private teaching 
do you think will prevail in opposition to these?” 
“None, I fancy,” said he. ‘‘ No,” said I, “the very 
attempt? is the height of folly. For there is not,never 
has been and never will be, a divergent type of char- 
acter and virtue created by an education running 
219 D3 τίνα οἴεσθέ με διάνοιαν ἔχειν ; Eurip. ILA. 1173 τίν᾽ 
ἐν δόμοις με καρδίαν ἕξειν δοκεῖς ; 

“ Adam translates as if it were καὶ φήσει. Cf. my “‘ Platon- 
ism and the History of Science,” Amer. Philos. Soc. Proc. 
Ixvi. p. 174 n. See Stallbaum ad loc. 

. * Cf. Protag. 317 a-s, Soph. 239 c, Laws 818 νυ. 
* Cf. Od. xvi. 437. See Friedlander, Platon, ii. 386 n. 

who says ἀλλοῖον γίγνεσθαι can only = ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, “* be made 






πεπαιδευμένον, ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε: θεῖον μέντοι 
κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου: εὖ γὰρ 
χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅ τί περ ἂν σωθῇ τε καὶ γένηται οἷον 

498 δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, θεοῦ μοῖραν 

Ὁ 4 ~ ij > cat DF is, 292 2)~O¥ 
αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων od κακῶς ἐρεῖς. Οὐδ᾽ ἐμοὶ 
ΝΜ ” col ” : , ΩΝ 3 7 
ἄλλως, ἔφη, δοκεῖ. "Ere τοίνυν σοι, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξάτω. Τὸ ποῖον; “Exa- 

“- - 5 \ 
στος τῶν μισθαρνούντων ἰδιωτῶν, ods δὴ οὗτοι 
A a \ 
σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι Kal ἀντιτέχνους ἡγοῦνται, μὴ 
ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, 
“a / μὴ ε ~ \ / , 
ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἁθροισθῶσι, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην 
καλεῖν: οἵόνπερ ἂν εἰ θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ 
ἰσχυροῦ τρεφομένου τὰς ὀργάς τις καὶ ἐπιθυμίας 
κατεμάνθανεν, ὅπῃ τε προσελθεῖν χρὴ καὶ ὅπῃ 
ἅψασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁπότε χαλεπώτατον ἢ πραό- 
τατον καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίγνεται, καὶ φωνὰς δὴ ἐφ᾽ 

e ε 4 ” 0 θ ’ θ ‘ a 8» ἢ 
οἷς ἑκάστας εἴωθε φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ οἵας ad ἄλλου 
φθεγγομένου ἡμεροῦταί τε καὶ ἀγριαίνει, κατα- 

“- * / eee Be 
μαθὼν δὲ ταῦτα πάντα Evvovaia τε καὶ χρόνου 
τριβῇ σοφίαν τε καλέσειεν καὶ ὡς τέχνην συστησά- 

« Of. 529 c for the idiom, and Laws 696 a οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε 
γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων 
πρὸς ἀρετήν. ' Ἶ 

» Cf. Symp. 176 c (of Socrates), Phaedr. 242 5, Theaet. 
162 D-£. 

¢ Cf. supra on 492 a, Apol. 838 ο, Phaedo 58 x, Protag. 
328 5, Meno 99 κε, Phaedr. 244 c, Laws 642 c, 875 0, Jon 534. 

4 Cf. Arnold, Preface to Essays in Criticism; Phaedo 
60 pv, Laws 817 3, On Virtue 376 Ὁ. 

4 Cf. Epist. v. 321 Ὁ ἔστιν γὰρ δή τις φωνὴ τῶν πολιτειῶν, 
ἑκάστης καθάπερεί τινων ζῴων, “each form of government has 
a sort of voice, as if it were a kind of animal”’ (tr. L.A. Post), 
Hackforth says this is a clumsy imitation of the Republic 
which proves the letter spurious. Cf. Thomas Browne, 
Religio Medici, ii. 1 “ If there be any among those common 



counter to theirs*—humanly speaking, I mean, my 
friend; for the divine, asthe proverbsays, allrules fail.” 
And you may be sure that, if anything is saved and 
turns out Sell in the present condition of society and 
government, in saying that the providence of God ¢ 
preservesit you willnot be speakingill.” “‘Neitherdo 

ithink otherwise,” he said. “‘ Then,” said I, “think , 

this also in addition.” “‘What?” “Each ofthese | 
privateteachers who work forpay, whomthe politicians _ 
call sophists and regard as their rivals,* inculeates | 

nothing else than these opinions of the multitude 

__ which they opine when they are assembled and calls | 
_ this knowledge wisdom. Itis asifaman were acquir- | 

ing the knowledge of the humours and desires of a| 
great strong beast ¢ which he had in his keeping, how | 
_ itis to be approached and touched, and when and by | 
_ what things it is made most savage or gentle} yes, 
and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the’ 
occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by an- 
other make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this 
knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse > 





of time should call it wisdom, and should construct | 

_ objects of hatred I do contemn and laugh at, it is that great 
enemy of reason, virtue, and religion, the multitude .. . one 
great beast and a monstrosity more prodigious than Hydra,” 
Horace, Ppist. i. 1. 76 ‘* belua multorum es capitum.” Also 
Hamilten’s “Sir, your people is a great beast,’’ Sidney, 
4ircadia, bk. ii. ** Many-headed multitude,’’ Wallas, Human 
Nature in Politics, p. 172 ‘*. . . like Plato’s sophist is learn- 
ing what the public is and is beginning to understand ‘the 
ions and desires’ of that ‘huge and powerful brute,’” 
es. Coriolanus iv. i. 2 “‘The beast with many heads 
Butts me away,” ibid. τε. iii. 18 “ΤῊΣ many-headed multi- 
tude.”’ For the idea cf. also Gorg. 501 B-c ff., Phaedr. 260 c 
δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκώς, “‘ having studied the opinions 
of the multitude,”’ Isoc. ii. 49-50. 


μενος ἐπὶ διδασκαλίαν τρέποιτο, μηδὲν εἰδὼς TH 
ἀληθείᾳ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν, 
“ 4« cia ΚΣ LG ἘΛ τὰ \ om ἌΣ: a gs 
ὅ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον 
ΠΟΥ 3 ’ὔ \ 4 “- of πλάσας “ 
Οἢ ἄδικον, ὀνομάζοι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ 
μεγάλου ζῴου δόξαις, οἷς μὲν χαίροι ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθὰ 
καλῶν, οἷς δὲ ἄχθοιτο κακά, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα ἔχοι 
, ‘ > ~ > A > -“ , “a 
λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ 
A , \ A a > ,ὕ ψ ΠΡ “- ΄, 
καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, 
ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακὼς εἴη μήτε 
ἄλλῳ δυνατὸς δεῖξαι. τοιοῦτος δὴ ὧν πρὸς Διὸς 
οὐκ ἄτοπος av σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι παιδευτής; “Epovy’, 
ἔφη. Ἢ οὖν τι τούτου δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ὃ τὴν τῶν 
Ὁ πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν ξυνιόντων ὀργὴν καὶ 
ε ‘ / , ε 7 ΠΑΝῚ 
ἡδονὰς κατανενοηκέναι σοφίαν ἡγούμενος, εἴτ᾽ ἐν 
- ας τὰ] ~ ” \ > a Ὁ 
γραφικῇ εἴτ᾽ ἐν μουσικῇ εἴτε δὴ ἐν πολιτικῇ; | ὅτι 
μὲν γάρ, ἐάν τις τούτοις ὁμιλῇ ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἢ 
ποίησιν ἤ τινα ἄλλην δημιουργίαν ἢ πόλει δια- 
κονίαν, κυρίους αὑτοῦ ποιῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς πέρα 
τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἡ Διομήδεια λεγομένη ἀνάγκη 
ποιεῖν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν οὗτοι ἐπαινῶσιν: ὡς δὲ 
καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ταῦτα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ἤδη 

« Of. Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 353, n. 1, ibid. xxiii. (1928) 
Ῥ. 361 (Tim. 75 Ὁ), What Plato Said, p. 616 on Tim. 47 Ἐ, 
Aristot. Eth. 1120 b 1 οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, Emer- 
son, Circles, “ Accept the actual for the necessary,” Eurip. 
1.4. 724 καλῶς ἀναγκαίως re. Mill iv. 299 and Grote iv. 221 
miss the meaning. Cf. supra Bk. I. on 347 c, Newman, 
Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 113-114, Iamblichus, Protrept. Teubner 
148 Κ. ἀγνοοῦντος. . . ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ 
ἀναγκαῖα, ‘not knowing how divergent have always been the 
good and the necessary.” 



thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of 
it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these 
opinions and desires is honourable or base, good or evil, 
just or unjust, but should apply all these terms to the 
judgements of the great beast, calling the things that 
pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad, 
having no other account to render of them, but should 
call what is necessary just and honourable,* never 
having observed how great is the real difference 
between the necessary and the good, and being in- 
capable of explaining it to another. Do you not 
think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange 
educator?” “1 do,” he said. “ Do you suppose 
that there is any difference between such a one and 
the man who thinks that it is wisdom to have learned 
to know the moods and the pleasures of the motley 
multitude in their assembly, whether about painting 
or music or, for that matter, politics >| For if a man 
associates with these and offers and exhibits to them 
his poetry ὃ or any other product of his craft or any 
political service,° and grants the mob authority over 
himself more than is unavoidable,’ the ‘proverbial 
necessity of Diomede* will compel him to give the 
public what it likes, but that what it likes is really 
good and honourable, have you ever heard an 

> Cf. Laws 659 5, 701 a, Gorg. 502 B. 

© Cf. 371 c, Gorg. 517 8, 518 B. 

@ Plato likes to qualify sweeping statements and allow 
something to necessity and the weakness of human nature. 
Of. Phaedo 64 καθ᾽ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, infra 558 D-E, 
500 Ὁ, 383 c. 

¢ The scholiast derives this expression from Diomedes’ 
binding Odysseus and driving him back to camp after the 
latter had attempted to kill him. The schol. on Aristoph. 
Heel. 1029 gives a more ingenious explanation. See Frazer, 
Pausanias, ii. p. 264. : 



, / ” 2 +a. /, > 
πώποτέ Tov ἤκουσας αὐτῶν λόγον διδόντος οὐ 
Ἑ καταγέλαστον; Οἶἷμαι δέ γε, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐδ᾽ 
VIII. Ταῦτα τοίνυν πάντα ἐννοήσας ἐκεῖνο 
3 vai 
ἀναμνήσθητι: αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ 
καλά, ἢ αὐτό τι ἕκαστον καὶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἕκαστα, 
» ΄- 
ἔσθ᾽ ὅπως πλῆθος ἀνέξεται ἢ ἡγήσεται εἶναι; 
ὝἭἭ / > ” Φ λό A ΝΜ 8° > , 
κιστά γ᾽, ἔφη. Φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
494 πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι. ᾿Αδύνατον. Kai τοὺς 
φιλοσοφοῦντας ἄρα ἀνάγκη ψέγεσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν. 
᾿Ανάγκη. Καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι 
προσομιλοῦντες ὄχλῳ ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. 
Δῆλον. Ἔκ δὴ τούτων τίνα ὁρᾷς σωτηρίαν 
φιλοσόφῳ φύσει, ὥστ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι μεί- 
νασαν πρὸς τέλος ἐλθεῖν; ἐννόει δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἔμ- 
Β προσθεν. ὡμολόγηται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν εὐμάθεια καὶ 
μνήμη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια ταύτης εἶναι 
τῆς φύσεως. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν εὐθὺς ἐν παισὶν ὃ 
τοιοῦτος πρῶτος ἔσται ἐν ἅπασιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ 
>A ‘ ~ a” A “- = , > > 
ἐὰν τὸ σῶμα φυῇ προσφερὴς τῇ ψυχῇ; Τί δ᾽ οὐ 
7 » ΄ , ἜΞΩ: a 
μέλλει; ἔφη. Βουλήσονται δή, οἶμαι, αὐτῷ χρῆ- 

α καταγέλαστον is a strong word. | ‘‘ Make the very jack- 
asses laugh’? would give the tone. Cf. Carlyle, Past and 
Present, iv. ‘Impartial persons have to say with a sigh 
that . . . they have ene no argument adyanced for it but 
such as might make the angels and almost the very jack- 
asses weep.” 

Cf. also Isoc. Panegyr. 14, Phil. 84, 101, Antid. 247, 
Peace 36, and καταγέλαστος in Plato passim, e.g. Symp. 189 Β. 

* A commonplace of Plato and all intellectual idealists. 
Cf. 503 8, Polit. 292 ©, 297 B, 300 Ἑ. 

Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 87, uses this to support his 
view that Plato had a secret doctrine. Adam quotes Gorg. 
474. A τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ὀὐδὲ διαλέγομαι, which is not quite 


attempted proof of this that isnot simply ridiculous?” 

“No,” he said, ‘‘ and I fancy I never shall hear it 

VIII. “ Bearing all this in mind, recall our former 
question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or 
believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as 
opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or 
can they believe in anything conceived in its essence 
as opposed to the many particulars?’ “ Not in the 
least,” he said. “‘ Philosophy, then, the love of 
wisdom, is impossible for the multitude.” τς 2 

sible.” “Τὸ is inevitable,* then, that those who 
philosophize should be censured by them.” “ In- 
evitable.” ‘‘ And so likewise by those laymen who, 
associating with the mob, desire to curry favour ¢ with 
it.” “Obyiously.”” ‘““ From this point of view do 
you see any salvation that will suffer the born philo- 
sopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the 
end? Consider it in the light of what we said before. 
We agreed* that quickness in learning, memory, 
courage and magnificence were the traits of this 
nature.”’ “Yes.” ‘Then even asa boy‘ among boys 
such a one will take the lead in all things, especially 
if the nature of his body matches the soul.” ‘‘ How 
could he fail to do so?” he said. “ His kinsmen and 

relevant. Cf. Renan, Piudes d’histoire relig. p. 403 “La 
-philosophie sera toujours le fait d’une imperceptible 
sninorité,”’ etc. 

© It is psychologically necessary. Cf. supra, Vol. I. on 
473 x. Cf. 527 a, Laws 655 ©, 658 -π, 681 c, 687 ο, Phaedr. 
239 c, 271 B, Crito 49 pb. 

4 Cf. Gorg. 481 £, 510 νυ, 513 8. 

¢ In 487 a. 

7 Cf. 386 4. In what follows Plato is probably thinking of / 
Alcibiades. Alc. J. 103 a ff. imitates the passage. Cf. Xen. ὁ 

Mem. i. 2. 24. 



θ > δὰ , / > 4 Ἁ | $e) 
σθαι, ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτερος γίγνηται, ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτῶν 
πράγματα οἵ τε οἰκεῖοι καὶ οἱ πολῖται. Πῶς δ᾽ 
οὔ; Ὑποκείσονται ἄρα δεόμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες, 
προκαταλαμβάνοντες καὶ προκολακεύοντες τὴν 
“- a ~ 3.07 
μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. Dire? γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω 
, Φ 4 ΝΜ > > ’ ‘ ~ 
γίγνεσθαι. Τί οὖν οἴει, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸν τοιοῦτον 
ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ποιήσειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τύχῃ 
μεγάλης πόλεως ὧν καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλούσιός τε καὶ 
-“ > 
γενναῖος, καὶ ἔτι εὐειδὴς καὶ μέγας; ἄρ᾽ ov 
> / > « , ma. 
πληρωθήσεσθαι ἀμηχάνου ἐλπίδος, ἡγούμενον καὶ 
\ a ε 7 \ ‘ “- / Ὁ \ 
τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἱκανον 
ἔσεσθαι πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν 
΄ “ cd 
αὑτόν, σχηματισμοῦ Kal φρονήματος κενοῦ ἄνευ 
a ~ 4 
vod ἐμπιπλάμενον; Kai μάλ᾽, ἔφη. Τῷ δὴ οὕτω 
διατιθεμένῳ ἐάν τις ἠρέμα προσελθὼν τἀληθῆ 
“a ~ a ‘ A 
λέγῃ, ὅτι νοῦς οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ, δεῖται δέ, τὸ δὲ 
“-“ ~ > 
od κτητὸν μὴ δουλεύσαντι τῇ κτήσει αὐτοῦ, dp 
εὐπετὲς οἴει εἶναι εἰσακοῦσαι διὰ τοσούτων κακῶν; 
Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. "Edy δ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
διὰ τὸ εὖ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τῶν λόγων 
se > / / / ‘ / 1, @& 
εἷς αἰσθάνηταί τέ πῃ Kal κάμπτηται Kal ἕλκηται 
\ , oe γ 3, ; \ 
πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, Ti οἰόμεθα δράσειν ἐκείνους τοὺς 
ἡγουμένους ἀπολλύναι αὐτοῦ τὴν χρείαν τε καὶ 

@ For ὑποκείσονται ef. Gorg. 510 c, infra 576 a ὑποπεσόντες, 
Eurip. Orest. 670 ὑποτρέχειν, Theaet. 173 a ὑπελθεῖν. 

> ἐδ. endeavouring to secure the advantage of it for them- 
selves by winning his favour when he is still young and 

¢ Cf. Ale. 1. 104 5-ο ff. 

4 Cf. Ale. I. 105 B-c. 

4 ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν, etc., seems to be a latent poetic quotation. 



fellow-citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make 
use of him when he is older for their own affairs.” 
“Of course.” “Then they will fawn upon? him 
with petitions and honours, anticipating > and flatter- 
ing the power that will be his.” “ That certainly 
is the usual way.” “‘ How, then, do you think such 
a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if 
it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich 
and well-born therein, and thereto handsome and 
tall? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded 
ambitious hopes,* and will he not think himself eap- 
able of managing the affairs of both Greeks and 
barbarians,? and thereupon exalt himself, haughty 
of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void 
of sense*?” ‘‘He surely will,” he said. “And if 
to a man in this state of mind’ someone gently? 
comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has 
no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way 
to get it is to work like aslave” to winit, do you think 
it will be easy for him to lend an ear‘ to the quiet 
voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil sur- 
roundings’?”’ “Far from it,” said he. ** And even 
supposing,” said I, “‘ that owing to a fortunate dis- 
position and his affinity for the words of admonition 
one such youth apprehends something and is moved 
and drawn towards philosophy, what do we suppose 
will be the conduct of those who think that they are 

7 Or perhaps “subject to these influences.” Adam says 
it is while he is sinking into this condition. 

9 Cf. supra Vol. I. on 476 ©. Cf. 533 νυ, Protag. 333 Ἐ, 
Phaedo 83 a, Crat. 413 a, Theaet. 154 ©. 

* Cf. Phaedo 66 νυ, Symp. 184 c, Euthydem. 282 8. 

ε Epin. 990 a, Epist. vii. 330 a-s. 

7 oF "Ὁ. 135%. 


ε ΄ > ~ A ” = > » ’ 
ἑταιρείαν; οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον, πᾶν δ᾽ ἔπος λέ- 
γοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας καὶ περὶ αὐτόν, ὅπως 
ἂν μὴ πεισθῇ, καὶ περὶ τὸν πείθοντα, ὅ ὅπως ἂν μὴ 
οἷός τ᾽ 7, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιβουλεύοντας καὶ δημοσίᾳ εἰς 
495 ἀγῶνας καθιστάντας; Πολλή, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ἀνάγκη. 
Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος φιλοσοφήσει; ; Οὐ 
πάνυ. ν᾿ ἶ 
ΙΧ. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐ κακῶς ἐλέ- 
ε ” \ : ak.’ \ “ / , 
γομεν Ws ἄρα Kat αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως 
μέρη, ὅταν ἐν κακῇ τροφῇ γένηται, αἴτια τρόπον 
τινὰ τοῦ ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, καὶ τὰ 
λεγόμενα ἀγαθά, πλοῦτοί τε καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη 
παρασκευή; Οὐ γάρ, ἀλλ᾽ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, ἐλέχθη. 
Οὗτος δή, εἶπον, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὄλεθρός τε καὶ 
\ , \ , a } , 

Β διαφθορὰ τοσαύτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς βελτίστης 
φύσεως εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὀλίγης καὶ 
ἄλλως γιγνομένης, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν. καὶ ἐκ τού- 
των δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργα- 
ζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, καὶ 
ot τἀγαθά, ot ἂν ταύτῃ τύχωσι ῥυέντες: σμικρὰ 
δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην 
οὔτε πόλιν δρᾷ. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὗτοι 

Ο μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐκπίπτοντες, οἷς μάλιστα προσήκει, 
a ‘ > a / , 3 7 
ἔρημον καὶ ἀτελῇ φιλοσοφίαν λείποντες αὐτοί τε 

βίον οὐ προσήκοντα οὐδ᾽ ἀληθῆ ζῶσι, τὴν δὲ 

@ For πᾶν ἔβγον cf. Sophocles, Zl. 615, 
> Cf. 51a. 



losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word 
or deed that they will stick at? to keep him from being 
persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts 
it,? both by private intrigue and public prosecution 
in the court?” ‘“‘ That is inevitable,” he said. 
“Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to 
philosophize?” ‘‘ None at all,” he said. 

IX. “Do you see, then,” said I, “ that we were not 
wronginsaying thatthe very qualitiesthatmakeupthe 
philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the en- 
vironment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause 
of its backsliding,’ and so do the so-called goods—4 
riches and all such instrumentalities®?”  ‘“‘No,” 
he replied, “it was rightly said.” “‘ Such, my good 
friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit, is 
the destruction and corruption“ of the most excellent 
nature, which is rare enough in any case,’ as we affirm. 
And it is from men of this type that those spring who 
do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, 
and the greatest good when the stream chances to 
be turned into that channel,” but a small nature‘ never 
does anything great to a man or a city.” ““ Most 
true,’ saidhe. “ Those, then, to whom she properly 
belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy 
forlorn and unwedded, themselves live an unreal and 
alien life, while other unworthy wooers/ rush in and 

4 For ἐκπεσεῖν cf. 496 c. 

4 Cf. supra on 491 c, p. 32, note a. 

* Cf. Lysis 220 a; Arnold’s “ machinery,’’ Aristotle's 
_ 1? Cf. 491 2-2, Laws 951 B ἀδιάφθαρτος, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 94. 
| @ For καὶ ἄλλως ef. IL. ix. 699. 

k Cf. on 485 D ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα. 

‘ φ; on 491 £, p. 33, note d. 
3 Cf.on 489 p, and Theaet. 173 ¢. 



ὥσπερ ὀρφανὴν ξυγγενῶν ἄλλοι ἐπεισελθόντες 
ἀνάξιοι ἤσχυνάν τε καὶ ὀνείδη περιῆψαν, οἷα καὶ 
σὺ φὴς ὀνειδίζειν τοὺς ὀνειδίζοντας, ὡς οἱ ξυνόντες 
αὐτῇ οἱ μὲν οὐδενός, ot δὲ πολλοὶ πολλῶν κακῶν 
» 7 Ὺ \ \ > » , 4 ie) i 
ἀξιοί εἰσιν. Kat yap οὖν, ἔφη, τά ye λεγόμενα 
ταῦτα. Εἰκότως γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λεγόμενα. καθ- 
ορῶντες γὰρ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωπίσκοι κενὴν τὴν χώραν 
ταύτην γιγνομένην, καλῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων καὶ προ- 
~ a > 
σχημάτων μεστήν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἱργμῶν εἰς 
τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδιδράσκοντες! ἅσμενοι καὶ οὗτοι ἐκ 
- - 2 ~ > sy Xr , « a 
τῶν τεχνῶν ἐκπηδῶσιν εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ot av 
κομψότατοι ὄντες τυγχάνωσι περὶ τὸ αὑτῶν τεχ- 
viov. ὅμως γὰρ δὴ πρός ye τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας 
,ὔ σ΄ ͵ὔ / ‘ se? 
Kaimep οὕτω πραττούσης φιλοσοφίας τὸ ἀξίωμα 
/ \ > , 
μεγαλοπρεπέστερον λείπεται: οὗ δὴ ἐφιέμενοι 
πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν 
\ ~ 7 \ / 4 
τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηνται, 
οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀπο- 
τεθρυμμένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν. ἢ οὐκ 
ἀνάγκη; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Δοκεῖς οὖν τι, ἣν δ᾽ 

* Cf. Taine, ἃ Sainte-Beuve, Aug. 14, 1865: ‘* Comme 
Claude Bernard, il dépasse sa spécialité et c’est chez des 
spécialistes comme ceux-la que la malheureuse philosophie 
livrée aux mains gantées et parfumées d’eau bénite va 
trouver des maris capables de lui faire encore des enfants.” 
Cf. Epictet. iii. 21.21. The passage is imitated by Lucian 
3. 2. 287, 294, 298. 

For the shame that has befallen philosophy ef. Buthydem. 
304 ff., Epist. vii. 328 πὶ Isoc. Busiris 48, Plutarch 1091 τ, 
Boethius, Cons. i. 3. There is no probability that this is 
aimed at Isocrates, who certainly had not deserted the 
mechanical arts for what he called philosophy. Rohde, 
Kleine Schriften, i. 319, thinks Antisthenes is meant. But 



defile heras an orphan, bereft of her Κίη and attach 
to her such reproaches|as you say her revilers taunt 
her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of 
no account and the many accountable for many 
evils.”’\_‘* Why, yes,” he replied, “ that is what they 
do say.” “And plausibly,” said I; “for other 
mannikins, observing that the place is unoccupied 
and full of fine terms and pretensions, just as men 
escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so 
these gentlemen joyously bound away from the 
mechanical arts ὃ to philosophy, those that are most 
eunning in their little craft. For in comparison with 
the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her 
present low estate retains a superior dignity ; and this 
is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of 
pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed 
and mutilated ὦ by their vulgar occupations *-even as 
their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is 
not that inevitable ?’’ ‘Quite so,” he said. “‘Is 

Plato as usual is generalizing. See What Plato Said, p. 593 
on Soph. 242 c. 

ὃ Cf. the different use of the idea in Protag. 318 5. 

5 rexvlov is a contemptuous diminutive, such as are common 
in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Cf. also ἀνθρωπίσκοι 
in c, and ψυχάριον in 519 a. 

ὦ Cf. infra 611 c-p, Theaet. 173 a-8. 

4 For the idea that trade is ungentlemanly and incompat- 
ible with philosophy ef. infra 522 5 and 590 ο, Laws 919 ς ff., 
and What Plato Said, p. 663 on Rivals 137 8. Cf. Richard 
of Bury, Philobiblon, Prologue, “ Fitted for the liberal arts, 
and equally disposed to the contemplation of Scripture, but 
destitute of the needful aid, they revert, as it wens ὧν a 
sort of apostasy, to mechanical arts.’’ ΟἿ also Xen. Mem. 
iv. 2.3, and Ecclesiasticus xxxviii. 25 f. ‘“‘ How can he get 
wisdom that holdeth the plough and glorieth in the goad 
«+» and whose talk is of bullocks? . . . so every carpenter 
and workmaster . . . the smith . . . the potter. . .” 

VOL, II E 49 


| ἐγώ, διαφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἰδεῖν ἀργύριον κτησαμένου 

χαλκέως φαλακροῦ καὶ σμικροῦ, νεωστὶ μὲν ἐκ 
δεσμῶν λελυμένου, ἐν βαλανείῳ δὲ λελουμένου, 
᾿ νεουργὸν ἱμάτιον ἔχοντος, ὡς νυμφίου παρ σκευα- 
σμένου, διὰ πενίαν καὶ ἐρημίαν τοῦ δεσπότου 
496 τὴν θυγατέρα μέλλοντος γαμεῖν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, 
διαφέρει. Ποῖ ἄττα οὖν εἰκὸς γεννᾶν τοὺς τοιού- 
τους; οὐ νόθα καὶ φαῦλα; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Ti 
dai; τοὺς ἀναξίους παιδεύσεως, ὅταν ᾿ αὐτῇ πλησιά- 
ζοντες ὁμιλῶσι μὴ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν, ποῖ ἄττα φῶμεν 
γεννᾶν διανοήματά, τε καὶ δόξας; dp’. οὐχ ὡς 
ἀληθῶς. προσήκοντα ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα, καὶ οὐ- 
δὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς" ἐχόμοηονη 
Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 
Χ. Πάνσμικρον. δή τι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ ᾿Αδείμαντε, 
Β λείπεται τῶν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν ὁμιλούντων φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἤ 
που ὑπὸ φυγῆς καταληφθὲν γενναῖον καὶ εὖ eb pags 
μένον. ἦθος, ἀπορίᾳ τῶν ᾿διαφθερούντων κατὰ 
φύσιν μεῖναν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ, ἣ ἐν σμικρᾷ πόλει ὅταν 
μεγάλη ψυχὴ φυῇ καὶ ἀτιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως 
ὑπερίδῃ" βραχὺ € πού τι καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἄλλης ς τέχνης 
ικαίως ἀτιμάσαν εὐφυὲς ἐ ἐπ᾽ “αὐτὴν ἂν ἔλθοι. εἴη 
δ᾽ ἂν καὶ 6 τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἑταίρου Θεάγους χαλινὸς 

1 ἄξιον secl. Ast: ἄξιον ἀληθινῆς ΑΜ, ἄξιον ὡς ἀληθινῆς dD, 
ἀληθινῆς ὡς ἄξιον F: ἀξίως conj. Campbell. 

* For a similar short vivid description ef. Hrastae 134 B, 
Buthyphro 2 8. Such are common in Plautus, e.g. Mer- 
cator 639. 

ὃ It is probably fanciful to see in this an allusion to the 
half-Thracian Antisthenes. Cf, also Theaet. 150 c, and Symp. 
212 A. 

© Cf. Euthydem. 306 Ὁ. 

@ Cf. Phaedrus 250 a ὀλίγαι δὴ λείπονται, and supra 494 A 
and on 490 εκ. 



not the picture which they present,” I said, “ pre- 
‘cisely that of a little bald-headed tinker ® who has 
made money and just been freed from bonds and 

d a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got 
timself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry 
his master’s daughter who has fallen into poverty and 

; n moment?” “There is no difference at all,” he 
aid. “‘ Of what sort will probably be the offspring of 

‘such parents? Will they not be bastard ὃ and base?” | 

“Inevitably.” “ And so when men unfit for cul- 
cute, can philosophy and consort with her un- 

γ, what sort of ideas and opinions shall we 
say they t? Will they not produce what may 





in very deed be fairly called sophisms, and nothing _ 

that is genuine or that partakes of true intelligence “δ᾽ 
_“ Quite so,” he said. 

ΠΧ, “There is a very small remnant,? then, Adei- 
mantus,”’ I said, “οὗ those who consort worthily with 
ilosophy, some well-born and well-bred nature, it 
may be, held in check* by exile,/ and so in the absence 
of corrupters remaining true to philosophy, as its 
quality bids, or it may happen that a great soul born 
in a little town scorns’ and disregards its parochial 
affairs; and a small group perhaps might by natural 
affinity be drawn to it from other arts which they 
justly disdain; and the bridle of our companion 
Theages” also might operate as a restraint. Forin the 
bo Peston “overtaken.” Cf. Goodwin on Dem. De cor, 
ae It is ible but unnecessary to conjecture that Plato 
may be thinking of Anaxagoras or Xenophon or himself 

or Dion. σ Cf. Theaet. 173 8, infra 540 pv, 
on τς ρα hes, become PROPER: Cf. Bie De my 
tuenda ε ar. wt. IV. ᾿ or Cj. 
also Apol. 385. and the spurious dialogue bearing peetas 




——— : 


οἷος κατασχεῖν: καὶ yap Θεάγει τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα 
παρεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας, ἡ δὲ, 
τοῦ σώματος νοσοτροφία ἀπείργουσα αὐτὸν τῶν 
πολιτικῶν κατέχει. τὸ δ᾽ ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον 
λέγειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον" ἢ γάρ πού τινι ἄλλῳ 
ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γέγονε. καὶ τούτων δὴ 
τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γενόμενοι καὶ γευσάμενοι ὡς ἡδὺ 
καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν αὖ ἱκανῶς 
ἰδόντες τὴν μανίαν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὡς 
ἔπος εἰπεῖν περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράττει, οὐδ᾽ ἔστι 
ξύμμαχος, μεθ᾽ ὅτου τις ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν δικαίων 
βοήθειαν σώζοιτ᾽ ἄν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄν- 
θρωπος ἐμπεσών, οὔτε ξυναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε, 
ἱκανὸς ὧν εἷς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν, πρίν τι τὴν 

« The enormous fanciful literature on the daimonion does 
not concern the interpretation of Plato, who consistently 
treats it as a kind of spiritual tact checking Socrates from 
any act opposed to his true moral and intellectual interests, 
Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 456-457, on Buthyphro 3 8, Jowett 
and Campbell, p. 285. Pee OP 

ὃ For rovrwy , . . γενόμενοι of. Aristoph. Clouds 107 τούτων 
γενοῦ μοι. ‘ ὌΝ 

© The irremediable degeneracy of existing governments is 
the starting-point of Plato’s political ot social specula- 
tions. Cf. infra 497 Β, Laws 832 c f., Epist. vii. 326 a; 
Byron, apud Arnold, Essays in Crit. ii. p. 195. “I haye 
simplified my politics into an utter detestation of all existing 

This passage, Apol, 31 x ff. and Gorg. 521-522 may be con- 
sidered Plato’s apology for not engaging in polities. Cf, 
J. V. Novak, Platon u. ἃ. Rhetorik, p. 495 (Schleiermacher, 
Einl. z. Gorg. pp. 15 f.), Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 441-442 
“* Wer kann hier die Klage iiber das eigene Los tiberhéren?” 

There is no probability that, as an eminent scholar has 
maintained, the Republic itself was intended as a programme 
of practical politics for Athens, and that its failure to win 
popular opinion is the chief cause of the disappointed tone 



ease of Theages all other conditions were at hand 
for his backsliding from philosophy, but his sickly 
abit of body keeping him out of politics holds him 
ek. My own case, the divine sign,” is hardly 
orth mentioning—for I suppose it has happened to 
w or none before me. And those who have been 
of this little company ὃ and have tasted the sweetness 
and blessedness of this possession and who have also 
come to understand the madness of the multitude 
sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I 
may say so, sound or right in any present polities,° and 
that there is no ally with whose aid the champion 
of justice? could escape destruction, |but that he 
would be as.aman who has fallen among wild beasts,” 
unwilling to share their misdeeds’ and unable to hold 
out singly against the savagery of all, and that he 
would thus, before he could in any way benefit his 
of Plato’s later writings. Cf. Erwin Wolff in Jaeger’s Neue 
Phil. Untersuchungen, Heft 6, Platos Apologie, pp. 31-33, 
who argues that abstinence from politics is proclaimed in the 
‘Apology before the Gorgias and that the same doctrine in 
the seventh Epistle absolutely proves that the Apology is 
Rie ae Theact 73 c ff, Hipp. Maj. 281 c, Euth 
¥ . 173 c Εἰ, Hipp. Maj. 281 c, But 
306 8, Xen. Mem. i. 6. 15. ΤΕ ir 
# Cf. supra 368 5, Apol. 32 £ εἰ. . . ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις 
and 32 ἃ μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου. 
6 Cf. Pindar, Ol. i. 64. For the antithetic tuxtaposition 
ef. also cis πᾶσιν below; see too 5208, 374.4, Menex. 241 5, 
-haedr. 243 c, Laws 906 pv, etc. 
- More in the Utopia (Morley, Ideal Commonwealths, p. 84) 
phrases loosely from memory what he calls “ no ill simile 
y which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a philo- 
sopher’s meddling with government.” 
ΟΠ Cf. Democrates fr. 38, Diels 11.3 p. 73 καλὸν μὲν τὸν 
ἀδικέοντα κωλύειν" εἰ δὲ μή, wh ξυναδικεῖν, “τὲ is well to prevent 
i from doing wrong, or else not to join in wrong- 




πόλιν ἢ φίλους. ὀνῆσαι προαπολόμενος. “ἀνωφελὴς 
αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἃ ἂν γένοιτο---ταῦτα πάντα 
λογισμῷ λαβὼν ἡ ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράτ- 
τῶν, οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κονιορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ 
πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς, ὁρῶν 
τοὺς ἄλλους καταπιμπλαμένους ἀνομίας ἀγαπᾷ, εἴ 

: Ἕ πῃ αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσίων ἔργων 

τόν τε ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν 
αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἵλεώς τε καὶ εὐμενὴς 
ἀπαλλάξεται. ᾿Αλλά τοι, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐ τὰ ἐλάχιστα 

497 ἂν διαπραξάμενος ἀπαλλάττοιτο. Οὐδέ γε, εἶπον, 


τὰ μέγιστα, μὴ τυχὼν πολιτείας προσηκούσης" ἐν 
γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται. καὶ 
μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει 

ΧΙ. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὧν ἕνεκα τ κε 
βολὴν εἴληφε καὶ ὅτι οὐ δικαίως, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ 
1 μετρίως εἰρῆσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἔτ᾽ ἄλλο “λέγεις τι σύ. 
1 AW οὐδέν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ἔτι "λέγω. περὶ τούτου: ἀλλὰ 

τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῇ τίνα τῶν νῦν λέγεις πολι- 

Β τειῶν; Οὐδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ 

α Maximus of Tyre 21, 20 comments, *‘ Show me a safe 
wall.”’ See Stallbaum ad loc. for references to this { Pane 
in later antiquity. Cf. Heracleit. fr. 44, Diels* i. 67, 
Stenzel, Platon der Hrzieher, p. 114, Bryce, Studies in 
History and Jurisprudence, p. 33, Renan, Souvenirs, xviii., 
P. E. More, Shelburne Essays, iii. pp. 280-281. Cf, also 
Epist. vii. 331 p, Eurip. Jon 598-601. 

» Cf. supra Vol. I. on 331 a, imfra 621 c-», Mare, 
Aurel. xii, 36 and vi. 30 in fine. See my article ““ Hope” in 
Hastings’s Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. 

2 Ch Aristot. Bth. Nic. 1094 b9 μεῖζόν δε καὶ τελεώτερον 
τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν, “yet the good of 



friends or the state come to an untimely end without 
doing any good to himself or others,—for all these 
reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds 
his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under 
shelter of a wall? in astorm and blast of dust and sleet 
and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content 
if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity 
and unholy deeds through this life and take his 
departure with fair hope, serene and well content 
when the end comes.” “ Well,” he said, “ that is no 
very slight thing to have achieved before taking his 
departure.” “He would not have accomplished any 
very great thing either,°”’ I replied, “if it were not his 
fortune to live in a state adapted to his nature. In 

_ such a state only will he himself rather attain his full 

stature? and together with his own preserve the 
common weal. 
_ XI. “ Thecauses and the injustice of the calumnia- 
tion of philosophy, I think, have been fairly set forth, 
unless you have something to add.*”’ ‘‘ No,” he said, 
“I haye nothing further to offer on that point. But 
which of our present governments do you think is 
suitable for philosophy?’ {‘ None whatever,” I 
said; ‘‘ but the very ground of my complaint is that no 
the state seems a grander and more perfect thing both to 
attain and to secure” (tr. Ἐς H. Peters). 

4 For αὐξήσεται ef. Theaet. 163 c ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ, and 
Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 68 “‘ As the Christian is said to 
be complete in Christ so the individual is said by Aristotle 
to be complete in the πόλις,᾽᾽ Spencer, Data of Ethics, xy. 
“Hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man 
as existing in the ideal social state.” Of. also infra 592 a-B, 

520 a-c and Introd. Vol. I. p. xxvii. 

* An instance of Socrates’ Attic courtesy. Cf. 430 5, 
Cratyl. 427 p, Theaet. 183 c, Gorg. 518 c, Phaedr. 235. a. 
But in Gorg. 462 c it is ironical and perhaps in Hipp. 
Maj. 291 a. 




ἐπαιτιῶμαι, μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νῦν κατά- 
στασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφου φύσεως: διὸ καὶ στρέ- 

, Α 3 ~ > ΄ σ ‘ 
φεσθαί τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι αὐτήν, ὥσπερ ξενικὸν 
σπέρμα ἐν γῇ ἄλλῃ σπειρόμενον ἐξίτηλον εἰς τὸ 
ἐπιχώριον φιλεῖ κρατούμενον ἰέναν, οὕτω καὶ 
τοῦτο τὸ γένος νῦν μὲν οὐκ ἴσχειν τὴν αὑτοῦ 
δύναμιν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀλλότριον ἦθος ἐκπίπτειν. εἰ δὲ 

Ο λήψεται τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ 

’ > / ᾽ὔ Ψ “-“- A ΄- 
ἄριστόν ἐστι, τότε δηλώσει, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν τῷ ὄντι 
θεῖον ἦν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀνθρώπινα, τά τε τῶν φύσεων 
καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων. δῆλος δὴ οὖν εἶ ὅτι μετὰ 
τοῦτο ἐρήσει τίς αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία. Οὐκ ἔγνως, 
” > i) a » The ὑοῦ Ole ee ae one 
ἔφη" οὐ yap τοῦτο ἔμελλον, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ αὕτη, ἣν ἡμεῖς 
διεληλύθαμεν οἰκίζοντες τὴν πόλιν ἢ ἄλλη. Τὰ 

A »” \ i 7 4 an A 9. Ὁ ’ 
μὲν ἄλλα, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, αὕτη: τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἐρρήθη 
μὲν καὶ τότε, ὅτι δεήσοι τι ἀεὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει 

D λόγον ἔχον τῆς πολιτείας τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ καὶ 

σὺ 6 νομοθέτης ἔχων τοὺς νόμους ἐτίθεις. ᾿Ἐρ- 
ρήθη γάρ, ἔφη. \’AAN’ οὐχ ἱκανῶς, εἶπον, ἐδηλώθη, 
φόβῳ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε 
μακρὰν καὶ χαλεπὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν: ἐπεὶ καὶ 
τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ πάντως" ῥᾷστον διελθεῖν. Τὸ ποῖον; 
Τίνα τρόπον μεταχειριζομένη πόλις φιλοσοφίαν οὐ 
διολεῖται. τὰ γὰρ δὴ μεγάλα πάντα ἐπισφαλῆ, καὶ 
1 πάντως AFDM: πάντων conj. Bekker. 

* κατάστασις = constitution in both senses, Cf. 414 a, 495 υ, 
464 a, 493 a, 426 c, 547 8. So also in the Laws. The word 
is rare elsewhere in Plato. 

> For ἐξίτηλον cf. Critias 121 a. 

¢ This need not be a botanical error. In any case the 
meaning is plain. Cf. Tim. 57 καὶ with my emendation. 

@ For the idiom ef. αὐτὸ δείξει Phileb. 20 c, with Stallbaum’s 
note, Theaet. 200 x, Hipp. Maj. 288 8, Aristoph. Wasps 



polity * of to-day is worthy of the philosophic nature. 
‘\his is just the cause of its perversion and alteration ; 
as a foreign seed sown in an alien soil is wont to 
be overcome and die out® into the native growth,° 
so this kind does not preserve its own quality but 
falls away and degenerates into an alien type. But 
if ever it finds the best polity as it itself is the 
best, then will it be apparent ¢ that this was in truth 
divine and all the others human in their natures and 
practices. Obviously then you are next going to ask 
what is this best form of government.’’ “‘ Wrong,” 
he said*; “I was going to ask not that but whether 
it is this one that we have described in our establish- 
ment of a state or another.” “In other respects it 
is this one,” said I; “ but there is one special further 
point that we mentioned even then, namely that 
there would always have to be resident in such a 
state an element having the same conception of its 
constitution that you the lawgiver had in framing 
its laws?” ‘That was said,’’ he replied. /* But it 
was not sufficiently explained,” I said, “from fear 
of those objections on your part which have shown 
that the demonstration of it is long and difficult. 
And apart from that the remainder of the exposition 
is by nomeanseasy.2”’ “ Just what do you mean?” 
“The manner in which a state that occupies itself 
with philosophy can escape destruction. For all 
great things are precarious and, as the proverb truly 

994, Frogs 1261, etc., Pearson on Soph. fr. 388. Cf. αὐτὸ 
σημανεῖ, Eurip. Bacch. 476, etc. 

* Plato similarly plays in dramatic fashion with the order 
of the dialogue in 523 B, 528 a, 451 B-c, 458 B. 

7 Cf. supra on 412 a and What Plato Said, p. 647 on 
Laws 962; infra 502 v. 

% Cf. Soph. 244 c. See critical note. 


τὸ λεγόμενον τὰ καλὰ τῷ ὄντι χαλεπά. ᾿Αλλ᾽ 

Ἕ ὅμως, ἔφη, λαβέτω τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις τούτου 

φανεροῦ γενομένου. \O8 3 τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἣν δ᾽ 
ἐγώ, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακωλύσει- 
παρὼν. δὲ τήν γ᾽ ἐμὴν προθυμίαν εἴσει. σκόπει δὲ 
καὶ νῦν, ὡς προθύμως καὶ παρακινδυνευτικῶς 
μέλλω λέγειν, ὅ ὅτι τοὐναντίον ἢ νῦν δεῖ τοῦ. ἐπιτη- 
δεύματος τούτου πόλιν ἅπτεσθαι. Πῶς; Νῦν μέν, 

>, 2 / ς 1.8 , / ᾿ » > 
498 ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οἱ καὶ ἁπτόμενοι μειράκια ὄντα ἄρτι ἐκ 

παίδων τὸ μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ 
of renee αὐτοῦ τῷ amir te NA ope Be 
τονται, φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι" λέγω. δὲ 
yadeniraroy τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους" ‘gv δὲ ἐν ἔπειτα, 
ἐὰν καὶ ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων παρακαλούμενοι 
ἐθέλωσιν ἀκροαταὶ γίγνεσθαι, μεγάλα ἡγοῦνται, 
πάρεργον οἰόμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν' πρὸς δὲ τὸ 
γῆρας ἐκτὸς δή τινων ὀλίγων ἀποσβέννυνται πολὺ 

Β μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου ἡλίου, ὅσον αὖθις οὐκ 

ἐξάπτονται. Δεῖ δὲ πῶς; ἔφη. Πᾶν τοὐναντίον" 

μειράκια μὲν ὄντα καὶ παῖδας μειρακιώδη παιδείαν 

@ So Adam. Others take τῴ ὄντι with χαλεπά as, iis of 

the proverb. Cf. 435. c, Crat. 384 4-8 with schol. 
ὁ For the idiomatic ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ cf. Parmen, 150 8, πεῖν 

296 5, Thompson on Meno, Excursus 2, pp. 258-264, Aristot. 
An. Post. 91 b 33, Eth. Nic. 1101 a 12, 1136 b 25, 1155 b 30, 
1168 a 12, 1174 a 27, 1180 b 27, Met. 1028 a 24, 1044 a 11, 
Rhet. 1371 a 16. 

¢ What Plato here deprecates Callicles in the Gorgias 
recommends, 484 c-p. For the danger of premature study 
of dialectic ef. 537 p-e ff. Cf. my Idea of Education in 
Plato’s Republic, p. 11. Milton Re aie the thought with 
characteristic exuberance, Of Education: ‘They present 
their young unmatriculated novices at first coming with on 
most intellective abstractions of logic and metaphysics . 




says, fine things are hard.*”’. “ΑἸ the same,”’ he said, 
our exposition must be completed by making this 
plain.” |‘ It will be no lack of will,” I said, “* but if 
ὃ a lack of ability, that would prevent that. 

But you shall observe for yourself my zeal.. And note 
again how zealously and recklessly I am prepared to 
say that the state ought to take up this pursuit in 
just the reverse of our present fashion.°” “Τὴ what 
way? "ΠΕ At present,” said I, “ those who do take 
it up are youths, just out of boyhood, who in the 
interval ὁ before they engage in business and money- 
making approach the most difficult part of it, and 
then drop it—and these are regarded forsooth as 
the best exemplars of philosophy. By the most 
difficult part 1 mean: dinevitajoiacd In later life they 
think they have done much if, when. invited, they 
) listen’ to the philosophic discussions of others. 

That sort of thing they think should be by-work. 
And towards old age,’ with few exceptions, their light 
is quenched. more completely than the sun of Hera- 
cleitus,* inasmuch as it is never rekindled.” “‘ And 
what should they do?” he said. “‘ Just the reverse. 
While they are Madi and boys they should “occupy 

to be tossed and turmoiled with their unballasted wits n 
fathomless and unquiet deeps of controversy,” etc. 

4 Cf. 386 a, 395 c, 413 c, 485 p, 519 a, Demosth, xxi. 154, 
Xen. Ages. 10. 4, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1103 b 24, 1104 b 11, Isoc. 

xv. 289. * Cf, 450.c, 

τὴ Cf. 475 Ὁ, Isoc. xii:.270 ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλον δεικνύοντος καὶ 

Ἐσήσαστοι ἠθέχησεν ἀκροατὴς γενέσθαι, “᾿ποι!ὰ not eyen be 
to listen to one worked out and submitted by another ” 

ter. orlin in L.C.L.). 

9 Cf. Antiphon’s devotion to horsemanshi the Par- 
1 196.6. For πρὸς τὸ γῆρας gies 552 v, Sa 653 A. 
un A Nees Cr A . Meteor. ii. 2. 9, 
Lucretius v. 662. 


καὶ φιλοσοφίαν μεταχειρίζεσθαι, τῶν τε σωμάτων, 
ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦται, εὖ μάλα ἐπι- 
μελεῖσθαι, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίᾳ κτωμένους" προ- 
tovons δὲ τῆς "ἡλικίας, ev ἣ ἡ ψυχὴ τελειοῦσθαι 
ἄρχεται, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια" ὅταν δὲ 
Ὁ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατειῶν 
ἐκτὸς γίγνηται, Τότε ἤδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι καὶ 
μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν, ὅ τι μὴ πάρεργον, τοὺς 
μέλλοντας. εὐδαιμόνως βιώσεσθαι καὶ τελευτή- 
σαντας τῷ βίῳ τῷ βεβιωμένῳ τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖρα 
ἐπιστήσειν πρέπουσαν. 

ΧΙ Ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, λέγειν. 
προθύμως, ὦ ὦ Σώκρατες" οἶμαι μέντοι τοὺς pee 
τῶν ἀκουόντων προθυμότερον ἔτι ἀντιτείνειν οὐδ᾽ 
ὁπωστιοῦν πεισομένους, ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρ- 
ξαμένους. Μὴ διάβαλλε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐμὲ καὶ 
D Θρασύμαχον ἄρτι φίλους γεγονότας, οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ 
ἐχθροὺς ὄντας. πείρας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀνήσομ , ἕως 
ἂν ἢ πείσωμεν καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς ous, ἢ 
προὔργου τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν 
αὖθις γενόμενοι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωσι λόγοις. 

“ΟἹ. 410 c and What Plato Said, p. 496 on Protag. 
326 B-c. 

» Like cattle destined for the sacrifice. A favourite figure 
with Plato. Cf. Laws 635 a, Protag. 320. It is used literally 
in Critias 119 Ὁ. 

° Cf. infra 540 a-8, Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 329-330. 
Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 207-208, fancies that 498 c to 502 a 
isa digression expressing Plato’s personal desire to be the 
philosopher in Athenian politics. 

4 A half-playful anticipation of the doctrine of immortality 
reserved for Bk. x. 608 p ff. It involves no contradiction 
and justifies no inferences as to the date and composition of 
the Republic. Cf. Gomperz iii. 335. 


ei ἀπδνανω 


themselves with an education and a culture suitable 
to youth, and while their bodies are growing to man- 
hood take right good care of them, thus securing a 
basis and a support? for the intellectual life. But 
with the adyance of age, when the soul begins to 
attain its maturity, they should make its exercises 
more seyere, and when the bodily strength declines 
and they are past the age of political and military 
service, then at last they should be given free range 
of the pasture® and do nothing but philosophize,° 
except incidentally, if they are to live happily, and, 
when the end has come, crown the life they have lived 
with a consonant destiny in that other world.” 
XII. “ You really seem to be very much in earnest; 
Socrates,” he said; “* yet I think most of your hearers 
are even more earnest in their opposition and will not 
be in the least convinced, beginning with Thrasy- 
machus.” “Do not try to breed a quarrel between 
me and Thrasymachus, who have just become friends 
and were not enemies before either. For we will 
spare no effort until we either convince him and the 
rest or achieve something that will profit them when 
they that life in which they will be born 
again ὦ and meet with such discussions as these.”’ ““A 

Cf. Emerson, Experience, in fine, “‘ which in his passage 
into new worlds ke will carry with him.” Bayard Taylor 
Eameriogs Men of Letters, p. 113), who began to study 

reek late in life, remarked, “ΟἿ, but I expect to use it 
in the other world.’’. Even the sober itivist Mill says 
(Theism, pp. 249-250) ‘* The truth that life is short and art 
is long is from of old one of the most discouraging facts of 
our condition: this hope admits the possibility that the art 
eomnoyes in improving and beautifying the soul itself may 
pat “cs good in some other life even when seemingly use- 

in this.” 



Eis σμικρόν γ᾽, ἔῤη, χρόνον “εἴρηκας. Εἰς. οὐδὲν 
μὲν οὖν, ἔφην, ὥς γε πρὸς TOV’ ἅπαντα. "τὸ 
μέντοι μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις ΄ τοὺς. πολλοὺς 
θαῦμα. οὐδέν: οὐ γὰρ πώποτε εἶδον γενόμενον. τὸ 
E νῦν λεγόμενον, δὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα 
ῥήματα ἐξεπίτηδες ἀλλήλοις ᾿ὡμοιωμένα,᾿ “ἀλλ᾽ 
οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ὥσπερ. vov hit 
ἄνδρα δὲ ἀρετῇ παρισωμένον καὶ ὡμοιωμένι 
μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελέως ἔργῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ 
δυναστεύοντα ἐν πόλει. ἕτέρᾳ τοιαύτῃ, οὐ 'πώποτε 
499 ἐ ἑωράκασιν οὔτε ἕνα. :οὔτε πλείους" ἢ ole; Οὐ α- 
μῶς γε. Οὐδέ γε αὖ “λόγων, ὦ ὦ μακάριε, καλῶν τε 
καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἱκανῶς ἐπήκοοι γεγόνασιν, οἵων 
ζητεῖν μὲν. τὸ “ἀληθὲς ξυντεταμένως ἐκ. “παντὸς 
τρόπου τοῦ γνῶναι χάριν, τὰ δὲ κομψά. τε καὶ 
ἐριστικὰ καὶ μηδαμόσε ἄλλοσε τείνοντα ἢ πρὸς 
δόξαν καὶ ἔριν καὶ ἐν δίκαις καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνου- 
σίαις πόρρωθεν ἀσπαζομένων. Οὐδὲ᾽ τούτων, ἔφη. 
Β Τούτων τοι χάριν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτα προορώ- 
μενοι ἡμεῖς τότε καὶ δεδιότες ὅμως ἐλέγομεν, ὑπὸ 

LoD. "30 te 

* For εἰς here cf. Blaydes: on) Clouds 1180. Herod. vii. 46, 
gy Heracleidae 270. 
'f. supra on 486 a, See too Plut. Cons. Apol. 17. 1lle¢ 
“a thousand, yes, ten thousand years are only an ἀόριστος 
point, nay, the smallest part of a point, as Simonides’ Says.” 
Cf. also Graeca (L.C.L.), ii. p. $338, Anth. Pal. x: 78. 
© yevouevov... λεγόμενον. It is not translating to make no 
attempt to reproduce Plato’s parody of “ polyphonic prose.” 
The allusion here to Isocrates and the Gorgian figure of 
παρίσωσις and παρομοίωσις is unmistakable. e subtlety of 
Plato’s style treats the ‘‘ accidental” occurrence of a Gorgian 
figure in his own writing as a symbol of the difference 
between the artificial style and fridincetity of the sophists and 
the serious truth of his own ideals. 





brief. time* your forecast contemplates,” he said. 
“Nay, nothing at all,’ I replied, “85 compared with 
eternity.’ However, the unwillingness of the multi- 
tude to believe what you say is nothing surprising. 
For of the thing here spoken they have never 
beheld a token,’ but only the forced and artificial 
chiming of word and phrase, not spontaneous and 
accidental as has happened here. _ But the figure of 
aman ‘ equilibrated’ and ‘ assimilated ’ to virtue’s self 
fectly, so far as may be, in word and deed, and 
olding rule in’a city of like quality, that is a thing 
they have neverseen in one case orinmany. Do you 
anja Sale * “By no means.” “ Neither, 
my dear fellow; have they ever seriously inclined to 
hearken to fair and free discussions whose sole en- 
deavour search out the truth? at any cost for 
knowledge’s sake, and which dwell apart and salute 
from afar? all the subtleties and cavils that lead to 
naught ut opinion’ and strife in court-room and in 
private talk.’’. “They have not,” he said. “ For 

_ this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite our 
fears 7 declared under compulsion of the truth” that 
» Cf. Isoc. x. 18 λεγόμενος... . γενόμενος, What Plato Said, 
p. 544 on Symp. 185 c, F. Reinhardt, De Isocratis aemulis, 
p. 39, Lucilius, bk. v. init. ‘hoc ‘nolueris et debueris’ te 

lawyer A ie 172 p-e) and the eristic (Euthydem, 272 5, 
Hipp. Maj. 288 p). 




τἀληθοῦς ἠναγκασμένοι, ὅτι οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολι- 
τεία οὐδέ γ᾽ ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μή ποτε γένηται τέλεος, 
πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ 
οὐ πονηροῖς, ἀχρήστοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις, ἀνάγκη 
τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλῃ, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μὴ πό- 
λεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι, καὶ τῇ πόλει κατήκοοι γενέσθαι, 
7), τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις. ὄντων 
υἱέσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἔκ τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἀληθινῆ ς 
φιλοσοφίας. ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ. τούτων "δὲ 

πότερα γενέσθαι ἢ ἢ ἀμῴοτερα ὡς ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀδύνα- 
τον, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδένα φημὶ ἔχειν λόγον. οὕτω γὰρ 
ἂν ἡμεῖς δικαίως καταγελῴμεθα, ὡς ἄλλως. 

ὅμοια λέγοντες. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; Οὕτως. Ei τοίνυν 
ἄκροις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν. πόλεώς τις ἀνάγκη ἐπι- 
μεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ τῷ παρελη- 

λυθότι χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἔν τινι βαρβαρικῷ 
τόπῳ, πόρρω που ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας π- 
όψεως, ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου 
ἕτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ 
εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἔστι καὶ γε joeTal γε, ὅταν 
αὕτη ἡ μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατὴς γένηται. οὐ γὰρ 
ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέ open 
χαλεπὰ δὲ καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ὁμολογεῖται. Kai ἐ ἐμοί, 

ἔφη, οὕτω δοκεῖ. Τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς, ἦν δ᾽ eels 

9 Cf. Laws 747 ©. But we must not attribute personal 
superstition to Plato. See What Plato Said, index, s.v. 
> Cf. Laws 711 pv, Thue, vi. 24.33 50 iv. 4. 1 ὁρμὴ ἐπέπεσε. 
¢ We might say, “talking like vain Utopians or idle 
idealists.” The scholiast says, p. 348, τοῦτο καὶ κενήν φασι 
μακαρίαν. Cf. supra, Vol. I. on 458 a, and for εὐχαί on 450 p, 
and Novotny on Fpist. vii, 331 Ὁ 
4 Cf, Laws 782 a, 678 a-s, and What Plato Said, p. 627 on 



neither city nor polity nor man either will, ever be 
perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted 
remnant of philosophers, who now bear the stigma of 
uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they 
wish it or not,and constrains the citizens to obey them, 
\or else until by some divine inspiration * a genuine 
passion for true philosophy takes possession ἢ either 
of the sons of the men now in power and sovereignty 
or of themselves. \To affirm that either or both of 
these scannot possibly come to pass is, I say, quite 
unreasonable. th in that case could we be justly 
ridiculed as uttering as futile as day-dreams are.° 
Isnotthatso?” “ tie τ᾽ Te then, the best philosophi- 
cal natures have ever been constrained to take charge 
of the state in infinite time past,’ or now are in some 
barbaric region ° far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter 
be, we are prepared to maintain our contention’ that 
the constitution we have described has been, is, or 
will be?’ realized* when this philosophic Muse has 
taken control of the state. It is not a thing impossible 
to happen, nor are we speaking of impossibilities. 
That it is difficult we too admit.”” “1 also think so,” 
hesaid. “But themultitude—are you going tosay ?— 

Laws 676 s-s; also Isoc. Panath. 204-205, seven hundred 
years seemed a short time. “ Of. Phaedo 78 a. 

7 For the ellipsis of the first person of the verb ¢f. Parmen. 
enero 180 a. The omission of the third person is 

very frequen 

a ἐπα τάν tidus $a bccirTS0P: 888 Fr. 

ἈΚ Cf. Vol. 1. Introd. p. xxxii, and ibid. on 472 8, and What 
see Said, p. 564, also infra 540 p, Newman, Aristot. Pol, 

Ρ. 377. 

* This is what I have called the ABA style. Cf. 599 8, 
Apol. 20 c, Phaedo 57 8, Laches 185 a, Protag. 344 c, Theaet. 
185 a, 190 5, etc. It is nearly what Riddell calls binary 
structure, Apology, pp. 204-217. 

VOL, II F 65 




Ore οὐκ αὖ δοκεῖ, ἐ ἐρεῖς; Ἴσως, ἔφη. Ὦ μακάριε, 
ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μὴ πανυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν κατηγόρει, 
ἀλλοίαν; τοι δόξαν ἕξουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς μὴ δ 
νεικῶν ἀλλὰ παραμυθούμενος καὶ ἀπολυόμενος 
τῆς φιλομαθίας διαβολὴν ἐνδεικνύῃ, οὗς λέγεις. Hibs 
φιλοσόφους, καὶ διορίζῃ ὥσπερ ἄρτι τήν τ τε φύσιν 
αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν, ἵνα “μὴ ἡγῶνταί, σε 
λέγειν ods. αὐτοὶ οἴονται. ἢ καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεῶνται, 
ἀλλοίαν τ᾽ οὐ" φήσεις αὐτοὺς δόξαν λήψεσθαι. καὶ 
ἄλλα ἀποκρινεῖσθαι; ἢ οἴει τινὰ χαλεπαίνειν τῷ μὴ 
χαλεπῷ ἢ ἢ φθονεῖν τῷ “μὴ φθονερῷ, ἀφθονόν τε καὶ 
πρᾶον ὄντα; ἐγὼ μὲν “γὰρ σὲ προφθάσας λέγω, 
ὅτι ἐν ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἡγοῦμαι ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ahr ήθει 
χαλεπὴν οὕτω φύσιν γίγνεσθαι. Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμέλει, 
ἔφη, ξυνοίομαι. “Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ξυνοίει, 
τοῦ χαλεπῶς πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν τοὺς πολλοὺς δια- 
κεῖσθαι ἐκείνους αἰτίους εἶναι τοὺς ἔξωθεν οὐ 
προσῆκον ,ἐπεισκεκωμακότας, λοιδορουμένους τε 
αὑτοῖς" καὶ φιλαπεχθημόνως ἔχοντας καὶ ἀεὶ περὶ 

1 ἀλλοίαν AD, ἀλλ᾽ οἷαν F, ἀλλ᾽ οἵαν M. 

2 +’ of Baiter: ro: uss.” Burnet brackets the sentence. 

3 αὑτοῖς Burnet and Adam, αὐτοῖς Ast, Stallbaum, Jowett, 
and Campbell. 

« It is uncritical to find “ contradictions”? in variations of 
mood, emphasis, and expression that are broadly human and 
that no writer can avoid. Any thinker.may at one moment 
and for one purpose defy popular opinion and for another 
conciliate it; at one time affirm that it doesn’t matter what 
the ignorant people think or say, and at another urge that 
prudence bids us be discreet. So St. Paul who says (Gal. i. 
10) ‘‘Do I seek to please men? for if I yet pleased men [ 
should not be the servant of Christ,’’ says also (Rom. xiv. 16) 
“Let not then your good be evil spoken of.” Cf. also What 
Plato Said, p. 646 on Laws 950 8. 

»’ A recurrence to etymological meaning. Cf. ἄθυμον 



does not think so,” said I. -““ That may be,” he said. 
“ My dear fellow,” said I, “do not thus absolutely 
condemn the multitude.* They will surely be of 
another mind if in no spirit of contention but sooth- 
ingly and endeavouring to do away with the dispraise 
of learning you point out to them whom you mean 
by philosophers, and define as we recently did their 
nature and their pursuits so that the people may not 
suppose you to mean those of whom they are thinking. 
_ Or even if they do look at them in that way, are you 
still going to deny that they will change their opinion 
and answer differently? Or do you think that anyone 
is ungentleto the gentle or grudging tothe ungrudging 
if he himself is ungrudging® and mild? I will antici- 
you and reply that I think that only in some 

ew and not in the mass of mankind is so ungentle or 

harsh a temper to be found.” “ And I, you may be 
assured,” he said, “concur.” “‘ And do you not also 
concur ¢ in this very point that the blame for this harsh 
attitude of the many towards philosophy falls on that 
riotous crew who have burst in? where they do not 
belong, wrangling with one another,’ filled with spite’ 
4118, Laws 888 a, εὐψυχίας Laws 791 c, Thompson on Meno 
78 x, Aristot. Topics 112 a 32-38, Eurip. Heracleidae 730 
ase: : Shakes. Rich. IIT. v. v. 37 “ Reduce these bloody 

: Σ For a similar teasing or playful repetition of a word ¢/. 
517 c, 394 B, 449 c, 470 B-c. 

. 3 For the figure of the κῶμος or revel rout ef. Theaet. 184 a, 
Aesch. Ag. 1189, Eurip. Jon 1197, and, with a variation of the 
image, Virgil, Aen. i. 148 and Tennyson, “ Lucretius”: 

* As crowds that in an hour 

Of civic tumult jam the doors. 
4 Cf. Adam ad loc. and Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 121. 

"7 Isoc. Antid. 260 seems to take this term to himself; οὐ 
Panath. 249, Peace 65, Lysias xxiv. 24 πολυπράγμων εἰμὶ καὶ 
θρασὺς καὶ φιλαπεχθήμων, Demosth. xxiv. 6. é7 


ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένους, ἥκιστα φιλο- 
σοφίᾳ πρέπον ποιοῦντας; Πολύ γ᾽, ἔφη. 

᾿ XIII. Οὐδὲ γάρ που, ὦ ᾿Αδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ 

γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι 

᾿Ο κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας, καὶ 

ο΄ μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας ἐμ- 

᾿ , >\)\> > , » : ὁ Aries eR 

πίπλασθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τεταγμένα ἅττα καὶ κατὰ 

ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα δρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὔτ᾽ 

> ~ " > 5 ΄ ik a , : , NB 

ἀδικοῦντα οὔτ᾽ ἀδικούμενα ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ 

πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαί 

τε καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. ἢ οἴει τινὰ 

μηχανὴν εἶναι, ὅτῳ τις ὁμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος, μὴ 

μιμεῖσθαι ἐκεῖνο; ᾿Αδύνατον, ἔφη. Θείῳ δὴ καὶ 

Ὁ κοσμίῳ ὅ γε φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσμιός τε καὶ 

θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται" διαβολὴ δ᾽ 

ἐν πᾶσι πολλή. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. “Av οὖν τις, 

α i.e. gossip. Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1125 a 5 οὐδ᾽ ἀνθρωπο- 
λόγος, Epictetus iii. 16. 4. Cf. also Phileb. 59 5, Theaet. 
173 p, 174 ο. 

> Cf. supra on 486 a, also Phileb, 58 Ὁ, 59 a, Tim. 90 v, 
and perhaps Tim. 47 a and Phaedo 79. 

This passage is often supposed to refer to the ideas, and 
ἐκεῖ in 500 p shows that Plato is in fact there thinking of. 
them, though in Rep. 529 a-s ff. he protests against this 
identification. And strictly speaking κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα 
in c would on Platonic principles be true only of the ideas. 
Nevertheless poets and imitators have rightly felt that the 
dominating thought of the passage is the effect on the philo- 
sopher’s mind of the contemplation of the heavens. This 
confusion or assimilation is, of course, still more natural 
to Aristotle, who thought the stars unchanging. Cf. Met. 
1063 a 16 ταὐτὰ δ᾽ αἰεὶ καὶ μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς κοινωνοῦντα. Cf. 
also Sophocles, Ajax 669 ff., and Shorey in Sneath, Evolution 
of Ethics, pp. 261-263, Dio Chrys. xl, (Teubner ii. p. 199), 



and always talking about persons,* a thing least be- 
fitting philosophy?” “‘ Least of all, indeed,” he 
_ XIII. “ For surely, Adeimantus, the man whose 
mind is truly fixed on eternal realities ὃ has no leisure 
to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of 
men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled 
with ory and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the 
i of the eternal and unchanging order, and 

seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by 
one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, 
he will endeavour to imitate them and, as far as may 
be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate® 
himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to 
imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself 
with admiration?” “Impossible,” he said. ‘Then 
the lover of wisdom associating with the divine order 
will himself become orderly and divine in the measure 
permitted to man.?_ But calumny ° is plentiful every- 
where.” “ Yes, truly.” “ If, then,” I said, “‘ some 
Boethius, Cons. iii. 8 “‘respicite caeli spatium ... et 
aliquando desinite vilia mirari,” Dante, Purg. 14: 

The heavens call you and o’er your heads revolving 

Reveal the lamps of beauty ever burning: 

Your eyes are fixed on earth and goods dissolving, 

Wherefore He smites you, He, the all-discerning. 
Cf. Arnold, “ A Summer Night,” in fine: 

you remain 

A world aboye man’s head to let him see 
How boundless might his soul’s horizons be, etc. 

© ἀφομοιοῦσθαι suggests the ὁμοίωσις θέῳ Theaet. 1768. Cf. 
What Plato Said, p. 578. 

4 Cf. on 493 pv, and for the idea 383 c. 

* Cf. Hamlet τι. i. 141 ‘ thou shalt not escape calumny,” 
Bacchylides 12 (13). 202-203 βροτῶν δὲ μῶμος πάντεσσι μέν 
ἐστιν ἐπ᾽ ἔργοις. 



εἶπον, αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ μελετῆσαι 
εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι, καὶ 
μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἄρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν 
αὐτὸν οἴει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιο- 
σύνης καὶ ξυμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; 
ἭΚκιστά γε, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. ᾿Αλλ’ ἐὰν δὴ αἴσθωνται οἱ 

E πολλοί, ὅτι ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγομεν, χαλε- 


“~ A a / 4. Ad , 5G ‘eu! 
πανοῦσι δὴ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ ἀπιστήσουσιν ἡμῖν 
λέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλως εὐδαιμονήσειε 
πόλις, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θείῳ παρα- 
δείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι; Οὐ χαλεπανοῦσιν, 
> δ᾽ σ 27 ” 0 ἀλλὰ A Ud λ ,ὔ 
ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐάνπερ αἴσθωνται. a δὴ τίνα λέγεις 

/ “ - , 3 > / 
τρόπον τῆς διαγραφῆς; Λαβόντες, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἤθη ἀνθρώπων, πρῶ- 
τον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν: ὃ οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον' 
ἀλλ᾽ οὖν οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τούτῳ ἂν εὐθὺς τῶν ἄλλων 

@ The philosopher unwillingly holds office. Cf. on 345 x. 

» ἐκεῖ is frequently used in Plato of the world of ideas. Cf. 
Phaedrus 250 a, Phaedo 109 ¥. 

¢ For the word πλάττειν used of the lawgiver ef. 377 c, 
Laws 671 c, 712 5, 746 a, 800 5, Rep. 374 a, 377 c, 420 6, 
466 a, 588 c, ete. 

For the idea that the ruler shapes the state according to 
the pattern ¢ infra 540 a-B. 

Plato applies the language of the theory of ideas to the 
“ social tissue” here exactly as he applies it to the making 
of a tool in the Cratylus 389 c. In both cases there is a 
workman, the ideal pattern and the material in which it is 
more or less perfectly embodied. Such passages are the 
source of Aristotle’s doctrine of matter and form. Cf. Met. 
1044 a 25, De part. an. 639 b 25-27, 640 b 24 f., 642 a 10 ff., 
Dean. 403 b 3, Zeller, Aristot. (Eng.) i. p. 867. Cf. also Gorg. 
503 v-r, Polit. 306 c, 309 p and Unity of Plato’s Thought, 
pp. 31-32. Cf. Alcinous, Εἰσαγωγή ii. (Teubner vi. p. 153) 
ἃ κατὰ τὸν θεωρητικὸν βίον ὁρᾶται, μελετῆσαι els ἀνθρώπων ἤθη. 

@ Of. Aristot. Pol. 1829 ἃ 91 ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν. Of. also 



compulsion ¢ is laid upon him to practise stamping on 
the plastic matter of human nature in publie and 
private the patterns that he visions there,’ and not 
merely to mould “ and fashion himself, do you think 
he prove a poor craftsman ? of sobriety and justice 
and all forms of ordinary civic virtue*?’’ “By no 
means,” he said. ‘ But if the multitude become 
aware that what we are saying of the philosopher is 
true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will 
they distrust our statement that no city could ever be 
blessed unless its lineaments were traced / by artists 
_ who used the heavenly model?” “‘ They will not be 
harsh,” he said, “if they perceive that. But tell 
_ me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in 
_ mind?” “ They will take the city and the characters 
of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean—? 
no easy task. But at any rate you know that this 
would be their first point of difference from ordinary 

1275 Ὁ 29 with Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 229. Cf. 
395 c δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας, Theages 125 a δημιουργὸν... τῆς 
4ΟΥ Laws 968 a πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς, Phaedo 
82 a and supra, Vol. I. on 430c. Brochard, “La Morale 
de Platon,” L’ Année Philosophique, xvi. (1905) p. 12 “Τὰ 
᾿ς justice est appelée une vertu populaire.”’ This is a little 
misleading if he means that justice itself is “une vertu 
For μας, γρακόμῳ ef. 387 5 and Laws 778 a. See also 

m 9 

9 Cf. Vol. I. on 426 ν. This is one of the passages that 
may used or misused to class Plato with the radicals. 
Cf. 541 a, Laws 736 a-s, Polit. 293 pv, Euthyphro 2 p-3 a. 

. W. Schneider, The Puritan Mind, p. 36, says, “ Plato 
claimed that before his Republic could be established the 
adult population must be killed off.”’ 

Cf. however Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxix, What Plato Said, 
p. 83, and infra, p. 76, note a on 502 B. 



διενέγκοιεν, τῷ μήτε ἰδιώτου μήτε πόλεως ἐθε- 
λῆσαι ἂν ἅψασθαι μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους, πρὶν ἢ 
παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν ἢ 7. αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς 
x > ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα οἴει ὑπογράψασθαι 
ἂν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας; Τί μήν; Ἔπειτα, 
Β οἶμαι, ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἑκατέρωσ᾽ ἀπο- 
βλέποιεν, πρός τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ 
σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ 
τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, ξυμμιγνύντες., τε 
καὶ κεραννύντες. ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων. τὸ δ 
δρείκελον, ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ. καὶ 
Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον 
θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ 
μὲν ἄν, οἶμαι, ἐξαλείφοιεν, τὸ δὲ πάλιν ἐγγρά- 
Ο φοιεν, ἕως ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀνθρώπεια ἤθη εἰς ὅ ὅσον 
ἐνδέχεται θεοφιλῆ ποιήσειαν. Καλλίστη γοῦν ἄν, 
ἔφη, ἡ γραφὴ γένοιτο. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
πείθομέν πῃ ἐκείνους, οὗς διατεταμένους ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς 
ἔφησθα ἰέναι, ὡς τοιοῦτός ἐστι πολιτειῶν ζωγρά- 
dos, ὃν τότ᾽ ἐπῃηνοῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, δι᾽ ὃν ἐκεῖνοι 
ἐχαλέπαινον, ὅτι τὰς πόλεις αὐτῷ παρεδίδομεν, καί 
τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ νῦν ἀκούοντες πραὔνονται; Kat 

4 The theory of ideas frequently employs this image of 
the artist looking off to his model and back again to his 
work. Cf. on 484 c, and What Plato Said, p. 458, Unity of 
Plato’s Thought, p. 37. 

> ἢ, ὁ. the idea of justice. For φύσις and the theory of ideas 
cf. infra 597 c, Phaedo 103 8, Parmen. 132 v, Cratyl. 389 c-p, 
390 τ. 

¢ For ἀνδρείκελον ef, Cratyl. 424 E. 

4 Jl. i. 131, Od. iii. 416. Of. 589 pv, 500 c-p, Laws 818 
B-c, and W, hat Plato Said, p. 578 on Theaet. 176 8, Cie. Tuse. 



reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand 
either individual or state or to legislate before they 
either received a clean slate or themselves made it 
clean.”” ‘And they would be right,” he said. 
“ And thereafter, do you not think that they would 
sketch the figure of the constitution?” “Surely.” 
“And then, I take it, in the course of the work 
_ they would glance? frequently in either direction, at 
justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in 
the nature of things,? and alternately at that which 
they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling 
_and blending from various pursuits that hue of 
_ the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgement from 
_ that likeness of humanity 5 which Homer too called 
when it appeared in men the image and likeness of 
God.*”” “Right,” he said. ‘‘ And they would erase 
one touch or stroke and paint in another until 
in the measure of the possible* they had made 
the characters of men pleasing and dear to God 
as may be.” “That at any rate’ would be the 
fairest painting.” ‘“‘ Are we then making any im- 
_ pression on those who you said’ were advancing to 
attack us with might and main? Can we convince 
them that such a political artist of character and such 
a painter exists as the one we then were praising when 
our proposal to entrust the state to him angered them, 
and are they now in a gentler mood when they hear 
what we are nowsaying?” ‘‘ Muchgentler,”’ he said, 

i. 26. 65 “‘divina mallem ad nos.” Cf. also Tim. 90 a, 
Phaedr. 249 c. 
The modern reader may think of Tennyson, Jn Mem. . 
eviii. “* What find I in the highest place But mine own 
chanting hymns?”’ Cf. also Adam ad loc. 
. * Cf. 500 » and on 493 νυ. 
7 For γοῦν ef. supra, Vol. I. on 334 4. £ Cf. 414 A. 



D πολύ ye, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, εἰ σωφρονοῦσιν. Πῆ “γὰρ δὴ 

ἕξουσιν ἀμφισβητῆσαι; πότερον μὴ τοῦ ὄντος TE 
καὶ ἀληθείας ἐραστὰς εἶναι τοὺς φιλοσόφους; 
Λτοπον μέντ᾽ ἄν, ἔφη, εἴη. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴ τὴν φύσιν 
αὐτῶν οἰκείαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀρίστου, ἣν ἡμεῖς διήλ- 
θομεν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Τί δέ; τὴν τοιαύτην τυχοῦ- 
σαν τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιτηδευμάτων οὐκ ἀγαθὴν 
τελέως ἔσεσθαι καὶ φιλόσοφον εἴπερ τινὰ ἄλλην; 
ἢ ἐκείνους φή σειν" μᾶλλον, ovs ἡμεῖς ἀφωρίσαμεν; 
Ε Οὐ δήπου. Ἔτι οὖν ἀγριανοῦσι λεγόντων ἡμῶν, 
ὅτι, πρὶν ἂν πόλεως τὸ φιλόσοφον γένος ᾿ἐγκρατὲς 
γένηται, οὔτε πόλει οὔτε πολίταις κακῶν Trad 
ἔσται, οὐδὲ ἡ πολιτεία, ἣν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγῳ, 
ἔργῳ eae λήψεται; Ἴσως, ἔφη, ἧττον. Βούλει 
οὖν, ἦν ὃ ἐγώ, μὴ ἧττον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ 
παντάπασι πράους γεγονέναι καὶ πεπεῖσθαι, ἵνα, 

502 εἰ “μή τι, ἀλλὰ αἰσχυνθέντες ὁμολογήσωσιν; Πάνυ 

μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 
XIV. Οὗτοι. μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τοῦτο 

πεπεισμένοι ἔστων" τοῦδε δὲ πέρι τις ἀμφισ- 
βητήσει, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τύχοιεν γενόμενοι βασιλέων 
ἔκγονοι ἢ δυναστῶν τὰς φύσεις φιλόσοφοι; Οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἢ 
εἷς, ἔφη. Τοιούτους δὲ γενομένους ὡς πολλὴ ἀ ἀνάγκη 
διαφθαρῆναι, ἔ ἔχει τις λέγειν; ὡς μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν 
σωθῆναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς ξυγχωροῦμεν" ὡς δὲ ἐν παντὶ 
Β τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πάντων οὐδέποτ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς σω- 
θείη, ἔσθ᾽ ὅστις ἀμφισβητήσει; Kat πῶς; ᾿Αλλὰ 
μήν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἷς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν ἔχων 
1 φήσειν ADM: Adam reads φήσει; see his note ad loc. 

@ Cf.591 a. This affirmation of the impossibility of denial 
or controversy is a motif frequent in the Attic orators. Cf. 
Lysias xxx. 26, xxxi. 24, xiii. 49, vi. 46, etc. 




“if they are reasonable.” ‘‘ How can they controvert 
it*? Will they deny that the lovers of wisdom are 
lovers of reality and truth?” “That would be 
monstrous,” he said. “Οὐ that their nature as we 
have portrayed it is akin to the highest and best ?”’ 
“Not that either.” “ Well, then, can they deny that 
such a nature bred in the pursuits that befit it will 
be perfectly good and philosophic so far as that can 
be said of anyone? Or will they rather say it of 
those whom we have excluded?” “‘ Surely not.” 
_ “Will they, then, any longer be fierce with us when 
we declare that, until the philosophic class wins 
_ control, there will be no surcease of trouble for city 
ΟΥ̓ citizens nor will the polity which we fable? in 
words be brought to pass in deed?” ‘They will 
_ perhaps be less so,’”’ he said. ‘‘ Instead of less so, 
may we not say that they have been altogether 
tamed and convinced, so. that for very shame, if 
_ for no other reason, they may assent?” “Certainly,” 

said he. _ 
_ XIV. “Let us assume, then,” said I, ‘‘ that they 
_ are won over to this view. Will anyone contend that 
there is no chance that the offspring of kings and 
tulers should be born with the philosophic nature ? ” 
“ Not one,” he said. “‘ And can anyone prove that if 
so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The 
_ difficulty “ of their salvation we too concede ; but that 
in all the course of time not one of all could be saved,4 
will anyone maintain that?’ ‘“‘ How could he?” 
“ But surely,” said I, “‘ the occurrence of one such is 

> Cf. 376 pv, Laws 632 £, 841 c, Phaedr. 276 Ξε. 
Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon, p. 13, says Plato uses the 
word μῦθος only once of his own m . Polit. 268 zB. 

© Cf. Laws 711 το τὸ χαλεπόν, and 495 a-s. 

4 Cf. 494 a. 




πειθομένην, πάντ᾽ ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστούμενα. 
41 \ 4 ” 7A La ὃ᾽ > ᾿ 
Kavos γάρ, ἔφη. “Apxovtos γάρ που, ἣν ἐγώ, 
τιθέντος τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, ἃ 
διεληλύθαμεν, οὐ δήπου ἀδύνατον ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν 
τοὺς πολίτας. Οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν. ᾿Αλλὰ δή, ἅπερ 
piv δοκεῖ, δόξαι καὶ ἄλλοις θαυμαστόν τι καὶ 
ὃ / O > ἷ ΝΜ re Ἁ Ἁ 
ἀδύνατον; Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Καὶ μὴν 
ὅτι γε βέλτιστα, εἴπερ δυνατά, ἱκανῶς ἐν τοῖς 
” θ ες > > ὃ ONG] "I ~ 4 
ἔμπροσθεν, ws ἐγῷμαι, διήλθομεν. “ἱκανῶς γάρ. 
Νῦν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομο- 
θεσίας ἄριστα μὲν εἶναι ἃ λέγομεν, εἰ γένοιτο, 
\ / = . 
αλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, od μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε. Ξυμ- 
aiver γάρ, ἔφη 
XV. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μόγις τέλος ἔσχε, τὰ 
ἐπίλοιπα δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον, τίνα τρόπον ἡμῖν 
καὶ ἐκ τίνων μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων οἱ 
σωτῆρες ἐνέσονται τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ κατὰ ποίας 
ἡλικίας ἕκαστοι ἑκάστων ἁπτόμενοι; Λεκτέον 
, ” \ O 35 / δ᾽ >? tA ΑἹ / 
μέντοι, ἔφη. Οὐδέν, ἦν ἐγώ, τὸ σοφόν μοι 
ἐγένετο τήν τε τῶν γυναικῶν τῆς κτήσεως δυσχέ- 
ρειαν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν παραλιπόντι καὶ παιδογονίαν 
καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων κατάστασιν, εἰδότι ὡς 
ws 7 / \ \ / ς ~ 
ἐπίφθονός τε Kal χαλεπὴ γίγνεσθαι ἡ παντελῶς 

E ἀληθής: νῦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἦλθε τὸ δεῖν. αὐτὰ 

« Of, Epist. vii. 828 ο and Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 170. 
Plato’s apparent radicalism again. Cf. on 501 a. Cf. also 
Laws 709 , but note the qualification in 875 c, 713 n-714 a, 
691 c-p. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 381-383 seems to say 
that the εἷς ἱκανός is the philosopher—Plato. 

ὃ Note the different tone of 565 £ λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον 
ὄχλον. Cf. Phaedr. 260 c λαβὼν πόχιν ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν 

¢ Of. on 499 νυ, and Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, p. 48. 


enough,* if he has a state which obeys him,” to realize® 
allthatnowseemssoincredible.”’ ‘‘ Yes,oneis enough,” 
he said. “‘ For if such aruler,” I said, “ ordains the 
laws and institutions that we have described it is surely 
not impossible that the citizens should be content to 
carry themout.” ‘“‘Bynomeans.” ‘‘ Wouldit, then, 
be at all strange or impossible for others to come to the 
opinion to which we have come??” “TI think not,” 
said he. “ And further that these things are best, if 
possible, has already, I take it, been sufficiently 
shown.” “‘Yes, sufficiently.” “* Our present opinion, 
_ then, about this legislation is that our plan would be 
_ best if it could be realized and that this realization 
is difficult * yet not impossible.” “‘ That is the con- 
clusion,” he said. 

XV. “ This difficulty disposed of, we have next to 
speak of what remains, in what way, namely, and as a 
result of what studies and pursuits, these preservers / 
of the constitution will form a part of our state, and 
at what ages they will severally take up each study.” 
“Yes, we have to speak of that,” he said. “ I gained 
nothing,” I said, “by my cunning’ in omitting hereto- 
fore* the distasteful topic of the possession of women 
and procreation of children and the appointment of 
_ rulers, because I knew that the absolutely true and 
right way would provoke censure and is difficult of 
realization; for now I am none the less compelled 
"4 Cf. Epist. vii. 327 s-c, viii. 357 β ff. 

* Cf. 502 a, Campbell’s note on Theaet. 144 a, and Wila- 
mowitz, Platon, ii. p. 208. 

7 Cf. on 412 4-8 and 497 c-p, Laws 960 ΒΚ. 463 8 is not 

quite relevant. 

9 For τὸ σοφόν ef. Euthydem. 293 pv, 297 vp, Gorg. 483 a, 
Herod. v. 18 τοῦτο οὐδὲν εἶναι σοφόν, Symp. 214 a τὸ σόφισμα, 
Laches 183 Ὁ. 

“*® Cf. 423 τ. 


διελθεῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ 
παίδων πεπέρανται, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ἐξ 
ἀρχῆς μετελθεῖν δεῖ. ἐλέγομεν δ᾽, εἰ μνημονεύεις, 
503 δεῖν αὐτοὺς φιλοπόλιδάς τε φαίνεσθαι, βασανι- 
Copevovs ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λύπαις, καὶ τὸ δόγμα 
τοῦτο μήτ᾽ ἐν πόνοις μήτ᾽ ἐν φόβοις μήτ᾽ ἐν ἄλλῃ 
μηδεμιᾷ μεταβολῇ φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας, ἢ τὸν 
ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον, τὸν δὲ πανταχοῦ, ἀκή- 
ρατον ἐκβαίνοντα, ὦ ὥσπερ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρὶ βασανιζό- 
μενον, στατέον ἄρχοντα καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι 

καὶ τελευτήσαντι καὶ ἄθλα. τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα ἣν τὰ 
λεγόμενα, παρεξιόντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ 

Β λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν. ᾿Αληθέ- 
στατα, ἔφη, λέγεις" μέμνημαι “γάρ. "Oxvos γάρ, 

fi ᾿ ἔφην, ὦ φίλε, ἐ ἐγώ, εἰπεῖν τὰ νῦν ἀποτετολμημένα" 
ἢ νῦν" δὲ" τόῦτο μὲν τετολμήσθω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοὺς 
ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ καθιστάναι. 
Εἰρήσθω γάρ, ἔφη. Νόησον δή, ὡς εἰκότως ὀλίγοι 
ἔσονταί σοι. ἣν γὰρ διήλθομεν φύσιν. δεῖν ὑπ- 
ἄρχειν αὐτοῖς, εἰς ταὐτὸ ξυμφύεσθαι eens τὰ μέρη 

* In Bk. V. 
> Cf. 412 p-x, 413 c-414 4, 430 a-B, 537, 540 a, Laws 751. Cc. 
$ oo on 412 £, 413 ὁ, Soph. 230 8. 

4 +6 δόγμα τοῦτο is an illogical idiom. The antecedent is 
only implied. Cf. 373 c, 598 c. See my article in Trans- 
actions of the American Phil. Assoc. xlvii. (1916) pp. 205-236. 

¢ Cf. Theognis 417-418 παρατρίβομαι ὥστε μολίβδῳ χρυσός, 
ibid. 447-452, 1105-1106, Herod. vii. 10, Eurip. fr. 955 (N. ) 

Cf. Zechariah xiii. 9 “I... will try them as is 
tried,’’ Job xxiii. 10 “* When he hath tried me I shall come 
forth as gold.” Cf. also 1 Peter i. 7, Psalm xii. 6, Ixvi, 10, 
Isaiah xlviii. 10. 

7 The translation preserves the intentional order of the 
Greek. For the idea cf. 414 a and 465 Ὁ-Ὲ and for ἄθλα ef, 
4608. Cobet rejects καὶ ἄθλα, but emendations are needless. 




to discuss them. The matter of the women and 
children has been disposed of,* but the education of 
the rulers has to be examined again, I may say, from 
the starting-point. We were saying, if you recollect, 
that they must approve themselves lovers of the state 
when tested? in pleasures and pains, and make it 
apparent that they do not abandon ® this fixed faith ὦ 
under stress of labours or fears or any other vicissi- 
tude, and that anyone who could not keep that faith 
must be rejected, while he who always issued from 
the test pure and intact, like gold tried in the ἔτεα," is 
to be established as ruler and to receive honours in 
life and after death and prizes as well. Something 
of this sort we said while the argument slipped by 
with veiled face? in fear” of starting‘ our present de- 
bate.”’ “Most true,” he said; “‘ remember.” “‘We 
shrank, my friend,’’ I said, ‘“‘from uttering the . 

audacities which have now been hazarded. But now |}! 
let us find courage for the definitive pronouncement 
that as the most perfect/ guardians we must establish 
philosophers.” ‘‘ Yes, assume it to have been said,” 
said he, “ Note, then, that they will naturally be few,* 
for the different components of the nature which we 
said their education presupposed rarely consent to 

τ Cf. Phaedr. 237 a, Epist. vii. 340 a. For the per- 
‘sonification of the λόγος ef. What Plato Said, p. 500 on 
Protag. 361 4-8. So too Cic. Tuse. i. 45. 108 ‘sed ita tetra 
sunt eg ut ea fugiat et reformidet oratio.”’ 

᾿" ναὶ Β. 

ἡ Cf. the proverbial μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα, do not moye the 
immovable, “let sleeping dogs lie,” in Laws 684 ν»-Ὲ, 
9138. Cf. also Phileb. 16 c, and the American idiom “‘ start 

4 ees δύσι, SAL B, 340 Ε, 342 νυ. 
* Cf. on 4944 



ὀλιγάκις ἐθέλει, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ διεσπασμένη φύεται. 
1 © Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ 
| ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἕπεται 
᾿ς οἷσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν &, ἅμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοί; τε 
καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας, οἷοι κοσμίως 
μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ “βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ 
οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅ ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι, 
καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται. ᾿Αληθῆ, 
ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἤθη καὶ 
οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς ἄν τις μᾶλλον ὡς πιστοῖς 
χρήσαιτο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους 
δυσκίνητα ὄ ὄντα, πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὖ ποιεῖ ταὐ- 
τόν" δυσκινήτως. ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς ὥσπερ ἀπο- 
νεναρκωμένα, καὶ ὕπνου τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίπλανται, 
ὅταν τι δέῃ τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖν. Ἔστι ταῦτα, 
Ἡμεῖς δέ γ᾽ ἔφαμεν ἀμφοτέρων δεῖν εὖ τε eal 
καλῶς μετέχειν, ἢ μήτε παιδείας τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης 
δεῖν αὐτῷ μεταδιδόναι μήτε τιμῆς μήτε ἀρχῆς. 
Ὀρθῶς, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐκοῦν σπάνιον αὐτὸ οἴει 
E ἔσεσθαι; Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; Βασανιστέον δὴ ἔν τε οἷς 
τότε ἐλέγομεν. πόνοις τε καὶ φόβοις καὶ ἡδοναῖς, 
καὶ ἔτι δὴ ὃ τότε παρεῖμεν νῦν λέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐν 

1 On the text see end of note a below. 


* The translation is correct. In the Greek the anacoluthon 
is for right emphasis, and the separation of νεανικοί re Kai 
μεγαλοπρεπεῖς from the other members of the list is also an 
intentional feature of Plato’s style to avoid the monotony of 
too long an enumeration. The two things that rarely com- 
bine are Plato’s two temperaments. The description of the 
orderly temperament begins with οἷοι and οἱ τοιοῦτοι refers to 
the preceding description of the active temperament. ‘The 
mss. have καὶ before νεανικοί ; Heindorf, followed by Wilamo- 
witz, and Adam’s minor edition, put it before οἷοι. Burnet 
follows the mss. Adam's larger edition puts καὶ νεανικοί τε 




grow in one ; but for the most part these qualities 
are found apart.’”’ ““ What do you mean ? ” he said. 
“ Facility in learning, memory, sagacity, quickness of 
apprehension and their accompaniments, and youth- 
ful spirit and magnificence in soul are qualities, you 
know, that are rarely combined in human nature with 
a disposition to live orderly, quiet, and stable lives : 
but such men, by reason of their quickness,” are driven 
about just as chance directs, and all steadfastness is 

one out of them.” “You speak truly,” he said. 

And on the other hand, the steadfast and stable 
temperaments, whom one could rather trust in use, 
_ and who in war are not easily moved and aroused to 

ee ee 

fear, are apt to act in the same way © when confronted | 

with studies. They are not easily aroused, learn with 

difficulty, as if benumbed, and are filled with sleep © 

and yawning when an intellectual task is set them.” 
“Tt is so,” he said. ‘‘ But we affirmed that a man 
must partake of both temperaments in due and fair 
combination or else participate in neither the highest® 
edueation norin honours norinrule.”” “* And rightly,” 
he said. “Do younot think, then,that sucha blend will 
be a rare thing?” “Of course.” ‘They must, then, 
be tested in the toils and fears and pleasures of which 
we then spoke,’ and we have also now to speak of a 

after ἕπεται. The right meaning can be got from any of the 
texts in a good viva voce reading. 

Plato’s contrast of the two temperaments disregards the 
‘possible objection of a psychologist that the adventurous 
temperament is not necessarily intellectual. Cf. supra on 
375 c, and What Plato Said, Ρ. 573 on Theaet. 144 a-s, Cic. 
Tusc. v. 24. Cf. Theaet. 144 a ff. 

- * A touch of humour in a teacher. 

# For the figure cf. Meno 80 a, 84 8 and c. 

* Lit. “most precise.” Cf. Laws 965 B ἀκριβεστέραν παιδείαν. 
ες 4 1n 412 c fi. 

VOL. II Ga 81 


μαθήμασι πολλοῖς γυμνάζειν δεῖ, σκοποῦντας εἰ 
καὶ τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα δυνατὴ ἔσται ἐνεγκεῖν, 
504 εἴτε καὶ ἀποδειλιάσει, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς ἄθλοις" 
ἀποδειλιῶντες. Πρέπει γε τοι δή, ἔφη, οὕτω 
σκοπεῖν: ἀλλὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα; 
XVI. Μνημονεύεις μέν που, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι 
τριττὰ εἴδη ψυχῆς διαστησάμενοι ξυνεβιβάζομεν 
δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ. “σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας 
καὶ σοφίας ὃ ὃ ἕκαστον εἴη. Μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων, 
ἔφη, τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν εἴην δίκαιος μὴ ἀκούειν. Ἦ καὶ 
Β τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν; Τὸ ποῖον δή; ᾿Ελέγομέν 
που, ὅτι, Ws μὲν δυνατὸν ἣν κάλλιστα αὐτὰ κατ- 
ἰδεῖν, ἄλλη μακροτέρα εἴη περίοδος, ἣν περι- 
ελθόντι καταφανῆ γίγνοιτο, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν 
προειρημένων ἑπομένας ἀποδείξεις οἷόν. τ᾽ εἴη 
προσάψαι. καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐξαρκεῖν ἔφατε, καὶ οὕτω 
δὴ ἐρρήθη τὰ τότε τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας, ὡς ἐμοὶ 
ἐφαίνετο, ἐλλιπῆ, εἰ δὲ ὑμῖν ἀρεσκόντως, ὑμεῖς ἂν 
τοῦτο εἴποιτε. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἔμοιγε, Ae μετρίως" ἐφαί- 
Ονετο μὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. ὦ φίλε, ἣν δ᾽ 

1 ἄθλοις Orelli: ἄλλοις Mss. 

« Cf. infra 535 8, Protag. 326 c. 

> For the tripartite soul cf. Vol. I. on 435 a and 436 8, 
Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42, What Plato Said, p. 526 on 
Phaedo 68 c, p. 552 on Phaedr. 246 5, and p. 563 on Rep. 
435 B-c. 

° Of. Vol. I. on 435 pv, Phaedr. 274 a, Friedlander, Platon, 
ii. pp. 376-377, Jowett and Campbell, p. 300, Frutiger, 
Mythes de Platon, pp. 81 ff., and my Idea Good in 
Plato” 8 Republic (Univ. of Chicago Studies in Class. Phil. 
vol. i. p. 190). There is no mysticism and no obscurity. The 
longer way is the higher education, which will ena Je the 
philosopher not only like ordinary citizens to do the right 
from habit and training, but to understand the reasons for it. 




point we then passed by, that we must exercise them 
in eee, studies, watching them to see whether their 
hook ἧδε χεῖρ οἵ enduring the greatest and most 

es or whether it will faint and flinch @ as 
men ae anc in the trials and contests of the body.” { 
“ That is certainly the right way of looking at it,” he 
said. ‘‘ But what do you understand by the greatest 

studies ᾿ is 

XVI. “ You remember, I presume,” said I, “ that 
sSieBdistingdishing three kinds? in the soul, we estab- 
lished definitions of justice, sobriety, bravery and 
wisdom severally.” “If I did not remember,” he 
said, “ I should not deserve to hear the rest.” ‘‘ Do 
you also remember what was said before this?” 
What?” “We were saying, I believe, that for 
the most perfect discernment of these things another 
way ° was requisite which would make them 
plain to one: who took it, but that it was possible 
to add proofs on a par with the preceding discussion. 
And you said that that was sufficient, and it was on 
this puleaitekdien that what we then said was said, 
falling short of ultimate precision as it appeared to 

me, but if it contented. you it is for you to say.’ 
“Well,” he said, “it was measurably satisfactory to 

me, and apparently to the rest of the company.’ 

' The outcome of such an education is described as the vision 

of the idea of good, which for ethics and politics means a 
restatement of the provisional psychological definition of the 
cardinal virtues in terms of the ea elements of human 
welfare. For metaphysics and cosmogony the vision of the 
idea of good may mean a tcloologies interpretation of the 
universe and the interpretation of all things in terms of 
benevolent design. That is reserved for poetical and mythical 
tee A in the Timaeus. The Republic merely glances at 

from time to time and returns to its own theme. 
© alse ntrod., p. xxxv. 


ἐγώ, eR τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολεῖπον Kal ὁτιοῦν 
τοῦ ὄντος οὐ πάνυ μετρίως grain ἀτελὲς γὰρ 
οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς μέτρον- δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἐνίοτέ τισιν ἱκανῶς 
ἤδη ἔχειν καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν περαιτέρω ζητεῖν. Καὶ 
μάλ᾽, ἔφη, συχνοὶ πάσχουσιν αὐτὸ διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν. 
Τούτου δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τοῦ παθήματος ἥκιστα 
δεὼ Ἂ ἕὰ- ae Ch αἱ de 

προσδεῖ φύλακι πόλεώς τε Kal νόμων. Εἰκός, ἢ 
δ᾽ ὅς. Τὴν μακροτέραν τοίνυν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἔφην, 
D περιιτέον τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ἧττον μανθάνοντι 
, ” ΄ oe es NY Sy SPEEA IY 
πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ: ἢ, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, 
τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθή- 
μᾶτος ἐπὶ τέλος οὔποτε ἥξει. Οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα, ἔφη, 
μέγιστα, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι τι μεῖζον paaeerryy τε καὶ ὧν 
διήλθομεν; Καὶ μεῖζον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν 
τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφὴν δεῖ ὥσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι, 
ἀλλὰ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι" 
n ΕῚ ~ > \ \ ΝΜ la ΦΙΛΟ ΓΕ Bian 
ἢ οὐ γελοῖον, ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίοις πᾶν 
E ποιεῖν συντεινομένους ὅπως ὅ τι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ 
καθαρώτατα ἕξει, τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μεγίστας 

@ Of. Cie. De Jin. i. 1 “‘nec modus est ullus investigandi 
veri nisi inveneris.” 

Note not only the edifying tone and the unction of the 
style but the definite suggestion of Plato’s distaste for 
relativity and imperfection which finds expression in the 
criticism of the homo mensura in the Theaetetus, in the state- 
ment of the Laws 716 c, that God is the measure of all things 
(What Plato Said, p. 631), and in the contrast in the Politicus 
283-284 between measuring things against one another and 
measuring them by an idea. Cf. infra 581 a. 



EO  ————— ᾿ 


“ Nay, my friend,” said 1, “ a measure of such things 
that in the least degree falls short of reality proves 
no measure at all. For nothing that is imperfect is 
the measure of anything,* though some people some- 
times think that they have already done enough? and 
that there is no need of further inquiry.” “ Yes, 
indeed,” he said, “‘ many experience this because of 
their sloth.” ** An experience,” said I, “ that least 
of all befits the guardians of a state and of its laws.” 
“That seems likely,” he said. “Then,” said I, 
“such a one must go around the longer way and must 
_ labour no less in studies than in the exercises of the 
body ; or else, as we were just saying, he will never 
come to the end of the greatest study and that which 
most properly belongs to him. ” ““Why, are not 
these things the greatest?” said he; “but is there 
still something greater than justice and the other 
virtues we described ἡ “There is not only some- 
;’ Isaid, “ but of these very things we 
need not merely to contemplate an outline? as now, 
but we must omit nothing of their most exact 
elaboration. Or would it not be absurd to strain every 
nerve * to attain to the utmost precision and clarity 
of knowledge about other things of trifling moment 
and not to demand the greatest precision for the 

ὃ Of. Menex. 234 a, Charm. 158 c, Symp. 204 4, Epist. 
Vii. 341 a. 

- From here to the end of this Book the notes are to be used 
in connexion with the Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxxvi, where the 
idea of and the divided line are discussed. 

_ * Cf, Phaedr. 274 a. 

# je. sketch, adumbration. The ὑπογραφή is the account 
of the cardinal virtues in Bk. iv. 428-433. 

_.* For πᾶν ποιεῖν ef. on 488 c, for συντεινομένους Huthydem. 



ἀξιοῦν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, 
[ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα }"-" ὃ μέντοι μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ 
rept 6 τι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἴει τιν᾽ ἄν σε, ἔφη, ἀφεῖναι 
μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἐστιν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐρώτα. πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις 
ἀκήκοας" νῦν δὲ ἢ ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ αὖ διανοεῖ ἐμοὶ 
505 πράγματα παρέχειν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος.. -οἶμαι δὲ 
τοῦτο μᾶλλον: ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε a τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα 
μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας, ἧ “ah δίκαια 
καὶ τἄλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα 
γίγνεται. καὶ νῦν σχεδὸν οἷσθ᾽ ὅτι μέλλω τοῦτο 
λέγειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ὅτι αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανῶς 
ἴσμεν: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης, εἰ ὅ τι 
μάλιστα τἄλλα ἐπισταίμεθα, οἷσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐδὲν ᾿ ἡμῖν 
Β ὄφελος, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ εἰ κεκτήμεθά τι ἄνευ τοῦ 
ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οἴει τι πλέον εἶναι πᾶσαν κτῆσιν ἐκτῆ- 
σθαι, μὴ μέντοι ἀγαθήν; ἢ πάντα τἄλλα φρονεῖν 

1 Bracketed by Scheiermacher, whom the Oxford text 
follows. Cf. also Adam ad loc. Stallbaum ad loc. defends. 

* Such juxtaposition of different forms of the same word is 
one of the most common features of Plato’s style. Cf. 453 B 
ἕνα ἕν, 466 Dd πάντα πάντῃ, 467 D πολλὰ πολλοῖς, 496 ὁ οὐδεὶς 
οὐδέν, Laws 835 ἃ μόνῳ μόνος, 958 B ἑκόντα ἑκών. Cf. also 
Protag. 327 5, Gorg. 523 5, Symp. 217 5, Tim. 92 5, Phaedo 
109 5, Apol. 32 c, and Laws passim. 

» The answer is to the sense. Cf. 346 8, Crito 47 c, and p, 
Laches 195 pv, Gorg. 467 ©. See critical note. 

¢ Plato assumed that the reader will understand that the 
unavailing quest for ‘the good”’ in the earlier dialogues is 
an anticipation of the idea of good. Cf. supra Vol. I. on 
476 4 and What Plato Said, p. 71. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 
p. 567, does not understand. 

4 Cf. 508 x, 517 c, Cratyl. 418 ©. Cf. Phileb. 64 © and 
What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 a. 


ae ee ee ἐνῶ 


@ matters?” “It would indeed,®”’ he said; 

ma do you suppose that anyone will let you go 
orca. what is the greatest study and with 

it is concerned?” “ΒΥ no means,” 

said. ; “but do you ask the question. You cer- 
tainly have heard it often, but now you either do not 
apprehend or again you are minded to make trouble 
for me by attacking the argument. I suspect it is 
rather the latter. For you have often heard° that the 
test thing tolearn is the idea of good¢ by reference 
towhich* justthings‘ and alltherest become useful and 
_ beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that 
this is what I am going to speak of and to say further 
that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we 
do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of 
this we should know all other things never so well, 
you are aware that it would avail us nothing, just as 
no possession either is of any avail? without the posses- 
sion of the good. Ordo you think there is any profit” 
in possessing everything except that which is good, 
or in understanding all things else apart from the 

Plato is unwilling to confine his idea of to a formula 
and so seems to speak of itasa mystery. It wasso 
throughout antiquity (cf. Diog. Laert. iii. 27), and_by a 

majority of modern scholars. Cf. my [dea of Good in Plato’ 3 
Republic. pp τς ΒΡ, 188-189, What Plato Said, pp. 72, 230-231, 
I, pp. xL-xli, and Vol. II. pp. xxvii, xxxiv. 

Ae tga ge which,” i.e. a theory of the cardinal 
virtues is scientific only if deduced from an Dp ultimele sanction 
or ideal. 

7 The omission of the article merely gives a vaguely 
generalizing colour. It makes no difference. 

_* For the idiom οὐδὲν ὄφελος ef. Euthyph. 4 2, Lysis 208 ε, 
supra 365 8, Charm. 155 k, etc. 

Cf. 427 a, Phaedr. 275 c, Cratyl. 387 a, Euthyd. 288 Ἐ, 
Laws 751 5, 944 p, etc. 



ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν “μηδὲν 
φρονεῖν; Ma A’? οὐκ ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη. oh Jud 
XVII. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς 
μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, Τοῖς δὲ 
κομψοτέροις φρόνησι ς. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; Καὶ ὅτι γε, 
ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις 
ον ae ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ 
ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, γελοίως. “Πῶς 
C yap οὐχί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰ ὀνειδίζοντές ὅτι. pw 
ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσιν, φρό 
νῆσιν γὰρ αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς (ad: τοῖς 
ιέντων ἡμῶν ὅ τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ 
φθέγξωνται ὄνομα. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη. Τί δαί; 
οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὁριζόμενοι μῶν “μή τι ἐλάτ- 
τονὸος πλάνης ἔμπλεῳ τῶν ἑτέρων; ἢ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι 
ἀναγκάζονται ὁμολογεῖν ἡδονὰς εἶναι κακᾶς; 

@ καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθόν suggests but does not mean καλοκάγαθόν 
in its half-technical sense. The two words fill out the tae 
with Platonie fulness and are virtual synonyms. Cf. Philed. 
65 a and Symp. 210-211 where because of the Sie the 
καλόν is substituted for the ἀγαθόν. 

δ So Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias and later the 
Epicureans and Cyrenaics. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 1313; 
Eurip. Hippol. 382 οἱ δ᾽ ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ, and 
supra on 329 a-B. 

ere is no contradiction here with the Philebus. Plato 
pa not himself say that either pleasure or knowledge is the 
ὃς κομψοτέροις is very slightly if at all ironical here. ΟἿ. 
the American “‘ sophisticated” in recent use. See too Theaet. 
156 a, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1905 a 18 οἱ χαρίεντες. 

4 Plato does not distinguish synonyms in the style of 
Prodicus (ef. Protag. 337 α ff.) and Aristotle (ef. Eth. Nie. 
1140-1141) when the distinction is irrelevant to his purpose. 
Cf. EButhyd. 281 pv, Theaet. 176 5 with 176 c. 

¢ Cf. 428 n-c, Euthydem. 288 τὸ f., Laws 961 Ἐ 6 περὶ τί 



while understanding and knowing nothing that is 
Saees ?” .“ No, by Zeus, I do not,” he said. — 

οὐ But, furthermore, you know this too, that 

the multitude believe pleasure? to be the good, and 
the finer® rie intelligence or knowledge.*” . “ Cer- 
tainly ou are also aware, my friend, that 
those who Hold diss latter view are not able to point 
_ out what knowledge * it is but are finally compelled 
to say that it is the knowledge of the good. * “Most 
absurdly,’ he'said. ‘‘ Is it not absurd,” said I, “ if 
while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they 
turn aboutand talk to us as if we knew it? For they 
say it is the knowledge of the good,’ as if we under- 
stood their meaning when they utter’ the word 
“good.’”” “ Most true,” he said. “‘ Well, are those 
who define the good as pleasure infected with any less 
confusion” of thought than the others? Or are not 
they in like manner?‘ compelled to admit that there 

νοῦς. See Unity of Plato’s Thought, τι. 650. The demand 
for specification is frequent in the dialogues. Cf. Euthyph. 
ae παν 199. τ, Gorg. 451 a, Charm. 165 c-£, Ale. I. 

# ‘There is no “ἐπε in the Greek. Emendations are idle. 
Plato is supremely indifferent to logical precision when it 
_ makes no difference for a reasonably intelligent reader. Cf. 
_ my note on Phileb. 11 s-c in Class. Phil. vol. iii. (1908) 
pp. 343-345. 
2 φθέγξωνται logically of mere physical utterance (ef. Theaet. 
157 8), not, I think, as Adam says, of high-sounding oracular 

Δ Lit. “‘ wandering,” the mark of error. Cf. 484 5, Lysis 
213 £, Phaedo 79 c, Soph. 230 8, Phaedr. 263 8, Parmen. 135 £, 
Laws 962 v. 

ὁ καὶ οὗτοι is an illogical idiom of over-particularization. 
The sentence begins generally and ends specifically. Plato 
does not care, since the meaning is clear. Cf. Protag. 336 ς, 
Gorg. 456 c-p, Phaedo 62 a. 



Σφόδρα γε. Συμβαίνει δὴ αὐτοῖς, οἶμαι, ὅμο- 
D λογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ ταὐτά. ἢ γάρ; Τί 
μήν; Οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν μεγάλαι καὶ reed ἀνάια. 
βητήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανερόν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; 
Τί δέ;. τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ 
πολλοὶ ἂν ἕλοιντο τὰ δοκοῦντα, κἂν μὴ ἢ, ὅμως 
ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ 
δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ 
ὄντα ζητοῦσι, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς 
Ε ἀτιμάζει; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν 
ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, 
ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ 
ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει 
χρήσασθαι μονίμῳ οἵᾳ καὶ περὶ τἄλλα, διὰ τοῦτο 
δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τι ὄφελος ἦν, 
506 περὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον οὕτω φῶμεν δεῖν 
ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ 

4.Α distinct reference to Callicles’ admission in Gorgias 
499 B τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, ras δὲ χείρους, ef. 499 c, 
Rep. 561 c, and Phileb. 13 c πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι, Stenzel’s 
notion (Studien zur Entw. ἃ. Plat. Dialektik, p. 98) that in 
the Philebus Plato “ist von dem Standpunkt des Staates 
503c weit entfernt”’ is uncritical, The Republic merely 
refers to the Gorgias to show that the question is disputed 
and the disputants contradict themselves, 

» ἀμφισβητήσεις is slightly disparaging, cf. Theaet. 163 c, 
158 c, 198 c, Sophist 233 B, 225 8, but less so than ἐρίζειν 
in Protag. 337 a. 

¢ Men may deny the reality of the conventional virtues 
but not of the ultimate sanction, whatever it is. Cf. Theaet. 
167 c, 172 a-s, and Shorey in Class. Phil. xvi. (1921) 
pp. 164-168. 

4 Cf. Gorg. 468 B τὸ ἀγαθὸν dpa διώκοντες, supra 505 a-B, 
Phileb. 20 νυ, Symp. 206 a, Euthyd. 278 8, Aristot. Bth. Nic. 




are bad pleasures*?’’ ‘‘ Most assuredly.’’ ‘‘ The 
outcome is, I take it, that they are admitting the same 
things to be both good and bad, are they not?” 
“Certainly.” “Then is it not apparent that there 
are many and violent disputes® about it?” ‘ Of 
course.” “ And again, is it not apparent that while 
in the case of the just and the honourable many would 
prefer the semblance° without the reality in action, 
possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good 
nobody is content with the possession of the appear- 
ance but all men seek the reality, and the semblance 
satisfies nobody here?” ‘‘ Quite so,” he said. 
“ That, then, which every soul pursues? and for its sake 
does all that it does, with an intuition ὁ of its reality, 
but yet baffled’ and unable to apprehend its nature 
adequately, or to attain to any stable belief about it 
as about other things, and for that reason failing of 
any possible benefit from other things,—in a matter 
of this quality and moment, can we, I ask you, allow 
a like blindness and obscurity in those best citizens* 

1173 a, 1094 a οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται, Zeller, Aristot. i. pp. 344-345, 
379, Boethius iii. 10, Dante, Purg. xvii. 127-129. 

* Cf. Phileb. 64 a μαντευτέον. Cf. Arnold’s phrase, God 
and the Bible, chap. i. p. 23 “approximate 1] age 
thrown out as it were at certain great objects which e 
human mind augurs and feels after.’ 

? As throughout the minor dialogues. Cf. What Plato 
Said, p. 71. 
~* Because, in the language of Platonic metaphysics, it is 
the παρουσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ that makes them good; but for the 

ical purpose of ethical theory, because they need the 
Sanction. Cf. Introd. p. xxvii, and Montaigne i. 24 ‘* Toute 
aultre science est dommageable  celuy qui n’a la science de 

Δ As in the “ longer way”’ Plato is careful not to commit 
himself to a definition of the ideal or the sanction, but 
postulates it for his guardians. 



πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχειριοῦμεν; Ἥκιστά γ᾽, ἔφη. 
Olax γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε Kal καλὰ ἀγνοού- ΐ 
μενα ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐ ἐστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινὸς ἄξιον 
φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα, 
μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερόν γνώσεσθαι 
ἱκανῶς. Καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, μαντέύει. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἡμῖν. 
Β ἡ πολιτεία τελέως κεκοσμήσεται, ἐὰν ὃ τοιοῦτος 
αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῇ φύλαξ, ὃ τούτων ἐπιστήμων; 
XVIII. ᾿Ανάγκη, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ σὺ δή, ὦ Σώ- 
κρατες, πότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φὴς εἶναι ἢ ἢ 
ἡδονήν; ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα; Οὗτος, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
ἀνήρ, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανὴς ὅτι σοι 
οὐκ ἀποχρήσοι τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν. 
Οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιόν μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται 
τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν δόγματα, τὸ δ᾽ 
αὑτοῦ μή, τοσοῦτον χρόνον περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευό- 
Ο μενον. Τί δαί; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ: δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι 
περὶ ὧν τις μὴ οἷδε λέγειν ὡς εἰδότα; Οὐδαμῶς 
γ᾽, ἔφη, ὡς εἰδότα, ὡς μέντοι οἰόμενον ταῦθ᾽ ἃ 
οἴεται ἐθέλειν λέγειν. Τί δέ; εἶπον" οὐκ ἤσθησαι 
τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι ἀϊσχραί; 
ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί: ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν 


* The personal or ab urbe condita construction. Of. 
Theaet. 169 x. 

Ὁ The guardians must be able to give a reason, which they 
can do only by reference to the sanction. For the idea that 
the statesman must know better than other men ef. Laws 
968 a, 964 c, 858 p-£, 817 ο, Xen. Mem. iii. 6. 8. 

¢ For the effect of the future perfect cf. 457 B λελέξεται, 
465 a προστετάξεται, Kurip. Heracleidae 980 πεπράξεται. 



to whose hands we are to entrust all things?” 
“ Least of all,” he said. “41 fancy, at any rate,” said 
1, “ that the just and the honourable, if their relation 
_and reference to the good is not known,? will not have 
secured a guardian” of much worth in the man thus 
orant, and my surmise is that no one will under- 
and them adequately before he knows this.” “ You 
surmise well,’’ he said. “‘ Then our constitution will 
have its perfect and definitive organization? only when 
such a guardian, who knows these things, oversees it.”’ 
_ XVIII. “ Necessarily,” he said. “‘ But you your- 
self, Socrates, do. you think that knowledge is the 
or pleasure or something else and different ?”’ 
What a man it is,” said 1; ‘‘ you made it very plain? 
long ago that you would not be satisfied with what 
others think about it.” “ Why, it does not seem 
right to me either, Socrates,” he said, “‘to be ready to 
state the opinions of others but not one’s own when 
one has occupied himself with the matter so long.*”’ 
“ But then,” said I, “ do you think it right to speak 
as haying knowledge about things one does not 
know?” “By no means,” he said, “as having 
knowledge, but one ought to be willing to tell as his 
opinion what he opines.” ‘“‘ Nay,” said I, “ have 
‘ou not observed that opinions divorced from know- 
ledge’ are ugly things? The best of them are 
blind.’ Or do you think that those who hold some 
Ἢ For the personal construction cf, 348 ©, Isoc. To Nic. 1. 
αταφανής is a variation in this idiom for δῆλος. Cf. also 
Theaet . 189 c, Symp. 221 B, Charm: 162 c, etc. 
 * Cf. 367 v-r. 
' ? This is not a contradiction of Meno 97 8, Theaet. 201 B-c, 

and Phileb. 62 s-n, but simply a different context and 
emphasis. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 47, nn. 338 

~ # Cf. on 484 c, Phaedr. 270 xe. 



διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων of ἄνευ νοῦ 
ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες; Οὐδέν, ἔφη. Βούλει οὖν 
αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι τυφλά τε καὶ σκόλια, ἐξὸν παρ᾽ 
ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά; Μὴ πρὸς Διός, 
ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει 
ὧν ἀποστῇς. ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν, κἂν ὥσπερ 
δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν , 
διῆλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθῃς. Kat 
γὰρ ἐμοί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ μάλα ἀρκέσει" 
ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ᾽ ἔσομαι, προθυμούμενος 
δὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτα ὀφλήσω. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ μακάριοι, 

E ἧς, ἊΝ ᾿ ΄ She τῶν 3 θό 27 \ oA 


, v4 / n A ἊΝ 
εἶναι: πλέον yap μοι φαΐνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παρ- 
οὔσαν ὁρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ 
νῦν: ὃς δὲ ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ 
ε ’, > “ ’, 52 7 > \ ec a 
ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνῳ, λέγειν ἐθέλω, εἰ καὶ ὑμῖν 
φίλον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν. ᾿Αλλ᾽, ἔφη, λέγε: εἰσαῦθις 
γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποτίσεις τὴν διήγησιν. Βου- 
/ », > ¢ 4 Reh > 
λοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν ἀποδοῦναι 

« Probably an allusion to the revelation of the mysteries. 
Cf. Phaedr. 250 c, Phileb. 16 c, Rep. 518 c, 478 c, 479 b, 
518 a. It is fantastic to see in it a reference to what Cicero 
calls the lumina orationis of Isocratean style. The rhetoric 
and synonyms of this passage are not to be pressed. 

> Of. Phileb. 64 α ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἤδη προθύροις, 
“‘ we are now in the vestibule of the good.” 

© καὶ μάλα, “jolly well,” humorous emphasis on the point 
that it is much easier to “define” the conventional virtues 
than to explain the “sanction.” Cf. Symp. 189 a, Euthydem. . 
298 v-x, Herod. viii. 66. It is frequent in the Republic. 
Ritter gives forty-seven cases. I have fifty-four! But the 
point that matters is the humorous tone. Cf. ¢.g. 610 B. 

ἃ Excess of zeal, προθυμία, seemed laughable to the Greeks. 



true opinion without intelligence differ appreciably 
from blind men who go the right way?”’ “ They 
do not differ at all,” he said. oh it, then, ugly things 
that you prefer to contemplate, things blind and 
crooked, when you might hear from others what is 
Juminous® and fair?” ‘“ Nay, in heaven’s name, 
Socrates,” said Glaucon, “do not draw back, as it 
were, at the very goal.’ For it will content us if 
you explain the good even as you set forth the 
nature of justice, sobriety, and the other-virtues.” 
“Tt will right well* content me, my dear fellow,” I 
said, “ but I fear that my powers may fail and that 
in my eagerness I may cut a sorry figure and become 
a i k.¢ Nay, my beloved, let us dismiss 
for the time being the nature of the good in itself ;* for 
‘to attain to my present surmise of that seems a pitch 
above the impulse that wings my flight to-day.’ But 
of what seems to be the offspring of the good and 
most nearly made in its likeness? I am willing to 
speak if you too wish it, and otherwise to let the 
matter drop.”” “‘ Well, speak on,”’ he said, “‘ for you 
‘will duly pay me the tale of the parent another time.” 
“T could wish,” I said, “ that I were able to make 
Of. my interpretation of Iliad i. in fine, Class. Phil. xxii. 
(1927) pp. 222-223. 

* Cf. More, Principia Ethica, p. 17 “Good, then, is 
in é able x Petes so ΕΣ as ἐν ait oe dey: = 
ethical writer, essor He idgwick, w ear 
recognized and stated this fact.” 

7 This is not superstitious mysticism but a deliberate 
refusal to confine in a formula what requires either a volume 
orasymbol. See Introd. p. xxvii, and my Idea of Good in 
Plato’s Republic, p. 212. τὰ viv repeats τὸ νῦν εἶναι (ef. Tim. 
48 c), as the evasive phrase εἰσαῦθις below sometimes lays the 
topic on the table, never to be taken up again. Cf. 347 £ 
and 430 c. 

9 Cf. Laws 897 »-Ἑ, Phaedr. 246 a. 



καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι, ἀλλα μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν Todds 
τόκους μόνον. τοῦτον δὲ δὴ οὖν τὸν τόκον τε καὶ 
ἔκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κομίσασθε. εὐλαβεῖσθε 
μέντοι μή πῇ ἐξαπατήσω ὑμᾶς ἄκων, κίβδηλον 
ἀποδιδοὺς τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου. Ἐϊλαβησόμεθα, 
ἔφη, κατὰ δύναμιν: ἀλλὰ μόνον λέγε. Διομολο- 
γησάμενός γ᾽, ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἀναμνήσας ὑμᾶς τά 
τ᾿ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ῥηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἤδη 
Β πολλάκις εἰρημένα. Τὰ ποῖα; ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Πολλὰ 
καλά, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα 
οὕτως εἶναί φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν TO λόγῳ. 
Φαμὲν γάρ. Kat αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν 
καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων, ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν, 
πάλιν αὖ κατ᾽ ἰδέαν μίαν ἑκάστου ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης 
τιθέντες ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν. “Kort 
ταῦτα. Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὁρᾶσθαι φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι 
C8 οὔ, τὰς δ᾽ αὖ ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μέν, ὁρᾶσθαι δ᾽ οὔ. 
/, A ~ Of «ΕΣ ~ 
Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Τῷ οὖν ὁρῶμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν 
τὰ ὁρώμενα; Τῇ ὄψει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
καὶ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις. αἰσθήσεσι 
πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά; Τί μήν; ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
ἐννενόηκας τὸν τῶν αἰσθήσεων δημιουργὸν ὅσῳ 

* This playful interlude relieves the monotony of argument 
and is a transition to the symbolism. τόκος means both 
interest and offspring... Cf. 555 ©, Polit. 267 a, Aristoph. 
Clouds 34, Thesm. 845, Pindar, Οἱ. x. 12. The equivocation, 
which in other languages became a metaphor, has played a 
great part in the history of opinion about usury. Cf. the 
article “ Usury’ in Hastings’s Encyclopaedia of Relig. and 
Ethics, and Antonio’s 

. . . when did friendship take 
A breed for barren metal of his friend ? 



— to receive the payment and not merely as 
e interest. But at any rate receive this 
᾿ρνρόβωρὶ and the offspring of the good. Have ἃ care, 
Ἀακέγοτει lest 1 deceive you unintentionally with a 
false τες koning of the interest.” “ We will do our 
best,” he said, “ to be on our guard. Only speak on.’ 
ἜΣ Yes,” Isaid, “after first coming to an understanding 
with you and reminding you of what has been said 
» before and often on other occasions.””” ““What?’’ 
said he.’ ‘‘ We predicate ‘ to be ᾽ς of many beautiful 
things and many good things, saying of them severally 
thatthey are,and so define them in our speech.” ““We 
* “ And again, we speak of a self-beautiful and of a 
good. that is only and merely good, and so, in the 
ease of all the things that we then posited as many, 
we turn about and posit each as a single idea or 
aspect, ing it to be a unity and call it that 
which each really ἰ5. ὦ “It is so.” ‘‘ And the one 
class of things we say can be seen but not ea Ἢ 
while_the ideas can be thought but not seen.” ~ 
all means.”” ‘‘ With which of the parts of ee acibee 
with which of our faculties, then, do we see visible 
?>” “With sight,” he said. ‘‘ And do we 
not,’ I said, “‘ hear audibles with hearing, and per- 
ceive all sensibles with the other senses ? ” “ Surely.” 
“ Have you ever observed,” said I, “ how much the 
> Cf. 475 xf. Plato as often begins by a restatement of 
the theory of ideas, i.e. practically of the distinction between 
the concept and the objects of sense. Cf. Rep. 596 a ff., 
Phaedo 108 8 ff. 
* The modern reader will never understand Plato from 
translations that talk about“ Being.” Cf. What Plato Said, 
ee ee is technical for the reality of the ideas. Cf. 

Phaedo 75 8, p, 78 pv, Parmen. 129 8, S 2lle, 490 B, 
532 a, 597 a. a re 

VOL. 11 H 97 


πολυτελεστάτην τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν Te καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι 
δύναμιν , ἐδημιούργησεν; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη. ᾿Αλλ᾽ 
ὧδε σκόπει. ἔστιν ὅ τι προσδεῖ ἀκοῇ καὶ φωνῇ 

γένους ἄλλου εἰς τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀκούειν, τὴν δὲ a ἀκούε- 

D σθαι, ὃ ἐὰν μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον, ἡ μὲν οὐκ 



ἀκούσεται, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἀκουσθήσεται; ; Οὐδενός, ἔφη. 
Οἶμαι δέ Ye ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, ἵ iva 
μὴ εἴπω ὅτι οὐδεμιᾷ, τοιούτου προσδεῖ οὐδενός. ἢ 
σύ τινα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; Οὐκ ἔ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. Τὴν 
δὲ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι 
προσδεῖται; Πῶς; ᾿Ενούσης που ἐν ὄμμασιν 
ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι 
αὐτῇ, “παρούσης δὲ χρόας ἐν αὐτοῖς," ἐὰν. μὴ 
παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπ᾿ αὐτὸ τοῦτο 
πεφυκός, οἶσθα, ὅ ὅτι ἣ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται τά τε 
χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα. Τίνος oy λέγεις, ἔφη, 
τούτου; Ὃ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς, ἦν ὃ ἐγώ, Φῶς. 
᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐ “σμικρᾷ ἄρα ἰδέᾳ ἡ τοῦ 
ὁρᾶν αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμις τῶν 
ἄλλων ξυζεύξεων τιμιωτέρῳ ζυγῷ ἐζύγησαν, εἴπερ 
μὴ ἄτιμον τὸ φῶς. ᾿Αλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, πολλοῦ γε 

δεῖ ἄτιμον εἶναι. 

* Creator, δημιουργός, God, the gods, and nature, are all 

vir tual synonyms in such passages. 
> Cf. Phaedr. 250 τ, Tim. 45 B. 

¢ This is literature, not science. Plato knew that sound 
required a medium, Jim. 67 8. But the statement here is 
true enous h to illustrate the thought. 

4 Lit. “ kind of thing,” γένος. Cf. 507 c-p. 

* Cf. Troland, The Mystery of Mind, p. 82: “ In order that 
there should be vision, it is not sufficient that a physical 
object should exist before the eyes. There must also be a 
nite φᾷ τ so-called ‘light.’’? Οὗ Sir John Davies’ poem on 
the Sou 






greatest expenditure the creator “ of the senses has 
lavished on the faculty of seeing and being seen??” 
“Why, no, I have not,” he said. “ Well, look at it 
thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another 
medium 5 so that the one may hear and the other be 
heard, in the absence of which third element the 
one will not hear and the other not be heard?” 
“They need nothing,” he said. “ Neither, I fancy,” — 
said I, “do many others, not to say that none require © 
anything of the sort. Or do you know of any?” 
“Not I,” he said. ‘‘ But do you not observe that 
vision and the visible do have this further need?” 
“How?” “ Though vision may be in the eyes and 
its possessor may try to use it, and though colour be 
present, yet without the presence of a third thing ὦ 
specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose, 
you are aware that vision will see nothing and the 
colours will remain invisible.?”” “‘ What? is this thi 
of which you speak?’ he said. “The thing,” I 
said, “that you call light.” “‘ You say truly,” he 
replied. ‘“‘ The bond, then, that yokes together visi- 
bility and the faculty of sight is more precious by no 
slight form’ than that which unites the other pairs, 
if light is not without honour.’’ “It surely is far 
from being so,” he said. 

But as the sharpest eye discerneth nought 
Except the sunbeams in the air do shine; 
So the best soul with her reflecting thought 
Sees not herself without some light divine. 

7 Plato would not have tried to explain this loose colloquial 
genitive, and we need not. 

σ The loose Herodotean-Thucydidean-Isocratean use of 
ἰδέα. Cf. Laws 689 pv καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος. “Form” 
over-translates ἰδέᾳ here, which is little more than a synonym 
for γένος above. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 250. 



XIX. Τίνα οὖν ἔχεις αἰτιάσασθαι τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ 
θεῶν τούτου κύριον, οὗ ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς ὄψιν τε ποιεῖ 
ει a a / ) , « ἢ : (ἸΕῚ σὰ d 
ὁρᾶν 6 τι κάλλιστα Kal τὰ ὁρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι; 
ov ‘ ” \ ¢ » Ὁ \ ΐ EAL 
Ονπερ καὶ σύ, ἔφη, καὶ of ἄλλοι: τὸν ἥλιον 
δῆλον ὅτι ἐρωτᾷς. “Ap” οὖν ὧδε πέφυκεν ὄψις 
πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν θεόν; ἸΙῶς; Οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἡ 
» ” > IN ” 5. Tg, ἀφ A ON 
ὄψις οὔτε αὐτὴ οὔτε ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται, ὃ δὴ Ka- 
Β λοῦμεν ὄμμα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἡλιοειδέστατόν 

γε οἶμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων. Πολύ. 

> lot \ \ ͵ὔ a ” > ͵ὔ 
γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν ἔχει, ἐκ τούτου 
ταμιευομένην ὥσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτηται; Πάνυ 
\ 5 > > \ ee ” αν cs Ξ- 
μὲν οὖν. “Ap οὖν οὐ καὶ 6 ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ 
ἔστιν, αἴτιος δ᾽ ὧν αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς ταύτης; 

* Plato was willing to call the stars gods as the barbarians 
did (Cratyl. 397 Ὁ, Aristoph. Peace 406 ff., Herod. iy. 188). 
Cf. Laws 821 8, 899 B, 950 », Apol. 26 v, Epinomis 985 8, 
988 B. υ 

> Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, pp. 223-225, 
Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie, pp. 374-384, Arnold, 
“ Mycerinus ”’: ὦ et 

Yet, surely, O my people, did I deem 
Man’s justice from the all-just Gods was given; 
A light that from some upper fount did beam, 
Some better archetype, whose seat was heaven ; 
A light that, shining from the blest abodes, 
Did shadow somewhat of the life of Gods. 
Complete Poems of Henry More, p. 77: 
Lift myself up in the Theologie 
Of heavenly Plato. There Til contemplate 
The Archetype of this sunne, that bright Idee 
Of steddie Good, that doth his beams dilate 
Through all the worlds, all lives and beings 

.. . a fair delineament 
Of that which Good in Plato’s school is hight, 
His T’agathon with beauteous rayes bedight. 



XIX. “ Which one can you name of the divinities 
in heaven “as the author and cause of this, whose light 
makes our vision see best and visible things to be 
seen?”’ “Why, the one that you too and other people 
mean,’’ he said; “‘ for your question evidently refers to 
thesun.®”’ “Is not this, then, the relation of vision to 
that divinity?” “What?” “ Neither vision itself nor 
its vehicle, which we call the eye, is identical with the 
sun.” “Why, no.” “‘ But it is, I think, the most 
sunlike ‘of all the instruments of sense.” “‘ By far the 
most.” “ And does it not receive the power which 
it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from 
the sun?” “ Certainly.” “Is it not also true that 
the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause ὦ thereof 

Mediaeval writers have much to say of Plato’s mysterious 
Tagathon. Aristotle, who rejects the idea of good, uses 
τἀγαθόν in much the same way. 

It is naive to take the language of Platonic unction too 
literally. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 394 ff. 

* Of. 509 a, Plotinus, Enn. i. 6. 9 οὐ yap ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν 
ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος and vi. 7. 19, Cic. 
Tuse. i. 25. 63 in fine “‘ quod si in hoe mundo fieri sine deo 
non Siri ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes 
sine divino ingenio potuisset imitare,”’ Manilius ii. 115: 

quis caelum posset nisi caeli munere nosse, 
et reperire deum nisi qui pars ipse deorum ? 
War’ nicht das Auge sonnenhaft, 
Die Sonne kénnt es nie erblicken, 

and Goethe to Eckermann, Feb. 26, 1824: ‘“‘ Hatte ich nicht 
die Welt durch Anticipation bereits in mir getragen, ich ware 
mit sehenden Augen blind geblieben.” 

4 Cf. Complete Poems of Henry More, p. 113: 

Behold a fit resemblance of this truth, 
The Sun begetteth both colours and sight . . ., etc. 



3 ~ 
Οὕτως, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, φάναι 
με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τἀγαθὸν 
4 2 τ ΝΕ Wy ε A bd {Ὁ > “- 
C ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, 6 τι περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ 
νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο 
- εὐ “- -“" / \ ε 

τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα. 
- > , > 
Πῶς; ἔφη: ἔτι δίελθέ por. ᾿Οφθαλμοί, ἣν ὃ 
ΨΩ > Φ' “ ΄ ΕΞ ee an > \ 
ἐγώ, οἷσθ᾽ ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτι ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνά τις αὐτοὺς 

/ es nn A / \ ¢ A > 4 
τρέπῃ ὧν av Tas χρόας TO ἡμερινὸν φῶς ἐπέχῃ, 
ἀλλὰ ὧν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουσί τε καὶ 

a A Ἷ A 
ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης 
a " 3 
καθαρᾶς ὄψεως; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. Ὅταν δέ γ᾽, 
D οἶμαι, ὧν 6 ἥλιος καταλάμπει, σαφῶς ὁρῶσι, καὶ 
τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνοῦσα φαίνεται. Ti 

᾿ Ψ / \ \ a a 58. /, 
μήν; Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὧδε νόει" 
| a Ld - 7 ἀλ / ᾿ς ‘ A » > 
ὅταν μέν, οὗ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ TO OV, εἰς 
τοῦτο ἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησέ τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ 
νοῦν ἔχειν φαίνεται: ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκότῳ 
κεκραμένον, τὸ γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, 
δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμβλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς 
δόξας μεταβάλλον καὶ ἔοικεν αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι. 
Ἐ Ἔοικε γάρ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον 
τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν 

α ἢ ὁ. creation was the work of benevolent design. This is 
one of the few passages in the Republic where the idea of 
good is considered in relation to the universe, a thesis re- 
served for poetical or mythical development in the Timaeus. 
It is idle to construct a systematic metaphysical theology for 
Plato. by identification of τἀγαθόν here either with God or 




is beheld by vision itself?’ ‘‘ That is so,” he said. 
“ This, then, you must understand that I meant by the 
offspring of the good? which the good begot to stand 
in a proportion ὃ with itself: as the good is in the in- 
telligible region to reason and the objects of reason, 
so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects 
of vision.” “ How is that?” he said; “ explain 
further.” “‘ You are aware,’ I said, “ that when the 
eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose 
colours the light of day falls but that of the dim 
luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they 
appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell 
in them.” ‘“‘ Yes, indeed,’ he said. ‘‘ But when, I 
take it, they are directed upon objects illumined by 
the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside 
in these same eyes.” “Certainly.” “ Apply this 
comparison to the soul also in this way. When it is 
firmly fixed on the domain where truth and reality 
shine resplendent” it apprehends and knows them and 
to possess reason; but when it inclines to 
that region which is mingled with darkness, the world 
of becoming and passing away, it opines only and its 
edge is blunted, and it shifts its opinions hither and 
thither, and again seems as if it lacked reason.” ‘‘ Yes, 
it does.” “This reality, then, that gives their truth to 
the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing 
a τα: ideas as a whole. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, 
oF Cf. Gorg. 465 s-c, infra 510 a-s, 511 ©, 530 pv, 534 a, 
576 c, Phaedo 111 a-s, Tim. 29 c, 32 a-B. For ἀνάλογον 
in this sense cf. 511 £, 534.4, Phaedo 110 νυν. 
© Plato’s rhetoric is not to be pressed. Truth, being, the 
good, are virtual synonyms. Still, for Plato’s ethical and 
political philosophy the light that makes things intelligible 
is the idea of good, i.e. the “sanction,” and not, as some 
commentators insist. the truth. 



δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι, 
αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας ὡς 
γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν 
5 [ f ΄ ef 
ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο 
ἢ ; » ye ΕΝ, aoe ΓΑ ΡΝ 
καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὁρ Ds 
ε Υ̓ ͵ ͵ - 
ἡγήσει: ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ 
509 φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον 
δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ᾽ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα 
3 A \ , a> 9 / > 27 
ἀγαθοειδῆῇ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτ᾽ ἀμφότερα ὀρθόν, 
ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, 
ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν. 
᾿Αμήχανον κάλλος, ἔφη, λέγεις, εἰ 4 ἐπιστήμην 
μὲν καὶ ἀλήθειαν παρέχει, αὐτὸ δ᾽ ὑπὲρ ταῦτα 

κάλλει ἐστίν: οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ 

* No absolute distinction can be drawn between εἶδος and 
ἰδέα in Plato. But ἰδέα may be used to carry the notion of 
“apprehended aspect’’ which I think is more pertinent here 
than the metaphysical entity of the idea, though of course 
Plato would affirm that. Cf. 369 a, Unity of Plato’s Thought, 
p- 35, What Plato Said, p. 585, Class. Phil. xx. (1925) p. 347. 

» ‘The meaning is clear. We really understand and know 
anything only when we apprehend its purpose, the aspect of 
the πὐδὰ that it reveals. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. The 
position and case οἵ γιγνωσκομένης are difficult. But no 
change proposed is any improvement. 

ὁ Plato likes to cap a superlative by a further degree 
of completeness, a climax beyond the climax. Cf. 4058 
αἴσχιστον . . . αἴσχιον, 578 B, Symp. 180 a-B and Bury ad 
loc. ‘The same characteristic can be observed in his method, 
6.5. in the Symposium where Agathon’s speech, which seems 
the climax, is surpassed by that of Socrates; similarly in the 
Gorgias and the tenth book of the Republic. Cf. Friedlander, 
Platon, i. p. 174, swpra Introd. p. Ixi. 

This and the next half page belong, I think, to rhetoric 
rather than to systematic metaphysics. Plato the idealist 
uses transcendental language of his ideal, and is never willing 



to the knower, you must say is the idea? of good, and 
you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, 
and of truth in so far as known.” Yet fair as they both 
are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be some- 
thing fairer still ¢ than these on will think rightly 
of it. But as for knowledge and truth, even as in 
our illustration it is right to deem light and vision 
sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so 
here it is right to consider these two their counter- 
parts, as being like the good or boniform,? but to think 
that either of them is the good® is not right. Still 
higher honour belongs to the possession and habit 7 of 
the good.” ‘An inconceivable beauty you speak of,” 
he said, “ if it is the source of knowledge and truth, 
and yet itself surpasses them in beauty. For you 
surely? cannot mean that it is pleasure.” “‘ Hush,” 

to admit that expression has done justice to it. But Plato 
the rationalist distinctly draws the line between his religious 
language thrown out at an object and his definite logical and 
practical conclusions. ΟἿ. e.g. Meno 81 p-r. 

ὁ ἀγαθοειδῇ occurs only here in classical Greek literature. 
Plato quite probably coined it for his purpose. 

¢ There is no article in the Greek. Plato is not scrupulous 
pry ag good and the good here. Cf. on 505 c, p. 89, 
note αὶ 

7 ἕξις is not yet in Plato quite the technical Aristotelian 
“habit.” However Protag. 344 c approaches it. Cf. also 
Phileb. 11 τὸ, 41 c, Ritter-Preller, p. 285. 

Plato used many words in periphrasis with the genitive, 
e.g. ἕξις Laws 625 c, γένεσις Laws 691 5, Tim. 73 5, 76 F, 
μοῖρα Phaedr. 255 5, 274 τ, Menex. 249 5, φύσις Phaedo 
109 x, Symp. 186 8, Laws 729 c, 845 p, 944 p, εἰς. He may 
have chosen ἔξις here to suggest the ethical aspect of the 
good as a habit or possession of the soul. The introduction 
of ἡδονή below supports this view. Some interpreters think 
it=76 ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἔχει, which is possible but rather pointless. 

κῃ For οὐ γὰρ δήπου cf. Apol. 90 ο, Gorg. 455 a, Euthyph. 
13 a. 


λέγεις. Εὐφήμει, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ: ἀλλ᾽ ὧδε μᾶλλον 

Β τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐπισκόπει. Πῶς; Τὸν 
ἥλιον τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐ μόνον, οἶμαι, τὴν τοῦ 
ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν 
γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν 
ὄντα. Πῶς γάρ; Kal τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν 
μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ 
παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ᾽ 
ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ 
ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ 
καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος. 

C XX. Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων μάλα γελοίως, "Απολλον, 
ἔφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς! Σὺ γάρ, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
αἴτιος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ 
λέγειν. Καὶ μηδαμῶς γ᾽, ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μή τι 
ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὖ διεξιών, εἴ 
πῃ ἀπολείπεις. ᾿Αλλὰ μήν, εἶπον, συχνά γε ἀπο- 

* i.e. not only do we understand a thing when we know 
its purpose, but a purpose in some mind is the chief cause of 
its existence, God’s mind for the universe, man’s mind for 
political institutions. This, being the only interpretation 
that makes sense of the passage, is presumably more or less 
consciously Plato’s meaning. Cf. Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. 

Quite irrelevant are Plato’s supposed identification of the 
ἀγαθόν with the ἕν, one, and Aristotle’s statement, Met. 
988 a, that the ideas are the cause of other things and the 
one is the cause of the ideas. 

The remainder of the paragraph belongs to transcendental 
rhetoric. It has been endlessly quoted and plays a great 
part in Neoplatonism, in all plillosophiids of the unknowable 
and in all negative and mystic theologies. 

» It is an error to oppose Plato here to the Alexandrians 
who sometimes said ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος.  Plato’s sentence 
would have made ὄντος very inconvenient here. But εἶναι 
shows that οὐσίας is not distinguished from τοῦ ὄντος here. 
ἐπέκεινα became technical and a symbol for the transcendental 



said I, ‘‘ but examine the similitude of it still further 
in this way.*”’. ““ How? ”..“* The sun, I presume you 
will say, not only furnishes to visibles the power of 
visibility but it also provides for their generation and | 
growth and nurture though itis not itself generation.” 
“ Of course ποῖ." “‘ In like manner, then, you are 
to say that the objects of knowledge not only receive 
from the presence of the good their being known, but 
their very existence and essence is derived to them 
from it, though the good itself is not essence but still 
transcends essence ® in dignity and surpassing power.” 

XX. And Glaucon very ludicrously ¢ said, “* Heaven 
save us, hyperbole can no further go.” “‘ The fault 
is yours,’’ I said, “‘ for compelling me to utter my 
thoughts about it.” ‘“‘ And don’t desist,” he said, 

“ but at least © expound the similitude of the sun, if 

there is anything that you are omitting.” “ Why, cer- 
tainly,”’ I said, “ I am omitting a great deal.” “Well, 

in Neoplatonism and all similar philosophies. Cf. Plotinus 
xvii. 1, Dionysius Areop. De divinis nominibus, ii. 2, Fried- 
lander, Platon, i. p. 87. 

© He is amused at Socrates’ emphasis. Fanciful is Wila- 
mowitz’ notion (Platon, i. p. 209) that the laughable thing 
is Glaucon’s losing control of himself, for which he com- 
pares Aristoph. Birds 61. Cf. the extraordinary comment 
of Proclus, p. 265. 

The dramatic humour of Glaucon’s surprise is Plato’s way 
of smiling at himself, as he frequently does in the dialogues. 
Cf. 536 B, 540 5, Lysis 223 8, Protag. 340 ©, Charm. 175 £, 

ratyl. 426 5, Theaet. 200 8, 197 p, etc. Cf. Friedlander, 
Platon, i. p. 172 on the Phaedo. 

4“ What a comble!’* would be nearer the tone of the 
Greek. There is no good English equivalent for ὑπερβολῆς. 
Cf. Sir Thomas Browne’s remark that “nothing can be 
said hyperbolically of God.” The banter here relieves the 
strain, as is Plato’s manner. 

* Cf. 502 a, Symp, 222 π, Meno 86 ε. 



λείπω. Μηδὲ σμικρὸν τοίνυν, ἔφη, πἀραλίπῃς: 
Οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ πολύ- ὅμως δέ, ὅσα γ᾽ 
ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυνατόν, ἑκὼν οὐκ ree Μὴ 
D γάρ, ἔφη. Νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν ὃ ἐγώ, ὥσπερ 
έγομεν, δύω αὐτὼ εἶναι, καὶ ᾿Βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν 
νοητοῦ γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ᾽ αὖ ὁρατοῦ, ἵνα 
μὴ οὐρανοῦ εἰπὼν δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ 
ὄνομα. ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἔχεις ταῦτα διττὰ εἴδη, ὁρατόν, 
νοητόν; Ἔχω. Ὥσπερ, τοίνυν γραμμὴν. δίχα 
τετμημένην λαβὼν ἄνισα' τμήματα, πάλιν τέμνε 
ἑκάτερον τμῆμα ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τό τε τοῦ 
ὁρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου, καί σοι 
ἔσται σαφηνείᾳ καὶ ἀσαφείᾳ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν μὲν 
Ἐ τῷ ὁρωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμῆμα εἰκόνες. λέγω 

“ » 
510 δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιάς, ἔπειτα τὰ 

ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά 
τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ ξυνέστηκε, καὶ πᾶν τὸ 
τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς. ᾿Αλλὰ κατανοῶ.: Τὸ τοί- 
νυν ἕτερον τίθει ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικε, τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς 
ζῶα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον 
γένος. Τίθημι, ἔφη. Ἢ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ 
φάναι, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, διῃρῆσθαι ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μή, 
ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν 
πρὸς τὸ ᾧ “ὡμοιώθη; Ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη, καὶ “μάλα. 
Σκόπει δὴ αὖ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομὴν ἣ τμητέον. 
1 ἄνισα ADM Proclus, ἄν, ἴσα F, dv’ ἴσα Stallbaum. 

« Of. the similar etymological pun in Cratyl. 396 B-c. 
Here, as often, the translator must choose between over- 
translating for some tastes, or not translating at all, 

ὃ The meaning is given in the text. Too many com- 
mentators lose the meaning in their study of the imagery. 
Cf. the notes of Adam, Jowett, Campbell, and Apelt. See 
Introd. p. xxxi for my interpretation of the passage. 

¢ Some modern and ancient critics prefer av’ ἴσα. It isa 


don’t omit the least bit,” he said. “‘ I fancy,” I said, 
“that I shall have to pass over much, but nevertheless 
so far as it is at present practicable 1 shall not will- 
ingly leave anything out.” “Do not,” he said. 

“ Conceive then,” said I, “ as we were saying, that 
there are these two entities, and that one of them is 
sovereign over the intelligible order and region and the 
other over the world of the eye-ball, not to say the 
sky-ball,* but let that pass. Yousurely apprehend the 
two types, the visible and the intelligible.” “I do.” 
** Represent them then, as it were, by a line divided? 
into two uriequal® sections and cut eachsection again 
in the same ratio (the section, that is, of the visible 
and that of the intelligible order), and then as an ex- 
pression of the ratio of their comparative clearness 
and obscurity you will have, as one of the sections of 
the visible world, images. By images 41 mean; first, 
shadows, and then reflections in water and on surfaces 
of dense, smooth and bright texture, and everything 
of that kind, if you apprehend.” “‘ I do.” Κ΄ As the 
second section assume that of which this is a likeness 
or an image, that is, the animals about us and all plants 
and the whole class of objects made by man.” “Iso 
assume it,” he said. “ Would you be willing to say,” 
said I, “ that the division in respect of reality and truth 
or the opposite is expressed by the proportion: ¢ as is 
the opinable tothe knowableso is the likeness to that of 
which it is alikeness?”’ “I certainly would.” “ Con- 
sider then again the way in which we are to make the 
division of the intelligible section.” “ In what way?” 
little more plausible to make the sections unequal. But again 
there is doubt which shall be longer, the higher as the more 
honourable or the lower as the more multitudinous. Cf. Plut. 

Plat. Quest. 3. 4 Cf. supra 402 B, Soph. 266 B-c. 
* Cf. supra on 508 c, p. 103. note ὃ. 


Πῆ; Ἧι τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσιν' ὡς 
εἰκόσι χρωμένη ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάξεται ἐξ ὑπο- 
ἔσεων, οὐκ ἐπ᾿ ἀρχὴν πορευομένη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τελευ- 
τήν, τὸ δ᾽ αὖ ἕτερον ἐπ᾿" ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον͵ ἐξ 
ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα καὶ ἄνευ ὧνπερ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων 
αὐτοῖς εἴδεσι δι’ αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη. 
Ταῦτ᾽, ἔφη, ἃ λέγεις, οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἔμαθον. ᾿Αλλ᾽ 
C αὖθις, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ: ῥᾷον γὰρ τούτων προειρημένων 
μαθήσει. οἶμαι γάρ σε εἰδέναι, ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς 
γεωμετρίας. τε καὶ λογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα 
πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι. τό τέ περιττὸν καὶ 
τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ εἴδη 
καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην μέθοδον, 
ταῦτα μὲν Ws εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, 
οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὑτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι 
περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν, ἐκ τούτων 
D δ᾽ ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν 
ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο, οὗ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὁρμή- 
σωσιν. ἸΙάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε olda. Οὐκ- 
1 τμηθεῖσιν DM, μιμηθεῖσιν A Proclus, τιμηθεῖσιν F. 
2 [τὸ] ἐπ᾽ Ast. 

* Cf. my Idea of Good in Plato's Republic, pp. 230-234, for 
the ἀνυπόθετον. Ultimately, the ἀνυπόθετον is the Idea of 
Good so far as we assume that idea to be attainable either 
in ethics or in physics. But it is the Idea of Good, not as a 
transcendental ontological mystery, but in the ethical sense 
already explained. The ideal dialectician is the man who 
can, if challenged, run his reasons for any given proposition 
back, not to some assumed axioma medium, but to its 
relation to ultimate Good. ΤῸ call the ἀνυπόθετον the Uncon- 
ditioned or the Absolute introduces metaphysical associations 
fore n to the passage. Cf. also Introd. pp. xxxiii-xxxiv. 

he practical meaning of this is independent of the 
Pt metaphysics. Cf. Introd. pp. xvi-xviii. 



“ By the distinction that there is one section of it 
which the soul is compelled to investigate by treating 
as images the things imitated in the former division, 
and by means of assumptions from which it proceeds 
not up to a first principle but down to a conclusion, 
while there is another section in which it advances 
from its assumption to a beginning or principle that 
transcends assumption,? and in which it makes no use 
of the images employed by the other section, relying 
on ideas” only and progressing systematically through 
ideas.” ‘‘I don’t fully understand* what you mean 
by this,” he said. “ Well, I will try again,” said I, “ for 

τ will better understand after this preamble. For 

think you are aware that students of geometry and 
reckoning and such subjects first postulate the odd 
and the even and the various figures and three kinds 
of angles and other things akin to these in each 
branch of science, regard them as known, and, treat- 
ing them as absolute assumptions, do not deign to 
render any further account of them ὦ to themselves or 
others, taking it for granted that they are obvious to 
everybody. They take their start from these, and 
pursuing the om a from this point on consistently, 
conclude with that for the investigation of which they 
set out.” “Certainly,” he said, “I know that.” 

¢ Gf. Vol. I. p. 79, note c on 347 a and p. 47, note f on 
338.p; What Plato Said, p. 503 on Gorg. 463 pv. 

4 Aristot. Top. 100 Ὁ 2-3 οὐ δεῖ yap ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστημονικαῖς 
ἀρχαῖς ἐπιζητεῖσθαι τὸ διὰ τί, exactly expresses Plato’s thought 
and the truth, though Aristotle may have meant it mainly 
for the principle of non-contradiction and other first principles 
of logic. Of. the mediaeval “contra principium n tem 
non est disputandum.”’ A teacher of geometry will refuse 
to discuss the psychology of the idea re mint a teacher. of 

chemistry will not permit the class to ask whether matter is 



ody καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὁρωμένοις εἴδεσι προσχρῶνται καὶ 
τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων 
διανοούμενοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνων πέρι, οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, 
τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιού- 

‘ ΄, > a >)\)? > eae a 
μενοι καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλ᾽ od ταύτης ἣν 

E γράφουσι, καὶ τἄλλα οὕτως, αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα, ἃ 


πλάττουσί τε Kal γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν 
ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσί, τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ 
χρώμενοι, ζητοῦντές δὲ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν, ἃ οὐκ 
ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη, 
λέγεις. widtye 

ΧΧΙ.- Τοῦτο τοίνυν vontov μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, 
© , > > “ ᾿ νὰ, ὍΝ 
ὑποθέσεσι δ᾽ ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ 
τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ én’ ἀρχὴν ἰοῦσαν, ὡς οὐ 
δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαΐίνειν, 
εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω 
ἀπεικασθεῖσι καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι 
δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις. Νίανθάνω, 
ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίαις τε καὶ ταῖς 

4 > a , , ’ , @ oki 
ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις. Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον 
μάνθανε tu . 00 νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο, οὗ 
αὐτὸς 6 λόγος ἅπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, 

« Cf. 527 a-s. This explanation of mathematical reasoni 
does not differ at all from that of Aristotle and Berkeley an 
the moderns who praise Aristotle, except that the meta- 
physical doctrine of ideas is in the background to be asserted 
if isthe Ser 

» i.e. a bronze sphere would be the original of its imitative 
reflection in water, but it is in turn only the imperfect 
imitation of the mathematical idea of a sphere. 

¢ Stenzel, Handbuch, 118 “ das er nur mit dem Verstande 
(διανοίᾳ) sieht”? is mistaken. διανοίᾳ is used not in its special 
sense (*‘ understanding.” See p. 116, note c), but generally 

for the mind as opposed to the senses. Cf. 511 c. 
4 For the concessive μέν cf. 546 ©, 529 τ, Soph. 225 c. 




“ And do you not also know that they further make 
use of the visible forms and talk about them, though 
they are not thinking of them but of those things of 
which they are a likeness, pursuing their inquiry for 
the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as 
such, and not for the sake of the image of it which 
they draw*? And so in all cases. The very things 
which they mould and draw, which have shadows and 
images of themselves in water, these things they treat 
in their turn ὃ. as only images, but what.they really 
seek is to get sight of those realities which can be 
seen only ties mind.*”’ “ True,” he said. 

-XXI. “ This then is the class that I described as 
intelligible, it is true,* but with the reservation first 
that.the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in 
the investigation of it, not proceeding to a first prin- 
ciple because of its inability to extricate itself from 
and rise above its assumptions, and second, that it 
uses as images or likenesses the very objects that are 
themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below 
them, and that in comparison with these latter* are 
esteemed as clear and held in honour.f”’ “TI under- 
stand,” said he, “that you are spea® ὃ of what falls 
under geometry and the kindred arts.’’ ‘‘ Under- 
stand then,” said I, “that by the other section of 
the intelligible I mean that which the reason? itself 
lays hold of by the power of dialectics," treating its 

* The loosely appended dative ἐκείνοις is virtually a dative 
absolute. Cf. Phaedo 105 a. Wilamowitz’ emendation (Platon, 
ii. p. 384) to πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ἐκείνοις rests on a misunder- 

standing of the passage. 

7 The translation of this sentence is correct. But ef. 
Adam ad loe. 

5, λόγος here suggests both the objective personified argu- 
ment and the subjective faculty. fy 

δ Cf. 533 a, Phileb. 57 ©. 

VOL, II I 113 


tas ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχάς, ἀλλὰ τῷ 
ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα 
μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν 
ἰών, ἁψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν 
ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνῃ, 
αἰσθητῷ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλ᾽ 
εἴδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι᾿ αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς 
εἴδη. Μανθάνω, ἔφη, ἱκανῶς μὲν οὔ--δοκεῖς γάρ 
μοι συχνὸν ἔργον λέγειν--ὅτι μέντοι βούλει δι- 
ορίζειν σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι 
ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον 
ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἷς αἱ ὑπο- 
θέσεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ διανοίᾳ μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ μὴ 
αἰσθήσεσιν αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ 
μὴ ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὕπο- 

’ “ 3 » \ > \ δὰ τὰ ΨΎΓΙ 
θέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσί σοι, 

α τῷ ὄντι emphasizes the etymological meaning of the word. 
Similarly ὡς ἀληθῶς in 551 Ἐ, Phaedo 80 v, Phileb. 64". For 
hypotheses cf. Burnet, Greek Philosophy, p. 229, Thompson 
on Meno 86 8. But the thing to note is that the word accord- 
ing to the context may emphasize the arbitrariness of an 
assumption or the fact that it is the starting-point—dpy% 
—of the inquiry. 

> Cf. Symp. 211 ο ὥσπερ ἐπαναβάσμοις, “like steps of a 

5 παντὸς ἀρχήν taken literally lends support to the view 
that Plato is thinking of an absolute first principle. But in 
spite of the metaphysical suggestions for practical purposes 
the παντὸς ἀρχή may be the virtual equivalent of the ἱκανόν 
of the Phaedo. It is the ἀρχή on which all in the particular 
case depends and is reached by dialectical agreement, not by 
arbitrary assumption. Cf. on 510 8, p, 110, note a. 




assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally 
as hypotheses,* underpinnings, footings,’ and spring- 
boards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which 

uires no assumption and is the starting-point of 
all,¢ and after attaining to that again|taking hold of 
the first dependencies from it, so to proceed down- 
ward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of 
any object of sense? but only of pure ideas moving 
on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.*” 
“1 understand,” he said; “ποῖ fully, for it is no 
slight task that you appear to have in mind, but I do 
understand that you mean to distinguish the aspect 
of reality and the intelligible, which is contemplated 
by the power of dialectic, as something truer and 
more exact than the object of the so-called arts and 
sciences whose assumptions are arbitrary starting- 
points. And though it is true that those who con- 
template them are compelled to use their understand- 
ing’ and not their senses, yet because they do not go 
back to the beginning in the study of them but start 
from assumptions you do not think they possess true 

4 This is one of the passages that are misused to attribute 
ta Plato disdain for experience and the perceptions of the 
senses. Cf. on 530 8, p. 187, notec, The dialectician is able 
to reason purely in concepts and words without recurring 
to images. Plato is not here considering how much or 
little of his knowledge is ultimately derived from experience. 

* The description undoubtedly applies to a metaphysical 
philosophy that deduces all things from a transcendent first 
principle. I haye never denied that. The point of m 
interpretation is that it also describes the method whi 
distinguishes the dialectician as such from the man of science, 
and that this distinction is for practical and educational 
purposes the chief result of the discussion, as Plato virtually 
says in the next few lines. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 233-234. 

7 διανοίᾳ here as in 511 a is general and not technical. 


καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς. διάνοιαν δὲ 
καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ 
τὴν τῶν τοιούτων ἕξιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νοῦν, ὡς μεταξύ τι 
δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν. “ἹἹκανώτατα, 
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι 
τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ 
γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτω, 

E διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν 
ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον 
αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφ᾽ οἷς ἔστιν ἀληθείας 
μετέχειν, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετ- 

έχειν. Μανθάνω, ἔφη, καὶ ξυγχωρῶ καὶ τάττω ws 
λέγεις. ἴθ poet ed 

* γρῦν οὐκ ἴσχειν is perhaps intentionally ambiguous. 
Colloquially the phrase means “have no sense.” For its 
higher meaning cf. Meno 99 c, Laws 962 a. 

Unnecessary difficulties have been raised about καίτοι 
and μετά here. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 345 mistakenly 
resorts to emendation. The meaning is plain. Mathematical 
ideas are ideas or concepts like other ideas; but the mathe- 
matician does not deal with them quite as the dialectician 
deals with ideas and therefore does not possess νοῦς or reason 
in the highest sense. 

° Here the word διάνοια is given a technical meaning as a 



intelligence * about them although ὃ the things them- 
selves are intelligibles when apprehended in con- 
junction with a first principle. And I think you call 
the mental habit of geometers and their like mind or 
understanding ° and not reason because you regard 
understanding as something intermediate between 
opinion and reason.” ‘“ Your interpretation is quite 
sufficient,’ I said; “‘ and now, answering to? these 
four sections, assume these four affections occurring 
in the soul: intellection or reason for the highest, 
understanding for the second ; assign belief? to the 
third, and to the last picture-thinking or conjecture,’ 
and arrange them in a proportion,’ considering that 
they participate in clearness and precision in the same 
degree as their objects partake of truth and reality.” 
“Tunderstand,” he said ; ‘‘ I concur and arrange them 
as you bid.” i 
1 inferior to νοῦς, but, as Plato says, the terminol 
pag matter. The adn has eee ene μῶν 
For ἐπί ef. Polit. 280 a, Gorg. 463 8. 

ἐ πίστις is.of course not “ faith in Plato, but Neoplaton- 
ae take iar and commentators have confused the two 

eas hopelessly. 

7 eixacia asia bial had this connotation for Plato. 

* Cf. on 508 c, p. 103, note ὁ. 



ἵ ᾿ 

14 17 Μετὰ ταῦτα δή, εἶπον, ἀπείκασον “τοιούτῳ 
πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ 
ἀπαιδευσίας. ἰδὲ γὰρ ἀνθρώπους οἷον ἐν κατα- 
γείῳ οἰκήσει σπηλαιώδει, ἀναπεπταμένην πρὸς τὸ 
φῶς τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχούσῃ μακρὰν παρ᾽ ἅπαν τὸ 
σπήλαιον, ἐν ταύτῃ ἐκ παίδων ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς 


* The image of the cave illustrates by another proportion 
the contrast between the world of sense-perception and 
the world of thought. Instead of going above the plane of 
ordinary experience for the other two members of the 
portion, Plato here goes below and invents a fire niittishiailars 
cast from it on the walls of a cave to correspond to the sun 
and the “ real”’ objects of sense. In such a proportion our 
“‘real’’ world becomes the symbol of Plato’s ideal world. 

Modern fancy may read what meanings it pleases into the 
Platonic antithesis of the ‘real’? and the “ideal.” It has 
even been treated as an anticipation of the fourth dimension. 
But Plato never leaves an attentive and critical reader in 
doubt as to his own intended meaning. There may be at 
the most a little uncertainty as to which precise traits are 
intended to carry the symbolism and which are merely 
indispensable parts of the picture. 

The source and first suggestion of Plato’s imagery is an 
interesting speculation, but it is of no significance for the 
interpretation of the thought. Cf. John Henry Wright, 
* The Origin of Plato’s Cave’ in Harvard Studies in Class. 
Phil. xvii. (1906) pp. 130-142. Burnet, Karly Greek Philo- 
sophy, pp. 89-90, thinks the allegory Orphic. Cf. also 
Wright, loc. cit. pp. 134-135. Empedocles likens our world 



1. “ Next,” said I, “ compare our nature in respect 
of education and its lack to such an experience as 
this. Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean 
cavern * with a long entrance open? to the light on its 
entire width. Conceive them as having their legs 
and necks fettered® from childhood, so that they 

to a cave, Diels i.2 269. Cf. Wright, loc. cit. Wright refers 
it to the Cave of Vari in Attica, pp. 140-142. Others have 
‘supposed that Plato had in mind rather the puppet and 
marionette shows to which he refers. Cf. Diés in Bulletin 
Budé, No. 14 (1927) pp. 8 f. 

‘The iveness of the image has been endless. The 
most eloquent and frequently quoted passage of Aristotle’s 
-early writings is derived from it, Cic. De nat. deor. ii. 37. 
‘It is the source of Bacon’s “idols of the den.” Sir Thomas 
Browne writes in Urn Burial: “᾽ς yet discourse in Plato's 
den and are but embryo philosophers.” Huxley’s allegory 
of “Jack and the Beanstalk” in Evolution and Ethics, 
pp. 47 ff. is a variation on it. Berkeley recurs to it, Siris, 
§ 263. The Freudians would have still more fantastic inter- 
pretations. Cf. Jung, Analytic Psych. p. 952. Eddington 
perhaps glances at it when he attributes to the new physics 
the frank realization that physical science is concerned with 
a world of shadows. Cf. also Complete Poems of Henry 
More (ed. Grossart), p. 44: 

Like men new made contriv’d into a cave 
That ne’er saw light, but in that shadowy pit 
Some uncouth might them hoodwink hither drave, etc. 

> Cf. Phaedo 111 c ἀναπεπταμένους. 
© Cf. Phaedo 67 νυ. 



‘ A “λ ‘ A > ’ . td 
kat τὰ σκέλη καὶ τοὺς αὐχένας, ὥστε μένειν TE 
> ~ ” ‘ ’ “-“ 
Β αὐτοῦ' εἴς τε τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὁρᾶν, κύκλῳ δὲ 
4 αλὰ ς ‘ “- ὃ “- LO , ,ὔ 
τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν, 
φῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς πυρὸς ἄνωθεν καὶ πόρρωθεν καό- 
μενον ὄπισθεν αὐτῶν, μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ 
A ~ Ὁ 2 Li ae > a 291 , 
τῶν δεσμωτῶν ἐπάνω ὁδόν, παρ᾽ ἣν ἰδὲ τειχίον 
παρῳκοδομημένον, ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυμὰτοποιοῖς πρὸ 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόκειται τὰ παραφράγματα, ὑπὲρ 
e \ 4, 7 « - ΝΜ σ΄. : 
ὧν τὰ θαύματα δεικνύασιν. Ὃρῶ, ἔφη. “O 
, BY a \ , , “on Os Lin 
τοίνυν παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τειχίον φέροντας ἀνθρώπους 
σκεύη τε παντοδαπὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ τειχίου καὶ 
΄ ‘ 
515 ἀνδριάντας καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα λίθινά τε Kai ξύλινα καὶ 
παντοῖα εἰργασμένα, οἷον εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν φθεγ- 
γομένους, τοὺς δὲ σιγῶντας τῶν παραφερόντων. 
” " λ , δὲν \ ὃ Aa ty tb 
Ἄτοπον, ἔφη, λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ δεσμώτας ἀτό- 
- > Sach 
mous. ‘Opotovs ἡμῖν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ: τοὺς yap τοιού- 
“- δ 3 - ι ἀλλ ἽΝ " ΓΝ 
τοὺς πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ ἀλλήλων οἴει ἄν τι 
¢ i »” \ A A \ « ‘ Aa A 
ἑωρακέναι ἄλλο πλὴν τὰς σκιὰς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς 
εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ αὐτῶν τοῦ σπηλαίου προσ- 
~ / ” ΨΥ / 4 
πιπτούσας; lds γάρ, ἔφη, εἰ ἀκινήτους γε τὰς 
B κεφαλὰς ἔχειν ἠναγκασμένοι elev διὰ βίου; Τί δὲ 
an ~ / 
τῶν παραφερομένων; od ταὐτὸν τοῦτο. Τί μήν; 
Ei οὖν διαλέγεσθαι οἷοί τ᾽ εἶεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ 
“- a > 
ταῦτα" ἡγεῖ ἂν τὰ παριόντα" αὐτοὺς νομίζειν ὀνομά- 
1 αὐτοῦ Hischig: αὐτούς. 
2 οὐ ταῦτα D, οὐ ταὐτὰ AFM, οὐκ αὐτὰ ci. Vermehren. 
8 παριόντα ser. rece., παρόντα AF DM, ὄντα Iamblichus. 


remain in the same spot, able to look forward only, 
and prevented by the fetters from turning their heads. 
Picture further the light from a fire burning higher 
up and at a distance behind them, and between the 
fire and the prisoners and above them a road along 
which a low wall has been built, as the exhibitors of 
puppet-shows ® have partitions before the men them- 
selves, above which they show the puppets.” “ All 
that Isee,” he said. .“ See also, then, men carrying” 
past the wall implements of all kinds that rise above 
the wall, and human images and shapes of animals 
as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material, 
some of these bearers presumably speaking and 
others silent.” “A strange image you speak of,’ he 
said,“ and strange prisoners.”’ “‘ Like te us,” I said; 
“for, to begin with, tell me do you think that these 
men would have seen anything of themselves or of | 
one another except the shadows cast from the fire | 
on the wall of the cave that fronted them?” “How 
could they,” he said, “if they were compelled to 
hold their heads unmoved through life?” “ And 
again, would not the same be true of the objects 
carried past them?” “Surely.” “If then they 
were able to talk to one another, do you not think 
that they would suppose that in naming the things 
* H. Rackham, Class. Rev. xxix. PP. 77-78, suggests that 
the τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς should be transla “δὲ the marion- 
ettes’” and be classed with καινοῖς τραγῳδοῖς (Pseph. ap. 
Dem. xviii. 116). For the dative he refers to Kuehner-Gerth; 
Ai τ τῆς are merely a part of the necessary machinery 
of the image. Their shadows are not cast on the wall. The 
artificial objects correspond to the things of sense and opinion 
in the divided line, and the shadows to the world of refiec- 

tions, εἰκόνες. 


σ “- . 
ζειν ἅπερ ὁρῷεν; ᾿Ανάγκη. Τί δ᾽; εἰ καὶ ἠχὼ 
‘ ~ 
τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐκ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ἔχοι, ὅπότε TIS 
~ , ‘ 
τῶν παριόντων φθέγξαιτο, οἴει ἂν ἄλλο τι αὐτοὺς 
ε a Α “- , 
ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ φθεγγόμενον ἢ τὴν παριοῦσαν σκιάν; 
‘ n . 
Ma A? οὐκ ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη. Παντάπασι δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
ε ~ 
C οὗ τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ 
\ ~ ~ : 

Tas τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. 
Σκόπει δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, αὐτῶν λύσιν τε καὶ ἴασιν 
noe, - tit Lis , σ΄ ~ oo» > 
τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης, ola τις av εἴη, εἰ 
tA ,ὔ , 3 a « = a, 
φύσει τοιάδε ξυμβαίνοι αὐτοῖς: ὁπότε τις λυθείη 
καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἐξαίφνης ἀνίστασθαί τε καὶ περι- 
ἄγειν τὸν αὐχένα καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς 
3 7 ΜΝ / A ~ a > o ‘ 
ἀναβλέπειν, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶν ἀλγοῖ τε καὶ 
διὰ τὰς μαρμαρυγὰς ἀδυνατοῖ καθορᾶν ἐκεῖνα, ὧν 
τότε τὰς σκιὰς ἑώρα, τί ἂν οἴει αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, εἴ 

a γο , ¢ , ἀμ a, ἊΨ a 
tis αὐτῷ λέγοι, ὅτι τότε μὲν ἑώρα φλυαρίας, νῦν 
δὲ μᾶλλόν τι ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον 

* Cf. Parmen. 130 pv, Tim. 51 8, 52 a, and my De 
Platonis Idearum doctrina, pp. 24-25; also E. Hoffmann 
in Wochenschrift f. klass. Phil. xxxvi. (1919) pp. 196-197. 
As we use the word tree of the trees we see, though the 
reality (αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι) is the idea of a tree, so they would speak 
of the shadows as the world, though the real reference un- 
known to them would be to the objects that cause the 
shadows, and back of the objects to the things of the “ real” 
world of which they are copies. The general meaning, 
which is quite certain, is that they would suppose the 
shadows to be the realities. The text and the precise turn 
of expression are doubtful. See crit. note. παριόντα is 
intentionally ambiguous in its application to the shadows 
or to the objects which cast them. They suppose that the 
names refer to the passing shadows, but (as we know) they 




that they saw* they were naming the passing objects?” 
“ Necessarily.” ‘* And if their prison had an echo® . 
from the wall opposite them, when one of the passers- 
by uttered.a sound, do you think that they would 
suppose anything else than the passing shadow to 
be the speaker?”’ “By Zeus, I do not,” said he. 
“Then in every way such prisoners would deem 
reality to be nothing else than the shadows of the 
artificial objects.” “‘ Quite inevitably,’ he said. 
“ Consider, then, what would be the manner of the 
release 5 and healing from these bonds and this folly 
if in the course of nature? something of this sort 
should happen to them: When one was freed from 
his fetters and compelled to stand up suddenly and 
turn his head around and walk and to lift up his eyes 
to the light, and in doing all this felt pain and, because 
of the dazzle and glitter of the light, was unable to 
discern the objects whose shadows he formerly saw, | 
what do you suppose would be his answer if someone 
told him that what he had seen before was all a cheat 
and an illusion, but that now, being nearer to reality 

really apply to the objects. Ideas and particulars are hom- 
onymous. Assuming a slight illogicality we can get some- 
what the same meaning from the text ταὐτά. “Do you 
not think that they would identify the passing objects 
(which strictly speaking they do not know) with what they 
saw 9” 

Cf. also P. Corssen, Philologische Wochenschrift, 1913, 
p. 286. He prefers οὐκ αὐτά and renders: “Sie wiirden in 
nag Sie sahen, das Voriibergehende selbst zu benennen 


ὃ The echo and the voices (515 a) merely complete the 

© Cf. Phaedo 67 νυ λύειν, and 82 D λύσει τε Kal καθαρμῷ. 
λύσις became technical in Neoplatonism. 

# Lit. “by nature.” φύσις in Plato often suggests reality 
and truth, 





” “ , > , / ‘ ‘ 
ὄντα τετραμμένος ὀρθότερα βλέποι, καὶ δὴ καὶ 
-“ ~ ~ yy. 
ἕκαστον τῶν παριόντων δεικνὺς αὐτῷ ἀναγκάζοι 
ἐρωτῶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅ τι ἔστιν; οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸν 
> A {niet Ge Ἀ 4 , ¥ , 
ἀπορεῖν τε ἂν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ τότε ὁρώμενα 
3 ἢ “- hy 2) 
ἀληθέστερα ἢ τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα; Πολύ γ᾽, ἔφη. 
II. Οὐκοῦν κἂν εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκάζοι 
Ἁ a rt 
αὐτὸν βλέπειν, ἀλγεῖν τε ἂν τὰ ὄμματα καὶ 
~ : } * 
φεύγειν ἀποστρεφόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἃ δύναται 
καθορᾶν, καὶ νομίζειν ταῦτα τῷ ὄντι σαφέστερα 
τῶν δεικνυμένων; Οὕτως, ἔφη. Et δέ, ἦν δ᾽ 
» ~ » 
ἐγώ, ἐντεῦθεν ἕλκοι τις αὐτὸν βίᾳ διὰ τραχείας 
τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους καὶ μὴ aveln πρὶν 
ἐξελκύσειεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἄρα οὐχὶ 
ὀδυνᾶσθαί τε ἂν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἑλκόμενον, καὶ 
> \ A A ~ ” 7 A Ἅ » A 
ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς av ἔχοντα τὰ 
»» \ ς aA 29> =A a 4 ~ - 
ὄμματα μεστὰ ὁρᾶν οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἕν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν 
λεγομένων ἀληθῶν; Οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, ἐξαίφνης γε. 
> 0 7 ὃ / t 8 / > ΝΜ > “λλ, \ », 
ὑνηθείας δή, οἶμαι, δέοιτ᾽ ἄν, εἰ μέλλοι τὰ ἄνω 
ὄψεσθαι: καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς ἂν ῥᾷστα καθ- 
ορῷ, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τά τε τῶν 
3 / \ A ~ ” » « A 
ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἴδωλα, ὕστερον δὲ 
αὐτά: ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν 
οὐρανὸν νύκτωρ ἂν ῥᾷον θεάσαιτο, προσβλέπων τὸ 

Β τῶν ἄστρων τε καὶ σελήνης φῶς, ἢ μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν 

* The entire passage is an obvious allegory of the painful 
experience of one whose false conceit of ett is tested 
by the Socratic elenchus. Cf. Soph. 230 B-p, and for ἀπορεῖν 
Meno 80 a, 84 s-c, Theaet. 149 a, Apol. 23 pv. Cf. also 
What Plato Said, p. 513 on Meno 80 a, Eurip. Hippol. 
Q47 τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοῦσθαι γνώμαν ὀδυνᾷ, “it is painful to have 
one’s opinions set right,” and infra 517 a, supra 494 νυ. 

> Cf. Theaet. 175 5, Boethius, Cons. iii. 12 “ quicunque 
in superum diem mentem ducere quaeritis’’; infra 529 a, 
521 c, and the Neoplatonists’ use of ἀνάγειν and_ their 




and turned toward more real things, he saw more 
truly? Andif also one should point out to him each 
of the passing objects and constrain him by questions 
to say what it is, do you not think that he would be 
at kes « and that he would regard what he formerly 
saw as more real than the things now pointed out 
to him?” “Far more real,” he said. 

II. “ And if he were compelled to look at the light - 
itself, would not that pain his eyes, and would he not | 
turn away and flee to those things which he is able 
to discern and regard them as in. very deed more 
clear and exact than the objects pointed out?” 
“Tt is so,” he said. “‘‘ And if,” said I, “‘ someone 
should drag him thence by force up the ascent ® which 
is rough and steep, and not let him go before he had 
drawn him out into the light of the sun, do you not 
think that he would find it painful to be so haled 
along, and would chafe at it, and when he came out 
into the light, that his eyes would be filled with its ~ 
beams so that he would not be able to see “ even one of 
the things that we call real?” ‘“ Why, no, not im- 
mediately,” he said. ‘Then there would be need 
of habituation, I take it, to enable him to see the 
things higher up. And at first he would most easily 
discern the shadows and, after that, the likenesses. 
or reflections in water? of men and other things, 
and later, the things themselves, and from these he 
would go on to contemplate the appearances in the 
heayens and heaven itself, more easily by night, look- 
ing at the light of the stars and the moon, than by day 
° ical” virtue and interpretation. C/. Leibniz, ed. 
Gerhardt, vii. 270. 

᾽ 4; Laws 897 Ὁ, Phaedo 99 ν. 

* Cf 

Phaedo 99 p. Stallbaum says this was imitated by 
Themistius, Orat. iv. p.51 Β΄ - 



τὸν ἥλιόν τε καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; 
Τελευταῖον δή, οἶμαι, τὸν ἥλιον, οὐκ ἐν ὕδασιν 
οὐδ᾽ ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἕδρᾳ φαντάσματα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ 
αὐτὸν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἐν τῇ αὑτοῦ χώρᾳ δύναιτ᾽ ἂν 
ἰδεῖ ᾿ , ’ > Ai 

κατιδεῖν καὶ θεάσασθαι οἷός ἐστιν. ᾿Αναγκαῖον, 
ΝΜ " κ a> nn ” / ‘ 
ἔφη. Kai μετὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἂν ἤδη συλλογίζοιτο περὶ 
αὐτοῦ ὅτι οὗτος ὃ τάς τε ὥρας παρέχων καὶ 
ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ πάντα ἐπιτροπεύων τὰ ἐν τῷ 
C ὁρωμένῳ τόπῳ, καὶ ἐκείνων, ὧν σφεῖς ἑώρων, 
τρόπον τινὰ πάντων αἴτιος. Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐπὶ 
ταῦτα ἂν μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ἔλθοι. Τί οὖν; ἀναμιμνη- 
~ ~ ΠῚ δὰ 

σκόμενον αὐτὸν τῆς πρώτης οἰκήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ 
σοφίας καὶ τῶν τότε ξυνδεσμωτῶν οὐκ ἂν οἴει αὑτὸν 

\ ? / “ ~ 4 eS - 
μὲν εὐδαιμονίζειν τῆς μεταβολῆς, τοὺς δὲ ἐλεεῖν; 
Καὶ μάλα. Τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ ἔπαινοι εἴ τινες αὐτοῖς 
’ > > 4 ‘ ,ὔ | » / 
ἦσαν τότε παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων Kal γέρα τῷ ὀξύτατα καθ- 
ορῶντι τὰ παριόντα, καὶ μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα 
ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα 
πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ δυνατώτατα ἀπο- 
μαντευομένῳ τὸ μέλλον ἥξειν, δοκεῖς ἂν αὐτὸν 
- A “- 3 
ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ 
ἐκείνοις τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐνδυναστεύοντας, ἢ τὸ 
ae "4 Ἅ ’ ‘ / 4, 

τοῦ Ὁμήρου ἂν πεπονθέναι καὶ σφόδρα βούλεσθαι 

α It is probably a mistake to look for a definite symbolism 
in all the details of this description. There are more stages 
of progress than the proportion of four things calls for. All 
that Plato’s thought requires is the general contrast between 
an unreal and a real world, and the goal of the rise from one 
to the other in the contemplation of the sun, or the idea of 
good. Cf. 517 B-c. > i.e. a foreign medium. 

¢ Cf. 508 8, and for the idea of good as the cause of all 
things cf. on 509 5, and Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxvi. 

P. Corssen, Philol. Wochenschrift, 1913, pp. 287-288, un- 
necessarily proposes to emend ὧν σφεῖς ἑώρων to ὧν σκιὰς €. Or 


δ ἐλιὰ 


the sun and the sun’s light.*” “‘ Of course.” “ And 
so, finally, I suppose, he would be able to look upon 
the sun itself and see its true nature, not by reflections 
in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting,’ but in 
and by itself in its own place.” “‘ Necessarily,’ he 
said. ‘“ And at this point he would infer and con- 
clude that this it is that provides the seasons and the 
courses of the year and presides over all things in the 
visible region, and isin some sort the cause ¢ of all these 
things that they had seen.”’ “‘ Obviously,” he said, 
“that would be the next step.” “‘ Well then, if he 
recalled to mind his first habitation and what passed 
for wisdom there, and his fellow-bondsmen, do you 
not think that he would count himself happy in the 
change and pity them4?” ‘‘ He would indeed.” “And 
if there had been honours and commendations among 
them which they bestowed on one another and prizes 
for the man who is quickest to make out the shadowsas 
they pass and best able to remember their customary 
precedences,sequences andco-existences,’ andsomost 
successful in guessing at what was to come, do you 
think he would be very keen about such rewards, and | 
that he would envy and emulate those who were 
honoured by these prisoners and lorded it among 
them, or that he would feel with Homer “ and greatly 
ὧν σφεῖς σκιὰς é., “ne sol umbrarum, quas videbant, auctor 
fuisse di » cum potius earum rerum, quarum umbras vide- 
bant, fuerit auctor.” 4 Cf.on 486 a, p. 10, note a. 

* Another of Plato’s anticipations of modern thought. This 
is precisely the Humian, Comtian, positivist, pragmatist view | 
of causation. Cf. Gorg. 501 a τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην | 
μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γἔγνεσθαι, “* relying on routine and | 
habitude for merely preserving a memory of what is wont to | 
result.” (Loeb tr. 

7 Odyss. xi. 489. The quotation is almost as apt as that 
at the beginning of the Crito. 



ἐπάρουρον ἐόντα θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὲ 

ἀκλήρῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἂν πεπονθέναι μᾶλλον ἢ cd 
E τέ δοξάζειν καὶ ἐκείνως ζῆν; Οὕτως, ἔφη, 

οἶμαι, πᾶν μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι ἂν δέξασθαι ἘΦ 
ἐκείνως. Kat τόδε δὴ ἐννόησον, ἦν δ᾽ eye € 
πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος καταβὰς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν. Bion 
καθίζοιτο, ἄρ᾽ οὐ σκότους ἂν πλέως" σχοίη τοὺς 
ὀφθαλμούς, ἐξαίφνης ἥκων ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου; Καὶ 
μάλα γ᾽ “ἔφη. Τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιὰς ἐκεΐνας πάλιν εἰ 
δέοι αὐτὸν ,γνωματεύοντα διαμιλλᾶσθαι. τοῖς. ἀεὶ 

517 δεσμώταις € ἐκείνοις, ἐν ᾧ ἀμβλυώττει, πρὶν. κατα- 

στῆναι τὰ ὄμματα, οὗτος δ᾽ ὁ χρόνος μὴ πάνυ ὀλίγος 
εἴη τῆς συνηθείας, dp’ οὐ γέλωτ᾽ ἂν παράσχοι, καὶ 
λέγοιτο ἃ ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἀναβὰς ἄ ἄνω διε ένος 
ἥκει τὰ ὄμματα, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄξιον οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι 
ἄνω ἰέναι; καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀν- 
ἄγειν, εἴ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναιντο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀπο- 
κτείνειν, ἀποκτεινύναι ἄν"; Σφόδρ α γὴ » ἔφη. 

III. Terni τοίνυν, ἦν 15 ἐγώ, τὴν εἰκόνα, ὦ 
φίλε Ῥλαύκων, προσαπτέον ἅπασαν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν 
Β λεγομένοις, τὴν μὲν. δι᾽ ὄψεως φαινομένην ἕδ 

τοῦ “δεσμωτηρίου οἰκήσει ἀφομοιοῦντα, τὸ δὲ 70 τοῦ 
πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει: τὴν δὲ 

ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν 

1 ἂν πλέως Stallb., ἀνάπλεως ss., ἂν ἀνάπλεως Baiter. See 
Adam ad loc. on the text. 

2 ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτεινῦναι ἄν F: ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι ἄν 
AD lamblichus: ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτιννύναι αὖ M, ἀποκτείνειαν 
ἄν ci. Baiter. 

@ On the metaphor of darkness and light cf. also Soph. 254 a. 
δ Like the philosopher in the court-room. Cf. Theaet. 
172 co, 178 ὁ ff., Gorg. 484 υ- Ὁ Cf. also supra on 487 c-p. 
515 Ὁ, infra 517 D, Soph. 216 Ὁ, Laches 196 58, Phaedr. 249 τ». 




prefer while living on earth to be serf of another, a 

landless man, and endure anything rather than opine 

with them and live that life?” ‘‘ Yes,” he said, “I 
think that he would choose to endure anything rather 
than such a life.” ‘“‘ And consider this also,” said I, 
“if such a one should go down again and take his old 
place would he not get his eyes full? of darkness, thus 
suddenly coming out of the sunlight?” “ He would 
indeed.” ‘‘ Now if he should be required to contend 
with these etual prisoners in ἡ evaluating ᾿ these 
shadows while his vision was still dim and before his 
eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this time re- 
quired for habituation would not be very short—would 
he not provoke laughter, and would it not be said of 
him that he had returned from his journey aloft with 
his eyes ruined and that it was not worth while even to 
attempt the ascent? And if it were possible to lay 
hands on and to kill the man who tried to release 
them and lead them up, would they not kill him *?”’ 
“* They certainly would,” he said. 

- ΠῚ. “ This image then, dear Glaucon, we must 
apply as a whole to all that has been said, likening 
the region revealed through sight to the habitation 
of the prison, and the light of the fire in it to the power 
of the sun. And if you assume that the ascent and 
the contemplation of the things above is the soul’s 

* An obvious allusion to the fate of Socrates. For other 

Stinging allusions to this ef. Gorg. 486 B, 521 c, Meno 100 
B-c. Cf. Hamlet’s “ Wormwood, wormwood”’ (11. ii. 191). 
‘The text is disputed. See crit. note. A. Drachmann, “ Zu 
Platons Staat,”” Hermes, 1926, p. 110, thinks that an οἴει or 
something like it must be understood as having preceded, 
at least in Plato’s thought, and that ἀποκτείνειν can be 
taken as a gloss or variant of ἀποκτεινύναι and the correct 

hg peg must be λαβεῖν, καὶ ἀποκτεινύναι ἄν. See also Adam 
ad loc. 

VOL. 11 K 129 





τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον τιθεὶς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσει τῆς 
γ᾽ ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος, ἐπειδὴ ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀκούει" 
θεὸς δέ που οἷδεν, εἰ ἀληθὴς. οὖσα τυγχάνει. τὰ 
δ᾽ οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ι ἐν τῷ 
γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις 
ὁρᾶσθαι, ὀφθεῖσα δὲ συλλογιστέα εἶναι ὡς ἄρα 
πᾶσι πάντων αὕτη ὀρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν αἰτία, ἔν 
τε ὁρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τούτου κύριον τεκοῦσα, ἔν 
τε γοητῷ αὐτὴ κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρα- 
σχομένη, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα 
ἐμφρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ. Συνοίομαι, 
ἔφη, καὶ ἐγώ, ὅν γε δὴ τρόπον δύναμαι. ἴθι 
τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ τόδε ξυνοιήθητι., καὶ μὴ 
θαυμάσῃς ὅτι οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐλθόντες οὐκ ἐθέλουσι 
τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράττειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἄνω ἀεὶ ἐπείγον- 
ται αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ διατρίβειν: εἰκὸς γάρ που οὕτως, 
εἴπερ αὖ κατὰ τὴν προειρημένην εἰκόνα τοῦτ᾽ ἔχει. 
Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ἔφη. Τί δέ; τόδε οἴει τι θαυμαστόν, 
εἰ ἀπὸ θείων, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, θεωριῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπειά 
τις ἐλθὼν κακὰ ἀσχημονεῖ τε καὶ φαίνεται σφόδρα 
γελοῖος ἔτι ἀμβλυώττων καὶ πρὶν ἱκανῶς συνήθης 

* Of. 508 B-c, where Arnou (Le Désir de dieu dans la 
philos. de Plotin, p. 48) and Robin (La Théorie plat. de 
Vamour, p pp. 83-84) make τόπος νοητός refer to le ciel astro- 
nomique as opposed to the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος of the Phaedrus 
247 Α-Ἐ 248 B, 248 pD-249 a. The phrase νοητὸς κόσμος, often 
attributed to Plato, does not occur in his writings. 

ὃ Plato was much less prodigal of affirmation about meta- 
a ultimates than interpreters who take his myths 
plas have supposed. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 515, on 

eno 86 B. 



ascension to the intelligible region,* you will not miss 
my. surmise, since that is what you desire to hear. 
But God knows? whether it is true. But, at any rate, 
m dream: as it appears to me is that in the region 

- known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen 
is the idea of good, and that when seen it must needs 
point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the 
cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, 
giving birth‘ in the visible world to light, and the 
author of light and itself in the intelligible world 
being the authentic source of truth and reason, and 
that anyone who is to act wisely? in private or public 
must have caught sight of this.” “I concur,” he 
said, ° “so far as I am able.” ‘Come then,” I said, 
: “and j join me in this further thought, and do not be 

surprised that those who have attained to this height 
are not willing’ to occupy themselves with the affairs 
of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and 
the yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I 
take it, is likely if in this point too the likeness of 
our image holds.” “ Yes, itis likely.” “ And again, 
do you think it at all strange,” said I, “if a man 
returning from divine contemplations to the petty 
miseries’ of men cuts a sorry figure’ and appears.most 
ridiculous, if, while still blinking through the gloom, 
and before he has become sufficiently accustomed 

© Cf. 

. is ws the main point for the Republic. The significance 
of the ‘lea of good for cosmogony is just glanced at and 
reserved for the Timaeus. Cf. on 508 B, p. 102, note a and 
conooates For the preicel application cf. Meno 81 ν-Ἑ. 

also Introd. pp. xxxv-xxxv 
᾿ τό OL eal Ἰ. on 347 p, p. 81, note d. 

9 Of Theaet. 174 c ἀσχημοσύνη. 


γενέσθαι τῷ παρόντι σκότῳ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἐν 
δικαστηρίοις ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἀγωγέξ ἐόθαῖ περὶ τῶν 
τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ “ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί, καὶ 

Ε διαμιλλᾶσθαι περὶ τούτου, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ὑπολαμβάνεται 


ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην μὴ πώποτε 
ἰδόντων; Οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν θαυμαστόν, ἔφη. ᾿Αλλ᾽ 
εἰ νοῦν γε ἔχοι τις, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μεμνῇτ᾽ ἄν, ὅτι 
διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διττῶν γίγνονται ἐπιταράξεις ὄμ- 
μασιν, ἔκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένων καὶ 
ἐκ σκότους εἰς φῶς" ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα νομίσας 
γίγνεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχήν, ὁπότε ἴδοι θορυβόὺ- 
μένην τινὰ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦσάν τι καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἂν 
ἀλογίστως γελῷ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπισκοποῖ ἂν πότερον ἐκ 
φανοτέρου βίου ἥκουσα ὑπὸ ἀηθείας ἐσκότωται ἢ 
ἐξ ἀμαθίας πλείονος εἰς φανότερον ἰοῦσα ὑπὸ λαμ- 
προτέρου μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ 
τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἂν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου, 
τὴν δὲ ἐλεήσειεν, καὶ εἰ γελᾶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ βούλοιτο, 
ἧττον ἂν καταγέλαστος ὁ γέλως αὐτῷ εἴη ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ 
τῇ ἄνωθεν ἐκ φωτὸς ἡκούσῃ. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, 
μετρίως λέγεις. 

IV. Δεῖ δή, εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσαι περὶ 
αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀληθῆ, τὴν παιδείαν οὐχ οἵαν τινὲς 
ἐπαγγελλόμενοί φασιν εἶναι τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι. 

α For the contrast between the. philosophical and the 
pettifogging soul cf. Theaet. 173 c-175 £. Cf. also on 
517 a, p. 128, note ὁ. 

ὃ For ἀγαλμάτων ef. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, 
p. 237, Soph. 234 c, Polit. 303 c. 



to the environing darkness, he is compelled in court- 
rooms ¢ or elsewhere to contend about the shadows of 
justice or the images? that cast the shadows and to 
wi in debate about the notions of these things 
in the minds of those who have never seen justice 
itself?” ‘It would be by no means strange,” he 
said. “ But a sensible man,” I said, “‘ would re- 
member that there are two distinct disturbances of 
' the eyes arising from two causes, according as the 
_ shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to 
light,° and, believing that the same thing happens 
_ to the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed _ 
and unable to discern something, he would not laugh? 
unthinkingly, but would observe whether coming 
from a brighter life its vision was obscured by the 
unfamiliar darkness, or whether the passage from the 
deeper dark of ignorance into a more luminous world 
and the greater brightness had dazzled its vision.¢ 
And so/hewoulddeem the one happy inits experience 
and way of life and pity the other, and if it pleased 
him to laugh at it, his laughter would be less laugh- 
able than that at the expense of the soul that had 
come down from the light above.’’ “* That is a very 
fair statement,” he said. 

IV. “Then, if this is true, our view of these 
matters must be this, that education is not in reality 
what some people proclaim it to be in their profes- 

* Aristotle, De an. 422 a 20 f. says the over-bright is ἀόρατον 
but otherwise than the dark. 

4 Cf. Theaet. 175 v-¥. 

* Lit. “or whether coming from a deeper ignorance into a 
more luminous world, it is dazzled by the brilliance of a 
greater light.” 

7 i.e. only after that. For οὕτω δή in this sense cf, 484 ν, 
429 p, 443 π, Charm. 171 kB. 



C φασὶ δέ που οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης 
σφεῖς ἐντιθέναι, οἷον τυφλοῖ is ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν 
ἐντιθέντες. Φασὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. O “δέ γε ee 
Adyos, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, σημαίνει, ταύτην ὴν ἐνοῦσι 
ἑκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ; ὄργανον, 


καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, οἷον εἰ ὄμμα μὴ δυνατὸν 

ἣν ἄλλως ἢ ἢ ξὺν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ 

φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους, οὕτω ξὺν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ : 

ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου περιάκτέον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ 

ὃν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ yer 

ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη τοῦτο δ᾽ εἶναί φαμεν τἀγα- 

Oov- ἢ γάρ; Ναί. Τούτου τοίνυν, ἦν. δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἂν εἴη τῆς περιαγωγῆς,. τίνα τρόπον 
ὡς ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα μεταστραφήσεται, 
οὐ τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν 
αὐτό, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τετραμμένῳ οὐδὲ βλέποντι of 
ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι. “Eouxe γάρ, ἔφη. 

4 ἐπαγγελλόμενοι connotes the boastfulness of their claims. 
Cf. Protag. 319 a, Gorg. 447 c, Laches 186 c, Buthyd. 4788, 
Isoc. Soph. 1, 5, 9, 10, Antid. 193, Xen. Mem. iii. 1. 1, 
i. 2. 8, Aristot. Rhet. 1402 a 25. 

ὃ Ch. Theognis 429 ff. Stallbaum com Eurip. _ Hippo i 

917 f. Similarly Anon. Theaet. Comm. (Berlin, 1908), 
48.4 καὶ δεῖν αὐτῇ οὐκ ἐνθέσεως ΩΣ ἀλλὰ ava Beet 
Cf. also St. Augustine: “* Nolite putare rhea tyudllet eae 
aliquid discere ab homine. Admonere possumus per stre- 
pitum vocis nostrae;*’ and Emerson’s “ἢ deri trictly speaking, it 
is not instruction but provocation that I can receive from 
another soul.” 

¢ περιακτέον is probably a reference to the περίακτοι or tri- 
angular prisms on each side of the stage. They revolved on 
an axis and had different scenes painted on their three faces. 
Many scholars are of the opinion that they were not known 
in the classical period, as they are mentioned only by late 



sions.* What they aver is that they can put true 
knowledge into a soul that does not possess it, as if 
they were inserting? vision into blind eyes.”” “‘They 
do indeed,” he said. “ But our present argument 
indicates,” said I, “that the true analogy for this 
indwelling power in the soul and the instrument 
whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye that 
could not be converted to the light from the darkness 
except by turning the whole body. Even so this 
organ of knowledge must be turned around from 
the world of becoming together with the entire 
soul, like the scene-shifting periact ὁ in the theatre, 
until the soul is able to endure the contemplation 
of essence and the brightest region of being. And 
this, we say, is the good,? do we not?” “Yes.” 
“ Of this very thing, then,” I said, “ there might be 
an art, an art of the speediest and most effective 
shifting or conversion of the soul, not an art of pro- 
ducing vision in it, but on the assumption that it 
possesses vision but does not rightly direct it and 
does not look where it should, an art of bringing this 
about.” “ Yes, that seems likely,” he said. “‘ Then 
writers; but others do not consider this conclusive evidence, 

as a number of classical plays seem to have required some- 
thing of the sort. Cf. O. Navarre in Daremberg-Saglio 8.0. 

Machi . 1469. 

ἃ Hard-headed distaste for the unction or seeming mysti- 
cism of Plato’s language should not blind us to the plain 
meaning. Unlike Schopenhauer, who affirms the moral 
will to be unchangeable, Plato says that men may be preached 
and drilled into ordinary morality, but that the degree of 
their intelligence is an unalterable endowment of nature. 
Some teachers will concur. 

* Plato often distinguishes the things that do or do not 
admit of reduction to an art or science. Cf. on 488 £, p. 22, 
note 6. Adam is mistaken in taking it ““ Education (ἡ racdeia) 
would be an art,” etc. 




Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς 

κινδυνεύουσιν ἐγγύς τι εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος" 
τῷ ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμ- 
ποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσί τε καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν" ἡ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι 
παντὸς μᾶλλον θειοτέρου τινὸς χάνει, ὡς 
ἔοικεν, οὖσα, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν o οὐ έποτε ἀπ- 
dAdvow, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς χρήσιμόν. τε καὶ 
ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἄχρηστον αὖ καὶ βλαβερὸν γίγνεται. 
ἢ οὔπω ἐννενόηκας, τῶν λεγομένων πονηρῶν μέν. 
σοφῶν δέ, ὡς δριμὺ μὲν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον Kk 

ὀξέως διορᾷ ταῦτα ἐφ᾽ ἃ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ τῶν 
ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν, κακίᾳ δ᾽ ἠναγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν, 
ὥστε ὅσῳ ἂν ὀξύτερον βλέπῃ, τοσούτῳ πλείω 
κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τοῦτο 
μέντοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως εἰ ἐκ 
παιδὸς εὐθὺς κοπτόμενον περιεκόπη τὰς τῆς 

Β γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἵ δὴ 

« This then is Plato’s answer (intended from the first) to 
the question whether virtue can be taught, debated in the 
Protagoras and Meno. The intellectual virtues (to use Aris- 
ΜΕ s term), broadly speaking, cannot be taught; they are 

ift. And the highest moral virtue is inseparable from 
rig tly directed intellectual virtue. Ordinary moral virtue 
is not rightly taught in democratic Athens, but comes by 
the grace of God. Ina reformed state it could be systemati- 
cally inculecated and “taught.” Cf. What Plato Said, 
pp. 511-512 on Meno 70 a. But we need not infer that 
lato did not believe in. mental discipline. Cf. Charles Fox, 
Educational Psychology, p. 164 *“‘ The conception of mental 
discipline is at least as old as Plato, as may be seen from the 
seventh book of the Republic . . 

> Of. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1103 2 14-17 ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους. 
Plato does not explicitly name “‘ ethical’’ and “‘ intellectual” 
virtues. Cf. Fox, op. cit. p. 104 ‘ Plato correctly believed 



the other so-called virtues α of the soul do seem akin 
to those of the body. For it is true that where they 
do not pre-exist, they are afterwards created by 
habit® and practice. But the excellence of thought,° 
it seems, is certainly of a more divine quality, a thing 
that never loses its potency, but, according to the 
direction of its conversion, becomes useful and bene- 
ficent, or, again, useless and harmful. Have you 
never observed in those who are popularly spoken of 
as bad, but smart men,’ how keen is the vision of the 
little soul,* how quick it is to discern the things that 
interest it,’ a proof that it is not a poor vision which 
it has, but one forcibly enlisted in the service of 
evil, so that the sharper its sight the more mischief 
it accomplishes?” 1 certainly have,” he said. 
“ Observe then,” said I, “ that this part of such a 
soul, if it had been hammered from childhood, and 
had thus been struck free’ of the leaden weights, so 
that all virtues except wisdom could be acquired habitually 

¢ Plato uses such synonyms as φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς, διάνοια, 
etc., as Suits his purpose and context. He makes no attempt 
to define and discriminate them with impracticable Aristo- 
telian meticulousness. 

ἃ Cf. Theaet. 176 pv, Laws 689 c-p, Cic. De offic. i. 19, and 
also 819 a. 

_* Cf. Theaet. 195 a, ibid. 173 a σμικροὶ. . . τὰς ψυχάς, 
Marcus Aurelius’ ψυχάριον εἶ βαστάζων νεκρόν, Swinburne’s 
** A little soul for a little bears up this corpse which is man” 
(“Hymn to Proserpine,” in fine), Tennyson's “If half the little 
soul is dirt.” 

7 Lit. “ Toward which it is turned.” 

* The meaning is plain, the precise nature of the image 
that carries it is doubtful. Jowett’s “circumcision’’ was 
suggested by Stallbaum’s “ purgata ac circumcisa,’’ but 
carries alien associations. The whole may be compared 
with the incrustation of the soul, infra 611 c-p, and with 
Phaedo 81 8 f. 




25 ὃ a ‘ 4 ¢ ὃ a ‘ λ ’ 
ἐδωδαῖς τε καὶ τοιούτων ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λιχνείαις 
προσφυεῖς γιγνόμεναι κάτω' στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς 
a ” a ,» 5» > 
ψυχῆς ὄψιν: dv εἰ ἀπαλλαγὲν περιεστρέφετο εἰς 
3 ~ \ > ~ Ἅ A A ~ ~~ Pim 
τἀληθῆ, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν 
> θ ’ 395 7 ε,’ σ ᾿ A é > a A 
ἀνθρώπων ὀξύτατα ἑώρα, ὥσπερ Kal ἐφ᾽ ἃ νῦν 
/ ie Ὃς ” , 34 
τέτραπται. Ἑϊκός ye, ἔφη. Ti δαί; τόδε οὐκ 
εἰκός, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, 
μήτε τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους καὶ ἀληθείας ἀπείρους 

~ “- » ΑΣ 

ἱκανῶς ἄν ποτε πόλιν ἐπιτροπεῦσαι, μήτε τοὺς ἐν 
παιδείᾳ ἐωμένους διατρίβειν διὰ τέλους, τοὺς μὲν 
ὅτι σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἕνα, οὗ atoxalo- 
μένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ 
τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ ὅτι ἑκόντες εἶναι οὐ 
πράξουσιν, ἡγούμενοι ἐν μακάρων νήσοις ζῶντες 

” > / > ~ ” «ε / ᾽ 
ἔτι ἀπῳκίσθαι; ᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη. ‘Hperepov δὴ 
ἔργον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῶν οἰκιστῶν τάς τε βελτίστας 
φύσεις ἀναγκάσαι ἀφικέσθαι πρὸς τὸ μάθημα ὃ 
» ~ / ” ΄ > A 
ev τῷ πρόσθεν ἔφαμεν εἶναι μέγιστον, ἰδεῖν τε TO 
ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν; καὶ 
ἐπειδὰν ἀναβάντες ἱκανῶς ἴδωσι, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν 
αὐτοῖς ὃ νῦν ἐπιτρέπεται. Τὸ ποῖον δή; Τὸ 

> ~ δ᾽ > 7 tA ‘ 20 “λ ΄ 
αὐτοῦ, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καταμένειν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν πάλιν 

1 κάτω Hermann: περὶ κάτω Μ85. : περὶ τὰ κάτω Iamblichus. 

« Or “eye of the mind.” Cf. 533 p, Sym. 219 a, Soph. 
254 a, Aristot. Eth. 1144 a 30, and the parallels and imita- 
tions collected by Gomperz, Apol. der Heilkunst, 166-167. 
Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 534, on Phaedo 99 xr, Ovid, 
Met. xv. 64: 
. . » quae natura negabat 
visibus humanis, oculis ea peetoris hausit. 

Cf. Friedlander, Platon, i. pp. 12-13, 15, and perhaps Odyssey, 
i. 115, Marc. Aurel. iv. 29 καταμύειν τῷ νοερῷ ὄμματι. 
» For likely and necessary cf. on 485 c, p. 6, note ¢. 



to speak, of our birth and becoming, which attaching 
themselves to it by food and similar pleasures and 
gluttonies turn downwards the vision of the soul? 
—if, I say, freed from these, it had suffered a con- 
version towards the things that are real and true, 
that same faculty of the same men would have been 
most keen in its vision of the higher things, just as 
it is for the things toward which it is now turned.” 
“Tt is likely,” he said. “ Well, then,” said I, “is 
not this also likely ὃ and a necessary consequence of 
what has been said, that neither could men who 
are uneducated and inexperienced in truth ever 
adequately preside over a state, nor could those 
who had been permitted to linger on to the end 
in the pursuit of culture—the one because they 
have no single aim 5 and purpose in life to which all 
τ their actions, public and private, must be directed, 
and the others, because they will not voluntarily 
engage in action, believing that while still living 
they have been transported to the Islands of the 
Blest.2” “‘ True,” he said. “ΤῈ is the duty of us, the 
founders, then,” said I, “‘ to compel the best natures 
to attain the knowledge which we pronounced 
the greatest, and to win to the vision of the good, 
to scale that ascent, and when they have reached 
the heights and taken an adequate view, we must 
not allow what is now permitted.” ““ Whatis that?” 
“That they should linger there,” I said, “‘ and refuse 

* σκοπόν : this is what distinguishes the philosophic states- 
man from the opportunist politician. Cf. 452 τ, Laws 
962 a-z, Ὁ, Unity of Plato’s Thought, Ὁ. 18, n. 102. 

* Cf. 540 5, Gorg. 526 c, infra 520 τὸ ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ and 
Phaedo 114 c, 109 8. Because they will still suppose that 
they are “building Jerusalem in England’s green and 
pleasant land” (Blake). 


καταβαίνειν παρ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς δεσμώτας μηδὲ 

μετέχειν τῶν παρ᾽ ἐκείνοις πόνων τε καὶ τιμῶν, 
εἴτε φαυλότεραι εἴτε σπουδαιότεραι.. Ἔπειτ᾽, ἔφη, 
ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς, καὶ ποιήσομεν χεῖὶ ἴρον or 
δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὃν ἄμεινον; 

EV. ᾿Επελάθου, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πάλιν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι 
νόμῳ οὐ τοῦτο “μέλει, ὅπως ἕν τι γένος ἐν πόλει 
διαφερόντως εὖ πράξει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει τοῦτο 
μηχανᾶται ἐγγενέσθαι, ξυναρμόττων τοὺς πολίτας 
πειθοῖ τε καὶ ἀνάγκῃ, ποιῶν μεταδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις 

520 τῆς ὠφελείας, ἣν ἂν ἕκαστοι τὸ κοινὸν δυνατοὶ 
ὦσιν | ὠφελεῖν, καὶ “αὐτὸς ἐμποιῶν τοιούτους ᾿ ἄνδρας 
ἐν τῇ πόλει, οὐχ ἵνα ἀφίῃ τρέπεσθαι ὅ ὅπῃ. ἕκαστος 
βούλεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα καταχρῆται αὐτὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ 
τὸν ξύνδεσμον τῆς πόλεως. ᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη: ἐπ- 
ἐλαθόμην γάρ. Σκέψαι τοίνυν, εἶπον, ὦ ὦ Γλαύκων, 
ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἀδικήσομεν τοὺς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν φιλοσόφους 
γιγνομένους, ἀλλὰ δίκαια πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐροῦμεν, 
προσαναγκάζοντες τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαί τε καὶ 

Β φυλάττειν. ἐροῦμεν γάρ, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις 
πόλεσι τοιοῦτοι γιγνόμενοι εἰκότως οὐ μετέχουσι 
τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς πόνων" αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται 
ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείας, δίκην δ᾽ ἔχει τό 
γε αὐτοφυές, μηδενὶ τροφὴν ὀφεῖλον, μηδ᾽ ἐκτίνειν 

* Cf. infra 539 πὶ and Laws 803 B-c, and on 520 ¢, Huxley, 
Evolution and Ethics, p. 53 “‘ the hero of our story descended 
the bean-stalk and came back to the common world,” etc. 

> Cf. Vol. I. pp. 314-315 on 419. 

¢ i.e. happiness, not of course exceptional happiness. 

4 Persuasion and compulsion are often bracketed or con- 
trasted. Of. also Laws 661 c, 7292 5, 711 c, Rep. 548 B. 

¢ Of. 369 c ff. The reference there however is only to the 
economic division of labour. For the idea that laws should 



to go down again? among those bondsmen and share 
their labours and honours, whether they are of less or 
of greater worth.”’ “Do you mean to say that we 
must do them this wrong, and compel them to live 
an inferior life when the better is in their power ἢ ” 

V. “You have again forgotten,” my friend,” said I, 
“ that the law is not concerned with the special happi- 
ness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce 
this condition‘ in the city as a whole, harmonizing 
and adapting the citizens to one another by per- 
suasion and compulsion,’ and requiring them to im- 
part to one another any benefit* which they are 
severally able to bestow upon the community, and 
that it itself creates such men in the state, not that it 
may allow each to take what course pleases him, but 
with a view to using them for the binding together of 
the commonwealth.”’ ‘“‘ True,” he said, “1 did for- 
get it.” “‘ Observe, then, Glaucon,” said I, “that 
we shall not be wronging, either, the philosophers who 
arise among us, but that we can justify our action 
when we constrain them to take charge of the other 
citizens and be their guardians. For we will say to 
them that it is natural that men of similar quality 
who spring up in other cities should not share in the 
labours there. For they grow up spontaneously? from 
no volition of the government in the several states, 
and it is justice that the self-grown, indebted to none 
for its breeding, should not be zealous either to pay 

be for the good of the whole state cf. 420 s ff., 466 a, 341-342, 
Laws 715 8, 757 νυ, 875 a. 

1 Noblesse oblige. This idea is now a commonplace of 
communist orations. - 

5 αὐτόματοι : cf. Protag. 320 a, Euthyd. 982 οσ. For the 
thought that there are a few men naturally good in any 
state cf. also Laws 951 B, 642 c-p. 



Tw προθυμεῖσθαι τὰ τροφεῖα" ὑμᾶς δ᾽ ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν 
τε αὐτοῖς τῇ τε ἄλλῃ πόλει ὥσπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν 
ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐ ἐγεννήσαμεν, ἀμεινόν᾽ τε 
C καὶ τελεώτερον ἐκείνων πεπαιδευμένους καὶ μᾶλλον 
δυνατοὺς ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν. καταβατέον οὖν 
ἐν μέρει ἑκάστῳ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ξυνοίκησιν᾽ καὶ 
ξυνεθιστέον τὰ σκοτεινὰ θεάσασθαι: ξυνε wld 
yap μυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεῖ, καὶ γνώσεσθε 
ἕκαστα τὰ εἴδωλα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὧν, διὰ τὸ πάλη 
ἑωρακέναι καλῶν. τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν πέρι: 
καὶ οὕτω ὕπαρ ἡμῖν. καὶ ὑμῖν ἡ πόλις οἰκήσεται, 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ὄναρ, ὡς νῦν. αἱ πολλαὶ ὑπὸ σκιαμαχούν- 
D τῶν τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ 
ἄρχειν οἰκοῦνται, ὡς μεγάλου τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ 6: ὄντος. 
τὸ δέ που “ἀληθὲς ὧδ᾽ ἔχει: ἐν πόλει ἧ ἥκιστα 
πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ “μέλλοντες ἄρξειν, ταύτην 
ἄριστα καὶ ἀστασιαστότατα ἀνάγκη οἰκεῖσθαι, τὴν 
δ᾽ ἐναντίους ἄρχοντας σχοῦσαν ἐναντίως. Πάνυ 
« ΟἽ Isoc. Archidamus 108 ἀποδῶμεν τὰ τροφεῖα τῇ πατρίδι. 
Stallbaum refers also to Phoenissae 44, For the country as 
τροφός see Vol. I. p. 303, note 6 on 414 £. 

> Of. Polit. 301 v-®, Xen. Cyr. v. 1. 24, Oecon. 7. 32-33. — 

¢ For τελεώτερον... πεπαιδευμένους ef. Prot. 342 πὶ τελέως 
πεπαιδευμένου. : 

ἃ They must descend into the cave again. ἔς infra 539 πὶ 
and Laws 803 s-c. Cf. Burnet, Karly Greek Philos. pp. 89- 
90: ‘‘It was he alone, so far as we know, that insisted on 
philosophers descending by turns into the cave from which 
they had been a eer and coming to the help of their - 
former fellow-prisoners.’’. He agrees with Stewart or ‘yths 
of Plato, p. 252, πη. 2) that Plato had in mind the ΤΡΑΝᾺ 
κατάβασις εἰς “Αιδου to ‘‘rescue the spirits in prison.” Cf. 
Wright, Harvard Studies, xvii. p. 139 and Complete Poems 
of Henry More, pp. xix-xx “ All which is agreeable to that 
opinion of Plato: That some descend hither to declare the 
Being and Nature of the Gods; and for the greater Health, 




to anyone the price of its nurture.* But you we have 
engendered for yourselves and the rest of the city 
to be, as it were, king-bees ὃ and leaders in the hive. 
You have received a better and more complete 
education® than the others, and you are more capable 
of sharing both ways of life. Down you must go? 
then, in his turn, to the habitation of the others 
and accustom yourselves to the observation of the 
obseure things there. For once habituated you will 
discern them infinitely* better than the dwellers 
there, and you will know what each of the ‘ idols ’ is 
and whereof it is a semblance, because you have seen 
the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good. 
So our city will be governed by us and you with 
waking minds, and not, as most cities now which are 
inhabited and ruled darkly as in a dream’ by men 
who fight one another for shadows” and wrangle for 
office as if that were a great good, when the truth is 
that the city in which those who are to rule are least 
eager to hold office‘ must needs be best administered 
and most free from dissension, and the state that gets 
the contrary type of ruler will be the opposite of this.” 
Purity and Perfection of this Lower World.” This is taking 
Plato somewhat too literally and confusing him with 

* For μυρίῳ ef. Eurip. Androm. 701. 

7 i.e. images, Bacon’s “ idols of the den.” 

5 Plato is fond of the contrast, ὕπαρ. . . ὄναρ. Cf. 476 c, 
Phaedr. 277 το, Phileb. 36 ©, 65 8, Polit. 277 v, 278 &, 
Theaet. 158 5, Rep. 574 νυ, 576 5, Tim. 71 τ, Laws 969 8, 
also 533 B-c. 

* Cf. on 586 c, p. 393; Shelley, Adonais st. 39 “‘ keep with 
phantoms an unprofitable strife’; Arnold, ‘* Dover Beach ἢ": 

..- a darkling plain... 
Where ignorant armies clash by night. 
* Cf. on 517 ς, p. 131, note 6. 

-Ὡ-Ὡ-- ΟΝ» 






\. Ev ” > , » ς« a ” ¢ 
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. ᾿Απειθήσουσιν οὖν ἡμῖν, οἴει, οἱ 
/ ied > 4 \ > > 5 
τρόφιμοι ταῦτ᾽ ἀκούοντες, καὶ οὐκ ἐθελήσουσι 
ξυμπονεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἕκαστοι ἐν μέρει, τὸν δὲ 
πολὺν χρόνον μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖν ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ; 
᾿Αδύνατον, ἔφη: δίκαια γὰρ δὴ δικαίοις ἐπι- 
τάξομεν. παντὸς μὴν μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον 
αὐτῶν ἕκαστος εἷσι τὸ ἄρχειν, τοὐναντίον τῶν νῦν 
Sis Sie δ 3 ΄, “ ae ἐν aN) 
ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει ἀρχόντων. Οὕτω yap ἔχει, Hv ὃ 
ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε: εἰ μὲν βίον ἐξευρήσεις ἀμείνω τοῦ 
ἄρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἄρξειν, ἔστι σοι δυνατὴ 
γενέσθαι πόλις εὖ οἰκουμένη: ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ 

»* ε ~ »” ,ὔ / > 
ἄρξουσιν οἱ τῷ ὄντι πλούσιοι, od χρυσίου, ἀλλ 
οὗ δεῖ τὸν εὐδαίμονα πλουτεῖν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς τε καὶ 
Ν > \ ‘ \ ~ > ~ 
ἔμφρονος. εἰ δὲ πτωχοὶ καὶ πεινῶντες ἀγαθῶν 
»ο,ὕὔ a. 4 \ / "ΝΜ > ~ a4 Η 
ἰδίων ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἴασιν, ἐντεῦθεν οἰόμενοι 
τἀγαθὸν δεῖν ἁρπάζειν, οὐκ ἔστι: περιμάχητον 
γὰρ τὸ ἄρχειν γιγνόμενον, οἰκεῖος ὧν καὶ ἔνδον ὃ 
τοιοῦτος πόλεμος αὐτούς τε ἀπόλλυσι καὶ τὴν 
ἄλλην πόλιν. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη. "Ἔχεις οὖν, ἣν 
δ᾽ ἐγώ, βίον ἄλλον τινὰ πολιτικῶν ἀρχῶν κατα- 
“- Ἃ \ a > ~ , bees BY 
φρονοῦντα ἢ τὸν τῆς ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας; Οὐ μὰ 
τὸν Δία, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ ye μὴ ἐραστὰς 
τοῦ ἄρχειν ἰέναι ἐπ᾽ αὐτό" εἰ δὲ μή, οἵ γε ἀντ- 
‘ ~ ~ > a / > a 

ἐρασταὶ μαχοῦνται. Πῶς δ᾽ od; Τίνας οὖν ἄλλους 
ἀναγκάσεις ἰέναι ἐπὶ φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως, ἢ οἱ 

* The world of ideas, the upper world as opposed to that 
of the cave. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc. 

> Cf. supra Vol. I. p. 80, note ὃ on 347 c. 

© Of. Phaedrus in fine, supra 416 2-417 a, infra 547 B. 

4 Stallbaum refers to Xen. Cyr. viii. 3. 39 οἴομαί σε καὶ διὰ 
τοῦτο ἥδιον πλουτεῖν, ὅτι πεινήσας χρημάτων πεπλούτηκας, * for you 
must enjoy your riches much more, I think, for the very reason 

that it was only after being hungry for wealth that you became 
rich.” (Loebtr.) Cf. also infra 577 2-578 a, and Adam ad loc, 



“By all means,” he said.“ Will our alumni, then, 
disobey us when we tell them this, and will they refuse 
to share in the labours of state each in his turn while 
permitted to dwell the most of the time with one 
another in that purer world? ?”  “ Impossible,’’ he 
said: “‘ for we shall be imposing just commands on men 
who are just. Yet they will assuredly approach office as 
an unavoidable necessity,° and in the opposite temper 
from that of the present rulers in our cities.” “For 
the fact is, dear'friend,” said I, “‘if you can discover a 
better way of life than office-holding for your future 
rulers, a well-governed city becomes a possibility. 
For only in such a state will those rule who are really 
rich,° not in gold, but in the wealth that makes happi- 
ness—a good and wise life. But if, being beggars and 
Btatyelings 4 from lack of goods of their own, they turn 
to affairs of state thinking that it is thence that they 
should grasp their own good, then it is impossible. 
For when office and rule become the prizes of con- 
tention,’ such a civil and internecine strife’ destroys 
the office-seekers themselves and the city as well.” 
“ Most true,” he said. ‘‘ Can you name any other 
type or ideal of life that looks with scorn on political 
office except the life of true philosophers 2?” I asked. 

“No, by Zeus,” he said. “ But what we require,’’ I 
said, “is that those who take office” should not be 
lovers of rule. Otherwise there will be a contest with 
rival lovers.” “Surely.” “*‘ What others, then, will 
you compel to undertake the guardianship of the city 

© Cf. supra 347 Ὁ, Laws 715 4, also 586 ὁ and What Plato 
Said, p. 627, on Laws 678 x, Isoc. Areop. 24, Pan. 145 and 146. 

“ we Eurip. Heracleidae 415 οἰκεῖος ἤδη πόλεμος ἐξαρτεὕὔεται. 

ὩΣ infra 580 νυ ff., pp. 370 ff. 

ἰέναι ἐπὶ in erotic language means “to woo.” Cf. on 
489 τ, p. 26, note b, also 347 c, 588 8, 475 c. 

VOL. II L 145 


περὶ τούτων τε φρονιμώτατοι, δι᾽ ὧν ἄριστα πόλις 
οἰκεῖται, ἔχουσι τε τιμὰς ἄλλας καὶ βίον ἀμείνω 
τοῦ πολιτικοῦ; Οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἔφη. oa 
C VI. Βούλει οὖν τοῦτ᾽ ἤδη σκοπῶμεν, τίνα τρόπον 
οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐγγενήσονται καὶ πῶς τις ἀνάξει αὐτοὺς 
> ~ σ > σ , 24 ΚΙ 
εἰς φῶς, ὥσπερ ἐξ “Αἰδου λέγονται δή τινες εἰς 
θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἔφη. 
“Τοῦτο δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὀστράκου ἂν εἴη περι- — 
nF ae A “-“ A > ~ ον 
στροφὴ ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινὸς | 
ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν, τοῦ ὄντος οὖσα ἐπάνοδος, ἣν 
δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι. Πάνυ μὲν 
᾿οὖν. Οὐκοῦν δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι τί τῶν μαθημάτων 
D ἔχει τοιαύτην δύναμιν; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τί ἂν οὖν 
εἴη, ὦ Γλαύκων, μάθημα ψυχῆς ὁλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ 
Ἶ 2. ἡ ae , te ; δι» 4, 
γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν; τόδε δ᾽ ἐννοῶ λέγων ἅμα' 
οὐκ ἀθλητὰς μέντοι πολέμου ἔφαμεν τούτους 
1 οὖσα ἐπάνοδος Hermann: οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον AFDM, ἰούσης : 
ἐπάνοδον scr. recc.: οὐσίαν ἐπάνοδος ci. Cobet. 

« Cf. on 515 £, p. 124, note ὃ. 

> This has been much debated. Cf. Adam ad loe. | Pro- 
fessor Linforth argues from Pausanias i. 34 that Amphiaraus 
is meant. ' 

¢ Cf. Phaedr. 241 8; also the description of the game in- 
Plato Comicus, fr. 153, apud Norwood, Greek Comedy, 
p. 167. The players were divided into two groups. A shell 
or potsherd, black on one side and white on the other, was 
thrown, and according to the face on which it fell one group 
fled and the other pursued. Cf. also commentators on 
Aristoph. Knights 855. = 

4 Much quoted by Neoplatonists and Christian Fathers. 
Cf. Stallbaum ad loc. Again we need to remember that 
Plato’s main and explicitly reiterated purpose is to describe 
a course of study that will develop the power of consecutive 
consistent abstract thinking. All metaphysical and mystical 
suggestions of the imagery which conveys this idea are — 



than those who have most intelligence of the prin- 
ciples that are the means of good government and 
who possess distinctions of another kind and a life 
that is preferable to the political life?”’ “No 
others,” he said. " 
- VI. “ Would you, then, have us proceed to consider 
how such men may be produced in a state and how 
they may be led upward ? to the light even as some ὃ 
are fabled to have ascended from Hades to the gods?”’ 
“Of course I would.” “So this, it seems, would not 
be the whirling of the shell* in the children’s game, 
but a conversion and turning about of the soul from 
a day whose light is darkness to the veritable day— 
that ascension ¢ to reality of our parable which we will 
affirm to be true philosophy.” “By all means.” 
“Must we not, then, consider what studies have the 
power to effect this?” “‘Ofcourse.”’ “‘ What, then, 
Glaucon, would be the study that would draw the 
soul away from the world of becoming to the world 
of being? A thought strikes me while I speak*: Did 
_ We not say that these men in youth must be athletes 
secondary and subordinate. So, e.g. Urwick, The Message 
of Plato, pp. 66-67, is mistaken when he says “.. . Plato 
oo tomy tells us that his education is ΟΝ simply and 
ly to awaken the spiritual faculty which every soul 
om, by ‘ wheeling the soul round and turning it away 
m the world of change and decay.’ He is not concerned 
with any of those ‘excellences of mind’ which may be pro- 
duced by training and discipline, his only aim is to open the 
eye of the soul... ." The general meaning of the sentence 
is plain but the text is disputed. See crit. note. 
~ * A frequent pretence in Plato. Cf. 370 a, 525 ο, Buthy- 
ro 9 c, Laws 686 c, 702 5, Phaedr. 262 c with Fried- 
r, Platon, ii. Ὁ. 498, Laws 888 p with Tayler Lewis, Plato 
against the Atheists, pp. 118-119. Cf. also Vol. I. on 
394 p-e, and Isoc. Antid. 159 ἐνθυμοῦμαι δὲ μεταξὺ λέγων, 
Panath. 127. 



ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι νέους ὄντας; " Ἔφαμεν γάρ. Δεῖ 
ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα ὃ 6 ζητοῦμεν, 
πρὸς ἐκείῳ. TO ποῖον; Μὴ ἄχρηστον πολεμι- 
κοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἶναι. Δεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη, εἴ ἴπερ οἷόν 

Eve. Γ υμναστικῇ μὴν καὶ μουσικῇ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν 


ἐπαιδεύοντο ἡμῖν. Ἦν ταῦτα, ἔφη. Καὶ γυμνα- 
στικὴ μέν που περὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον 
τετεύτακε': σώματος γὰρ αὔξης καὶ φθίσεως 
ἐπιστατεῖ. Φαίνεται. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἂν εἴη 
ὃ ζητοῦμεν μάθημα. Οὐ γάρ. ᾿Αλλ’ ἄρα μουσική, 
ὅσην τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν; ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἦν ἐκείνη. γ᾽, 
ἔφη, ἀντίστροφος τῆς γυμναστικῆς, εἰ μέμνησαι, 
ἔθεσι παιδεύουσα τοὺς φύλακας, κατά τε ἁρμόνίαν 
εὐαρμοστίαν τινά, οὐκ ἐπιστήμην, παραδιδοῦσα, 
καὶ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν εὐρυθμίαν, ἔν τε τοῖς λόγοις 
ἕτερα τούτων ἀδελφὰ ἔθη" ἄττα ἔχουσα, καὶ ὅσοι 
μυθώδεις τῶν λόγων καὶ ὅσοι ἀληθινώτεροι ἦσαν" 
μάθημα δὲ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ἀγαθόν," οἷον σὺ νῦν 

Β ζητεῖς, οὐδὲν ἣν ἐν αὐτῇ. ᾿Ακριβέστατα, ἦν δ᾽ 

ἐγώ, ἀναμιμνήσκεις με' τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τοιοῦτον 

οὐδὲν εἶχεν. ἀλλ᾽, ὦ δαιμόνιε Γλαύκων, τί ἂν εἴη 

τοιοῦτον; al τε γὰρ τέχναι βάναυσοί που ἅπασαι 

ἔδοξαν εἶναι. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; καὶ μὴν τί ἔτ᾽ ἄλλο 
2 τετεύτακε(ν) ADM Euseb., τεύτακε F, ee vulg. 

2 ἔθη F Euseb., ἔφη ADM 
3 ἀγαθὸν ADM, ἄγον Euseb. et ἼΡρ D, ay (sie) F. 

@ Of. 416 p, 422 5, 404 a, and Vol. I, p. 266, note a, on 

403 π΄. 
> προσέχειν is here used in its etymological sense. Cf. 

pp. 66-67 on 500 a. 
¢ This further prerequisite of the higher education follows 

naturally from the plan of the Republic; but it does not 


of ett tt “We did.” “ Then the study for which 
we are. are sceking must have this additional? qualifica- 
tion.” ‘What one?” ‘“‘ That it be not useless to 
jiers.0” “ Why, yes, it must,” he said, “‘if that is _ 
sible.” “ But in our previous account they were ; 
ππτεπαϑ in gymnastics and τητος. Ὁ “‘ They were,” 
he said. “ And gymnastics, I take it, i is devoted ὁ to 
‘that which grows and perishes; for it presides over 
the growth and decay of the body.f” ‘‘ Obviously.” 
“Then this cannot be thestudy that we seek.” “No.” 
“Ts it, then, music, so far as we have already de- 
ite” “ Nay, that,” he said,“ was the counter- 
park of g ics, if you remember. It educated 
the guardians through habits, imparting by the 
y acertain harmony of spirit that is not science,* 
and by the rhythm measure and grace, and also 
qualities akin to these in the words of tales that are 
fables and those that are more nearly true. But it 
included no study that tended to any such good as 
you are now seeking.’’ “ Your recollection is most 
exact,” I said; “for in fact it had nothing of the 
kind. But in heaven’s name, Glaucon, what study 
could there be of that kind? For all the arts were 
im our opinion base and mechanical.*’’. “Surely; 

ποτὰ Plato much and is, after one or two repetitions, 
af supra 376 & ff. 
or reretraxe cf. Tim. 90 B τετευτακότι. 
“ΟΣ 376. This is of course no contradiction of 410 c. 

e ordinary study of music may cultivate and refine 
feeling. Only the mathematics of music would develop the 
power of abstract thought. 

* Knowledge in the true sense, as contrasted with opinion 
_ * Cf. supra, p. 49, note e, on 495 2. This idea is the 
source of much modern prejudice against Plato. 




λείπεται μάθημα, μουσικῆς καὶ "γυμναστικῆς. καὶ 
τῶν τεχνῶν κεχωρισμένον; Φέρε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰ 
μηδὲν ἔτι ἐκτὸς τούτων ἔχομεν λαβεῖν, τῶν ἐπὶ 
πάντα τεινόντων σι λάβωμεν. Τὸ ποῖον; Οἷον 
τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, ᾧ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται πέχναι τε 
καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι, ὃ καὶ παντὶ ἐν πρώ- 
τοις ἀνάγκη μανθάνειν. Lloiov; ἔφη. Τὸ φαῦλον 
τοῦτο, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸ ἕν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία 
διαγιγνώσκειν: λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ee 
τε Kal λογισμόν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω περὶ τούτων ἔ 

ὡς πᾶσα τέχνη τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀναγκάζεται 
αὐτῶν μέτοχος γίγνεσθαι; Kai μάλα, ἔφη. Οὐκ- 
οῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ πολεμική; ; Πολλή, 
ἔφη, ἀνάγκη. Παγγέλοιον γοῦν, ἔφην, στρατηγὸν 
᾿Αγαμέμνονα ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις Παλαμήδης 
ἑκάστοτε ἀποφαίνει. ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόηκας. ὅτι φησὶν 
ἀριθμὸν εὑρὼν τάς τε τάξεις τῷ στρατοπέδῳ 
καταστῆσαι ev ᾿Ιλίῳ καὶ ἐξαριθμῆσαι ναῦς τε καὶ 
τἄλλα πάντα, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ ἀναριθμή τῶν ὄντων καὶ 
τοῦ ᾿Αγαμέμνονος, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ ὅσους. πόδας 
εἶχεν εἰδότος, εἴπερ ἀριθμεῖν μὴ ἠπίστατο; καίτοι 
ποῖόν τιν᾽ αὐτὸν οἴει στρατηγὸν εἶναι; "Ατοπόν 
τιν᾽, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, εἰ ἦν τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθές. 

E VII. ἤλλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μάθημα ἀναγκαῖον 
πολεμικῷ ἀνδρὶ θήσομεν καὶ λογίζεσθαί τε καὶ 

@ Cf. Symp. 186 Β ἐπὶ πᾶν τείνει. 
ὃ διάνοιαι is not to be pressed in the special sense of 

511 p-e. 
¢ A playful introduction to Plato’s serious treatment of the 

psychology of number and the value of the study of 


<a Se eee Se ee ἔπ νον 


and yet what other study is left apart from music, 
nastics and the arts?” “Come,” said I, “if we 
are unable to discover anything outside of these, let us 
_take something that applies to all alike.*”” “What?” 
“Why, for example, this common thing that all arts 
and forms of thought ὃ and all sciences employ, and 
which is among the first things that everybody must 
learn.” “‘ What?” he said.“ This trifling matter,*” 
I said, “ of distinguishing one and two and three. 1 
mean, in sum, number and calculation. Is it not 
true of them that every art and science must neces- 
6 of them?” “‘ Indeed it is,” he said. 
“The art of war too?” said I. “ Most necessarily,” 
he said. “‘Certainly,then,” said I,“‘ Palamedes? in the 
play is always making Agamemnon appear a most 
ridiculous * general. Have you not noticed that he 
affirms that by the invention of number he marshalled 
the troops in the army at Troy in ranks and companies 
and enumerated the ships and everything else as if 
before that they had not been counted, and Aga- 
memnon apparently did not know how many feet 
he had if he couldn't count ? And yet what sort of a 
general do you think he would be in that case?” 
“A very queer one in my opinion,” he said, “if that 
was true.” 
VII. “ Shall we not, then,” I said, “‘ set down as a 
study requisite for a soldier the ability to reckon and 

ἃ Palamedes, like Prometheus, is a ‘“‘ culture hero,’”? who 
personifies in Greek tragedy the inventions and discoveries 
that produced civilization. _Cf. the speech of Prometheus 
in Aesch. Prom. 459 ff. and Harvard Studies, xii. p. 208, 

n. 2. 

¢ Quoted by later writers in pete of mathematics. Cf. 
Theo Smyrn. p. 7 ed. Gelder. For the necessity of mathe- 
matics ef. Laws 818 σ. 




ἀριθμεὶν δύνασθαι; Πάντων x: ἔφη, μάλιστα, εἰ 
καὶ ὁτιοῦν μέλλει τάξεων ἐπαΐειν, μᾶλλον δ᾽ εἰ καὶ 
ἄνθρωπος ἔσεσθαι. ᾿Εννοεῖς οὖν, ἘΜΈΟ περὶ 
τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα ὅπερ ἐγώ; Τὸ ποῖον; Κινδυ- 
vever τῶν πρὸς τὴν νόησιν ἀγόντὼν φύσει εἶναι 
ὧν ζητοῦμεν, χρῆσθαι δ᾽ οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ ὀρθῶς, ἑλκτι- 
κῷ ὄντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν. Πῶς, ἔφη. 
λέγεις; Ἐγὼ πειράσομαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τό γ᾽ Siot 
δοκοῦν δηλῶσαι. ἃ yap διαιροῦμαι παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ 
ἀγωγά τε εἶναι of λέγομεν καὶ μή, ξυνθεατὴς 
γενόμενος ξύμφαθι ἢ ἄπειπε, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο σαφέ- 
στερὸν ἴδωμεν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον “μαντεύομαι. Δείκνυ, 
ἐφη. Δείκνυμι δή, εἶπον, εἰ καθορᾷς, τὰ μὲν ἐν 

Β ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς 

ἐπίσκεψιν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρινό- 
μενα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελευόμενα ἐκείνην 
ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς 
ποιούσης. Τὰ πόρρωθεν, ἔφη, φαινόμενα δῆλον 
ὅτι “λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα. Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν 
δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔτυχες οὗ λέγω. Iota μήν, ἔφη, λέγεις; 
Τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅσα μὴ 

@ Of. Laws 819 υ. 

ὃ Plato’s point of view here, as he will explain, i is precisely 
the opposite of that of modern educators who would teac 
mathematics concretely and not puzzle the children with 
abstract logic. But in the Laws where he is speaking of 
primary and secondary education for the entire population 
he anticipates the modern kindergarten ideas (819 B-c). 

ὁ For σαφέστερον ef. 523'c. Cf. Vol. 1. p. 47, note f, on 
338 τ, and What Plato Said, p. 503, on Gorg. 463 τ. 

4 Cf. Phileb. 38 c, Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 337. 




number?” “ Most certainly, if he is to know any- 
thing whatever of the ordering of his troops—or 
rather if he is to be a man at all.*”” “ Do you observe 
then,” said I, “in this study what Ido?” “ What?” 
“It seems likely that it is one of those studies which 
we are seeking that naturally conduce to the awaken- 
ing of thought, but that no one makes the right use? of 
it, though it really does tend to draw the mind to 
essence and reality.” “What do you mean?” he 
said. “I will try,” I said, “ to show you at least my 
opinion. Do you keep watch and observe the things 
I distinguish in my mind as being or not being con- 
ducive to our purpose, and either concur or dissent, 
in order that here too we may see more clearly ὃ 
whether my surmise is right.” “‘ Point them out,” 
he said. “1 do point them out,” I said, “ if you can 
discern that some reports of our perceptions do not 
provoke thought to reconsideration because the 
judgement? of them by sensation seems adequate,’ 
while others always invite the intellect to reflection 
because the sensation yields nothing that can be 
trusted’” “ You obviously mean distant’ appear- 
ances,” he said, “and shadow-painting.*” ‘* You 
have quite missed my meaning,*” said I. “‘ What do 
you mean ?”’ he said. - “ The experiences that do not 
provoke thought are those that do not at the same 

® ἱκανῶς is not to be pressed here. 

? For οὐδὲν ὑγιές cf. 496 c, 584 a, 589 c, Phaedo 69 8, 89 E, 
90 ει, Gorg. 524 5, Laws 776 ©, Theaet. 173 8, Eurip. Phoen. 
201, Bacch. 262, Hel. 746, etc. 

_* The most obvious cause of errors of judgement. Cf. Laws 

* Cf. Vol. I. p. 137 on 365 ς. 

* The dramatic misapprehension by the interlocutor is one 
of Plato’s methods for enforcing his meaning. ΟἿ, on 529 a, 
p. 180, note a, Laws 792 B-c. 



C ἐκβαίνει εἰς ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν ἅμα" τὰ δ᾽ ἐκβαί- 
νοντα ὡς παρακαλοῦντα τίθημι, ἐπειδὰν ἡ αἴσθησις 
μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ, εἴτ᾽ 
ἐγγύθεν προσπίπτουσα εἴτε πόρρωθεν. ὧδε δὲ ἃ 
λέγω σαφέστερον εἴσει. οὗτοι, φαμέν, τρεῖς ἂν 
εἶεν δάκτυλοι, ὅ τε σμικρότατος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος 
καὶ ὃ μέσος. Πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη. ‘Qs ὑφ st ὕθεν τοίνυν 
ὁρωμένους λέγοντός μου διανοοῦ. ἀλλά μοι περὶ 
> A , , ‘ a , : ES Be Es eat 
αὐτῶν τόδε σκόπει. To ποῖον; Δάκτυλος μὲν 
αὐτῶν φαίνεται ὁμοίως ἕκαστος, καὶ ταύτῃ γε 
οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ἐάν τε ἐν μέσῳ ὁρᾶται ἐάν τ᾽ ἐν 
ἐσχάτῳ, ἐάν τε λευκὸς ἐάν τε μέλας, ἐάν τε παχὺς. 
ἐάν τε λεπτός, καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι τοιοῦτον. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ 
, ? > 4 “- “- ς \ 
τούτοις οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν 
νόησιν ἐπερέσθαι τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ δάκτυλος- οὐδαμοῦ 
‘ ε »Ἤ 7 A “ > ’ A 4 
yap ἡ ὄψις αὐτῇ ἅμα ἐσήμηνε τὸν δάκτυλον τοὐ- 
ναντίον ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκ- 
obv, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰκότως τό γε τοιοῦτον νοήσεως 
οὐκ ἂν παρακλητικὸν οὐδ᾽ ἐγερτικὸν εἴη. Ἑϊκότως. 
Τί δὲ δή; τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα 
ἡ ὄψις ἄρα ἱκανῶς ὁρᾷ, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἐν 
μέσῳ τινὰ αὐτῶν κεῖσθαι ἢ ἐπ᾽ ἐσχάτῳ; καὶ 
« Cf. Jacks, Alchemy of Thought, p. 29: ‘* The purpose of 
the world, then, being to attain consciousness of itself as a 
rational or consistent whole, is it not a little strange that the 
first step, so to speak, taken by the world for the attainment 
of this end is that of presenting itself in the form of con- 
tradictory experience ?”’ αἴσθησις is not to be pressed. Adam’s 
condescending apology for the primitive character of Plato’s 

psychology here is as uncalled-for as all such apologies. 
Plato varies the expression, but his meaning is clear, Cf, 

524 p. No modern psychologists are able to use “sensa- 
tion,” ‘‘ perception,” ‘‘ judgement,” and similar terms with 
perfect consistency. 

δ᾽ For προσπίπτουσα cf. Tim. 33 a, 44 4, 66 a, Rep. 515 a, 




time issue in a contradictory perception.* Those that 
do have that effect I set down as provocatives, when 
the perception no more manifests one thing than its 
contrary, alike whether its impact’ comes from nearby 
or afar. An illustration will make my meaning 
plain. Here, we say, are. three fingers, the little 
finger, the second and the middle.”’ “ Quite so,’’ he 
“ Assume that I speak of them as seen near 
at hand. But this is the point that you are to con- 
sider.” “ What?’ “‘ Each one of them appears to 
be equally a finger,° and in this respect it makes no 
difference whether it is observed as intermediate or 
‘at either extreme, whether it is white or black, thick 
or thin, or of any other quality of this kind. _ For in 
none of these cases is the soul of most men impelled 
to question the reason and to ask what in the world 
is a finger, since the faculty of sight never signifies 
to it at the same time that the finger is the opposite 
of a finge r.” “ Why, no, it does not,’’-he said. 
“Then,” said I, “it is to be expected that such a 
perception will not provoke or awaken? reflection and 
thought.” “It 15. “ But now, what about the 
bigness and the smallness of these objects? Is our 
vision’s view of them adequate, and does it make no 
difference to it whether one of them is situated ¢ out- 
side or in the middle; and similarly of the relation of 
561 c, Laws 791 c, 632 a, 637 a, Phileb. 21; also accidere in 
Lucretius, ¢.g. iv. 882, ii. 1024-1025, iv. 236 and iii. 841, and 
Goethe's ** Das Blenden der Erscheinung, die sich an unsere 
Ὁ This anticipates Aristotle’s doctrine that “ substances” 
do not, as qualities do, admit of more or less. 
# We should never press synonyms which Plato employs 

for ποικιλία of style or to avoid falling into a rut of 

4 κεῖσθαι perhaps anticipates the Aristotelian category. 



ὡσαύτως πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ 
σκληρότητα ἡ ἁφή; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις dp’ 
οὐκ ἐνδεῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν; ἢ ὧδε ποιεῖ 
ἑκάστη αὐτῶν: πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τε- 
ταγμένη αἴσθησις ἠνάγκασται καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μαλακῷ 
τετάχθαι, καὶ παραγγέλλει τῇ ψυχῇ ws. ταὐτὸν 
σκληρόν τε καὶ μαλακὸν αἰσθανομένη; Οὕτως, 
ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς τοιού- 
τοις αὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπορεῖν, τί ποτε σημαίνει αὐτῇ 
ἡ αἴσθησις τὸ σκληρόν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ 'μαλακὸν 
λέγει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ κούφου καὶ ἡ τοῦ βαρέος, τί τὸ 
κοῦφον καὶ βαρύ, εἰ τό τὲ βαρὺ κοῦφον καὶ τὸ 

Β κοῦφον βαρὺ σημαίνει; Καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, αὗταί γε 

ἄτοποι τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ ἑρμηνεῖαι καὶ ἐπισκέψεως 
ΕΣ ne Sal » a SS Gane > by ΔΙ 
εόμεναι. Εἰκότως ἄρα, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς TOLOU- 
a a pee 
τοις πρῶτον μὲν πειρᾶται λογισμόν TE καὶ νόησιν 
ψυχὴ παρακαλοῦσα ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἴτε ἕν εἴτε. δύο 
δ ἘΝῚ pe > , A 9. 
ἐστὶν ἕκαστα τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων. ἸΠῶς δ᾽ οὔ; 
Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν δύο φαίνηται, ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἕν ἑκά- 

« Of. Theaet. 186 ff., Tim. 62 2, Taylor, Timaeus, p. 233 
on 63 v-x, Unity of Plato’s Thought, nn, 222 and 225, 
Diels, Dialex. 5 (ii2 p. 341). Protag. 331 τὸ anticipates this 
thought, but Protagoras cannot follow it out. Cf. also 
pre 13 a-B. Stallbaum also compares Phileb. 57 το and 
56 cf. bah 

> Plato gives a very modern psychological explanation. 
Thought is proyoked by the contradictions in perceptions 
that suggest problems. The very notion of unity is contra- 
dictory of uninterpreted experience. This use of ἀπορεῖν (cf. 
supra 515 Ὁ) anticipates much modern psychology suppo 
to be new.. Cf. e.g. Herbert Spencer passim, and Dewey, 
How We Think, p. 12 “‘ We may recapitulate by saying that 
the origin of thinking is some perplexity, confusion, or 
doubt’; also ibid. p. 72. Meyerson, Déduction relativiste 



touch, to thickness and thinness, softness and hard- 
ness ?.. And aré not the other senses also defective in 
their reports of such things ? | Or is the operation of 
each of them as follows? In the first place, the sensa- 
tion that is set over the hard is of necessity related 
also tothe soft,¢ and it reports to thesoul that thesame 
thing is both hard and soft to its perception.” “It is 
so,” he said. “‘ Then,” said I, “‘ is not this again a 
case where the soul must be at a loss? as to what sig- 
nificance for it the sensation of hardness has, if the 
sense reports the same thing as also soft? And, 
similarly, as to what the sensation of light and heavy 
means by light and heavy, if it reports the heavy as 
light, and the light as heavy?” “Yes, indeed,” he 
said, ‘‘ these communications “ to the soul are strange 
and invite reconsideration.”’ ‘‘ Naturally,then,” said 
I, “it is in such cases as these that the soul first 
summons to its aid the calculating reason? and tries 
to consider whether each of the things reported to it 
is one or two.’”” “Of course.” ‘“‘ And if it appears 
to be two, each of the two is a distinct unit” 
p. 142, says “ Mais Platon . . . n’avait-il pas dit qu’il était 
impossible de raisonner si ce n’est en partant d’une percep- 
tion?” citing Rep. 523-524, and Rodier, Aristot. De anima, 
i.p. 197. But that is not Plato’s point here. Zeller, Aristot. 
i. p. 166 (Eng.), also misses the point when he says “* Even 
as to the passage from the former to the latter he had only 
the negative doctrine that the contradictions of opinion and 
fancy ought to lead us to go further and to pass to the pure 
treatment of ideas.” 

© For ἑρμηνεῖαι ef. Theaet. 209 a. 

4 Cf. Parmen. 130 a τοῖς λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις. 

* Cf. Theaet. 185 8, Laws 963 c, Sophist 254 p, Hipp. 
Major 301 Ὁ-Ἑ, and, for the dialectic here, Parmen. 143 b. 

7 Or, as the Greek puts it, ‘* both ‘one’ and ‘ other.*”’ Cf. 
Vol. I. p. 516, note f on 476 4. For ἕτερον ef. What Plato 
Said, pp. 522, 580, 887-588. 



τερον φαίνεται; Nai. El ἄρα ἕν. ἑκάτερον, ἀμφό- 
Tepa δὲ δύο; τά γε δύο κεχωρισμένα, νοήσει" oe 
C yap ἂν ἀχώριστά γε δύο ἐνόει, ἀλλ᾽ ἕν. “Ὀρθῶς. 

Μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, φαμέν, 

AV’ οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. ἢ 
γάρ; Ναί. Διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν. μέγα « 
καὶ σμικρὸν ἡ νόησις ἠναγκάσθη ἰδεῖν, οὐ συγ- 
κεχυμένα ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα, τοὐναντίον ἢ κείνη. 
᾿Αληθῆ. Οὐκοῦν ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν πρῶτον ἐπέρ- 
χεται ἐρέσθαι ἡμῖν, τί οὖν ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα αὖ 
καὶ τὸ σμικρόν; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Καὶ οὕτω 
δὴ τὸ μὲν νοητόν, τὸ δ᾽ ὁρατὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν; 
᾿Ορθότατ᾽, ἔφη. 

ὙΠ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, λέγειν, 
ὡς τὰ μὲν παρακλητικὰ τῆς διανοίας ἐστί, τὰ δ᾽ 
οὔ, a pev εἰς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα τοῖς ἐναντίοις 
ἑαυτοῖς ἐμπίπτει, παρακλητικὰ ,δριζόμενος, ὅσα 
δὲ μή, οὐκ ἐγερτικὰ τῆς νοήσεως. Μανθάνω 
τοίνυν ἤδη, ἔφη, καὶ δοκεῖ μοι οὕτως. Τί οὖν; 

4. ye vi termini. Cf. 879 5, 576 c, Parmen. 145 a, Protage 
358 c. 

> κεχωρισμένα and ἀχώριστα suggest the terminology of 
Aristotle in dealing with the problem of abstraction. _ 

¢ Plato’s aim is the opposite of that of the modern theorists 
who say that teaching should deal integrally with the total 
experience and not with the artificial division of abstrac- 

4 The final use of διά became more frequent in later Greek. 
Cf. Aristot. Met. 982 b 20, Eth. Nic. 1110 a 4, Gen. an. 
717 a 6, Poetics 1450 Ὁ 3, 1451 b 857. Cf. Lysis 218 νυ, Epin. 
975 a, Olympiodorus, Life of Plato, Teubner vi. 191, 2bid. 
p- 218, and schol. passim, Apsines, Spengel i. 361, line 18, 

* Plato merely means that this is the psychological origin 


ee ν ϑμμννω. .... 

— ΞΣ Αι 




“Yes.” “If, then, each is one and both two, the 
very meaning * of ‘two’ is that the soul will conceive 
them as distinct.” For if they were not separable, 
it would not have been thinking of two, but οἵ. 
one.” “Right.” “Sight too saw the great and 
the small, we say, not separated but confounded.° 
Is not that so?” “‘Yes.’’ “ And for? the clarifica- 
tion of this, the intelligence is compelled to con- 
template the great and small,’ not thus confounded 
but as distinct entities, in the opposite way from 
sensation.” “True.” “ And is it not in’some such 
experience as this that the question first occurs to us, 
what in the world, then, is the great and the small?”’ 
“By all means.”” “ And this is the origin of the 
designation intelligible for the one, and visible for the 
οἶμον." “ Just so,” he said. 

VIII. “ This, then, is just what I was trying to 
explain a little while ago when I said that some things 
are provocative of thought and some are not, defining 
as provocative things that impinge upon the senses 
tegether with their opposites, while those that 
do not I said do not tend to awaken reflection.” 
“Well, now I understand,” he said, “and agree.” 

of our attempt to form abstract and general ideas. My 
tion that this passage is the probable source of the 

_ notion which still infests the history of philosophy, that the 

the-small was a metaphysical entity or principle in 
’s later philosophy, to be identified with the indeter- 
minate dyad, has been disregarded. Of. Unity of Plato's 
Thought, p. 84. But it is the only plausible explanation that 
has ever proposed of the attribution of that “ clotted 
nonsense” to Plato himself. For it is fallacious to identify 
“μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον in Philebus 24 c, 25 c, 27 Ἑ, and else- 
where with the μέγα καὶ σμικρόν. But there is no limit to 
the misapprehension of texts by hasty or fanciful readers in 
any age. 



ἀριθμός τε καὶ τὸ ἕν ποτέρων. δοκεῖ εἶναι; Οὐ 
ξυννοῶ, ἔφη. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ἔφην, 
ἀναλογίζου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ 

Ε ὁρᾶται ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται. τὸ ἕν, 


οὐκ ἂν ὁλκὸν εἴη ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ 
δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν" εἰ δ᾽ del τι αὐτῷ ἅμα ὁρᾶται 
ἐναντίωμα, ὥστε μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἕν ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον 
φαίνεσθαι, τοῦ ἐπικρινοῦντος δὴ δέοι ἂν ἤδη καὶ 
ἀναγκάζοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ ἀπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, 
κινοῦσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν, καὶ ἀνερωτᾶν, τί 
ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, καὶ οὕτω τῶν | dye Gv dy 
εἴη καὶ μεταστρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἡ 

περὶ τὸ ἕν “μάθησις. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτό γ 
ἔχει οὐχ ἥκιστα ἡ περὶ αὐτὸ" ὄψις" ἅμα γὰρ 
ταὐτὸν ὡς ἕν τε ὁρῶμεν καὶ ὡς ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος. 

Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τὸ ἕν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ξύμπας ἀριθμὸς 
ταὐτὸν πέπονθε τούτῳ; Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; ΐ 
λογιστική τε καὶ soe περὶ ἀῤιθμὼν πᾶσα. 

Β Καὶ μάλα. Ταῦτα δέ γε φαίνεται aywyd πρὸς 

ἀλήθειαν. “Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν. Ὧν ζητοῦμεν a, ἄρα, 
ὡς ἔοικε, μαθημάτων ἂν εἴη" πολεμικῷ μὲν xa 
διὰ τὰς τάξεις ἀναγκαῖον μαθεῖν ταῦτα, φιλο- 

1 αὐτὸ F Iamblichus, τὸ αὐτὸ AD. 

* To waive metaphysics, unity is, as modern mathemati- 
cians say, a concept of the mind which experience breaks 
up. The thought is familiar to Plato from the Meno to the 
Parmenides. But it is not true that Plato derived the very 
notion of the concept from the problem of the one and the 
many. Unity is a typical concept, but the consciousness of 
the concept was developed by the Socratic quest for the 

» Cf.5238. The meaning must be gathered from the context. 

° See crit. note and Adam ad loc. 



“To which class, then, do you think number and 
the one belong*?” “I cannot conceive,” he said. 
“ Well, reason it out from what has already been 
said. For, if unity is adequately ὃ seen by itself or 
apprehended by some other sensation, it would not 
tend to draw the mind to the apprehension of essence, 
as we were explaining in the case of the finger. But 
if some contradiction is always seen coincidentally 
with it, so that it no more appears to be one than the 
opposite, there would forthwith be need of something 
to judge between them, and it would compel the soul 
to be at a loss and to inquire, by arousing thought in 
itself, and to ask, whatever then is the one as such, 
and thus the study of unity will be one of the studies 
that guide and convert the soul to the contemplation 
of true being.” “ But surely,” he said, “ the visual 
perception of it ὁ does especially involve this. For we 
see the same thing at once as one and as an indefinite 
plurality.¢” “‘ Then if this is true of the one,” I said, 
“the same holds of all number, does it not?” “Οἵ 
course.” “* But, further, reckoning and the science 
of arithmetic*® are wholly concerned with number.” 
“ They are, indeed.” “ And the qualities of number 
appear to lead to the apprehension of truth.” “‘ Be- 
ae anything,” he said. “ Then, as it seems, these 
would be among the studies that we are seeking. 
For a soldier must learn them in order to marshal his 
troops, and a philosopher, because he must rise out of 

᾿ ἃ This is the problem of the one and the many with which 
Plato often plays, which he exhaustively and consciously 
illustrates in the Parmenides, and which the introduction 
to the Philebus treats as a metaphysical nuisance to be dis- 
regarded in practical logic. We have not yet got rid of it, 
but have merely transferred it to psychology. 
4 Cf. Gorg. 450 p, 451 B-c. 

VOL. II M 161 




C μεγίστων μεθέξειν ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἰέναι καὶ ἀνθ- 

πολέμου τε καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ῥᾳστώνης 

D μοὺς μαθήματος, ὡς κομψόν ἐστι καὶ πολλαχῇ 


σόφῳ δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἁπτέον εἶναι γενέσεως 

ἐξαναδύντι, ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενέσθαι. Ἔστι 
ταῦτ᾽, ἔφη. Ὃ δέ γε ἡμέτερος φύλαξ πολεμικός 
τε καὶ φιλόσοφος τυγχάνει dv. Τί μήν; ΤΙροσ- 

ἤκον δὴ τὸ μάθημα ἂν εἴη, ὦ Γλαύκων, νομοθε- 

τῆσαι καὶ πείθειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν 

- A WP SUIS {Ὧι 
ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῆς μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ 

i. υδϑωνοι κιδονὐνωνς π΄. - -ἰὖ 

/ - ~ > ~ 7 > ’ , ν ~ 
θέαν τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ 
‘ « ὶ 

νοήσει αὐτῇ, οὐκ. ὠνῆς οὐδὲ πράσεως χάριν ὡς 
359 te 

ἐμπόρους ἢ καπήλους μελετῶντας, ἀλλ᾽ ἕνεκα 

μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ᾽ ἀλήθειάν te Kal 
οὐσίαν. Ἰζάλλιστ᾽, ἔφη, λέγεις. Καὶ μήν, ἣν δ᾽ 

ἐγώ, νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ ῥηθέντος τοῦ περὶ τοὺς λογισ- 

χρήσιμον ἡμῖν πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα, ἐὰν τοῦ γνωρίζειν 
ἕνεκά τὶς αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύῃ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ καπηλεύειν. 

“ Cf. my review of Jowett, 4.J.P. xiii. p. 365. My view 
there is adopted by Adam ad loc., and Apelt translates in 
the same way. ᾿ ᾿ 

» It is not true as Adam says that “the nature of numbers 
cannot be fully seen except in their connexion with the 
Good.”. Plato never says that and never really meant it, 
though he might possibly have affirmed it on a challenge. 
Numbers are typical abstractions and educate the mind for 
the apprehension of abstractions if studied in their nature, 
in themselves, and not in the concrete form of five apples. 
There is no common sense nor natural connexion between 
numbers and the good, except the point made in the Timaeus 
53 8, and which is not relevant here, that God used numbers 
and forms to make a cosmos out of a chaos. 

5 Instead of remarking on Plato’s scorn for the realities 

of experience we should note that he is marking the dis-— 

tinctive quality of the mind of the Greeks in contrast with 
the Egyptians and orientals from whom they learned and 


ne ee 

a ae κὸν 

ππ-- .-οϑυπε σαι κοιοος παρε, τς χω σαῶδο νος oe σοι ὦ ἀν. 


the region of generation and lay hold on essence or 
he can neyer become a true reckoner.*”’ “It isso,” he 
said. “‘ And our guardian is soldier and philosopher | 
in. one.” “Of course.’’ “It is befitting, then, 
Glaucon, that this branch of learning should be pre- 
scribed by our law and that we should induce those 
who are to share the highest functions of state to 
enter upon that study of calculation and take hold of 
it, not as amateurs, but to follow it up until they attain 
to the contemplation of the nature of number,” by 
pure thought, not for the purpose of buying and 
selling,° as if they were preparing to be merchants or 
hucksters, but for the uses of war and for facilitating 
the conversion of the soul itself from the world of 

eration to essence and truth.” “ Excellently 
said,” he replied. ‘‘ And, further,’ I said, “ it occurs 
to me,? now that the study of reckoning has been 
mentioned, that there is something fine in it, and that 
it is useful for our purpose in many ways, provided 
it is pursued for the sake of knowledge“ and not for 

the Romans whom they taught. Cf. infra 525 ν καπηλεύειν, 
and Horace, Ars Poetica 323-332, Οἷς. Tuse. i. 2.5. Per 

of Science, p. 49: “In this the writer did not aim at the 
mental discipline of the students, but sought to confine 
himself to what is easiest and most useful in calculation, 
Sueh as men constantly require in cases of inheritance, 
legacies, partition, law-suits, and trade, and in all their 
dealings with one another, or where the measuring of lands, 
the digging of canals, geometrical computation, and other 
objects of various sorts and kinds are concerned.” 
_* Cf. on 521 pb, p. 147, note 6. 
_* Cf. Aristot. Met. 982 a 15 τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν, and Laws 
747 c.. Montesquieu apud Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, 
p. 6: “The first motive which ought to impel us to study 
is the desire to augment the excellence of our nature and to 
render an intelligent being more intelligent.” 



Πῆ δή; ἔφη. Τοῦτό γε, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς 
σφόδρα ἄνω ποι ἄγει τὴν exe καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν 
τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἀναγκάζει διαλέγεσθαι, οὐδαμῇ ἀπο- 
δεχόμενον ἐάν τις αὐτῇ ὁρατὰ ἢ ἁπτὰ σώματα 
ἔχοντας ἀριθμοὺς προτεινόμενος διαλέγηται. οἶσθα 

E yap που τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα δεινοὺς ὡς, ἐάν τις 


, , 4a > ~ - , / LIS ted 1 
αὐτὸ TO ἕν ἐπιχειρῇ τῷ λόγῳ τέμνειν, καταγελῶσί 
τε καὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν σὺ κερματίζῃς 
αὐτό, ἐκεῖνοι πολλαπλασιοῦσιν, εὐλαβούμενοι μή 

- Aa 1 a 3 ‘ \ / > 4 
ποτε φανῇ τὸ ἕν μὴ ἕν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μόρια. ᾿Αληθέ- 

ΝΜ , / ἊΝ ΝΜ > y ” 
στατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Τί οὖν οἴει, ὦ Γλαύκων, εἴ 
τις ἔροιτο αὐτούς, ὦ θαυμάσιοι, περὶ ποίων ἀρι- 
θ ~ ὃ αλ / θ > ἷ ‘ Δ ἷο ς a > a FF 
μῶν διαλέγεσθε, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἕν οἷον ὑμεῖς ἀξιοῦτέ 
ἐστιν, ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν 
διαφέρον, μόριόν τε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν; τί ἂν 
οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀποκρίνασθαι; Todro ἔγωγε, ὅτι περὶ 
τούτων λέγουσιν, ὧν διανοηθῆναι μόνον ἐγχωρεῖ, 

α Lit. “ numbers (in) themselves,”’ 1.6. ideal numbers or the 
ideas of numbers. For this and the following as one of the 
sources of the silly notion that mathematical numbers are 
intermediate between ideal and concrete numbers, ¢f. my 
De Platonis Idearum Doctrina, p.33, Unity of Plato’s Thought, 
pp. 83-84, Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218. 

> Cf. Meno 79 c κατακερματίζῃς, Aristot. Met. 1041 a 19 
ἀδιαίρετον πρὸς αὑτὸ ἕκαστον: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἣν τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι, Met. 
1052 b 1 ff., 15 ff. and 1058 a 1 τὴν γὰρ μονάδα τιθέασι πάντῃ 
ἀδιαίρετον. κερματίζειν is also the word used of breaking 
money into small change. 

¢ Numbers are the aptest illustration of the principle of 
the Philebus and the Parmenides that thought has to 
postulate unities which sensation (sense perception) and also 
dialectics are constantly disintegrating into pluralities. Cf. 
my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 222. Stenzel, 
Dialektik, p. 32, says this dismisses the problem of the one 
and the many “‘ das ihn (Plato) spater so lebhaft beschaftigen 



huckstering.”’ “‘ In what respect ὃ he said. “* Why, 
in respect of the very point of which we were speaking, 
that it strongly directs the soul upward and compels | 
it to discourse about pure numbers, never acquiescing 
if anyone proffers to it in the discussion numbers 
attached to visible and tangible bodies. For you are 
doubtless aware that experts in this study, if anyone 
attempts to cut up the ‘one’ in argument, laugh at 
him and refuse to allow it; but if you mince it ἀρ. 
they multiply, always on guard lest the one should 
appear to be not one but a multiplicity of parts.*” 
“Most true,” he replied. ‘“‘ Suppose now, Glaucon, 
someone were to ask them, ‘ My good friends, what 
numbers? are these you are talking about, in which 
the one is such as you postulate, each unity equal to 
every other without the slightest difference and 
admitting no division into parts?’ What do you think 
would be their answer?” “ This, I think—that they 
are speaking of units which can only be conceived by 
thought, and which it is not possible to deal with in 

sollte.” But that is refuted by Parmen. 159 c οὐδὲ μὴν 
μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν. The “ problem” was 
always in Plato’s mind. He played with it when it suited 
his purpose and dismissed it when he wished to go on to 
something else. Cf. on 525 a, Phaedr. 266 8, Meno 72 c, 
Laws 964 a, Soph. 251. 

4 This is one of the chief sources of the fancy that numbers 
are intermediate entities between ideas and things. Cf. 
Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, i. Ὁ. 219: ‘*‘ Mathematical 
ον ορωιμαμίῳ are therefore not as Plato thought intermediate 

n sensible figures and universals. Sensible figures 
are only less simple mathematical ones.” Cf. on 525 υ. 
Plato here and elsewhere simply means that the educator 
may distinguish two kinds of numbers,—five apples, and 
the number five as an abstract idea. Cf. Theaet. 195 ©: We 
couldn’t err about eleven which we only think, i.e. the 
abstract number eleven. Cf. also Berkeley, Siris, § 283. 



ἄλλως δ᾽ οὐδαμῶς μεταχειρίζεσθαι δυνατόν. “Opas 
οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ὅ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν 
B δυῤεθξειθεῖναι τὸ μάθημα, ἐπειδὴ φαίνεταί γε 

προσαναγκάζον αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει χρῆσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν; Καὶ μὲν δή, ἔφη, σφόδρα 
γε ποιεῖ αὐτό. Τί δαί; τόδε ἤδη ἐπεσκέψω, ὡς 
οἵ τε φύσει λογιστικοὶ εἰς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ὡς 
ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὀξεῖς φύονται, οἵ τε βραδεῖς, ἂν ἐν 
τούτῳ παιδευθῶσι καὶ γυμνάσωνται, κἂν μηδὲν 
ἄλλο ᾿ὠφεληθῶσιν, ὅ ὅμως εἴς γε τὸ ὀξύτεροι αὐτοὶ 
αὑτῶν γίγνεσθαι πάντες ἐπιδιδόασιν; Ἔστιν, ἔφη, 

Ο οὕτως. Kai μήν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἅ γε μείζω πόνον 
παρέχει μανθάνοντι καὶ μελετῶντι, οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως 
οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὕροις ὡς τοῦτο. Οὐ “γὰρ οὖν. 
Πάντων δὴ ἕ ἕνεκα τούτων οὐκ ἀφετέον τὸ μάθημα, 
ἀλλ᾽ οἵ ἄριστοι τὰς φύσεις παιδευτέοι ἐν αὐτῷ. 
Ξύμφημι, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. 

ΙΧ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, εἶπον, ἕν ἡμῖν κείσθω" 
δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐχόμενον τούτου σκεψώμεθα ἄρά τι 
προσήκει ἡμῖν. Td ποῖον; ἢ γεωμετρίαν, ἔ 
λέγεις; Αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ. Ὅσον μέν, ἔφη, 

D πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ αὐτοῦ τείνει, δῆλον ὅτι προσήκει" 
πρὸς γὰρ τὰς στρατοπεδεύσεις καὶ καταλήψεις 

«ΟἽ Isoc. Antid. 267 αὐτοὶ δ᾽ αὑτῶν εὐμαθέστεροι. For 
the idiom αὐτοὶ αὑτῶν cf. also 411 c, 421 p, 571 Ὁ, Prot. 
350 a and vp, Laws 671 B, Parmen. 141 a, Laches 182 c 
Plato of course believed in mental discipline or “‘ spread.” 
** Educators ’’ have actually cited him as authority for the 
opposite view. On the effect of mathematical studies ef. 
also Laws 747 B, 809 c-p, 819 c, Isoc. Antid. 265. Cf. Max. 
Tyr. 37 § 7 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἴη ἄν τι τῶν ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ τὸ 
φαυλότατον. Mill on Hamilton ii. 311 “If the practice of 
mathematical reasoning gives nothing else it gives wariness 
of mind.” Jbid. 312. 



any other way.” “‘ You see, then, my friend,” said 
I, “ that this branch of study really seems to be in- 
dispensable for us, since it plainly compels the soul 
to employ pure thought with a view to truth itself.” 
“It most emphatically does.” “ Again, have you 
ever noticed this, that natural reckoners are by nature 
πὴ in virtually all their studies? And the slow, 
if they are trained and drilled in this, even if no other 
benefit results, all improve and become quicker than 
oer were*?” “It isso,” he said. ‘“‘ And, further, 
as I believe, studies that demand more toil in the 
learning and practice than this we shall not discover 
easily nor find many of them.?”’ ‘ You will not, in 
fact.” “‘ Then, for all these reasons, we must not 
neglect this study, but must use it in the education 
of the best endowed natures.” “1 agree,” he said. 
IX. “ Assuming this one point to be established,” I 
said, “‘ let us in the second place consider whether the 
study that comes next ° is suited to our purpose.” 
“What is that? Do you mean geometry,” he said. 
“Precisely that,” said I. “‘So much of it,” he said, “as 
applies to the conduct of war? is obviously suitable. 
For in dealing with encampments and the occupation 

Ὁ The translation is, I think, right. Cf. A.J.P. xiii. p. 365, 
and Adam ad loe. 

© Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 111: “Even 
Plato puts arithmetic before geometry in the Republic in 
deference to tradition.” For the three branches of higher 
learning, arithmetic, metry, and astronomy, οἷ. Ws 
$17 £-818 a, Isoc. Antid. 261-267, Panath. 26, Bus. 226; Max. 
Tyr. 37 § 7. 

* Cf. Basilicon Doron (Morley, A Miscellany, p. 144): 
“ie yo it is meete yee have some entrance, specially in 
the Mathematickes, for the knowledge of the art militarie, 
. in situation of Campes, ordering of battels, making fortifica- 

tions, placing of batteries, or such like.” 



χωρίων καὶ συναγωγὰς Kai ἐκτάσεις στρατιᾶς, καὶ 
ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα σχηματίζουσι τὰ στρατόπεδα ἐν av- 
ταῖς τε ταῖς μάχαις καὶ πορείαις, διαφέροι ἂν 
αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ μὴ ὦν. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὖν 
δή, εἶπον, πρὸς μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα βραχύ τι ἂν ἐξαρκοῖ 
γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν μόριον: τὸ δὲ πολὺ 
E αὐτῆς καὶ πορρωτέρω προϊὸν σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖ, εἴ 
τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τείνει, πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν κατιδεῖν ῥᾷον 
ἈΠ ΑΣ 9. a 297 ,’ , 7 ον, ᾽ 
τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν. τείνει δέ, φαμέν, πάντα ad- 
τόσε, ὅσα ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον 
/ > , ee ‘ \ > / ; ~ 
μεταστρέφεσθαι, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ 
» Δ a 3.% \ /, > - > ~ Μ 
ὄντος, ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη, 
λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν οὐσίαν ἀναγκάζει θεάσασθαι, 
προσήκει, εἰ δὲ γένεσιν, οὐ προσήκει. Φαμέν γε 
527 δή. Οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ,ἀμφισβητή- 
σουσιν ἡμῖν, ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειροι, 
ὅτι αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἔχει τοῖς ἐν 
αὐτῇ λόγοις λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν μεταχειριζομένων. 

« This was Xenophon’s view, Mem. vi. 7. 9, Whether it 
was Socrates’ nobody knows, Cf. supra pp. 162-163 on 525.c, 
Epin. 977 ©, Aristoph. Clouds 202. 

ὃ Because it develops the power of abstract thought. Not 
because numbers are deduced from the idea of good. Cf. 
on 525, p. 162, note b. 

: Cf. 518 c. Once more we should remember that for the 
practical and educational application of Plato’s main thought 
this and all similar expressions are rhetorical surplusage or 

*‘ unction,’’ which should not be pressed, nor used ¢.g. to 
identify, the idea of good with God. Cf. Introd. p. xxv. 

4 Or “becoming.” Cf. 485 B, 525 5. 

ὁ γε δή is frequent in confirming answers. Cf. 557 B, 517 Ὁ, 
Symp. 172 c, 173 Ε, Gorg. 449 8, εἴς, 


-“ . 


of strong places and the bringing of troops into 
column and line and all the other formations of an , 
army in actual battle and on the march, an officer 
who had studied geometry would be a very different 
person from what he would be if he had not.” “ But 
still,” I said, “for such purposes a slight modicum? of . 
yeometry and calculation would suffice. What we 
Rave to consider is whether the greater and more 
advanced part of it tends to facilitate the apprehen- 
sion of the idea of good.’ That tendency, we affirm, 
is to be found in all studies that force the soul to turn 
its vision round to the region where dwells the most 
blessed part of reality,° which it is imperative that it 
should behold.” “ You are right,” he said. “‘ Then 
if it compels the soul to contemplate essence, it is 
suitable; if genesis, it is not.” “80 we affirm.*” 
“ This at least,” said I, “ will not be disputed by those 
who have even a slight acquaintance with geometry, 
that this science is in direct contradiction. with the 
language employed in it byits adepts’” ““Howso?”’ 

7 Geometry (and mathematics) is inevitably less abstract 
than dialectics. But the special purpose of the Platonic educa- 
tion values mathematics chiefly as a discipline in abstraction. 
Cf. on 523 a, p. 152, note ὃ: and Titchener, A Beginner's 

'sychology, pp. 265-266: ** There are probably a good many 
of us whose abstract idea of ‘triangle’ is simply a mental 
picture of the little equilateral triangle that stands for the 
word in text-books of geometry.” ere have been some 
attempts to prove (that of Mr. F. M. Cornford in Mind, 
April 1932, is the most recent) that Plato, if he could not 
anticipate in detail the modern reduction of mathematics 
to logic, did postulate something like it as an ideal, the 
realization of which would abolish his own sharp distinction 

mathematics and dialectic. The argument rests 
on a remote and strained interpretation of two or three texts 
of the Republic (ε΄. e.g. 511 and 533 8-p) which, naturally 
in s merely affirm the general inferiority of the 



Πῶς; ἔφη. Λέγουσι μέν που μάλα γελοίως 
τε καὶ ἀναγκαίως: ὡς γὰρ πράττοντές τὲ καὶ 
πράξεως ἕνεκα πάντας τοὺς λόγους ποιούμένοι 
λέγουσι τετραγωνίζειν τε καὶ παρατείνειν καὶ 
προστιθέναι καὶ πάντα οὕτω φθεγγόμενοι" τὸ δ᾽ 
ἔστι που πᾶν τὸ μάθημα γνώσεως ἕνεκα ἐπι- 
τηδευόμενον. ἸΠαντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν 
τοῦτο ἔτι διομολογητέον; Τὸ ποῖον; Ὥς τοῦ ἀεὶ 
ὄντος γνώσεως, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦ ποτέ τι γιγνομένου 
καὶ ἀπολλυμένου. Εὐομολόγητον, ἔφη: τοῦ γὰρ 
ἀεὶ ὄντος ἡ γεωμετρικὴ γνῶσίς ἐστιν. ‘OAKov 
ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε, ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἴη ἂν καὶ 

mathematical method and the intermediate position for 
education of mathematics as a propaedeutic to dialectics. 
Plato’s purpose throughout is not to exhort mathematicians 
as such to question their initiatory postulates, but to mark 
definitely the boundaries between the mathematical and 
other sciences and pure dialectics or philosophy. The dis- 
tinction is a true and useful one to-day. Aristotle often 
refers to it with no hint that it could not be abolished by a 
new and different kind of mathematics. And it is uncritical 
to read that intention into Plato’s words. He may haye con- 
tributed, and doubtless did contribute, in other ways to the 
improvement and precision of mathematical logic. But he 
had no idea of doing away with the fundamental difference 
that made dialectics and not mathematics the coping- 
stone of the higher education—science as such does not 
question its first principles and dialectic does. Cf. 533 8- 
534 ε΄ 

* The very etymology of “‘ geometry ”’ implies the absurd 
practical conception of the science. Cf. Epin. 990 c γελοῖον 

> Cf. Polit. 302 Ἐπ, Laws 757 ©, 818 5, Phileb. 62 5, Tim. 
69 p, and also on 494 a. The word ἀναγκαίως has been 
variously misunderstood and mistranslated. It simply 
means that geometers are compelled to use the language 



he said. “ Their language is most ludicrous,* though 
they cannot help it,” for they speak as if they were 
doing something ° and as if all their words were 
directed towards action. For all their talk? is of 
squaring and applying’ and adding and the like’ 
whereas in fact the real object of the entire study is 
pure knowledge.?”’ “‘ That is absolutely true,” hesaid. 
“And must we not agree on a further point?” 
“What?” “ That it is the knowledge of that which 
always is,” and not of ἃ something which at some time 
comes into being and passes away.”” “ That is readily 
admitted,” he said, “ for geometry is the knowledge 
of the eternally existent.” “‘ Then, my good friend, 
it would tend to draw the soul to truth, and would be 

of sense tion though they are thinking of abstractions 
(ideas) of which sense images are only approximations. 

¢ Cf. Aristot. Met. 1051 a 22 εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμ- 
ματα ἐνεργείᾳ" διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν, “* geometrical con- 
structions, too, are discovered by an actualization, because it 
is by dividing that we discover them.”’ (Loeb tr.) 

ἃ For φθεγγόμενοι ef. on 505 c, p. 89, note g. 

be ἘΠ Thompson on Meno 87 a. 

7 E. Hoffmann, Der gegenwartige Stand der Platonfor- 
schung, p. 1097 (Anhang, Zeller, Plato, 5th ed.), misunder- 
stands the passage when he says: “ Die Abnei Platons, 
dem Ideellen irgendwie einen dynamischen Charakter zuzu- 
schreiben, zeigt sich sogar in preingee oe Andeutungen ; 
so verbietet er Republ. 527 a fiir die Mathematik jede 
A ung dynamischer Termini wie rerpaywrifew, παρα- 
τείνειν, προστιθέναι." Plato does not forbid the use of such 
terms but merely recognizes their inadequacy to express the 
true nature and purpose of geometry. 

9 Cf. Meyerson, De Verplication dans les sciences, Ὁ. 33: 
“En effet, Platon déja fait ressortir que la géométrie, en 
dépit de l’apparence, ne poursuit aucun but pratique et n’a 
tout entiére d’autre objet que la connaissance.” 

* ie. mathematical ideas are (Platonic) ideas like other 
concepts. Cf. on 525 ν, p. 164, note a. 



ἀπεργαστικὸν φιλοσόφου διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἄνω 
σχεῖν ἃ νυν κάτω οὐ δέον ἔχομεν. Ὥς οἷόν τε 

Ο μάλιστα, ἔφη. ‘Qs οἷόν τ᾽ ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μά- 

λιστα προστακτέον ὅπως οἱ ἐν τῇ καλλιπόλει σοι 

μηδενὶ τρόπῳ γεωμετρίας ἀφέξονται. καὶ γὰρ τὰ 
πάρεργα αὐτοῦ οὐ σμικρά. Ilota; ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. “A 
τε δὴ σὺ εἶπες, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, 
καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς πάσας μαθήσεις, ὥστε κάλλιον 
ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἴσμεν που ὅτι τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ 
διοίσει ἡ ἡμμένος τε γεωμετρίας καὶ μή. Τῷ παντὶ 
μέντοι νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη. Δεύτερον δὴ τοῦτο τιθῶμεν 
μάθημα τοῖς νέοις; Τιθῶμεν, ἔφη. 

ιν ΟΡ Bal; τρίτον θῶμεν. ἀστρονομίαν; ἢ οὐ 


δοκεῖ; "Ἐμοιγ᾽ οὖν, ἔφη" τὸ γὰρ περὶ ὥρας εὖὐ- 
αισθητοτέρως ἔχειν καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν οὐ 
μόνον γεωργίᾳ οὐδὲ ναυτιλίᾳ προσήκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
στρατηγίᾳ οὐχ ἧττον. Ἡδὺς εἶ, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι 
ἔοικας δεδιότι τοὺς πολλούς, μὴ δοκῇς ἄχρηστα 
μαθήματα προστάττειν. τὸ δ᾽ ἔστιν οὐ πάνυ 
φαῦλον ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις 
τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἑκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθ- 

« καλλιπόλει : Plato smiles at his own Utopia. There were 
cities named Callipolis, e.g. in the Thracian Chersonese and 
in Calabria on the Gulf of Tarentum. Cf. also Herod. vii. 154. 
Fanciful is the attempt of some scholars to distinguish the 
Callipolis as a separate section of the Republic, or to take it 
as the title of the Republic. 

> Plato briefly anticipates much modern literature on the 
value of the study of mathematics. Cf. on 526 zB, p. 166, note 
a. Olympiodorus says that when de hig deigns to enter 
into matter she creates mechanics which is highly esteemed. 



productive of a philosophic attitude of mind, direct- 
ing upward the faculties that now wrongly are turned 
earthward.”’ “Nothing is surer,” he said. “ Then 
nothing is surer,” said I, “ than that we must require 
that the men of your Fair City? shall never neglect 
geometry, for even the by-products of such study are 
not slight.’” “‘ What are they?”’ said he. “ What 
you mentioned,” said I, “its uses in war, and also we 
are aware that for the better reception of all studies ὃ 
there will be an immeasurable © difference between 
the student who has been imbued with geometry and 
the one who has not.’’ “ Immense indeed, by Zeus,” 
he said. “Shall we, then, lay this down as a second 
branch of study for our lads?” “ Let us do so,” he 

X. “ Shall we set down astronomy as a third, or 
do you dissent ὃ “1 certainly agree,” he said; 
“for quickness of perception about the seasons and 
the courses of the months and the years isserviceable,? 
not only to agriculture and navigation, but still more | 
to the military art.” “‘I am amused,*”’ said I, “ at 
your apparent fear lest the multitude may suppose 
you to be recommending useless studies.’ It is indeed 
no trifling task, but very difficult to realize that there 
is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge 
that is purified” and kindled afresh by such studies 

© For ὅλῳ καὶ παντί ef. 469 c, Laws 779 5, 734 π, Phaedo 79 Ἑ, 
Crat. 434 a. 

4 Xen. Mem. iv. 7. 3 ff. attributes to Socrates a similar 
purely utilitarian view of science. 

* For ἡδὺς εἴ ef. 337 v, Euthydem. 300 a, Gorg. 491 πε 
ἤδιστε, Rep. 348 c γλυκὺς ef, Hipp. Maj. 288 8. 

? Cf. on 499 v-x, p. 66, note a. 

* Again Plato anticipates much modern controversy. 

* Cf. Xen. Symp. 1. 4 ἐκκεκαθαρμένοις τὰς ψυχάς, and Phaedo 
67 B-c. 


᾿ ῳ ᾽ 
ΟΕ αἰίρεταί τε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ἀπολλύμενον καὶ τυ- 
φλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖττον 
ὃν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων: μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ 
ἀλήθεια ὁρᾶται. οἷς μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ξυνδοκεῖ, 

3 4 ε εν / / a \ 4 

apnxavws ws εὖ δόξεις λέγειν: ὅσοι δὲ τούτου μη- 
' δαμῇ ἠσθημένοι εἰσίν, εἰκότως ἡγήσονταί σε λέγειν 
| οὐδέν. ἄλλην yap ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐχ ὁρῶσιν ἀξίαν 
λόγου ὠφέλειαν. σκόπει οὖν αὐτόθεν, πρὸς ποτέ- 
528 pous διαλέγει, ἢ ἢ οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέρους, ἀλλὰ σαυτοῦ 
ἕνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους, φθονοῖς μὴν 
292 ἈΞ ” oF , 93:15 πα ἃ oe : ; 
οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἄλλῳ, εἴ tis τι δύναιτο ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι. 
Οὕτως, ἔφη, αἱροῦμαι, ἐμαυτοῦ ἕνεκα τὸ πλεῖστον 
λέγειν τε καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. “Avaye 
τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰς τοὐπίσω: νῦν δὴ ‘yap οὐκ 
ὀρθῶς τὸ ἑξῆς ἐλάβομεν τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ. Πῶς 
λαβόντες; ἔφη. Μετὰ ἐπίπεδον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐν 
aN ” ‘ {4 4 a» % > 
περιφορᾷ ov ἤδη στερεὸν λαβόντες, πρὶν αὐτὸ καθ 
Β αὑτὸ λαβεῖν: ὀρθῶς δὲ ἔχει ἑξῆς μετὰ δευτέραν 
αὔξην τρίτην λαμβάνειν. ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο περὶ 

\ a ΄ » \ ‘ 10 Lines 
τὴν τῶν κύβων αὔξην καὶ τὸ βάθους μετέχον. 
Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη: ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε, ὦ πκύκρραεβ, 

α Another instance of Plato’s “unction.” Cf. Tim. 47 A-B, 
Eurip. Orest. 806 μυρίων κρείσσων, and Stalibaum ad loc. 
for imitations of this passage in antiquity. 

> For ἀμηχάνως ὡς ef. Charm. 155 τὸ ἀμήχανόν τι οἷον. 
Cf. 588 a, Phaedo 80 c, 95 ο, Laws 782 a, also Rep. 331 4 
θαυμάστως ὡς, Hipp. Maj. 282 c, Hpin. 982 e-p, Aristoph. 
Birds 427, [ysist. 198, 1148. 

© This is the thought more technically expressed in the 

“earlier? work, Crito 49 p. Despite his faith in dialectics 



when it has been destroyed and blinded by our 
ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation out- 
weighs ten thousand eyes*; for by it only is reality 
beheld. Those who share this faith will think your 
words superlatively® true. But those who have and 
have had no inkling of it will naturally think them 
all moonshine.* For they can see no other benefit 
from such pursuits worth mentioning. Decide, then, 
on the spot, to which party you address yourself. Or 
are you speaking to neither, but chiefly carrying on 
the discussion for your own sake,? without however 
grudging any other who may be able to profit by it?” 
“ This is the alternative I choose,” he said, “* that it is 
for my own sake chiefly that I speak and ask questions 
and reply.” “ Fall back’ a little, then,” said I; “for 
we just now. did not rightly select the study that 
comes next/ after geometry.” ‘‘ What was our mis- 
take?” hesaid. ‘ After plane surfaces,” said I,“ we 
went on to solids in revolution before studying them 
inthemselves. The right way is next in order after the 
second dimension? to take the third. This, I suppose, 
is the dimension of cubes and of everything that has 
depth.”  “ Why, yes, it is,” he said; “ but this sub- 
ject, Socrates, does not appear to have been investi- 

Plato recognizes that the primary assumptions on which 
~ argument ily proceeds are irreducible choices of 
ity. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 468, Class. Phil. ix. 
(1914) p. 352. 
"8 Cf. Charm. 166 », Phaedo 64 c, Soph. 265 a, Apol. 33 a. 
© ἄναγε is a military term. Cf. Aristoph. Birds 383, Xen. 
Cyr. vii. 1. 45, iii. 3. 69. 

1 ἑξῆς: ef. Laches 182 5. 

2 Lit. “increase.” Cf. Pearson, The Grammar of Science, 
p. 411: ‘He proceeds from curves of frequency to surfaces 
of frequency, and then requiring to go beyond these he finds 
his problem lands him in space of many dimensions.” 



δοκεῖ οὔπω εὑρῆσθαι. Διττὰ γάρ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὰ 
” Ὁ > , / / Dow ” 
αἴτια: ὅτι τε οὐδεμία πόλις ἐντίμως αὐτὰ EXEL, 
5 ~ a ἥ ᾿ 
ἀσθενῶς ζητεῖται χαλεπὰ ὄντα, ἐπιστάτου τε 
é 2; eye 
δέονται οἱ ζητοῦντες, ἄνευ οὗ οὐκ ἂν εὕροιεν, 
ὃν πρῶτον μὲν γενέσθαι χαλεπόν, ἔπειτα καὶ γενο- 
“- ε a 
μένου, ws viv ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν πείθοιντο οἱ περὶ ταῦτα 
C ζητητικοὶ μεγαλοφρονούμενοι. εἰ δὲ πόλις ὅλη 
ξυνεπιστατοῖ ἐντίμως ἄγουσα αὐτά, οὗτοί τε ἂν 
, ‘ - Ἅ \ > /, 4 
πείθοιντο καὶ ξυνεχῶς τε ἂν καὶ ἐντόνως ζητούμενα 
ἐκφανῆ γένοιτο ὅπῃ ἔχει" ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν 
πολλῶν ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ κολουόμενα' ὑπὸ" τῶν 
4 , > peer 2 ¢ Pr opis 
ζητούντων, λόγον οὐκ ἐχόντων καθ᾽ 6 τι χρήσιμα, 
ὅμως πρὸς ἅπαντα ταῦτα βίᾳ ὑπὸ χάριτος αὐξά- 

1 κολουόμενα AD, κωλυόμενα F, 
2 ὑπὸ Madvig: ὑπὸ δὲ mssy 

« This is not to be pressed. Plato"means only that the 
progress of solid geometry is unsatisfactory. Cf, 528 pb. 
There may or may not be a reference here to the ‘ Delian 
problem” of the duplication of the cube (cf. Wilamowitz, 
Platon, i. p.503 for the story) and other specific problems which 
the historians of mathematics discuss in connexion with thi 
passage. Cf. Adam ad loc. To understand Plato we need : 
only remember that the extension of geometry to solids was 
being worked out in his day, perhaps partly at his sugges- 
tion, e.g. by Theaetetus for whom a Platonic dialogue is. 
named, and that Plato makes use of the discovery of the five 
regular solids in his theory of the elements in the Timaeus. 
Cf. also Laws 819 x ff. For those who wish to know more of 
the ancient traditions and modern conjectures I add refer- 
ences: Eva Sachs, De Theaeteto Ath. Mathematico, Diss. 
Berlin, 1914, and Die fiinf platonischen. Kérper (Philolog. 
Untersuch. Heft 24), Berlin, 1917; E. Hoppe, Mathematik 
und Astronomie im klass. Altertum, pp. 133 ff.; Rudolf 
Ebeling, Mathematik und Philosophie bei Plato, Miinden, 
1909, with my review in Class. Phil. v. (1910) p. 115; Seth 


= . 



gated yet.” “ There are twoccauses of that,” said 1: 
“ first, inasmuch as no city holds them in honour, 
these inquiries are languidly pursued owing to their 
difficulty. And secondly, the investigators need a | 
director,” who is indispensable for success and who, to 

begin with, is not easy to find, and then, if he could 
be found, as things are now, seekers in this field 
would be too arrogant® to submit to his guidance. But 
if the state as a whole should join in superintending 
these studies and honour them, these specialists 
would accept advice, and continuous and strenuous 
investigation would bring out the truth. Since even 
now; lightly esteemed as they are by the multitude ) 
and hampered by the i ignorance of their students? as | 
to the true reasons for pursuing them,’ they neverthe- 
less in the face of all these obstacles force their way 
by their inherent charm’ and it would not surprise us 

Demel, Platons Verhdltnis zur Mathematik, Leipzig, with 
my review, Class. Phil. xxiv. (1929) pp. 312-313; and, for 
further bibliography on Plato and mathematics, Bude, Rep. 
Introd. pp. Ixx-lxxi. 

ον Plato. is perhaps speaking from personal experience as 
director of the ἤδομκονι Cf. the hint in Buthydem. 290 c. 

° i.e. the mathematicians already feel themselves to be in- 
dependent specialists. 

This interpretation is, I think, correct. For the con- 
struction of this sentence cf. Isoc. xv. 84. The text is 
disputed ; see crit. note. 

* Lit. “in what respect they are useful.” Plato 
ἐτεὸν οἵ the half legal καθ᾽ ὅ τι. Cf. Lysis 210 c, Polit, 

98 c. 

7 Aneminent modern psychol meeet innocently writes: “ The 
problem of why geometry gives pleasure is therefore a deeper 
problem than the mere assertion of the fact. Furthermore, 
there are many known cases where the study of geometry 
does not give pleasure to the student.’”” Adam seems to 
think it may refer to the personality of Eudoxus. 

VOL. II N 177 


Ὁ vera, καὶ οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν αὐτὰ φανῆναι. Kai 
μὲν δή, ἔφη, τό γε ἐπίχαρι καὶ διαφερόντως ἔχει. 
ἀλλά μοι σαφέστερον εἰπὲ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες. τὴν μὲν 
γάρ που τοῦ ἐπιπέδου πραγματείαν γεωμετρίαν 
ἐτίθεις. Ναί, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ. Εἶτά γ᾽, ἔφη, τὸ μὲν 
πρῶτον ἀστρονομίαν μετὰ ταύτην, ὕστερον δ᾽ ἀν- 
εχώρησας. Σπεύδων γάρ, ἔφην, ταχὺ πάντα δι- 
εξελθεῖν μᾶλλον βραδύνω: ἑξῆς γὰρ οὖσαν τὴν 
βάθους αὔξης μέθοδον, ὅτι τῇ ζητήσει γελοίως 
ἔχει, ὑπερβὰς αὐτὴν μετὰ γεωμετρίαν ἀστρονομίαν 

E ἔλεγον, φορὰν οὖσαν βάθους. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις. 
Τέταρτον τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τιθῶμεν μάθημα 
ἀστρονομίαν, ὡς ὑπαρχούσης τῆς νῦν παραλει- 
πομένης, ἐὰν αὐτὴν πόλις μετίῃ. Εἰκός, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς" 
καὶ ὅ γε νῦν δή μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπέπληξας περὶ 
ἀστρονομίας ὡς φορτικῶς ἐπαινοῦντι, νῦν ἧ σὺ 

529 μετέρχει ἐπαινῶ. παντὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ δῆλον, ὅτι 


α πραγματείαν : interesting is the development of this 
word from its use in Phaedo 63 a (*‘interest,’” “zeal,” 
‘inquiring spirit.” Cf. 64 £, 67 B) to the later meaning, 
treatise.” Cf. Aristot. Top. 100 a 18, Eth. Nic. 1103 Ὁ 26, 
Polyb. i. 1. 4, ete 

» An obvious allusion to the proverb found in many forms 
in many languages. Cf. also Polit. 277 a-s, 264 B, Soph. 
Antig. 231 σχολῇ ταχύς, Theognis 335, 401 μηδὲν ἄγαν 
σπεύδειν, Suetonius, Augustus 25, Aulus Gellius x. 11. 5, 
Macrob. Sat. vi. 8. 9, “‘festina lente,” ‘* hatez-vous 
lentement” (Boileau, Art poétique, i. 171), “Chi va piano 
va sano e va lontano”’ (Goldoni, 7 volponi, τ. ii.), “ Bile 
mit Weile’”’ and similar expressions; Franklin’s ‘* Great 
haste makes great waste,” etc. 



if the truth about them were made apparent.” “‘ Itis 
true,’ he said, “‘ that they do possess an extraordinary 
attractiveness and charm. But explain more clearly 
what you were just speaking of. The investigation? of 
plane surfaces, I presume, you took to be geometry ?” 
“Yes,” said I. “‘ And then,” he said, “ at first you 
took astronomy next and then you drew back.” 
“Yes,” I said, “ for in my haste to be done I was mak- 
ing less speed.” For, while the next thing in order is 
the study‘ of the third dimension or solids, I passed it 
over because of our absurd neglect? to investigate it, 
and mentionednext after geometry astronomy ,@ which 
deals with the movements of solids.” “* Thatis right,” 
hesaid, ‘‘ Then, as our fourth study,” said I, “ let us 
set down astronomy, assuming that this science, the 
discussion of which has been passed over, is available,’ 
provided, that is, that the state pursues it.” “* That 
is likely,” said he; “and instead of the vulgar 
utilitarian’ commendation of astronomy, for which 
you just now rebuked me, Socrates, I now will praise 
it on your principles. For it is obvious to everybody, 

© μέθοδον : this word, like πραγματεία, came to mean 

4 This is the meaning. Neither Stallbaum’s explanation, 
“quia ita est comparata, ut de ea quaerere ridiculum sit,” 
nor that accepted by Adam, “quia ridicule tractatur,” is 
correct, and 529 © and 527 a are not in point, Cf. 528 5, 
p. 176, note a. 

¢ Cf. Laws 822 a ff. 

7 i.e. “ assuming this to exist,” “‘ vorhanden sein,”’ which 
is the usual meaning of ὑπάρχειν in classical Greek. The 
science, of course, is solid geometry, which is still un- 
developed, but in Plato’s state will be constituted as a 

lar science through endowed research. 

9 Cf. Vol. I. p. 410, note c, on 442 Ἐπ, Gorg. 482 ©, Rep. 367 
4, 581 pv, Cratyl. 400 a, Apol. 32.4, Aristot. Pol. 1333 Ὁ 9, 



αὕτη ye ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ ἄνω ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀπὸ 
τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε ἄγει. “lows, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, παντὶ 
δῆλον πλὴν ἐμοί: ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως. ee: da 
πῶς; ἔφη. ‘Qs μὲν νῦν αὐτὴν μεταχειρίζονται 
ε xii Sep 
οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες, πάνυ ποιεῖν κάτω 
βλέπειν. Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς μοι 
δοκεῖς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὴν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μάθησιν λαμ- 
΄ \ a ¢ 3 
B βάνειν παρὰ σαυτῷ ἥ ἐστι: κινδυνεύεις γάρ, Kal 
εἴ τις ἐν ὀροφῇ ποικίλματα θεώμενος ἀνακύπτων 
/ ec a an“ a, ἃ / 3 > 
καταμανθάνοι τι, ἡγεῖσθαι ἂν αὐτὸν νοήσει ἀλλ 
οὐκ ὄμμασι θεωρεῖν. ἴσως οὖν καλῶς ἡγεῖ, ἐγὼ 
δ᾽ εὐηθίικῶς. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ οὐ δύναμαι ἄλλο τι 
δὲ ᾿ His 
νομίσαι ἄνω ποιοῦν ψυχὴν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ 

pee ΔΙᾺ gags ἄν. pape seaghe: y. 
ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν περὶ τὸ ὄν τε ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον: ἐὰν 

* Cf. my review of Warburg, Class. Phil. xxiv. (1929) p. 
319. The dramatic misunderstanding forestalls a possible 
understanding by the reader. Cf. supraon 523 8. The 
misapprehension is typical of modern misunderstandi 
Glaucon is here the prototype of all sentimental Platonists 
or anti-Platonists. The meaning of “higher” things in 
Plato’s allegory is obvious. But Glaucon takes it literally. 
Similarly, Soar critics, taking Plato’s imagery literally 
and pressing single expressions apart from the total context, 
have inferred that Plato would be hostile to all the applica- 
tions of modern science to experience. They refuse to make 
allowance for his special and avowed educational purpose, 
and overlook the fact that he is prophesying the mathe- 
matical astronomy and science of the future. The half-serious 
exaggeration of his rhetoric can easily be matched by similar 
utterances of modern thinkers of the most various schools, 
from Rousseau’s “ écarter tous les faits” to Judd’s ‘‘ Once 
we acquire the power to neglect all the concrete facts ... 
we are free from the incumbrances that come through atten- 
tion to the concrete facts.” Cf. also on 529 B, 530 8 and 
534 A. 

> ἀνάγοντες is tinged with the suggestions of supra 517 a, but 



I think, that this study certainly compels the soul to 
look upward? and leads it away from things here to 
those higher things.”” “ΤῈ may be obvious to every- 
body except me,” said I, “ for I do not think so.” 
** What do you think?’ hesaid. “‘As itis now handled 
by those who are trying to lead us up to philosophy,” 
I think that it turns the soul’s gaze very much down- 
ward.” “Whatdo you mean?” hesaid. “‘ Youseem 
to me in your thought to put a most liberal ° interpre- 
tation on the ‘study of higher things,’” I said, “ for 
‘apparently if anyone with back-thrown head should 
learn something by staring at decorations on a ceil- 
ing, you would regard him as contemplating themwith | 
the higherreason and not with the eyes. Perhaps you | 
are right and I am asimpleton. For I, for my part, " 
am unable to suppose that any other study turns the | 
soul’s gaze upward ὁ than that which deals with being 

the meaning here is those who use astronomy as a part 
of the higher education. φιλοσοφία is used in the looser 
sense of Isocrates. Cf. A.J.P. xvi. p. 237. 

© For οὐκ ἀγεννῶς ef. Gorg. 462 p, where it is ironical, as 
here, Phaedr. 264 8, Euthyph. 2 c, Theaet. 184. In Charm. 
158 c it is not ironical. 

ἃ The humorous exaggeration of the language reflects 
Plato’s exasperation at the sentimentalists who prefer star- 
gazing to mathematical science. Cf. Tim. 91 τὸ on the 
evolution of birds from innocents who supposed that sight 
furnished the surest proof in such matters. Cf. Walt 

When I heard the learned astronomer . . . 

Rising and gliding out I wander’d off by myself 

In the mystical moist night air, and from time to time 

Look’d up in perfect silence at the stars. 
Yet such is the irony of misinterpretation that this and the 
following pages are the chief support of the charge that Plato 
is hostile to science. Cf. on 530 B, p. 187, note c. 

¢ Cf. Theaet. 174 a ἄνω βλέποντα. 



δέ τις ἄνω κεχηνὼς ἢ κάτω συμμεμυκὼς τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν ἐπιχειρῇ τι μανθάνειν, οὔτε μαθεῖν ἄν 
ποτέ φημι αὐτόν -- , ἐπιστήμην γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔχειν 
τῶν τοιούτων -- οὔτε ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ 

σ βλέπειν τὴν ψυχήν, κἂν ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῇ ἢ 
ἐν θαλάττῃ μανθάνῃ. 

XI. Δίκην, ἔφη, ἔχω: ὀρθῶς γάρ μοι ἐπέπληξας. 
ἀλλὰ πῶς “δὴ ἔλεγες δεῖν ἀστρονομίαν μανθάνειν 
παρὰ ἃ νῦν μανθάνουσιν, εἰ μέλλοιεν oper 
πρὸς ἃ λέγομεν μαθήσεσθαι; Ὧδε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ 
ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, ἐπείπερ 
ἐν ὁρατῷ πεποίκιλται, κάλλιστα μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ 

D ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν 

πολὺ ἐνδεῖν, ἃς τὸ ὃν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα Preuss 

"OF, Aristoph. Clouds 172. 
> συμμύω probably refers to the eyes. But οὐ, Adam ad loc. 
© Cf. Phaedr. 264.4, and Adam in Class. Rev, xiii. p. 11. 
Δ Or rather, “serves me right,” or, in the American 
language, “I’ve got what’s coming to me.”’ The expres- 
sion is colloquial. Cf, Epist. iii. 319 τ, Antiphon exxiv. 45. 
But δίκην ἔχει in 520 B=“*‘ it is just.” 
© Cf. Tim. 40 a κόσμον ἀληθινὸν αὐτῷ πεποικιλμένον, Eurip. 
Hel. 1096 ἀστέρων ποικίλματα, Critias, Sisyphus, Diels ii.* p. 
321, lines 33-34: 
τό τ᾽ ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέμας 
χρόνου καλὸν ποίκιλμα τέκτονος σοφοῦ. 
Cf. also Gorg. 508 a, Lucretius ν. 1205 “stellis micanti- 
bus aethera fixum,” ii. 1031 ff., Aeneid iv. 482 *“‘stellis 
ardentibus aptum,”’ vi. 797, xi. 202, Ennius, Ann. 372, 
Shakes. Hamlet τι. ii. 313 “" This majestical roof fretted with 
golden fire,” Arthur Hugh Clough, Uranus: 
Then Plato in me said, " 
*Tis but the figured ceiling overhead 
With cunning diagrams bestarred . 
Mind not the stars, mind thou thy mind and God 



and the invisible. But if anyone tries to learn about 

the things of sense, whether gaping up* or blinking 
down,” I would never say that he really learns—for 

nothing of the kind admits of true knowledge—nor | 

would I say that his soul looks up, but down, even / 

though he study floating on his back ¢ on sea or land.” 

XI. “A fair retort,?”’ he said; “your rebuke is 
deserved. But how, then, did you mean that astronomy 
ought to be taught contrary to the present fashion if 
it is to be learned in a way to conduce to our purpose?” 
“Thus,” said I: “‘ these sparks that paint the sky,’ 
since they are decorations on a visible surface, we 
must regard, to be sure, as the fairest and most exact 

of material things ; but we must recognize that they | 

fall far short of the truth,’ the movements, namely, of 

The word ποικίλματα may further suggest here the com- 
plication of the movements in the heavens. 

7 The meaning of this sentence is certain, but the expres- 
sion will no more bear a matter-of-fact logical analysis than 
that of Phaedo 69 a-s, or Rep. 365 c, or many other subtle 
saps ἐκ in Plato. No material object perfectly embodies 
the ideal and abstract mathematical relation. These mathe- 
matical ideas are designated as the true, ἀληθινῶν, and the 
real, ὄν. As in the Timaeus (38 c, 40 a-B, 36 p-£) the 
abstract and ideal has the primacy and by a reversal of the 
ordinary point of view is said to contain or convey the 
concrete. The visible stars are in and are carried by their 
invisible mathematical orbits. By this way of speaking 
Plato, it is true, disregards the apparent difficulty that the 
moyement of the visible stars then ought to be mathemati- 
cally perfect. But this interpretation is, I think, more 
P le for Plato than Adam’s attempt to secure rigid con- 
τ χὰ ἀμ, taking τὸ ὃν τάχος etc., to represent invisible and 
ideal planets, and τὰ ἐνόντα to be the perfect mathematical 
realities, which are in them. ἐνόντα would hardly retain the 
metaphysical meaning of ὄντα. For the interpretation of 
529 p ef. also my “" Platonism and the History of Science,” 
Am. Philos. Soc. Proc. \xvi. p. 172. 



ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχή- 
/ i ” \ \ » Κ 
μασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα 
2 Δ \ , \ \ I ἃ 1 “4 > 
φέρει: ἃ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοίᾳ ληπτά, ὄψει ὃ 
δ. “ἃ \ ” > a μὴ 2 ~ j = 
οὔ: ἢ ov οἴει; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, τῇ 
περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποικιλίᾳ παραδείγμασι χρηστέον 
τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἕνεκα, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ 
E ἂν εἴ τις ἐντύχοι ὑπὸ Δαιδάλου ἤ τινος ἄλλου 
~ ͵ ὦ, 
δημιουργοῦ ἢ γραφέως διαφερόντως γεγραμμένοις 
καὶ ἐκπεπονημένοις διαγράμμασιν. ἡγήσαιτο γὰρ 
ἄν πού τις ἔμπειρος γεωμετρίας, ἰδὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα, 
κάλλιστα μὲν ἔχειν ἀπεργασίᾳ, γελοῖον μὴν ἐπι- 
σκοπεῖν αὐτὰ σπουδῇ, ὡς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς 
530 ληψόμενον ἴσων ἢ διπλασίων ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς 
/ / > > / a 
συμμετρίας. Τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει γελοῖον εἶναι; ἔφη. 
Τῷ ὄντι δὴ ἀστρονομικόν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὄντα οὐκ 
οἴει ταὐτὸν πείσεσθαι εἰς τὰς τῶν ἄστρων φορὰς 
ἀποβλέποντα; νομιεῖν μέν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα 
τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα συστήσασθαι, οὕτω ἕυνεστάναι 
τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν 
A 7 
αὐτῷ: τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς πρὸς ἡμέραν ξυμμετρίαν καὶ 
τούτων πρὸς μῆνα καὶ μηνὸς πρὸς ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ 
Βτῶν ἄλλων ἄστρων πρός τε ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς 
Bd > » ” « la A , 
ἄλληλα, οὐκ ἄτοπον, οἴει, ἡγήσεται τὸν νομίζοντα 
γίγνεσθαί τε ταῦτα ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδὲν 
παραλλάττειν, σῶμά τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὁρώμενα, καὶ 

2 δημιουργῷ : an anticipation of the Timaeus. 

» Cf. Bruno apud Héffding, History of Modern Philosophy, 
i. 125 and 128, and Galileo, ibid. i. 178; also Lucretius v. 

° Plato was right against the view that Aristotle imposed 
on the world for centuries. We should not therefore say 
with Adam that he would have attached little significance 
to the perturbations of Neptune and the consequent discovery 



real speed and real slowness in true number and in 
all true figures both in relation to one another and 
as.vehicles of the things they carry and contain, 
These can be apprehended only by reason and thought, 
but not by sight; ordo you think otherwise?” “B 

no means,” he said. “‘ Then,” said I, “νὰ must 
use the blazonry of the heavens as patterns to aid 
in the study of those realities, just as one would do 
who chanced upon diagrams drawn with special care 
and elaboration by Daedalus or some other craftsman 
or painter. For anyone acquainted with geometry 
who saw such designs would admit the beauty of the 
workmanship, but would think it absurd to examine 
them seriously in the expectation of finding in them 
the absolute truth with regard to equals or doubles 
or any other ratio.” “How could it be other- 
wise than absurd?’’ he said. ‘‘ Do you not think,” 
said I, ‘‘ that one who was an astronomer in very truth 
would feel in the same way when he turned his eyes 
upon the movements of the stars ? He will be willing 
to concede that the artisan? of heaven fashioned it-and 
all that it contains in the best possible manner for 
such a fabric; but when it comes to the proportions 
of day and night, and of their relation to the month, 
and that of the month to the year, and of the other 
stars to these and one another, do you not suppose 
that he will regard as a very strange fellow the man 
who believes that these things go on for ever without 
change ὃ or the least deviation “though they possess 

of Uranus. It is to Plato that tradition attributes the problem 
of accounting by the simplest hypothesis for the movement of 
the heavenly bodies and *‘ saving the phenomena.” 

The alleged contradiction between thisand Laws 891 8 ff. and 
Tim, 47 « is due to a misapprehension. That the stars in their 
movements de not perfectly express the exactness of mathe- 



ζητεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν; 
᾿Εμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, σοῦ νῦν ἀκούοντι. Προ- 
βλήμασιν ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, χρώμενοι ὥσπερ 
γεωμετρίαν οὕτω καὶ ἀστρονομίαν μέτιμεν" τὰ 
Ο δ᾽ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐάσομεν, εἰ μέλλομεν ὄντως 

matical concepiions is no more than modern astronomers 
say. In the aap passage Plato protests against the idea 
that there is no law and order governing the movement of 
the planets, but that they are ‘* wandering stars,”’ as irregular 
in their movements as they seem. In the Timaeus he is saying 
that astronomy or science took its beginning from the sight 
and observation of the heavenly bodies and the changi 
seasons. In the Republic Plato’s purpose is to predict and 
encourage a purely mathematical astronomy and to indicate 
its place in the type of education which he wishes to give 
his guardians. ere is not the slightest contradiction or 
change of opinion in the three passages if interpreted rightly 
in their entire context. 

* The meaning is not appreciably affected by a slight 
doubt as to the construction of ἕητεῖν. It is usually taken 
with ἄτοπον (regarded as neuter), the meaning being that the 
philosophic astronomer will think it strange to look for the 
absolute truth in these things. This double use of ἄτοπον is 
strained and it either makes παντὶ τρόπῳ awkward or attri- 
butes to Plato the intention of decrying the concrete study 
of astronomy. I think ξητεῖν etc. are added by a trailing 
anacoluthon such as occurs elsewhere in the Republic. Their 
subject is the real astronomer who, using the stars only as 
‘“‘diagrams”’ or patterns (529 p), seeks to learn a higher 
exacter mathematical truth than mere observation could 
ΤΣ Madvig’s ζητήσει implies a like view of the meaning 

ut smooths out the construction. . But my interpretation of 
the passage as a whole does not depend on this construction. 
If we 2a, ΔΑ ζητεῖν depend on ἄτοπον (neuter) ἡγήσεται, the 
meaning will be that he thinks it absurd to expect to get 
that higher truth from mere observation. At all events 
Plato is not here objecting to observation as a suggestion 
for mathematica] studies but to its substitution for them, as 
the next sentence shows. 

» That is just what the mathematical astronomy of to-day 



bodies and are visible objects—and that his unre- 
mitting quest is the realities of these things?” “I 
at least do think so,” he said, “ now that I hear it 
from you.” ‘‘ Itis by means of problems,” then,” said 
I, “65 in the study of geometry, that we will pursue 
astronomy too, and we will let be the things in the 
heavens,° if we are to have a part in the true science of 

does, and it is a πολλαπλάσιον ἔργον compared with the 
merely observational astronomy of Plato’s day. Cf. the 
interesting remarks of Sir James Jeans, apud S. J. Woolf, 
Drawn from Life, Ὁ. 14: “The day is gone when the 
astronomer’s work is carried on only at the eyepiece of a 
telescope. Naturally, observations must be made, but these 
must be recorded by men who are trained for that purpose, 
and I am not one of them,” etc. 

Adam’s quotation of Browning’s ““ Abt Vogler” in con- 
nexion with this passage will only confirm the opinion of those 
who regard Plato as a sentimental enemy of science. 

¢ Cf. also Phileb. 59 a, Aristot. Met. 997 Ὁ 35 οὐδὲ περὶ 
τὸν οὐρανὸν 4 ἀστρολογία τόνδε. 

This intentional Ruskinian boutade has given t 

The Platonist, we are told ad nauseam, deduces 
the world from his inner consciousness. This is of course 
not true (cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 45). But Plato, 
like some lesser writers, loves to emphasize his thought by 

x and surprise, and his postulation and prediction 
of a mathematical astronomy required emphasis. Cf. my 
Platonism and the History of Science, pp. 171-174. 

This and similar passages cannot be used to prove that 
Plato was unscientific, as many hostile or thoughtless critics 
have attempted todo. Cf. e.g. the severe strictures of Arthur 
Platt, Nine Essays, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1927, pp. 12-16, 
especially p. 16: “Plato being first and foremost a meta- 
physician with a sort of religious system would not have us 
study anything but oe sics and a kind of mystic 
religion.” Woodbridge Riley, From Myth to Reason, p. 47: 
“νος Plato . . . was largely responsible for turning back 
the clock of scientific progress. To explain the wonders of 
the world he preferred imagination to observation.” Cf. also 
Benn, Greek Philosophers, vol. i. pp. 173 and 327, Herrick, 



ἀστρονομίας μεταλαμβάνοντες χρήσιμον τὸ φύσει 

φρόνιμον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐξ ἀχρήστου ποιήσειν.. Ἢ 
πολλαπλάσιον, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον ἢ ὡς νῦν ἀστρονο- 

μεῖται προστάττεις. Οἷμαι δέ γε, εἶπον, καὶ 
τἄλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ie a ἡμᾶς, 
ἐάν τι ἡμῶν ὡς νομοθετῶν ὄφελος ἢ 7} 

ΧΗ. ᾿Αλλὰ γὰρ τί ἔχεις ὑπομνῆσαι τῶν oe 
ἡκόντων μαθημάτων; Οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη, νῦν. 
οὑτωσί. Οὐ μὴν ἕν, ἀλλὰ πλείω, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἴδη 
D παρέχεται ἡ φορά, ὡς ἐγῷμαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν “πάντα 
ἴσως ὅστις σοφὸς ἕξει εἰπεῖν: ἃ δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν 
προφανῆ, δύο. Ποῖα δή; Πρὸς τούτῳ, jv δ᾽ 
ἐγώ, ἀντίστροφον αὐτοῦ. Τὸ ποῖον; Κωδυνεύει, 
ἔφην, ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὡς 
πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὦτα παγῆναι, καὶ αὗται 
ἀλλήλων ἀδελφαί τινες ai ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, ὡς οἵ 
τε Πυθαγόρειοί φασι καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὦ Γλαύκων, 

The Thinking Machine, p. 335, F.C. S. Schiller, Plato and 
his Predecessors, p. 81: ‘“‘. . . that Plato’s anti-empirical 
bias renders him profoundly anti-scientific, and that his 
influence has always, openly or subtly, counteracted and 
thwarted the scientific impulse, or at least diverted it into 
unprofitable channels.” Dampier-Whetham, A History of 
Science, pp. 27-28: ‘‘ Plato was a great philosopher but in 
the history of experimental science he must be counted a 

Such statements disregard the entire context of the 
Platonic passages they exploit, and take no account of 
Plato’s purpose or of other passages which counteract his 
seemingly unscientific remarks. 

Equally unfair is the practice of comparing Plato un- 
fayourably with Aristotle in this respect, as Grote ¢.g. 
frequently does (cf. Aristotle, p. 233). Plato was an artist 
and Aristotle an encyclopaedist; but Plato as a whole is far 
nearer the point of view of recent science than ees 
Cf. my Platonism and the History of Science, p. 163; 

532 a and on 529 a, ἢ. 180, note a, and What Plato Said, p. 336. 



astronomy and so convert to right use from useless- 
ness that natural indwelling intelligence of the soul.” | 
“ You enjoin a task,” he said, “that will multiply 
the labour * of our present study of astronomy many 
times.” “ And I fancy,” 1 said, “that. our other 
injunctions will be of the same kind if we are of any 
use as lawgivers. 

XII. ““ However, what suitable studies have you 
to suggest?” “ Nothing,” he said, “ thus off-hand.” 
“Yet, surely,” said I, “ motion® in general provides © 
not one but many forms or speciés, according to my 
opinion. To enumerate them all will perhaps be the 
task of a wise man,° but even to us two of them 
are apparent.’’  “‘ What are they?” “In addition 
to astronomy, its counterpart,’ I replied. “‘ What 
is that δ᾿ γε may venture to suppose,” I said, 
“that as the eyes are framed for astronomy so the 
ears are framed? for the movements of harmony; 
and these are in some sort kindred sciences,’ as the 
Pythagoreans’ affirm and we admit,’ do we not, 

* Cf. Phaedr. 272 πὶ καίτοι οὐ σμικρόν ye φαίνεται ἔργον. 
- δ Plato here generalizes motion as a subject of science. - 

© The modesty is in the tone of the Timaeus- 

4 Por πέπηγεν cf. 605.4. 
_ * The similar statement attributed. to Archytas, Diels: 1.5 
p. 331, is probably an imitation of this. 

7 ras is a great name, but little is known of him. 
** Pythagoreans”’ in later usage sometimes means mystics, 
sometimes mathematical physicists, sometimes both. Plato 
makes use of both traditions but is dominated by neither. 
For Erich Frank’s recent book, Plato und die sogenannten 
Pythagoreer, cf. my article in. Class. Phil. vol. xxiii. (1928) 
pp. 347 ff. The student of Plato will do well to turn the page 
when he meets the name Hiuthagoras in a commentator. 

5 For this turn of phrase ef. Vol. 1. p. 333, 424.c, Protag. 
316 a, Symp. 186 5. 



ξυγχωροῦμεν. ἢ πῶς ποιοῦμεν; Οὕτως, ἔφη. 

E Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ πολὺ τὸ ἔργον, ἐκεί- 
/ ~ , ~ 

νῶν πευσόμεθα, πῶς λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν Kal εἴ 

τι ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις; ἡμεῖς δὲ παρὰ πάντα 

ταῦτα φυλάξομεν τὸ ἡμέτερον. ἸΠοῖον; Μή ποτ 

. A > A > “ ca | eee = 
αὐτῶν τι ἀτελὲς ἐπιχειρῶσιν ἡμῖν μανθάνειν ovs 

, ~ aA , ae ae ¥ 24 ν 
θρέψομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐξῆκον ἐκεῖσε ἀεΐ, of πάντα δεῖ 

ἀφήκειν, οἷον ἄρτι περὶ τῆς ἀστρονομίας ἐλέγομεν. 
“σ᾿ a OV - ; 

ἢ οὐκ οἷσθ᾽ ὅτι καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἕτερον τοιοῦτον 
ποιοῦσι; τὰς γὰρ ἀκουομένας αὖ συμφωνίας καὶ 
φθόγγους ἀλλήλοις ἀναμετροῦντες ἀνήνυτα ὥσπερ 
οἱ ἀστρονόμοι πονοῦσιν. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, καὶ 
γελοίως γε, νώμακ:...«ἀφααὶ ὀνομάζοντες καὶ 
παραβάλλοντες τὰ ὦτα, οἷον ἐκ γειτόνων φωνὴν 
θηρευόμενοι, of μέν φασιν ἔτι κατακούειν ἐν μέσῳ 
τινὰ ἠχὴν καὶ σμικρότατον εἶναι τοῦτο διάστημα, 

α« For the reference to experts ¢f. supra 400 B, 4245. Cf. 
also What Plato Said, p. 484, on Laches 184 p-x, 

> παρά of course here means ‘throughout’ and not 

¢ I take the word ἀτελές etymologically (cf. pp. 66-67, note ὁ, 
on 500 a), with reference to the end in view. Others take it 
in the ordinary Greek sense, “‘ imperfect,”’ “* incomplete.” 

4 This passage is often taken as another example of Plato’s 
hostility to science and the experimental method. It is of 
course not that, but the precise interpretation is difficult. 
Glaucon at first misapprehends (ef. p. 180, note a, on 529 a) 
and gives an amusing description of the mere empiricist in 
music. But Socrates says he does not mean these, but those 
who try to apply mathematics to the perception of sound 
instead of developing a (Kantian) a priori science of harmony 
to match the mathematical science of astronomy. Cf, also 
p. 193, note g, on 531 8, W. Whewell, Transactions of the Cam- 
bridge Philos. Soc. vol. ix. p. 589, and for music A. Rivaud, 
“Platon et la musique,’ Rev. d’ Histoire de la Philos. 1929, 


tn σιωναινασνονο 


Glaucon?”’’ ‘“‘ We do,’ he said. ‘ Then,” said I, 
“since the task is so great, shall we not inquire of 
them what their opinion is and whether they have 
anything to add? And we in all this” will be on 
the watch for what concerns us.” ‘‘ What is that?” 
“To prevent our fosterlings from attempting to learn 

nything that does not conduce to the end*° we have 
in view, and does not always come out at what we said 
ought to be the goal of everything, as we were just 
now saying about astronomy. Or do you not know 
that they repeat the same procedure in the case 
of harmonies?? They transfer it to hearing and 
measure audible concords and sounds against one an- 
other,’ expending much useless labour just as the 
astronomers do.” ‘“‘ Yes, by heaven,” he said, “ and 
most absurdly too. They talk of something they 
call minims’ and, laying their ears alongside, as if 
trying to catch a voice from next door,’ some affirm 
that they can hear a note between and that this is 
the least interval and the unit of measurement, while 

pp. 1-30; also Stallbaum ad loc., and E. Frank, Platon 
τι. d. sog. Pyth., Anhang, on the history of Greek music. 
He expresses surprise (p. 139) that Glaucon knows i 
of Pythagorean theories of music. Others use this to prove 
Socrates’ ignorance of music. 

* This hints at the distinction developed in the Politicus 
between relative measurement of one thing against another 
and measurement by a standard. Cf. Polit. 283 ©, 284 B-c, 
Theat. 186 a. 
᾿ 4 πυκνώματα (condensed notes). The word is technical. 
Cf. Adam ad loc. But, as ἄττα shows, Plato is using it 
loosely to distinguish a measure of sense perception from a 
mathematically determined interval. 

“ Cf. Pater, Renaissance, p. 157. The phrase, ἐκ γειτόνων, 
is colloquial and, despite the protest of those who insist that 
it only means in the neighbourhood, oe overhearing 
what goes on next door—as often in the New Comedy. 



ᾧ μετρητέον, of δὲ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ὡς ὅμοιον ἤδη 
Β φθεγγομένων, ἀμφότεροι ὦτα τοῦ νοῦ προστησά- 
μενοι. Σὺ μέν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις 
τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ 
βασανίζοντας, ἐπὶ τῶν κολλόπων στρεβλοῦντας" 
ἵνα δὲ μὴ μακροτέρα ἡ εἰκὼν γίγνηται, πλήκτρῳ 
τε πληγῶν γιγνομένων καὶ κατηγορίας πέρι καὶ 
ἐξαρνήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας χορδῶν, παύομαι τῆς 
εἰκόνος καὶ οὔ φημι τούτους λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνους 
οὗς ἔφαμεν νῦν δὴ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἐρήσεσθαι. 
C ταὐτὸν γὰρ ποιοῦσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἀστρονομίᾳ: τοὺς 
γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκουομέναις 
ἀριθμοὺς ζητοῦσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα 
ἀνίασιν ἐπισκοπεῖν, τίνες ξύμφωνοι ἀριθμοὶ καὶ 
, BA \ \ ee 4 4..." , ΟΜ ᾿ 
τίνες οὔ, καὶ διὰ τί ἑκάτεροι. Δαιμόνιον γάρ, ἔφη, 
πρᾶγμα λέγεις. Χρήσιμον μὲν οὖν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πρὸς 
« Cf. Aldous Huxley, Jesting Pilate, p. 152: “Much is 
enthusiastically taught about the use of quarter tones in 
Indian music. I listened attentively at Lucknow in the 
hope of hearing some new and extraordinary kind of melody 
based on these celebrated fractions. But I listened in vain.” 
Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. pp. 334-335, n. 85, thinks 
that Plato ‘‘ shrugs his shoulders at experiments.” He refers 
to Plutarch, Life of Marcellus, xiv. 5, and Quaest. Conv. 
viii. 2. 1, 7, where Plato is represented as “having been 
angry with Eudoxus and Archytas because they employed 
instruments and apparatus for the solution of a problem, 
instead of relying solely on reasoning.” 
>» So Malebranche, ntretiens sur la métaphysique, 3, X.: 

‘** Je pense que vous vous moquez de moi. C’est la raison 

et non les sens qu’il faut consulter.”’ 
ὁ For χρηστός in this ironical sense cf. also 479 a, Symp. 

4 The language of the imagery confounds the torture of 
slaves giving evidence on the rack with the strings and pegs 
of a musical instrument. For the latter ¢f. Horace, 4. P. 348, 



others insist that the strings now render identical 
sounds,* both preferring their ears to their minds.>” 
“ You,” said I, “ are speaking of the worthies * who 
vex and torture the strings and rack them? on the 
pegs; but—not to draw out the comparison with 
strokes of the plectrum and the musician’s complaints 
of too responsive and too reluctant strings °—I drop 
the figure,’ and tell you that I do not mean these 
people, but those others? whom we just now said we 
would interrogate about harmony. Their method 
exactly corresponds to that of the astronomer; for 
the numbers they seek are those found in these heard 
concords, but they do not ascend” to generalized 
problems and the consideration which numbers are 
inherently concordant and which not and why in 
each case.”’ “Α superhuman task,” he said. “‘Say, 
rather, useful,‘”” said I, “‘ for the investigation of the 

nam neque chorda sonum reddit quem vult manus et mens 

poscentique gravem persaepe remittit acutum. 
Stallbaum says that Plato here was imitated by Aristaenetus, 
Epist yxiv. libr. 1 ri πράγματα παρέχετε χορδαῖς ; 
- 4 This also may suggest a reluctant and a too willing 
witness. ; 

7 4 on 489 a, p. 23, note d. 

® Hedistinguishes from the pure empirics justsatirized those 
who apply their mathematics only to the data of observation. 
This is perhaps one of Plato’s rare errors. For though there 
may be in some sense a Kantian @ priori mechanics of 
astronomy, there can hardly be a purely a priori mathematics 
of acoustics. What numbers are consonantly harmonious 
must always remain a fact of direct experience. Cf, my 
Platonism and the History of Science, p. 176. 

* Of. Friedlander, Platon, i. p. 108, n. 1. 

* Cf. Tim. 47 c-p. Plato always keeps to his point—ef. 
349 B-c, 564 a-s—or returns to it aftér a digression. Cf. on 
572 5, p. 339, note ὁ. 

VOL, II re) 193 


τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ζήτησιν, ἄλλως δὲ 
μεταδιωκόμενον ἄχρηστον. Εἰκός γ᾽, ἔφη. . 
XIII. Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ τούτων 
D πάντων ὧν διεληλύθαμεν μέθοδος ἐὰν μὲν ἐπὶ 
τὴν ἀλλήλων κοινωνίαν ἀφίκηται καὶ ξυγγένειαν, 
καὶ ξυλλογισθῇ ταῦτα ἣ ἔστιν ἀλλήλοις οἰκεῖα, 
φέρειν τι αὐτῶν εἰς ἃ βουλόμεθα τὴν πραγματείαν 
καὶ οὐκ ἀνόνητα πονεῖσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνόνητα. 
Καὶ ἐγώ, ἔφη, οὕτω μαντεύομαι. ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ 
ἔργον λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Τοῦ προοιμίου, ἦν δ᾽ 
ἐγώ, ἢ τίνος λέγεις; ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅτι πάντα 
ταῦτα προοίμια ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου ὃν δεῖ 
μαθεῖν; οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦσί γέ σοι οὗ ταῦτα 
E δεινοὶ διαλεκτικοὶ εἶναι. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί᾽, ἔφη, εἰ 
μὴ μάλα γέ τινες ὀλίγοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα. 
᾿Αλλ᾽ ἤδη," εἶπον, μὴ δυνατοί τινὲς ὄντες" δοῦναί τε 
καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον εἴσεσθαι ποτέ τι ὧν φαμὲν 
1 ἀλλὰ ἤδη ADM, ἀλλὰ δὴ F. ! 
5. μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες ΑΞ ΕἾΜ, οἱ μὴ δυνατοί τινες ὄντες A: 
μὴ δυνατοὶ οἵτινες Burnet. 

2 Cf. on 505 8, p. 88, note a. . 

> μέθοδος, like πραγματείαν in Ὁ, is used almost in the 
later technical sense of ‘treatise’? or “branch of study.” 
Cf. on 528 pb, p. 178, note a. 

° Cf. on 537.c, Epin. 991 ΕΞ. 

4 Plato is fond of this image. It suggests here also the 
preamble of a law, as the translation more explicitly in- 
dicates. Cf. 532 p, anticipated in 457 c, and Laws 722 p-x, 
723 a-s and Ἑ, 720 p-x, 772 £, 870 τ, 854 a, 932 a and passim. 

4“ Of. Theaet. 146 58, and perhaps Huthyd. 290 c. ough 
mathematics quicken the mind of the student, it is, apart 
from metaphysics, a matter of common experience that 
mathematicians are not necessarily good reasoners on other 
subjects. Jowett’s wicked jest, “1 have hardly ever known 
a mathematician who could reason,” misled an eminent 



beautiful and the good,® but if otherwise pursued, 
useless,” ‘‘ That is likely,” he said. 

XIII. “ And what is more,” I said, “ I take it that 
if the inyestigation® of all these studies goes far 
enough to bring out their community and kinship ° 
with one another, and to infer their affinities, then 
to busy ourselves with them contributes to our de- 
sired end, and the labour taken is not lost; but 
otherwise it is vain.” “‘ I too so surmise,”’ said he; 
“but it is a huge task of which you speak, Socrates.” 
“Are you talking about the prelude,?” I said, “‘ or 
_ what? Or do we not know that all this is but the 
_ preamble of the law itself, the prelude of the strain 

that we have to apprehend? - For you surely do not 

suppose that experts in these matters are reasoners 
and. dialecticians®?’’ “No, by Zeus,’’ he said, 

_““except a very few whom I haye met.” ‘“ But have 
you ever supposed,” I said, “‘ that men who could 
not render and exact an account’ of opinions in 
discussion would ever know anything of the things 

professor of education who infers that Plato disbelieved in 
“*mental discipline’ (Yale Review, July 1917). Cf. also 
Taylor, Note in Reply to Mr. A. W. Benn, Mind, xii. (1903) 
p. 511; Charles Fox, Educational Psychology, pp. 187- 
188: “... a training in the mathematics may produce 
exactness of thought . . . provided that the training is of 
such a kind as to inculeate an ideal which the pupil values 
and strives to attain. Failing this, Glaucon’s observation 
that he had ‘ hardly ever -known a mathematician who was 
capable of reasoning’ is likely to be repeated.” On the text 
ef. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 384-385, and Adam ad loc. 

7 λόγον. .. dofvac. A commonplace Platonic plea for 
dialectics. Cf. 534 5, Prot. 336 c, Polit. 286 a, Theaet. 
202 c, 175 c, 183 ν, Seph. 230 a, Phaedo 78 c-p, 95 νυν, 
Charm. 165 5, Xen. Oecon. 11. 99, Cf. also λόγον λαβεῖν 
Rep. 402 a, 534 5, Soph. 246 c, Theaet. 208 p, and Thompson 
on Meno 75 pv. 


532 δεῖν εἰδέναι; Οὐδ᾽ ad, ἔφη, τοῦτό ye. Οὐκοῦν, 

> , 3) > , > ε { 
εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὗτος ἤδη αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ νόμος 
ὃν τὸ διαλέγεσθαι περαίνει; ὃν καὶ ὄντα νοητὸν 
μιμοῖτ᾽ ἂν ἡ τῆς ὄψεως δύναμις, ἣν ἐλέγομεν πρὸς 
αὐτὰ ἤδη τὰ ζῷα ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς 
αὐτὰ ἄστρα τε καὶ τελευταῖον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν 

ἥλιο Ὁ ‘ LA ~ ὃ αλ ,ὔ θ > 
ἥλιον. οὕτω καὶ oTav Tis τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπι- 
χειρῇ ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου 
ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὁρμᾶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ, 
Β πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ᾽ 
αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος 
τότε ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 
Τί οὖν; οὐ διαλεκτικὴν ταύτην τὴν πορείαν 
καλεῖς; Τί μήν; ‘H δέ γε, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λύσις τε 
ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ μεταστροφὴ ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν 
ἐπὶ τὰ εἴδωλα καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείου εἰς 
τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος, καὶ ἐκεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ζῷά τε 

1 ὁρμᾶν Clemens: ὁρμᾷ AFDM. 

* Of. Phileb. 58 pv, Meno 75 c-p, Charm. 155 a, Cratyl 
390 c, and on 533 B, pp. 200 f., note αὶ 

» This is not a literal rendering, but gives the meaning. 

¢ Cf. 516 a-s. Plato interprets his imagery again Ted 
and in Β infra. 

4 Of. supra p. 180, note a, and p. 187, notec. Cf. also 537 p, 
and on 476 4 ff. Cf. Bergson, [ntroduction to Metaphysics, 
p. 9: “‘ Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dis- 
pense with symbols”; E. S. Robinson, Readings in General 
Psych. p. 295: “ A habit of suppressing mental imagery must 
therefore characterize men who deal much with abstract ideas; 
and as the power of dealing easily and firmly with these 
ideas is the surest criterion of a high order of intellect . . .’’; 
Pear, Remembering and Forgetting, p. 57: ‘“‘ He (Napoleon) 
is reported to have said that ‘there are some who, from 
some physical or moral peculiarity of character, form a 

picture (tableau) of everything. No matter what knowledge, 
intellect, courage, or good qualities they may have, these men 



we say must be known?” “ Nois surely the answer 
to that too.” ‘“‘ This, then, at last, Glaucon,” I said, 
“is the very law which dialectics ¢ recites, the strain 
which it executes, of which, though it belongs to the 
intelligible, we may see an imitation in the progress ὃ 
of the faculty of vision, as we described* its en- 
deavour to look at living things themselves and the 
stars themselves and finally at the very sun. In like 
manner, when anyone by dialectics attempts through 
discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of 
sense‘ to find his way to the very essence of each thing 
and does not desist till he apprehends by thought 
itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at 
the limit of the intelligible, as the other in our 
parable came to the goal of the visible.” “‘ By all 
means,” he said. ‘* What, then, will you not call this 
progress of thought dialectic?”’ “Surely.” ‘‘ And 
the release from bonds,” I said, “‘ and the conversion 
from the shadows to the images * that cast them and 
to the light and the ascent’ from the subterranean 
cavern to the world above,’ and there the persisting 

are unfit to command”’; A. Bain, Mind, 1880, p. 570: ** Mr. 
Galton is naturally startled. at finding eminent scientific men, 
by their own account, so very low in the visualizing power. His 
explanation, I have no doubt, hits the mark; the deficiency is 
due to thenatural antagonism of pictorial aptitude and abstract 
thought”; Judd, Psychology of High School Subjects, p. 321: 
“Tt did not appear on superficial examination of the stand- 
ings of students that those who can draw best are the best 
students from the point of view of the teacher of science.” 

* εἴδωλα : cf. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 238 ; 
also 516 a, Theaet. 150 c, Soph. 240 a, 241 ©, 234c, 966 5 
with 267 c, and Rep. 517 p ἀγαλμάτων. 

7 ἐπάνοδος became almost technical in Neoplatonism. Cf. 
also 517 a, 529 a, and p. 124, note ὃ. 

* Lit. “sun,” i.e. the world illumined by the sun, not by 
the fire in the cave. 



καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ἔτι ἀδυναμία! 
C βλέπειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν ὕδασι φαντάσματα θεῖα" καὶ 
σκιὰς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰδώλων σκιὰς δι᾿ 
ἑτέρου τοιούτου φωτὸς ὡς πρὸς͵ ἥλιον κρίνειν 
ἀποσκιαζομένας, πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία τῶν 
τεχνῶν, ἃς διήλθομεν, ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ 
ἐπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ᾿ Ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ 
ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν, ὥσπερ. τότε τοῦ σα- 
φεστάτου ἐν σώματι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φανοτάτου ἐν 
τῷ σωματοειδεῖ τε καὶ ὁρατῷ τόπῳ. "Kya “μέν, 
ἔφη, ἀποδέχομαι οὕτω. καίτοι παντάπασί γέ μοι 
δοκεῖ χαλεπὰ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι εἶναι, ἄλλον δ᾽ αὖ 

τρόπον χαλεπὰ μὴ ἀποδέχεσθαι. ὅμως δέ--οὐ γὰρ 

> ~ ~ ᾿ 
ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι μόνον. ἀκουστέα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὖθις 
πολλάκις ἐπανιτέον--ταῦτα θέντες ἔχειν ὡς νῦν 
λέγεται, ἐπ᾿ a ov δὴ τὸν γόμον ἴωμεν, καὶ 
διέλθωμεν οὕτως ὥσπερ τὸ προοΐμιον διήλθομεν. 
λέγε οὖν, τίς ὃ τρόπος τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνά- 
E pews, καὶ κατὰ ποῖα δὴ εἴδη διέστηκε, καὶ τίνες 
> c / - \ Ἅ ” ε » « \ 
αὖ ὅδοί. αὗται yap av ἤδη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἱ πρὸς 
> A »” > / ὦ ε “- 
αὐτὸ ἄγουσαι εἶεν, of ἀφικομένῳ ὥσπερ ὁδοῦ 
5 ,ὔ nn ΜΝ ‘ / “ / ΕἸ ἘΞ 
ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας. Οὐκέτ᾽, 
1 ἔτι ἀδυναμία Tamblichus: ἐπ᾽ ἀδυναμίᾳ ADM, ἀδυναμία F. 

2 θεῖα Mss., bracketed by Stallbaum: θέα Ast and Apelt. 
Adam once proposed «καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅσα πυκνά τε kal A>eia. 

* See crit. note, The text of lamblichus is the only reason- 
able one. The reading of the manuscripts is impossible. 
For the adverb modifying a noun cf. 558 B οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν 
σμικρολογία, Laws 688 B σφόδρα γυναικῶν, with England’s 
note, Theaet. 183 © πάνυ πρεσβύτης, Laws 791 c παντελῶς 
παίδων, 698 c σφόδρα φιλία, Rep. 564 a ἄγαν δουλείαν, with 
Stallbaum’s note. 



__ inability ¢ to look directly at animals and plants and 

the light of the sun, but the ability to see the phan- 
_ tasms created by God? in water and shadows of objects 
that are real and not merely, as before, the shadows 
of images cast through a light which, compared with 
the sun, is as unreal as they—all this procedure of 
the arts and sciences that we have described indicates 
their power to lead the best part of the soul up to the 
contemplation of what is best among realities, as in 
_ our parable the clearest organ in the body was turned 
to the contemplation of what is brightest in the 
corporeal and visible region.” “1 accept this,” he 
said, “as the truth; and yet it appears to me very hard 
to accept, and again, from another point of view, hard 
to reject. Nevertheless, since we have not to hear 
it at this time only, but are to repeat it often here- 
after, let us assume that these things are as now has 
been said, and proceed to the melody itself, and go 
through with it as we have gone through the prelude. 
Tell me, then, what is the nature of this faculty of 
dialectic ? Into what divisions does it fall? And what 
are its ways? For it is these, it seems, that would 
bring us to the place where we may, so to speak, rest 
on the road and then come to the end of our journey- 

δ θεῖα because produced by God or nature and not by man 
with a mirror or a paint-brush. See crit. note and Class. 
Review, iv. Ὁ. 480. I quoted Sophist 266 n-n, and Adam with 
rare candour withdrew his emendation tn his Appendix XIIT. 
to this book. Apelt still misunderstands and emends, p. 296 
and note, 

Pi This poor Fira for the ear Pag pee of 
ato’s metaphysical philosophy generally. . Unity ὁ 
Plato’s Thought, p. 30, n. 192, What Plato ΠΕΣ ΟἿ toe i 
p. 586 on Parmen. 135 c. So Tennyson says it is hard to 

believe in God and hard not to believe. 



533 ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, οἷός τ᾽ ἔσει ἀκολουθεῖν" 

Peewee ἢ 

ἐπεὶ τό γ᾽ ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι" οὐδ᾽ 
εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι οὗ λέγομεν ἴδοις, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ 
ἀληθές, ὅ γε δή μοι φαίνεται---εἰ δ᾽ ὄντως ἢ μή 
οὐκέτ᾽ ἄξιον τοῦτο διισχυρίζεσθαι: ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μὲν 
δὴ τοιοῦτόν τι ἰδεῖν, ἰσχυριστέον. ἢ γάρ; Τί μήν; 
Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις μόνη ἂν 
/ > , Μ e ~ A /, 

φήνειεν ἐμπείρῳ ὄντι dv νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἄλλῃ 
δὲ οὐδαμῇ δυνατόν; Kai τοῦτ᾽, ἔφη, ἄξιον δι- 

/ , “- 3 > , > Ἂς ca 
ισχυρίζεσθαι. Τόδε γοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν 


Β ἀμφισβητήσει λέγουσιν, ὡς αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου 

* This is not mysticism or secret doctrine. It is, in fact, 
the avoidance of dogmatism. But that is not all. Plato 
could not be expected to insert a treatise on dialectical 
method here, or risk an absolute definition which would 
only expose him to misinterpretation. The principles and 
methods of such reasoning, and the ultimate metaphysical 
conclusions to which they may lead, cannot be expounded 
in a page or a chapter. They can only be suggested to the 
intelligent, whose own experience will help them to under- 
stand. As the Republic and Laws entire explain Plato’s 
idea of social good, so all the arguments in the dialogues 
illustrate his conception of fair and unfair argument. ΟἿ᾽ 
What Plato Said, Index s.v. Dialectics, and note καὶ below. 

> For the idiom οὐδὲν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι cf. Symp. 210 a, 
Meno 77 a, Laws 961 c, Aesch. Prom. 848, Thucyd. viii. 
22. 1, Eurip. Hippol. 285. 

ὁ On Plato’s ke ek, ca the dogmatism often attributed 
to him cf. What Plato Said, p. 515 on Meno 86 5. 

4 The mystical implications of φήνειεν are not to be pressed. 
It is followed, as usual in Plato, by a matter-of-fact state- 
ment of the essential practical conclusion (γοῦν) that no man 
can be trusted to think straight in large matters who has 
not been educated to reason and argue straight. 

* Plato anticipates the criticism that he neglects experience. 

7 i.e. dispute our statement and maintain. The meaning 
is plain. It is a case of what I have called illogical idiom. 

200 ΞΡ 

ing.” ‘‘ You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow 

_ me further,* though on my part there will be no lack § 

_ of goodwill.’ And, if I could, I would show you, no 

_ longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the 

very truth, as it appears to me—though whether 
rightly or not I may not properly affirm.° But that 
something like this is what we have to see, I must 
affirm.’ Isnotthatso?” “Surely.”’ “And may we not 
also declare that nothing less than the power of dia- 
lectics could reveal? this, and that only to one experi- 
enced “ in the studies we have described, and that the 
thing is in no other wise possible ἢ “‘ That, too,” he 
said, “we may properly affirm.” ‘This, at any rate,” 
said I, “πὸ one will maintain in dispute against us/: 
that there is any other way of inquiry 5 that attempts 

Cf. T.A.P.A. vol. xlvii. pp. 205-234. -The meaning is that 

Phi 58 π, 59 a. Other “science” may more 
interesting or useful, but sound dialectics alone fosters the 
disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake. Cf. Soph. 
235 c, Phaedr. 265-266. Aristotle, Topics i. 2. 6, practically 
comes back to the Platonic conception of dialectics. 

The full meaning of dialectics in Plato would demand a 
treatise. It is almost the opposite of what Hegelians call by 
that name, which is represented in Plato by the second part 
of the Parmenides. The characteristic Platonic dialectic is 
the checking of the stream of thought by the necessity of 
securing the understanding and assent of an intelligent 
interlocutor at every step, and the habit of noting all relevant 

isti , divisions, and ambiguities, in ideas and terms. 
When the interlocutor is used merely to relieve the strain on 
the leader’s voice or the reader’s attention, as in some of the 
later dialogues, dialectic becomes merely a literary form. 

Κα Cicero’s “via et ratione.” περὶ παντός is virtually 
identical with αὐτοῦ ye ἑκάστου πέρι. 

It is true that the scientific specialist confines himself to 
his eer tao The epee a his base ee the 
sophi oph. 231 a), is prepared to argue about anything, 
Soph. 232 c f., Luthyd. 272 a-s. at Ὁ 






πέρι, ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον, ἄλλη Tis ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος. 

_-O8@ περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν. ἀλλ᾽ αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι 

a / a“ ‘ /, > 4 em 
πᾶσαι τέχναι ἢ πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπι- 
θυμίας εἰσὶν ἢ πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ συνθέσεις ἢ 
πρὸς θεραπείαν τῶν φυομένων τε καὶ συντιθεμένων 
ἅπασαι τετράφαται: at δὲ λοιπαΐ, ἃς τοῦ ὄντος τι 
ἔφαμεν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, γεωμετρίας τε καὶ τὰς 
ταύτῃ ἑπομένας, ὁρῶμεν ὡς ὀνειρώττουσι μὲν 
περὶ τὸ ὄν, ὕπαρ δὲ ἀδύνατον αὐταῖς ἰδεῖν, Ews ἂν 
ὑποθέσεσι χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἐῶσι, μὴ 
δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν. ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν 
ὃ μὴ olde, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδε 
συμπέπλεκται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν 
ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι; Οὐδεμία, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. 

XIV. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος 
μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, 
ἐπ᾿ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἵνα βεβαιώσηται, καὶ τῷ 
ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα 

UT. supra 525 c, 527 B. 

ὃ The interpreters of Plato must allow for his Emersonian 
habit of hitting each nail in turn as hard as he can. There 
is no real contradiction between praising mathematics in 
comparison with mere loose popular thinking, and disparag- 
ing it in comparison with dialectics. There is no evidence 
and no probability that Plato is here proposing a reform of 
mathematics in the direction of modern mathematical logic, 
as has been suggested. Cf. on 5274. It is the nature of 
mathematics to fall short of dialectics. ; 

¢ Of. Phileb. 20 Β and on 520 ¢, p. 143, note g. 

4 Cf. supra on 531 τ. 

¢ The touch of humour in the expression may be illustrated 
by Lucian, Hermotimus 74, where it is used to justify Lucian’s 
scepticism even of mathematics, and by Hazlitt’s remark on 
Coleridge, “‘ Excellent talker if you allow him to start from 

no premises and come to no conclusion.” 
* Or “admission.” Plato thinks of even geometrical 



systematically and in all cases to determine what each 

_ thing really is. But all the other arts have for their 


_ object the opinions and desires of men or are wholly 

concerned with generation and composition or with 

_ the service and tendance of the things that grow 

and are put together, while the remnant which we 
said did in some sort lay hold on reality—geometry 

and the studies that accompany it—are, as we see, 
_ dreaming ὃ about being, but the clear waking vision ὃ 

of it is impossible for them as long as they leave the 
assumptions which they employ undisturbed and 
cannot give any account? of them. For where the 

ing-point is something that the reasoner does not 
know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is 
a tissue of things not really known,’ what possibility 
is there that assent‘ in such cases can ever be con- 
verted into true knowledge or science?’ “ None,” 
said he. 

XIV. “‘ Then,” said I, “15 not dialectics the only 
process of inquiry that advances in this manner, 
doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle 
itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is 
literally true that when the eye of the soul? is sunk in 
reasoning as a Socratic dialogue. Οὗ the ex. ration Οἱ 
this idea by the Epicureans in Cie. De fn. i. 21 quae et : 
falsis initiis profecta, vera esse non possunt: et si essent vera 
nihil afferunt quo iucundius, id est, quo melius yiveremus.” 

Dialectic proceeds διὰ συγχωρήσεων, the admission of the 
interlocutor. Cf. Laws 957 pv, Phaedr. 237 c-p, Gorg. 
487 ε, Lysis 219 c, Prot. 350 ©, Phileb. 12 a, Theaet. 162 a, 
169 D-E, 164 c, ps 340 8. But such admissions are not 
valid unless when challenged they are carried back to some- 
thing satisfactory—ixavdy—(not necessarily in any given 
case to the idea of good). But the mathematician as such 
in sa acg demands the admission of his postulates and 

efinitions. Cf. 510 s-p, 511 B. 

9 Cf. supra on 519 5, p. 138, note a. 



KaTopwpvypevov ἠρέμα ἕλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω, 
συνερίθοις καὶ συμπεριαγωγοῖς χρωμένη αἷς δι- 
ἤλθομεν τέχναις" ἃς ἐπιστήμας μὲν πολλάκις προσ- 
είἰπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, δέονται δὲ ὀνόματος ἄλλου, 
ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδροτέρου δὲ ἢ 
ἐπιστήμης. διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν 
που ὡρισάμεθα- ἔστι δ᾽, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ 

E ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις 


ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη" [ἀλλ᾽ ὃ 
ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ πρὸς τὴν ἔξω σαφήνειαν, ἃ λέγει 
ἐν ψυχῇ, ἀρκέσει ᾿Αρέσκει γοῦν," ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
ὥσπερ τὸ πρότερον, τὴν μὲν πρώτην μοῖραν 
ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν, δευτέραν δὲ διάνοιαν, τρίτην δὲ 
πίστιν καὶ εἰκασίαν τετάρτην" καὶ ξυναμφότερα μὲν 
ταῦτα δόξαν, ξυναμφότερα δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα νόησιν" καὶ 
δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν" 
καὶ ὅ τι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν, 
καὶ ὅ τι νόησις πρὸς δόξαν, ἐπιστήμην πρὸς πίστιν 
καὶ διάνοιαν πρὸς εἰκασίαν" τὴν δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ οἷς ταῦτα 

1 The text as printed is that of Hermann, brackets by Adam. 
ἀλλ᾽ ὃ AM, ἄλλο FD: ἕξιν σαφηνείᾳ AFDM, ἔξω σαφηνείαν 
Herm., πως τὴν ἕξιν, σαφηνείᾳ Burnet, τὴν ἕξιν πῶς ἔχει σαφηνείας 
Bywater: ἃ addidit et σαφηνείαν emendavit Herm,; λέγει AD, 

λέγειν FM, λέγεις ΑΞ: ἀρκέσει mss. See also Adam, Appendix, 
2 ἀρέσκει MSS., καὶ ἀρκέσει Burnet; γοῦν AM, οὖν FD, Burnet. 

@ Orphism pictured the impious souls as buried in mud in 
the world below ; ¢f.363 p. Again we should not press Plato’s 
rhetoric and imagery either as sentimental Platonists or hostile 
critics. See Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 463, n. 3. 

» All writers and philosophers are compelled to “speak 
with the yulgar.” ΟἿ. e.g. Meyerson, De l’explication dans 
les sciences, i. p. 329: ‘* Tout en sachant que la couleur n’est 
pas réellement une qualité de l’objet, ἃ se servir cependant, 
dans la vie de tous les jours, d’une locution qui l’affirme.” 





_ the barbaric slough* of the Orphic myth, dialectic 
gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as 
helpers and co-operators in this conversion the studies 
and sciences which we enumerated, which we called 
sciences often from habit,? though they really need 
some otherdesignation,connoting more clearness than 
opinion and more obscurity than science. “Under- 
standing, ¢ I believe, was the term we employed. But 
I presume we shall not dispute about the name? when 
ings of such moment lie before us for consideration.” 
“No, indeed,” he said.¢* * * ‘‘ Are you satisfied, 
then,” said I, “as before,f to call the first division 
science, the second understanding, the third belief 
andthe fourth conjecture or picture-thought—and the _ 
last two collectively opinion, and the first two intellec- 
tion, opinion dealing with generation, and intellection 
with essence, and this relation being expressed in the 
ion’: as essence is to generation, so is intellec- 
tion to opinion ; and as intellection is to opinion, so 
is science to belief, and understanding to image- 
thinking or surmise? But the relation between 
their objective correlates‘ and the division into two 

- Male, 511 p, pp. 116-117, note ce. 

4 This unwillingness to dispute about names when they do 
not concern the argument is characteristic of Plato. Cf. What 
Plato Said, p. 516 on Meno 78 s-c for numerous instances. 
Stallbaum refers to Max. Tyr. Diss. xxvii. p. 40 ἐγὼ γάρ roe 
τά τε ἄλλα, καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐλευθερίᾳ πείθομαι Ἠλάτωνι. 

¢ The next sentence is hopelessly corrupt and is often 
considered an interpolation. e translation omits it. See 
Adam, Appendix XVI. to Bk. VII., Bywater, Journal of 
Phil. (Eng.) v. pp. 122-124. 4 Supra 511 p-. 

* Always avoid “ faith” in translating Plato. 

= Ig on 508 c, p. 103, note ὁ. 

* That is the meaning, though some critics will object to 
the phrase. - Lit. “ the things over which these (mental states) 
are set, or to which they apply.” 



ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν διχῇ ἑκατέρου, δοξαστοῦ 
τε καὶ νοητοῦ, ἐῶμεν, ὦ ᾿᾿λαύκων, ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς 
πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἢ ὅσων οἱ παρ- 
εληλυθότες. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγ᾽, ἔφη, τά γε ἄλλα, 

> “ 4 ΄“ a > ae, 
καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναμαι ἕπεσθαι, ξυνδοκεῖ. Ἢ καὶ 
\ a ‘ , to 2? / 
διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα 
τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν μὴ 
» / Wy + / } ἔ 
ἔχῃ λόγον αὑτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ 
τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν; Πῶς 
\ * > “ ’ > ~ Si ‘ “~ 
yap av, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, φαίην; Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ 
ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως: ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ 
λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τὴν τοῦ 
ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῇ διὰ πάντων 

ἐλέγχων διεξιών, μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ οὐρίαν 
᾿ προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι naam 

τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται, οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν 
“ > 4 \ σ΄ A 4 ” > A 

φήσεις εἰδέναι τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα οὔτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν 
» tA > > " > / ‘ > ,ὔ /, 

οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴ πῃ εἰδώλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται, δόξῃ, 

4 There are two probable reasons for this: (1) The objective 
classification is nothing to Plato’s present purpose; (2) The 
second member of the proportion is lacking in the objective 
correlates. Numbers are distinguished from ideas not in 
themselves but only by the difference of method in dialectics 
and in mathematics. Cf. supra on 525 pv, 526 a, Unity of 
Plato’s Thought, pp. 83-84, and Class. Phil. xxii, (1927) 
pp. 213-218. The explicit qualifications of my arguments 
there have been neglected and the arguments misquoted but 
not answered. They can be answered only by assuming the 
point at issue and affirming that Plato did assign an inter- 
mediate place to mathematical conceptions, for which there 
is no evidence in Plato’s own writings. 

> Cf. supra.on 531 £, p. 195, note αὶ 

¢ Cf. on 511 ν, p. 116, note a. 

4 This would be superfluous on the interpretation that the 
ἱκανόν must always be the idea of good. What follows dis- 
tinguishes the dialectician from the eristic sophist.. For the 




parts of each of these, the opinable, namely, and the 
intelligible, let us dismiss,* Glaucon, lest it involve us 
in discussion many times as long as the preceding.” 
“ Well,”’ he said, “I agree with you about the rest of 
it, so far as I am able to follow.” “ And do you not 
also give the name dialectician to the man who is able 
to exact an account? of the essence of each thing? 
And will you not say that the one who is unable to 
do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an 
account to himself and others, does not possess full 
_ reason and intelligence ὁ about the matter?” “‘ How 
could I say that he does?” he réplied. “ And is not 
this true of the good likewise #—that the man who 
is unable to define in his discourse and<distifiguish 
and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea 
of the ‘good, and who cannot, as it were in battle, 
running the gauntlet® of all tests, and striving to 
examine everything by essential reality and not by 
opinion, hold on his way through all this without 
tripping’ in his reasoning—the man who lacks this 
power, you will say, does not really know the good 
itself or any particular good; but if he apprehends 

short cut, καὶ. . . ὡσαύτως, cf. 523 £, 580 p, 585 p, 346 a, 

¢ It imports little whether the objections are in his own 
mind or made by others. Thought is a discussion of the soul 
with itself (cf. Theaet. 189 ©, Phileb. 38 ©, Soph. 263 £), and 
when the interlocutor refuses to proceed Socrates sometimes 
continues the argument himself by supplying both question 
and answer, ¢.g. Gorg. 506 c ff. Cf. further Phaedrus 278 c, 
Parmen. 136 v-e, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 17. 

* Cf. Theaet. 160 v, Phileb. 45 a. The practical outcome 
= Laws 966 a-z, Phaedr. 278 c, Soph. 259 5-ο. Cf. Mill, 
Diss. and Disc. iv. p. 283: “There is no knowledge and no 
assurance of right belief but with him who can both confute 
the opposite opinion and successfully defend his own against 


PLATO : ᾿ 

οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐφάπτεσθαι, καὶ τὸν νῦν βίον 
> an ‘ ς uff \ > 799 > 
ὀνειροπολοῦντα Kal ὑπνώττοντα, πρὶν ἐνθάδ᾽ ἐξ- 
/ > 7 / > / / 
εγρέσθαι, εἰς “Αιδου πρότερον ἀφικόμενον τελέως 
ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν; Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, σφόδρα 
γε πάντα ταῦτα φήσω. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τούς γε σαυτοῦ 
παῖδας, οὗς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ 
ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν ἐάσαις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, 
ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμὰς ἄρχοντας ἐν τῇ 
πόλει κυρίους τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, 
ἔφη. Νομοθετήσεις δὴ αὐτοῖς ταύτης μάλιστα 
~ / > 4 > > lod > 
τῆς παιδείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐξ ἧς ἐρωτᾶν τε 
καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστημονέστατα οἷοί τ᾽ ἔσονται; 
E Νομοθετήσω, ἔφη, μετά γε . *Ap’ οὖν δοκεῖ 

σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ θῥῤιγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ 
διαλεκτικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαΐϊ, καὶ οὐκέτ᾽ ἄλλο 
τούτου μάθημα ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι, 
ἀλλ᾽ ἔχειν ἤδη τέλος τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων; "Ἐμοιγ᾽, 
ἔφη. Ἁ 3 > 4 A / 

XV. Διανομὴ τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸ λοιπόν σοι, 
τίσι ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα δώσομεν καὶ τίνα τρόπον. 
Δῆλον, ἔφη. Μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν Ἀν ε ς 
τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἵους ἐξελέξαμεν; Πῶς γάρ, ἢ δ᾽ 
σ »᾿ Ἁ A 3, , 4 3 >? A > , 
ὅς, οὔ; Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐκείνας 

« For εἰδώλου ef. on 532 B, p. 197, note e. This may be one 
of the sources of Hist. vii. 342 B. 

» For Platonic intellectualism the life of the ordinary man 
is something between sleep and waking. Cf. Apol. 31 a. 
Note the touch of humour in τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν. Cf. 
Bridges, Psychology, p. 382: ‘There is really no clear-cut 
distinction between what is usually called sleeping and 
waking. In sleep we are less awake than in the waking 
hours, and in waking life we are less asleep than in sleep.” 

¢ Plato likes to affirm his ideal only of the philosophic 



_ any adumbration? of it, hiscontact with itis by opinion, 
not by knowledge; and dreaming and dozing 
his present life, before he awakens here he 

will arrive at the house of Hades and fall asleep for | 
- ever?®” “Yes, by Zeus,” said he, “all this I will 
stoutly affirm.” “But, surely,” said I, “if you 

should ever nurture in fact your children ° whom you 

are now hurturing and educating in word,’ you would 
not suffer them, I presume, to hold rule in the state, 
and determine the greatest matters, being them- 
selves as irrational® as the lines so called ingeometry.” 
“Why, no,” he said. ‘Then you will provide by 
law that they shall give special heed to the discipline 
that will enable them to ask and answer’ questions 
in the most scientific manner?” “I willso legislate,” 
he said, “‘ in conjunction with you.” “‘ Do youagree, 
then,” said I, “‘ that we have set dialectics akove all 
other studies to be as it were the coping-stone ὅ- 
that no other higher kind of stu uld rightly be 
placed above it, but that our discussion of studies is 
now complete”?” ‘I do,” he said. : 
_ XV. “ The distribution, then, remains,” said I, “ to 
whom we are to assign these studies and in what way.” 
“Clearly,” he said. “ Do you remember, then, the 
kind of man we chose in our former selection* of 
rulers?” “ΟΥ̓́ course,” he said. “‘In most re- 
spects, then,” said I, “ you must suppose that we 
4 Cf. 376 νυ, 369 c, 472 κε, Critias 106 a. 

* A slight touch of humour. Cf. the schoolgirl who said, 
“These equations are inconsiderate and will not be solved.” 

? A frequent periphrasis for dialectics. Cf. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον 
aici Gorg. 461 ©, Charm. 166 νυ, Prot. 338 p, Ale. 1. 


5 For ὥσπερ θριγκός cf. Eur. Here. Fur. 1280, Aesch. Ag. 
1283; and Phileb. 58 c-p ff. 

* Cf. 541 B. * Cf. 412 v-£, 485-487, 503 a, c-E. 
VOL. II P 209 



\ 4 ΜΝ a > ,ὔ ‘ 
τὰς φύσεις οἴου δεῖν ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι" τούς τε yap 
᾽ὔ A \ 5 ὃ / ,ὔ 
βεβαιοτάτους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρειοτάτους ἤροαιρετέον, 
καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τοὺς εὐειδεστάτους: πρὸς δὲ 
τούτοις ζητητέον μὴ μόνον γενναίους τε καὶ 
βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἤθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ τῇδε τῇ παιδείᾳ 
Lin ΄ , ε ΤΡ vale 
τῆς φύσεως πρόσφορα ἑκτέον αὐτοῖς. [οἵα 
, ’ , τ ΣΎ ΣΈ δ Harbe 
διαστέλλει ὶ Δριμύτητα, ὦ μακάριε, ἔφην, δεῖ αὖ- 
τοῖς πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρχειν, καὶ μὴ. ρος 
“- a ' > , φφ Δ: 
πῶς μανθάνειν: πολὺ γάρ τοι μᾶλλον ἀποδειλιῶσι 
a 2 ryt: 7, 
ψυχαὶ ἐν ἰσχυροῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐν γυμνασίοις" 
οἰκειότερος γὰρ αὐταῖς ὁ πόνος, ἴδιος ἀλλ᾽ οὐ 
κοινὸς ὧν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος. ᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη. Καὶ 
μνήμονα δὴ καὶ ατὸν καὶ πάντῃ φιλόπονον 
nTnTéov. ἤ τινὶ τρόπῳ οἴει τά τε τοῦ σώματος 
edi} vis ar \ ͵ Dohirly. 
ἐθελήσειν τινὰ διαπονεῖν Kal τοσαύτην μάθησιν τε 
καὶ μελέτην ἐπιτελεῖν; Οὐδένα, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐὰν 
\ ΄ ,, 3. ed τ \ ~ ~ ε 4 
μὴ παντάπασί γ᾽ ἢ (εὐφυής. To γοῦν viv ἁμάρ- 
t A 
Tha, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ ἀτιμία φιλοσοφίᾳ διὰ 
ταῦτα προσπέπτωκεν, ὃ καὶ πρότερον elroy, ὅτι 
a ὶ 3) 
οὐ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν αὐτῆς ἅπτονται: οὐ γὰρ νόθους ἔδει 
hd > A 7 Π ~ ” Il 7 
ἅπτεσθαι, ἀλλὰ γνησίους. Πῶς; ἔφη. Iparov 
μέν, εἶπον, φιλοπονίᾳ οὐ χωλὸν δεῖ εἶναι τὸν 
ἁψόμενον, τὰ μὲν ἡμίσεα φιλόπονον, τὰ δ᾽ ἡμίσεα 
ἄπονον: ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν τις φιλογυμναστὴς μὲν 
καὶ φιλόθηρος ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος 

φιλοπονῇ, φιλομαθὴς δὲ μή, μηδὲ φιλήκοος μηδὲ 

5 RLY, as well as physically. Cf. 357 a, Prot. 
350 85 f. 

» Cf. Symp. 209 8-c, Phaedr. 252 © and Vol, I. p. 261 on 
402 Ὁ. Ascham, The Schoolmaster, Bk. I. also approves of 
this qualification. © For βλοσυρούς ef. Theaet. 149 a. 

4 ΟἹ, 504 a, 374 π, Gorg. 480 c, Protag. 326 c, Euthyphro 



ee ee 


have to choose those same natures. The most stable, 
the most brave and enterprising ¢ are to be prefcrresl; 
and, so far as practicable, the most comely.? But in 
addition we must now require that they not only be 
virile and vigorous ° in temper, but that they possess 
also the gifts of nature suitable to this type of educa- 
tion.” “* What qualities are you distinguishing ? ’ 
“They must have, my friend, to begin with, a certain 
or study, and must not learn with difficulty. 
souls are much more likely to flinch and faint? in 
severe studies than in gymnastics, because the toil 
touches them more nearly, being peculiar to them and 
not shared with the body.” “‘ True,” he said. “‘ And 
we must demand a good memory and doggedness and 
industry ὁ in every sense of the word. Otherwise how 
do you suppose anyone will consent both to undergo 
all the toils of the body and to complete so great a 
course of study and discipline? ’’ “No one could,” 
he said, “ unless most happily endowed.” “‘ Our 
present mistake,” said I, “and the disesteem that 
has in consequence fallen upon philosophy are, as I 
said before,’ caused by the unfitness of her associates 
and wooers, They should not have been bastards?” but 
true scions.” ‘What do you mean?” he said. “In 
the first place,” I said, “the aspirant to philosophy 
must not limp” in his industry, in the one half of him 
loving, in the other shunning, toil. This happens when 
anyone is a lover of gymnastics and hunting and all 
the labours of the body, yet is not fond of learning or 

* The qualities of the ideal student again. Cf. on 487 a. 

7 Cf. supra 495 c ff., pp. 49-51. 

? Montaigne, i. 24 (vol. i. p. 73), “165 Ames boiteuses, les 
bastardes et vulgaires, sont indignes de la philosophie.” 

* Cf. Laws 634 a, Tim. 44 ο. 




ζητητικός, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις μισοπονῇ" χωλὸς 
} δὲ καὶ ὁ τἀναντία τούτου μεταβεβληκὼς τὴν 
/ φιλοπονίαν. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν 
ὃ» Kal πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἀνά- 
Τὶ πῆρον ψυχὴν θήσομεν, ἣ ἂν τὸ μὲν ἑκούσιον 
ψεῦδος μισῇ καὶ χαλεπῶς. φέρῃ αὐτή τε καὶ ἑτέ ων 
ψευδομένων ὑ ὑπεραγανακτῇ, τὸ δ᾽ ἀκούσιον εὐκό ως 
προσδέχηται καὶ ἀμαθαίνουσά που ἁλισκομένη μὴ 
ἀγανακτῇ, ἀλλ᾽ εὐχερῶς ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον. ἐν 
536 ἀμαθίᾳ “μολύνηται; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 
Καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνδρείαν 
καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς 
μέρη οὐχ ἥκιστα δεῖ φυλάττειν τὸν νόθον τε καὶ 
τὸν γνήσιον, ὅταν γάρ τις μὴ ἐπίστηται τὰ τοιαῦτα 
σκοπεῖν καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πόλις, λανθάνουσι χωλοῖς 
τε καὶ ψόθοις χρώμενοι, πρὸς ὅ Tt ἂν τύχωσι τού- 
τῶν, οἵ μὲν φίλοις, οἱ δὲ a ἄρχουσι. Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, 
οὕτως ἔχει. Ἢ piv, δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα 
B διευλαβητέον, ὡς ἐὰν μὲν ἀρτιμελεῖς τε Kal ἀρτί- 
ppovas ἐπὶ τοσαύτην μάθησιν καὶ τοσαύτην 
ἄσκησιν κομίσαντες παιδεύωμεν, 7 τε δίκη ἡμῖν 
οὐ μέμψεται αὐτή, τήν τε πόλιν καὶ πολιτείαν 
σώσομεν, ἀλλοίους δὲ ἄγοντες ἐπὶ ταῦτα τἀναντία 

« Of. 548 π, Lysis 206 c, μά. 274 c, 804 ο, and Vol. I. 
p. 515, on 475 Ὁ. 

ὃ Of. supra 382 A-B-c. 

¢ Of. Laws 819 Ὁ, Rep. 372 Ὁ, Politicus 266 c, and my note 
in Class. Phil. xii. (1917) pp. 308-310. Cf. too the proverbial 
ds γνοίη, Laches 196 τὸ and Rivals 134 a; and Apelt’s 
emendation of Cratyl. 393 c, Progr. Jena, 1905, p. 19. 

@ Of. 487 a and Vol. I. p. 261, note ¢ on 402 c. The 
cardinal virtues are not rigidly fixed in Plato. Cf. on 427 Ὲ, 
Vol. I. p. 346. 



ee .... 


of listening * or inquiring, but in all such matters hates 
work. And he too is lame whose industry is one- 
sided in the reverse way.” ‘‘ Most true,” he said. 
“Likewise in respect of truth,” I said,“ we shall 
regard as maimed in precisely the same way the soul 
that hates the voluntary lie and is troubled by it in 
its own self and greatly angered by it in others, but 
cheerfully accepts the involuntary falsehood ὃ and is 
not distressed when convicted of lack of knowledge, 
but wallows in the mud of ignorance as insensitively 
as a pig.” “ By all means,” he said. “And with 
reference to sobriety,” said I, “and bravery and 
loftiness of soul? and all the parts of. virtue,’ we 
must especially be on our guard to distinguish the 
base-born from the true-born. For when the know- 
ledge necessary to make such discriminations is lack- 
ing in individual or state, they unawares employ at 
random‘ for any of these purposes the crippled and 
base-born natures, as their friends or rulers.” “It 
is so indeed,” he said. “ But we,” I said, “‘ must be 
on our guard in all such cases, since, if we bring men 
sound of limb and mind to so great a study and so 
Severe a training, justice herself will have no fault 
to find’ with us, and we shall preserve the state and 
our polity. But, if we introduce into it the other sort, 

ε Plato is using ordinary language and not troubling him- 
self with the problem of Protag. 329 τὸ (What Pan Said, 
p- πὶ and Laws 633 a (What Plato Said, p. 624). Cf. also 
on D. 

7 πρὸς 5 τι ἂν τύχωσι: lit. “ for whatsoever they happen to of 
these (services).”” Cf. Symp. 181 8, Prot. 353 a, Crito 44 το 
and 45 p, Gorg. 522 c, Laws 656 c, Rep. 332 8, 561 p, Dem. 
iv. 46, Isoc. Panath. 25, 74, 239, Aristot. Met. 1013 a 6. 

* Cf. supra 487 a. For δίκη ef. Hirzel, Dike, Themis und 
Verwandtes, p. 116. 



πάντα καὶ πράξομεν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἔτι πλείω 
έλωτα καταντλήσομεν. Αἰσχρὸν μέντ᾽ ἂν εἴη, 
ἣ δ᾽ Os. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, εἶπον" γελοῖον δ᾽ ἔγωγε 
καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ἔοικα παθεῖν. Τὸ ποῖον; x: ‘ 
C ᾿Επελαθόμην, ἢ ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐπαίζομεν, καὶ ον 
ἐντεινάμενος εἶπον. λέγων γὰρ ἅμα ἔβλεψα πρὸς 
φιλοσοφίαν, καὶ ἰδὼν προπε λακισμένην ἀναξίως 
ἀγανακτήσας μοι δοκῶ καὶ ὥσπερ θυμωθεὶς. τοῖς 
τὰν σπουδαιότερον εἰπεῖν ἃ εἶπον. Οὐ μὰ τὸν 
᾽ ἔφη, οὔκουν ὥς γ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἀκροατῇ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὡς 
] rie ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ῥήτορι. τόδε δὲ μὴ ἐπιλανθανώ- 
| μεθα, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῇ “προτέρᾳ ἐκλογῇ πρεσβύτας 
_ ἐξελέγομεν, ἐν δὲ «(Ταύτῃ οὐκ ἐγχωρήσει: Σόλωνι 
D yap οὐ πειστέον, ὡς γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατὸς 
μανθάνειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἧττον 7 τρέχειν, νέων δὲ πάντες 
οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι. ᾿Ανάγκη, ἐφὴ. 
XVI. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν λογισμῶν τε καὶ γεω- 
μετριῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς προπαιδείας, ἣ ἣν τῆς δια- 
λεκτικῆς δεῖ ,προπαιδευθῆναι, παισὶν οὖσι χρὴ 
προβάλλειν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπάναγκες μαθεῖν τὸ 
τῆς διδαχῆς ποιουμένους. Τί δή; Ὅτι, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
E οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλεύθερον χρὴ 

4 καταντλήσομεν : ef. 344 Ὁ. 

δ Jest and earnest are never far apart in Plato. Fabl 
about justice is an old man’s game, Laws 685 a, 769 a. Life 
itself is best treated as play, Laws 803 c. Science in Tim. 
59 Ὁ is παιδιά, like literature in the Phaedrus 276 p-x, ibid. 
278 5. Cf. Friedlander, Platon, i. pp. 38 and 160, and What 
Plato Said, pp. 553 and 601. 

¢ For similar self-checks cf. Laws 804 8, 832 B, 907 B-c, 
Phaedr. 260 v, 269 8. For ἐντεινάμενος cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. 
Clouds 969. 



the outcome will be just the opposite, and we shall 

_ pour astill greater flood? of ridicule upon philosophy.” 
e That would indeed be shameful,”’ he said. “‘ Most 
certainly,” said I; “but here again I am making 
myself a little ridiculous.” “ In what way?” “I 
forgot,” said I, “that we were jesting,” and I spoke 
too great intensity. For, while speaking, I 
turned my eyes upon philosophy,? and when I saw 
how she is undeservedly reviled, I was revolted, and, 
as if in anger, spoke too earnestly to those who are 
in fau “ No, by Zeus, not too earnestly for me® as 

a hearer.” © “‘ But too much so for me'as a speaker,” 
I said. “ But this we must not forget, that in our 
former selection we chose old men, but in this one 
that will not do. For we must not take Solon’s’ word 
for it that growing old a man is able to learn many 
He is less able to do that than to run a race, 

Tothe young? belong all heavy and frequent labours.” 

“* Necessarily,” he sai 

XVI. “ Now, all this study of reckoning and geo- 
metry and all the preliminary studies that are indis- 
pensable preparation for dialectics must be presented 
to them while still young, not in the form of compulsory 
instruction.””” “‘Whyso?” “Because,” said I, “a 
free soul ought not to pursue any study slavishly ; for 

4 Cf. Isoc. Busiris 49. Whatever the difficulties of the 
chronbiog it is hard to believe that this is not one of Isocrates’ 
many endeavours to imitate Platonic effects. 

* Cf. Soph. 226 c, Sophocles, Ajax 397. 

Η τάς ζυβα δ᾽ ἀεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος, “I grow old ever learn- 
ing man a % Cf. Laches 188 a-p; Otto, p. 317. 

9 Cf. t. ee take This has been misquoted to the effect 
that Plato said the young are the best philosophers. 

_ *® This and παίζοντας below (537 a) anticipate much modern 
kindergarten rhetoric. 





μανθάνειν. ot μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος πόνοι βίᾳ 

πονούμενοι χεῖρον οὐδὲν τὸ σῶμα ἀπεργάζονται, 
ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον “μάθημα. ᾿Αληθῆ, 
ἔφη. Μὴ τοίνυν βίᾳ, εἶπον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοὺς παῖδας 
ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἀλλὰ παίζοντας τρέφε, ἵνα καὶ 
μᾶλλον. οἷός τ᾽ ἧς καθορᾶν ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἕκαστος πέφυκεν. 
Ἔχει ὃ λέγεις, ἔφη, λόγον. Οὐκοῦν μνημονεύεις, 
ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἔφαμεν. τοὺς 
παῖδας εἶναι ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων θεωρούς, καὶ 
ἐάν που ἀσφαλὲς ἢ, προσακτέον ἐγγὺς καὶ γευ- 
στέον αἵματος, ὥσπερ τοὺς σκύλακας; Μέμνημαι, 
ἔφη. Ἔν πᾶσι δὴ τούτοις, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τοῖς τε 
πόνοις καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ φόβοις, ὃς ἂν ἐντρεχέ- 
στατος ἀεὶ φαίνηται, εἰς ἀριθμόν τινα ἐγκριτέον. 
Ἔν τίνι, ἔφη, ἡλικίᾳ; Ἡνίκα, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῶν 
ἀναγκαίων. γυμνασίων. “μεθίενται. οὗτος “γὰρ ὁ 
χρόνος, ἐάν τε δύο ἐάν τε τρία ἔτη γίγνηται, 
ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πρᾶξαι. κόποι γὰρ καὶ ὕπνοι, 
μαθήμασι πολέμιοι: καὶ ἅμα μία καὶ αὕτη͵ τῶν 
βασάνων οὐκ ἐλαχίστη, τίς ἕκαστος ἐν τοῖς γυμ- 
νασίοις φανεῖται. ἸΙΪῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη. Mera 
δὴ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐκ τῶν εἰκοσι- 

* Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. 858, says Aristotle Valente 
this distinction, Pol. 1338 b 40 μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφότερα 
γυμνάσια χρυὰ σίδ δον: τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην 
πόνους ἀπείργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ἦ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν. 

> Of. 424 2-425 a, Laws 819 π5-Ὸ, 648 5-Ὁ, 797 A-B, Polit. 
308 Ὁ. 

Cf. the naive statement in Colvin and Bagley, Human 


EE ἀἕἐοβῆϑδεδιδις 


while bodily labours * performed under constraint do 
not harm the body, nothing that is learned under com- 
pulsion stays with the mind.” “True,” he said. “Do 
not, then, my friend, keep children to their studies 
_ by compulsion but by play.’ That will also better 
_ enable you to discern the natural capacities of each.” 
_ “There is reason in that,” he said. “ And do you not 
_ remember,’’ I said, “‘ that we also declared * that we 
_ must conduct the children to war on horseback to be 
_ spectators, and wherever it may be safe, bring them 
to the front and give them a taste of blood as we do 
_ with whelps?” “I do remember.” “And those who 
__as time goes on show the most facility in all these toils 
_ and studies and alarms are to be selected and enrolled 
_ ona list.4” “At what age?” hesaid. ‘‘ When they 
are released from their prescribed gymnastics. For 
that period, whether it be two or three years, incapaci- 
tates them for other occupations.’ For great fatigue 
and much sleep are the foes of study, and moreover 
one of our tests of them, and not the least, will be 
their behaviour in their physical exercises.’ ἡ “Surely 
it is,’ he said. “‘ After this period,” I said, “ those 
who are given preference from the twenty-year class 

Behaviour, Ὁ. 41: “‘ The discovery [sic /] by Karl Groos that 

play was actually a preparation for the business of later life 

was almost revolutionary from the standpoint of educational 
sory and practice.” 

© Cf. supra 467, Vol. I. pp. 485-487. 

4 éyxpréov: cf. 413 το, 377 c, 486 pv, Laws 802 B, 820 ἡ, 
936 A, 952 a. 

* Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1339 a7 f. dua yap τῇ τε διανοίᾳ καὶ τῷ 
σώματι διαπόνεῖν οὐ δεῖ, etc.; Plut. De Ed. Puer. 11, De 
Tuenda San. c. 25, quoted by Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 
359, are irrelevant to this passage, but could be referred to 
the balancing of music and gymnastics in 410-412, 

7 Cf. Laws 829 B-c. 



ετῶν ot | ἱπροκριθέντες τιμάς τε μείζους τῶν ἄλλων 
οἴσονται, τά τε χύδην μαθήματα παισὶν ἐν τῇ 
παιδείᾳ γενόμενα τούτοις συνακτέον εἰς σύνοψιν 
οἰκειότητος ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ 
ὄντος φύσεως. Μόνη γοῦν, εἶπεν, ἡ τοιαύτη 
/ / > bal > / A , 
μάθησις βέβαιος ἐν οἷς ἂν ἐγγένηται. Kat μεγίστη β 
γε, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πεῖρα διαλεκτικῆς φύσεως καὶ μή 
ς \ \ \ , ey q st} ᾿ 
ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς. διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ μὴ οὔ. 
Ἑυνοίομαι, ἦ δ᾽ ἃς, Tatra τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 

ΠῚ... ee 

Εἰ δεήσει σε ἐπισκοποῦντα, οἵ ἂν μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι 
ἐν αὐτοῖς ὦσι καὶ μόνιμοι μὲν ἐν μαθήμασι, μό- 
> > ͵ \ a ΝΜ ! 
νιμοι δ᾽ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις νομίμοις, 
΄ δε, .,.4 \ \ ΄, γι ; my 
τούτους αὖ, ἐπειδὰν τὰ τριάκοντα ἔτη ἐκβαίνωσιν, 
ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων προκρινάμενον εἰς μείζους τε 
τιμὰς καθιστάναι καὶ σκοπεῖν, τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι 
δυνάμει βασανίζοντα, τίς ὀμμάτων Kai τῆς ἄλλης 
αἰσθήσεως δυνατὸς μεθιέμενος ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃν μετ᾽ 
ἀληθείας ἰέναι. καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς φυλακῆς 

α σύνοψιν: cf. 581 Ὁ. This thought is endlessly repeated 
by modern writers on education. Cf. Mill, Diss. and Disc, 
iv. 336; Bagley, The Mducative Process, p. 180: ‘* The theory 
of concentration proposed by Ziller . . . seeks to organize 
all the subject matter of instruction into a unified system, 
the various units of which shall be consciously related to one 
another in the minds of the pupils’’; Haldane, The Philo- 
sophy of Humanism, Ὁ. 94: “‘ There was a conference attended 
by representatives of various German Universities . . . which 
took place at Hanstein, not far from Géttingen in May 1921. 

. The purpose of the movement is nominally the establish- 
ment of a Humanistic Faculty.. But in this connexion 
‘faculty’ does not mean @ separate faculty of humanistic 
studies. . . . The real object is to bring these μὰς τυ οι into | 
organic relation to one another.” "ἢ 

218 ; 


will receive greater honours than the others, and they 
will be required to gather the studies which they dis- 
connectedly pursued as children in their former educa- 
tion into a comprehensive survey? of their affinities 

_ with one another and with the nature of things.” 

“ That, at any rate,” he said, “ is the only instruction 

_ that abides with those who receive it.”’ “‘ And it is 

also,”’ said I, “ the chief test of the dialectical nature 

_ and its opposite. For he who can view things in their 

connexion is a dialectician; he who cannot, is not.” 

_“Teoncur,” hesaid. “‘ With these qualities in mind,” 
I said, “ it will be your task to make a selection of 
_ those who manifest them best from the group who are 
_ steadfast in their studies and in war and in all lawful 
_ requirements, and when they have passed the thirtieth 

year to promote them, by asecond selection from those 
preferred in the first,’ to still greater honours, and 
to prove and test them by the power of dialectic® to 
see which of them is able to disregard the eyes and 
other senses? and go on to being itself in company with 
truth. And at this point, my friend, the greatest 

Of. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, vol. i. p. 4 “So 

| true is it that, as Plato puts it, the metaphysician is a 

‘synoptical’ man.” Cf. Aristot. Soph. El. 167 a 38 
διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνορᾶν τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. Stenzel, 
Dialektik, p. 8, misuses the δήνεα to support the view 
that Plato’s dialectic still looks for unity and not for 
pets and distinctions, as in the Sophist. Cf. also ibid. 
p. 72. 

ὃ For the technical meaning of the word προκρίτων ef. 
Laws 753 π5-ν. 

* For this periphrasis ef. Phaedr. 246 p, Tim. 858. Cf. also 
on 509 a. 

4 The reader of Plato ought not to misunderstand this 
now. Cf. supra on 532 a, pp. 196 f., note d, and 530 8, 
p. 187, note c. 


a i 
i a 
’ μι 


ἔργον, ὦ ἑταῖρε. Ti μάλιστα; ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐκ ev- 
E νοεῖς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸ νῦν περὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι κακὸν 
γιγνόμενον ὅσον γίγνεται; Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη. Lapa- 
νομίας που, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐμπίπλανται. Καὶ μάλα, 
ἔφη. Θαυμαστὸν οὖν τι οἴει, εἶπον, πάσχειν ad- 
τούς, καὶ οὐ ξυγγιγνώσκεις; Πῇ μάλιστα; ἔφη. 
Οἷον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἴ τις ὑποβολιμαῖος “τραφείη ἐὶ 
πολλοῖς. μὲν χρήμασι, πολλῷ δὲ καὶ μεγάλως γέ 
538 καὶ αξὲὶ πολλοῖς, ἀνὴρ δὲ γενόμενος αἴσθοιτο, 
ὅτι οὐ τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν φασκόντων γονέων, τοὺς 
δὲ τῷ ὄντι γεννήσαντας μὴ εὕροι, τοῦτον ἔχεις 
μαντεύσασθαι, πῶς ἂν διατεθείη πρός τε τοὺς κό- 
λακας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὑποβαλομένους ἐν ἐκείνῳ τε 
τῷ χρόνῳ, ᾧ οὐκ ἤδει τὰ περὶ τῆς ὑποβολῆς, καὶ 
ἐν ᾧ αὖ ἤδει; ἢ βούλει ἐμοῦ μαντευομένου ἀκοῦσαι; 
Βούλομαι, ἔφη. Sy 
XVII. Μαντεύομαι τοίνυν, εἶπον, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν 
Β τιμᾶν ἂν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τοὺς 
ἄλλους οἰκείους δοκοῦντας ἢ τοὺς κολακεύοντας, 
καὶ ἧττον μὲν ἂν περιιδεῖν ἐνδεεῖς τινός, ἧττον δὲ 

α Plato returns to an idea suggested in 498 a, and warns 
against the mental confusion and moral unsettlement that 
result from premature criticism of life by undisciplined minds. 
In the terminology of modern education, he would not 
encourage students to discuss the validity of the Ten Com- 
mandments and the Constitution of the United States before 
they could spell, construe, cipher, and had learned to dis- 
tinguish an undistributed middle term from a petitio 
principii. Cf. Phaedo 89 v-x. 

We need not suppose with Grote and others that this 
involves any “reaction” or violent change of the opinion he 
held when he wrote the minor dialogues that portray such — 
discussions. In fact, the still later Sophist, 230 B-c-p,is more ~ 
friendly to youthful dialectics. i 

Whatever the effect of the practice of Socrates or the — 



care is requisite.” ‘‘Howso?” he said. ‘‘Do you 
not note,”’ said I, “how great is the harm caused by 
our present treatment of dialectics?” ‘‘ What is 
that? ’’hesaid. ‘‘Its practitioners are infected with 
_ lawlessness.?”” “‘ They are indeed.” ‘‘ Do you sup- 
_ pose,” I said, “that there is anything surprising in this 
state of mind, and do you not think it pardonable ὁ ὃ ἢ 
_ “Tn what way, pray?” he said. ‘‘ Their ” gai 

I, “resembles that of a supposititious son re 
abundant wealth and a great and numerous famil 


amid many figtterers) who on arriving at ma 
hould. become aware that he is ot the child of 
_ those who call themselves his parents, and should 
not be able to find his true father and mother. 
Can you divine what would be his feelings towards 
the flatterers and his supposed parents in the time 
when he did not know the truth about his adoption, 
and, again, when he knewit? Or would you like to 
hear my surmise?” “I would.” 

XVII. “‘ Well, then, my surmise is,” I said, “that 
he would be more likely to honour his reputed father 
and mother and other kin than the flatterers, and 
that there would be less likelihood of his allowing 
them to lack for anything, and that he would be less 

_ Sophists, Plato himself anticipates Grote’s criticism in the 
_ Republic by representing Socrates as discoursing with in- 
uous youth in a more simple and edifying style. Cf. 
is 207 vp ff., Buthydem. 278 £-282 c, 288 v-290 pv. Yet 
again the Charmides might be thought an exception. 
Cf. also Zeller, Phil. d. Griechen, ii. 1, p. 912, who seems 
to consider the Sophist earlier than the Republic. 
δ i.e. they call all restrictions on impulses and instincts 
tyrannical conventions. C/. Gorg. 483-484, Aristoph. Clouds, 
passim, and on nature and law ¢/. Vol. I. p. 116, note a, on 

359 c. 
* Cf. on 494 a, p. 43, note ὁ. 


παράνομόν τι δρᾶσαι ἢ εἰπεῖν εἰς αὐτούς, ἧττον δὲ 
ἀπειθεῖν τὰ μεγάλα ἐκείνοις ἢ τοῖς κόλαξιν, ἐν ᾧ 
χρόνῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὴ εἰδείη. Εἰκός, ἔφη. Αἰσθό- 
μενον τοίνυν τὸ ὃν μαντεύομαι. αὖ περὶ μὲν τούτους 
ἂν τὸ τιμᾶν τε καὶ σπουδάζειν, περὶ δὲ 
κόλακας ἐπιτεῖναι, καὶ πείθεσθαί τε αὐτοῖς 
C διαφερόντως ἢ πρότερον καὶ ζῆν ἂν ἤδη κατ᾽ 
ἐκείνους, ξυνόντα αὐτοῖς ἀπαρακαλύπτως, πατρὸς 
δὲ ἐκείνου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιουμένων οἰκείων, εἰ 
μὴ πάνυ εἴη φύσει ἐπιεικής, μέλειν τὸ μηδέν. 
Πάντ᾽, ἔφη, λέγεις οἷά περ ἂν γένοιτο. ἀλλὰ πῇ 
πρὸς τοὺς ἁπτομένους τῶν λόγων αὕτη φέρει ἡ 
εἰκών; Τῇδε. ἔστι που ἡμῖν δόγματα ἐκ παίδων 
περὶ δικαίων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐκτεθράμμεθα 
ὥσπερ ὑπὸ γονεῦσι, πειθαρχοῦντές τε καὶ τιμῶντες 
αὐτά. "Ἔστι γάρ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλα ἐναντία 
τούτων “ἐπιτηδεύματα ἡδονὰς ἔχοντα, ἃ κολακεύει 
μὲν ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἕλκει ἐφ᾽ αὑτά, πείθει δ᾽ 

οὗ Ree rere μι ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τιμῶσι 
τὰ πάτρια εἵνοις πειθαρχοῦσιν. "Ἔστι ταῦτα. 

4 * διαφερόντως ἢ πρότερον : rh Phaedo 85 8. 

ὃ οἷά περ ἂν γένοιτο is the phrase Aristotle uses to distinguish 
the truth of poetry from the facts of history. 

¢ That is the meaning. Lit. ‘‘those who lay hold on 

4 Plato’s warning applies to our day no less than to_ his 
own. Like the proponents of ethica nihilism in Plato’s 
Athens, much of our present-day literature and 
questions all standards of morality and aesthetics, and con- 
fuses justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness. Its gospel 
is expressed in Mr. Oppenheim’s lines: 



inclined to do or say to them anything unlawful, and 
_ less liable to disobey them in great matters than to 
{ disobey the flatterers—during the time when he did 
ποῖ know the truth. »~ “Tt is probable,” he said. 
“ But when he foy _the truth, I surmise that 

_ to them and pay-more-refard to the flatterers, whom 
he would heed more than before * and would hence- 
_ forth live by their rule; associating with them openly, 
_ while for that former father and his adoptive kin he 
would not care at all, unless he was naturally of a 
very good disposition. ΚΑΙ that you say,” he 
_ replied, “would be likely tohappen.’ But what is the 
pertinency of this comparison to the novices of 
dialectic®?”” “Itisthis. Wehave, I takeit, certain 
convictions ἃ from childhood about the just and the 
honourable, in which, in obedience and honour to 
them, we have been bred as children under their 
parents.” “Yes, we have.” “And are there not 
other practices going counter to these, that have 
pleasures attached to them and that flatter and 
solicit our souls, but do not win over men of any 
decency ; but they continue to hold in honour the 

of their fathers and obey them?” “It is 

Let nothing bind you. 

If it is duty, away with it. 

If itis law, disobey it. 

If it is opinion, go against it. 

There is only one divinity, yourself, 

Only one god, you. 
For the unsettling effects of dialectic ef. Phaedo 90 8; also 
Sa hemes I see grb Bernard psa p. 249: he πνεῖν ΩΝ have 

slu at anything that woke them u 
μετ οὐπῴδ είν ing. . Noone.. \aliec inicabelaih 40 
our age merely by as asking questions ‘unless he can answer 
the question.” Cf. also on 537 p, p. 220, note a. 



Τί οὖν; ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ: ὅταν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐλθὸν 
ἐρώτημα ἔρηται, τί ἐστι τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἀποκρινα- 
μένου, ὃ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἤκουεν, ἐξελέγχῃ ὁ λόγος, 
καὶ πολλάκις καὶ πολλαχῆ ἐλέγχων εἰς δόξαν 
Ἑ καταβάλῃ, ὡς τοῦτο οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ 
αἰσχρόν, καὶ περὶ δικαίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀγαθοῦ 
καὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἦγεν ἐν τιμῇ, μετὰ τοῦτο τί οἴει 
ποιήσειν αὐτὸν πρὸς αὐτὰ τιμῆς τὲ πέρι καὶ 
πειθαρχίας; «᾿Ανάγκη, ἔφη, μήτε τιμᾶν ἔτι ὁμοίως 
μήτε πείθεσθαι. Ὅταν οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μήτε ταῦτα 

/ A > ~ σ Ἁ - , 
Cre τίμια Kal οἰκεῖα, ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ, τά TE 
“- ᾿ ; -- a ‘ μι 
639 ἀληθῆ μὴ εὑρίσκῃ, ἔστι πρὸς ὁποῖον βίον ἄλλον ἢ 

τὸν κολακεύοντα εἰκότως προσχωρήσεται; Οὐκ 
ἔστιν, ἔφη. Παράνομος δή, οἶμαι, δόξει γεγο- 
νέναι ἐκ νομίμου. ᾿Ανάγκη. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην, εἰκὸς 
τὸ πάθος τῶν οὕτω λόγων ἁπτομένων καί, ὃ ἄρτι 
ἔλεγον, πολλῆς συγγνώμης ἄξιον; Kat ἐλέου γ᾽, 
ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἵνα μὴ γίγνηται 6 ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ 
τοὺς τριακοντούτας σοι, εὐλαβουμένῳ παντὶ τρόπῳ 
τῶν λόγων ἁπτέον; Kat μάλ᾽, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. *Ap’ οὖν 
Bod μία μὲν εὐλάβεια αὕτη συχνή, τὸ μὴ νέους 

α The question is here personified, as the λόγος so often is, 
e.g. 503 a. Cf. What Plato Said on Protag. 361 a-s. 

> A possible allusion to the καταβάλλοντες λόγοι of the 
sophists. Cf. Buthydem. 277 Ὁ. 288 a, Phaedo 88 c, Phileb. 
15 © and What Plato Said, p. 518, on Crito 272 B. 

¢ This is the moral counterpart of the intellectual scepti- 4 





so.” “ Well, then,” said I, “when a man of this kind 

met by the question,* ‘ What is the honourable ?’ 

_ and on his giving the answer which he learned from 

the lawgiver, the argument confutes him, and by 
many and yarious refutations upsets” his faith and 
makes him believe that this thing is no more honour- 
able than it is base,’ and when he has had the same 
experience about the just and the good and every- 
thing that he chiefly held in esteem, how do you 
suppose that he will conduct himself thereafter in the 
matter of respect and obedience to this traditional 
morality δ᾿ ““It is inevitable,” he said, “that he 
will not continue to honour and obey as before.” 
“ And then,” said I, “‘ when he ceases to honour 
these principles and to think that they are binding 
on him,? and cannot discover the true principles, will 
he be likely to adopt any other way of life that 
which flatters his desires*?’’ ‘‘ He will not,” he said. 
“ He will, then, seem to have become a rebel to law 
and convention instead of the conformer that he 
was.” “Necessarily.” ‘‘ And is not this experience 
of those who take up dialectics in this fashion to 
be expected and, as I just now said, deserving of 
much leniency ?”’ “‘ Yes, and of pity too,” he said. 
“ Then that we may not have to pity thus your thirty- 
year-old disciples, must you not take every pre- 
caution when you introduce them to the study of 
dialectics? *’ *‘ Yes, indeed,’’ he said. . ‘‘ And is it 
not one chief safeguard not to suffer them to taste 

cism or μισολογία of Phaedo 90 σὺν. Cf. What Plato Said, 
p. 531, on Phaedo 89 "Ὁ. 

4 For οἰκεῖα ef. supra 433 £, 443 pv, and Class. Phil. xxiv. 
(1929) pp. 409-410. 

* Cf. Laws 633 © and supra 442 a-s. Others render it, 
“than the life of the flatterers (parasites).””. Why not both? 

VOL, II Q ᾿ 225 

ὄντας αὐτῶν γεύεσθαι χ οἶμαι γάρ σε οὐ λεληθέναι 

ὅτι οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γεύ- 
“-- A ~ ye he Pas 

wvrat, ὡς παιδιᾷ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, ἀεὶ εἰς 
2 a NANI, , ᾿ “ΔΙ τῶν ς ἐλᾷ 1 
ἀντιλογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγ- 
χοντας αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι, χαίροντες ὥσπερ 
σκυλάκια τῷ ἕλκειν TE καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ ἰλόγῳ 
τοὺς πλησίον ἀεί, Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν - 

Ε ~ -“ ὃ Ἁ λλ 4 A Φ" ‘ ὅλ, γε. qv 
Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δὴ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοὶ ἐλέ ὑσίν, ὑπ. πὸ 

C πολλῶν δὲ ἐλεγχθῶσι, σφόδρα καὶ ταχὺ ἐμπίπτουσιν 

εἰς τὸ μηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι ὧνπερ πρότερον: καὶ ἐκ 
, \ > , \ δ ὦ , ; " gio 
τούτων δὴ. αὐτοί τε Kal τὸ ὅλον φιλοσοφίας πέρι 
εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληνται. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη. 
Ὅ ὃ \ ὃ \ + ὃ᾽ > , a \ ; oe) 
€ δὴ πρεσβύτερος, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τῆς μὲν τοι- 
/ / > a 2 7 ‘ A 
avrns μανίας οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοι μετέχειν, τὸν δὲ 
διαλέγεσθαι ἐθέλοντα καὶ σκοπεῖν τἀληθὲς μᾶλλον 
μιμήσεται ἢ τὸν παιδιᾶς χάριν παίζοντα καὶ 
ἀντιλέγοντα, καὶ αὐτός τε μετριώτερος ἔσται καὶ 
ΣΝ Σ 7 > > /, : % : 
TO ἐπιτήδευμα τιμιώτερον ἀντὶ ἀτιμοτέρου ποιήσει. 
Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ προειρημένα τούτου 

pF > 7 / A " “ete 
ἐπ᾿ εὐλαβείᾳ πάντα a ee τὸ Tas φύσεις 

, 5 {5} ΄ Φ ΚΠ ἢ 
κοσμιοὺυς ELVOL και (OTAGL us οἱς TLS PETAOWOEL 

@ See on 498 a-s. Cf. Richard of Bury, Philobiblon 
(Morley, A Miscellany, pp. 49-50) : ‘* But the contemporaries 
of our age negligently apply a few years of ardent youth, 
burning by turns with the fire of vice; and when they have 
attained the acumen of discerning a doubtful truth, they 
immediately become involved in extraneous business, retire, 
and say farewell to the schools of philosophy; they sip the 

frothy must of juvenile wit over the difficulties of philosophy, 

and pour out the purified old wine with economical care.” 

ὃ Cf. Apol. 23 ο, Phileb. 15", Xen. Mem. i. 2. 46, Isoc. 
xii. 26 and x. 6; also Friedlander, Platon, ii. p. 568. 

¢ But in another mood or from another angle this is the 
bacehic madness of philosophy which all the company in the 




of it while young?®. For I fancy you have not failed 
to obserye that lads, when they first get a taste of 
disputation, misuse it as a form of sport, always em- 
ploying it contentiously, and, imitating confuters, 
they themselves confute others.” They delight like 
puppies in pulling about and tearing with words all 
who approach them.” “Exceedingly so,~ he said. 
“ And when they have themselves many 
and been confuted by many, they quickly fall into 
a violent distrust of all that they formerly held true ; 
and the outcome is that they themselves and the 
whole business of philosophy are discredited with 
other: men.” ‘‘ Most true,” he said. “‘ But an 

bring credit rather than discredit upon Suit. 
“ Right,” he said. . “ And were not.all our preceding 
statements made with a view to this precaution— 
our requirement that those permitted to take part in 
such discussions must have orderly and stab! natures, 

Symposium have shared, 218 a-s. Cf. also Phaedr. 245 s-c, 
249 c-x, Sophist 216 pv, Phileb. 15 v-£, and What Plato 
Said, p. 493, on Protag. 317 p-£. 

4 Of. Gorg. 500 πο. Yet the prevailing seriousness of 
Plato’s own thought does not exclude touches of humour and 
irony, and he vainly warns the modern reader to distinguish 
between jest and earnest in the drama of disputation in his 
dialogues. Many misinterpretations of Plato’s thought are 
due to the failure to heed this warning. Cf. ¢.g. Gorgias 
474 a (What Plato Said, p. 504), which Robin, L’ Année 
Philos. xxi. p. 29, and others miss, Rep. 376 8, Symp. 196 c, 
Protag. 339 f., Theaet. 157 a-B, 160 8, 165 B, and passim. 
Cf. also on 536 c, p. 214, note ὁ. 



τῶν λόγων, καὶ μὴ ὡς νῦν ὃ τυχὼν καὶ οὐδὲν 
προσήκων ἔρχεται ἐπ᾽ αὐτό; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 

XVII. ᾿Αρκεῖ δὴ ἐπὶ λόγων μεταλήψει μεῖναι 
ἐνδελεχῶς καὶ ξυντόνως, μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττοντι, 
ἀλλ᾽ ἀντιστρόφως γυμναζομένῳ τοῖς περὶ τὸ σῶμα 

E γυμνασίοις, ἔτη διπλάσια ἢ τότε; “EE, ἔφη, ἢ 


τέτταρα λέγεις; ᾿Αμέλει, εἶπον, πέντε θές. μετὰ 
γὰρ τοῦτο καταβιβαστέοι ἔσονταί σοι εἰς τὸ 
, A ile ow 
σπήλαιον πάλιν ἐκεῖνο, Kal ἀναγκαστέοι ἄρχειν 
τά τε περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ὅσαι νέων ἀρχαί, ἵνα 
3 » / ¢ ~ ~ » \ ” \ 
μηδ᾽ ἐμπειρίᾳ ὑστερῶσι τῶν ἄλλων" καὶ ἔτι καὶ 
5 εἴ 
ἐν τούτοις βασανιστέοι, εἰ ἐμμενοῦσιν ἑλκόμενοι 
πανταχόσε ἢ TL καὶ παρακινήσουσιν. Χρόνον δέ, 
e Ὁ « , ᾿Ξ , LIAGELS Σῳ 
ἡ δ᾽ ὅς, πόσον τοῦτον τίθης; Πεντεκαΐδεκα. ἔτη, 
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ. γενομένων δὲ πεντηκοντουτῶν τοὺς 
διασωθέντας καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας πάντα πάντῃ ἐν 
ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαις πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἀκτέον, 
καὶ ἀναγκαστέον ἀνακλίναντας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς 
> 4 > 9 1 9 , A a γε ΠΑ 
αὐγὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον, 

4 For the idiom μὴ ὡς viv ete. cf. supra on 410 B οὐχ. 

ὥσπερ: also 610 v, Gorg. 522 a, Symp. 179 π, 189 c, Epist. 
vii. 333 a, Aristoph. Knights 784, Eurip. Bacchae 929, II. 
xix. 403, Od. xxiv. 199, xxi. 427, Dem. iv. 34, Aristot. De an. 
414 a 22. 

» It is very naive of modern commentators to cavil at the 
precise time allotted to dialectic, and still more so to infer 
that there was not much to say about the ideas. Dialectic 
was not exclusively or mainly concerned with the meta- 
physics of the ideas, It was the development of the reason- 
ing powers by rational discussion. 

@ Cf, 519.c ff., pp. 139-145. 

4 Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 13 seems to copy this. Cf. on 484 Ὁ. 



_ instead of the present practice * of admitting to it any 
_ chance and unsuitable applicant?’’ “By all means,” 
| XVIII. “ Is it enough, then, to devote to the con- 
tinuous and strenuous study of dialectics undisturbed 
by anything else, as in the corresponding discipline 
in bodily exercises, twice as many years as were 
allotted to that?” “Do you mean six or four?” he 
said. “Well,” I said, “set it down as ἔνε. ὃ For 
after that you will have to send them down into the 
cave ° again, and compel them to hold commands in 
war and the other offices suitable to youth,so that they 
may not fall short of the other type in experience? 
either. Andin these offices, too, they are to be tested 
to see whether they will remain steadfast under 
diverse solicitations or whether they will flinch and 
swerve.*”’ “ον much time do you allow for that?” 
he said. “ Fifteen years,” said I, “‘ and at the age 
of fifty’ those who fame survived the tests and ap- 
proved themselves altogether the best in every task 
and form of knowledge must be brought at last to the 
goal. We shall require them to turn upwards the 
vision of their souls? and fix their gaze on that which 
sheds light on all; and when they have thus beheld 

Critics of Plato frequently overlook the fact that he in- 
sisted on practical experience in the training of his rulers, 
Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 5, points out that this experience 
takes the place of special training in political science. 

© Cf. ὑποκινήσαντ᾽, Aristoph. Frogs 643. 

* An eminent scholar quaintly infers that Plato could not 
have written this page before he himself was fifty years old. 

σ΄ Plato having made his practical meaning quite clear 
feels that he can safely permit himself the short cut of 
rhetoric and symbolism in summing it up.. He reckoned 
without Neoplatonists ancient and modern. Cf. also on 
519 8, p. 138, note a. 



καὶ ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, “παραδείγματι. χρω- 
μένους ἐκείνῳ, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς 
Β κοσμεῖν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον ἐν μέρει ἑκάστους, τὸ 
μὲν πολὺ πρὸς φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας, ὅταν δὲ 
τὸ μέρος ἥκῃ, πρὸς πολιτικοῖς ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας 
καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑκάστους τῆς πόλεως ἕ ἕνεκα, οὐχ ὡς 
καλόν τι ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράττοντας, καὶ 
οὕτως ἄλλους ἀεὶ παιδεύσαντας τοιούτους, ἀντι- 
καταλιπόντας τῆς πόλεως φύλακας, εἰς “μακάρων 
νήσους ἀπιόντας οἰκεῖν" μνημεῖα. δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ 
C θυσίας τὴν πόλιν δημοσίᾳ. ποιεῖν, ἐὰν καὶ ἡ Πυθία 
, ξυναναιρῇ, ὡς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς εὐδαίμοσί τε 
καὶ θείοις. Ἰ[αγκάλους, «ἔφη, τοὺς “ἄρχοντας, ὦ 
Σώκρατες, ee ἀπείργασαι. Kai 
τὰς ἀρχούσας γε, ἥν "δ᾽ ἐγώ, « ὦ Trade: μηδὲν 
\ γάρ τι οἴου με περὶ ἀνδρῶν εἰρηκέναι. μᾶλλον. a 
εἴρηκα ἢ ἢ περὶ γυναικῶν, ὅσαι ἂν αὐτῶν ἱκαναὶ τὰς 
φύσεις ἐγγίγνωνται. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφη. εἴπερ ἴσα γε 
πάντα τοῖς ἀνδράσι κοινωνήσουσιν, ὡς διήλθομεν. 
D Τί οὖν; ἔφην" ξυγχωρεῖτε περὶ τῆς πόλεώς τε καὶ 
πολιτείας μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι, 
ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μέν, δυνατὰ δέ πῃ, καὶ οὐκ. ἄλλῃ ἢ 


« Of. supra 500 5-π. For παράδειγμα ef. 592 5 and What 
Plato Said, p. 458, on Luthyphro 6 ©, and p. 599, on Polit. 
277 νυ. 

δ Of. 520 pv. © Cf. 347 c-p, 520 π. 

4 Plato’s guardians, unlike Athenian statesmen, could 
train their successors. Cf. Protag. 319 Ἐ-890 8, Meno 99 zs. 
Also ἄλλους ποιεῖν Meno 100 a, Gorg. 449 B, 455 c, Huthyph. 
3 c, Phaedr. 266 c, 268 5, Symp. 196 £, Protag. 348 x, As 
Demon. 3, Panath. 28, Soph. 13, Antid. 204, Xen. Oecon. 15. 
10, and παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, generally used of the sophists, 
ον. 519 x, Protag. 317 5, Huthyd. 306 ©, Laches 186 Ὁ, 
Rep. 600 c 


late δ. μων," ω,. . 


the good itself they shall use it as a pattern? for the 
right ordering of the state and the citizens and them- 
 selyes throughout the remainder of their lives, each 
in his turn,’ devoting the greater part of their time to 
the study of philosophy, but when the turn comes for 
each, toiling in the service of the state and holding 
office for the city’s sake, regarding the task not as 
a fine thing but a necessity®; and so, when each 
generation has educated others? like themselves to 
take their place as guardians of the state, they shall 
depart to the Islands of the Blest * and there dwell. 
And the state shall establish public memorials’ and 
sacrifices for them as to divinities if the Pythian oracle 
approves? or, if not, as to divine and godlike men.*”” | 
*“A most beautiful finish, Socrates, youhave put upon | 
your rulers, as if you were a statuary.*’’ “Andon | 
the women / too, Glaucon,” said 1; “‘ for you must not 
suppose that my words apply to the men more than 
to all women who arise among them endowed with 
the requisite qualities.” “‘ That is right,” he said, 
“if they are to share equally in all things with the 
men as we laid it down.” ‘“ Well, then,” said I, “ do 
you admit that our notion of the state and its polity 
is not altogether a day-dream,* but that though it is 
difficult,’ it is in a way possible ™ and in no other way 

¢ Cf. p. 139, noted. Plato checks himself in mid-flight and 
wistfully smiles at his own idealism. Cf. on 536 '8-c, also 
540c and 509c. Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, p. 170. 

7 Cf. Symp. 209 τ. 

9 For this caution cf. 461 © and Vol. I. p. 344, note c, on 

427 ς. 
Ὁ Plato plays on the words δαίμων and εὐδαίμων. Cf. also 
Crat. 398 B-c. # Of. 361 v. 3 Lit. ** female rulers.” 
llr lil t Cf. 499 pn. 
™ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 564 on Rep. 472 8-2, and supra 
p. 65, note h, on 499 p. 




εἴρηται, ὅταν of ws ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται, ἢ 
πλείους ἢ εἷς, ἐν πόλει γενόμενοι τῶν μὲν νῦν 
τιμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ἡγησάμενοι ἀνελευθέρους 
εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίας, τὸ δὲ ὀρθὸν περὶ πλείστου 

E ποιησάμενοι καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτου τιμάς, μέγιστον 

δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ 
ὑπηρετοῦντές τε καὶ αὔξοντες αὐτὸ διασκευω- 
ρήσωνται τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν; Πῶς; ἔφη. Ὅσοι 
μὲν ἄν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πρεσβύτεροι τυγχάνωσι δεκετῶν 
ἐν τῇ πόλει, πάντας ἐκπέμψωσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀγρούς, 
τοὺς δὲ παῖδας αὐτῶν παραλαβόντες ἐκτὸς τῶν 
νῦν ἠθῶν, ἃ καὶ οἱ γονῆς ἔχουσι, θρέψωνται ἐν τοῖς 
σφετέροις τρόποις καὶ νόμοις, οὖσιν οἵοις διυ- 
ἐληλύθαμεν τότε: καὶ οὕτω τάχιστά τε καὶ ῥᾷστα 
πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν, ἣν ἐλέγομεν, καταστᾶσαν 
αὐτήν τε εὐδαιμονήσειν καὶ τὸ ἔθνος ἐν ᾧ ἂν 
ἐγγένηται πλεῖστα ὀνήσειν; Πολύ γ᾽, ἔφη" καὶ 
ὡς ἂν γένοιτο, εἴπερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο, δοκεῖς μοὶ, ὦ 
Σώκρατες, εὖ εἰρηκέναι. Οὐκοῦν ἅδην ἤδη, εἶπον 
ἐγώ, ἔχουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι περί τε τῆς πόλεως 
ταύτης καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου ταύτῃ ἀνδρός; δῆλος γάρ που 
καὶ οὗτος, οἷον φήσομεν δεῖν αὐτὸν εἶναι. Δῆλος, 
ἔφη" καὶ ὅπερ ἐρωτᾷς, δοκεῖ μοι τέλος ἔχειν. 

@ Cf. 418 c-p, 499 B-c. 

> Cf. supra 521 B, 516 σ-Ὁ. 

© τὸ ὀρθόν: of. Theaet. 171 c, Meno 99 a. 

4 This is another of the passages in which Plato seems to 
lend support to revolutionaries. Cf. supra Ὁ. 71, note g. It 
is what the soviets are said to be doing. Lowell points out 
that it is what actually happened in the New England of 

Cf. Laws 752 c, where it is said that the children would 
accept the new laws if the parents would not. Cf. supra 




than that described—when genuine philosophers,* 
many or one, becoming masters of the state scorn? 
the present honours, regarding them as illiberal and 
worthless, but prize the right® and the honours that 
come from that above all things, and regarding 
justice as the chief and the one indispensable thing, 
in the service and maintenance of that reorganize and 
administer their city?” ‘‘ In what way?” he said. 
“ΑἸ inhabitants above the age of ten,” I said,“ they 
_ will send out into the fields, and they will take over 
the children,? remove them from the manners and 
habits of their parents, and bring them up in their 
own customs and laws which will be such as we have 
described. This is the speediest and easiest way 
in which such a city and constitution as we have por- 
trayed could be established and prosper and bring 
most benefit to the people among whom it arises.” 
“ Much the easiest,” he said, “ and I think you have 
well explained the manner ofits realization if it should 
ever be realized.” ‘Then,’ said I, ““have we not now 
said enough” about this state and the corresponding 
type of man—for it is evident what our conception of 
him will be?” “It is evident,” he said, “and, to 
answer your question, I think we have finished.” 
_ 415 v, and. also What Plato Said, p. 625, on Laws 644 4 and 
p. 638, on 813 pb. Ἶ 

‘There is some confusion in this passage between the 
imauguration and the normal conduct of the ideal state, and 
Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 439 calls the idea “ ein hingewor- 
fener Einfall.” But Plato always held that the reformer 
must have or make a clean slate. Cf. 501 a, Laws 735 5. 
And he constantly emphasizes the supreme importance of 
education; Rep. 377 a-B, 423 πὶ 416 c, Laws 641 B, 644 a-z, 
752 c, 765 E-766 a, 788 c, 804 bv. 

For παραλαβόντες cf. Phaedo 82 © παραλαβοῦσα. 
δ᾽ Cf. 535 a. 


= at COTO ee 

H | B24 

ὕ48 I. Elev: ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ὡμολόγηται, ὦ Ῥλαύκων, 
τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως οἰκεῖν πόλει κοινὰς μὲν. 

γυναῖκας, κοινοὺς δὲ παῖδας εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν 
παιδείαν, ὡσαύτως δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα κοινὰ ἐν 
πολέμῳ τε καὶ εἰρήνῃ, βασιλέας δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι 

A > , ‘ ᾿ ‘ / 1 J 
τοὺς ev φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον yeyo- — 

, ΣΕΥ͂, « 4, ΝΜ ay A \ 
votas ἀρίστους. ᾿Ὡμολόγηται, ἔφη. Kat μὴν καὶ 
Β τάδε ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, ὡς, ὅταν δὴ καταστῶσιν οἱ 
ν ») e ~ 
ἄρχοντες, ἄγοντες τοὺς στρατιώτας κατοικιοῦσιν 

> / a / ες σο»"» 
εἰς οἰκήσεις οἵας προείπομεν, ἴδιον μὲν οὐδὲν 
οὐδενὶ ἐχούσας, κοινὰς δὲ πᾶσι: πρὸς δὲ ταῖς 
τοιαύταις οἰκήσεσι καὶ τὰς κτήσεις, εἰ μνημονεύεις, 
διωμολογησάμεθά που οἷαι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς. ᾿Αλλὰ 
μνημονεύω, ἔφη, ὅτι γε οὐδὲν οὐδένα φόμεθα δεῖν 

Ἢ a - εὖν “ r‘> ΄ ἵ 
κεκτῆσθαι ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὥσπερ δὲ ἀθλητάς τε 
πολέμου καὶ φύλακας, μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς δεχο- 
μένους εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν τὴν εἰς ταῦτα τροφὴν παρὰ τῶν 
ἄλλων, αὑτῶν τε δεῖν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως 

« Strictly speaking, this applies only to the guardians, 
but cf. Laws 739 c ff. Aristotle, Pol. 1261 a 6 and 1262 a 
41, like many subsequent commentators, misses the point. 

> Of. supra 445 p and What Plato Said, p. 539, on Menea. 
238 c-pD. 

© So Jowett. Adam ad loc. insists that the genitive is 
partitive, ‘“‘ those of their number are to be kings.’ 



ete - BOOK VIII 

I. “Very good. We are agreed then, Glaucon, 
that the state which is to ἜΣ, λυ the height of good 
vernment must have community* of wives and 
children and all education, and also that the pursuits 
of men and women must be the same in peace and 
war, and that the rulers or kings” over them” are to be 
those who have approved themselves the best in both 
war and philosophy.” “γε are agreed,” he said. 
“And we further granted this, that when the rulers are 
established in office they shall conduct these soldiers 
and settle them in habitations 4 such as we described, 
that have nothing private for anybody but. are 
common forall, and in addition to such habitations 
we agreed, if you remember, what should be the 
nature of their possessions.’’’ “ Why, yes, I re- 
member,” he said, “that we thought it right that 
none of them should have anything that ordinary men’ 
now possess, but that, being as it were athletes? of 
war and guardians, they should receive from the others 
as pay” for their guardianship each year their yearly 
sustenance, and devote their entire attention to the 
Ὁ Cf. 415 ε. * Cf. 416 c. 
9 Cf. on 403 and 521 p. Polyb. i. 6. 6 ἀθληταὶ γεγονότες 
ἀληθινοὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔργων. 
* Of. 416 ε. 


> a A 
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. ᾿Ορθῶς, ἔφην, λέγεις. ἀλλ᾽ aye, 
> -“ ? ~ 
ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἀπετελέσαμεν, ἀναμνησθῶμεν, πόθεν 
δεῦρο ἐξετραπόμεθα, ἵνα πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἴωμεν. 
> ~ 
Od χαλεπόν, ἔφη. σχεδὸν γάρ, καθάπερ viv, ws 
διεληλυθὼς περὶ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς λόγους ἐποιοῦ 
λέγων, ὡς ἀγαθὴν μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην, οἵαν τότε 
D ὃ AAG. θ / 5A. \ » ὃ \ > / ὦ 
ιῆλθες, τιθείης πόλιν, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν ἐκείνῃ ὅμοιον, 
\ ~ e ” , wv 4 > ~ / 
Kal ταῦτα, ὡς ἔοικας, καλλίω ἔτι ἔχων εἰπεῖν πόλιν 
544 τε καὶ ἄνδρα: ἀλλ᾽ οὖν δὴ τὰς ἄλλας ἡμαρτημένας 
ἔλεγες, εἰ αὕτη ὀρθή. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν 
Μ ει 
ἔφησθα, ὡς μνημονεύω, τέτταρα εἴδη εἶναι, ὧν καὶ 
πέρι λόγον ἄξιον εἴη ἔχειν καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν τὰ 
ς ΄ ᾿ \ 5 Ἤν en cit | a 
ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τοὺς ἐκείναις ad ὁμοίους, ἵνα 
πάντας αὐτοὺς ἰδόντες καὶ ὁμολογησάμενοι τὸν 
ἄριστον καὶ τὸν κάκιστον ἄνδρα ἐπισκεψαίμεθα, εἰ 
6 ἄριστος εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ 6 κάκιστος ἀθλιώ- 
τατος ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοι: καὶ ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου, τίνας 
Β λέγοις τὰς τέτταρας πολιτείας, ἐν τούτῳ ὑπέλαβε 
Πολέμαρχός τε καὶ ᾿Αδείμαντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ σὺ 

« Of. Vol. I. p. 424, note c, and What Plato Said, p. 640, 
on Laws 857 c. ‘ 

> Cf. 449 A-B. ¢ Of, Aristot. Pol. 1275 Ὁ 1-2, 1289 b 9. 

4 Aristot. Pol. 1291-1292 censures the limitation to four. 
But cf. supra, Introd. p. xlv. Cf. Laws 693 p, where only two 
mother-forms of government are mentioned, monarchy and 
democracy, with Aristot. Pol. 1301 Ὁ 40 δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. 
Cf. also Eth. Nic. 1160 a 31 ff. The Politicus mentions 
seven (291 f., 301 f.). Isoc. Panath. 132-134 names three 
kinds—oligarchy, democracy, and monarchy—adding that 
others may say much more about them. See note ad /oc. in 
Loeb Isocrates and Class. Phil. vol. vii. p. 91. Cf. Hobbes, 
Leviathan 19 “ Yet he that shall consider the particular 
commonwealths that have been and are in the world will ποῦ 





_ care of'themselves and the state.” ‘‘ That is right,” 
I said. .“ But now that we have finished this topic 

let us recall the point at which we entered on the 

ession® that has brought us here, so that’ we 

may proceed on our way again by the same path.” 
“That is easy,” he said; “ for at that time, almost 

exactly as now, on the supposition that you had 
finished the description of the city, you were going 

on to say® that you assumed such a city as you 
then described and the corresponding type of man 
to be good, and that too though, as it appears, you 
had a still finer city and type of man to tell of; 
but at any rate you were saying that the others are 
aberrations,’ if this city is right. But regarding the 

other constitutions, my recollection is that you said © 

there were four species? worth speaking of* and 
observing their defects and the corresponding types 
of men, in order that when we had seen them all and 
come to an agreement about the best and the worst 
man, we might determine whether the best is the 
happiest and the worst most wretched or whether 
it is otherwise.” And when I was asking what were 
the four constitutions you had in mind, Polemarchus 
and Adeimantus thereupon broke in, and that was 
how you took up the discussion again and brought 

perhaps easily reduce them to three . . . as, for example, 
elective kingdoms,”’ ete. 

© For ὧν καὶ πέρι λόγον ἄξιον εἴη cf. Laws 908 Β ἃ καὶ δια- 
κρίσεως ἄξια, Laches 192 a οὗ καὶ πέρι ἄξιον λέγειν, Tim. 82 c ἕν 
γένος ἐνὸν ἄξιον ἐπωνυμίας. ΟἿ. αἰδο Euthydem. 279 c, Aristot. 
Pol. 1272 Ὁ 32, 1302 a 13, De part. an. 654 a 13, Demosth. 
vy. 16, Isoc. vi. 56, and Vol. I. p. 420, note f, on 445 c. 

7 For the relative followed by a demonstrative ef. also 
357 B. 

5 Plato’s main point again. Cf. 545 a, 484 a-pand Vol. I. 
p. xii, note ὦ. 



ἀναλαβὼν τὸν λόγον δεῦρ᾽ ἀφῖξαι. ᾿θρθότατα, 
i hae My SIONS ae, Πάλιν τοίνυν, ὥσπερ παλαι- 

στής, τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν πάρεχε, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμοῦ 
ἐρομένου πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἅπερ τότε ἔμελλες λέγειν. 
᾽᾿Ἔάανπερ, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγ; δύνωμαι: Καὶ μήν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, 
ἐπιθυμῶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκοῦσαι τίνας SMS ‘Tas 
τέτταρας πολιτείας. Οὐ χαλεπῶς, ἦν ὃ ἐγώ, 
ἀκούσει. εἰσὶ γὰρ ἃς λέγω, darn Kal ὀνόματα 
ἔχδυσδ; ἥ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐ Seba me ἡ Kpy- 
τική TE καὶ ἀμρωνμτὴ αὕτη" καὶ δευτέρα καὶ 
δευτέρως STOOL NEI, καλουμένη δ᾽ ὀλιγαρχία, 
᾿ συχνῶν γέμουσα κακῶν πολιτεία: ἥ τε ταύτῃ 
δα φορὸς καὶ ἐφεξῆς γϊγνομενὴ δημοκρατία, καὶ 
γενναία δὴ τυραννὶς καὶ πασῶν τούτων δια- 
φέρουσα, τέταρτόν τε καὶ ἔσχατον πόλεως νόσημα. 
ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἥτις καὶ ἐν 
εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινὲ κεῖται; δυναστεῖαι γὰρ καὶ 
ὠνηταὶ βασιλεῖαι. καὶ τοιαῦταί τινες πολιτεῖαι 
μεταξύ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν, εὕροι δ᾽ ἄν τις αὐτὰς 

« Cf. on 572 B, p. 339, note ὁ. 

» Cf. Phileb. 13 Ὁ εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας, Phaedr. 236 B, Laws 682 Ἐν 
Aristoph. Clouds 551 (Blaydes), Knights 841, Lysist. 672. 

¢ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Sophist 267 p. 

4 Cf. Crito 52 8, Norlin on Isoc. Nicocles 24 (Loeb), Laws 
712 v-z, Aristot. Pol, 1265 b.32, Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 15. 

© ἡ, υ «αὔτη σαν (Cf. Midsummer Night's Dream, τ. iis 
ad fin. and Gorg. 502 5, 452 E. 

7 Of course ironical. Cf. supra 454 a, and What Plato 
Said, p. 592, on Soph. 231 8. 

g Cf. 552 c, Protag. 322 pv, Isoc. Hel. 34, Wilamowitz on 





may have been thinking of Carthage. Cf. Polyb. vi. 56. 4. 


ἕο this point.” “Your memory is most exact,” 
I said. “ A second time then, as in a wrestling- 
_ to say.” ‘“‘ I will if I can,” said 1. “ And indeed,” 


match, offer me the same hold,’ and when I repeat 
my question try to tell me what you were then about 

said he, “1 am eager myself to hear what four 
forms of government you meant.” “ There will be 

no difficulty about that,” said I. “* For those I mean 
are precisely those that have names* in common 
_ usage : that which the many praise,* your® Cretan 

and Spartan constitution ; and the second in place 

_ and in honour, that which is called oligarchy, a con- 

stitution teeming with many ills, and its sequent 

_ counterpart and opponent, democracy ; and then the 
_ noble’ tyranny surpassing them all, the fourth and 
_ final malady 9 ofa state.. Can you mention any other 

type” of government, I mean any other that. con- 

_ stitutes a distinct species‘? For, no doubt, there are 
hereditary principalities’ and purchased* kingships, 

and similar intermediate constitutions. which one 

_ Eurip. Heracles 542. For the effect of surprise ef. Rep. 
554 a, 373 a, 555 a, Theaet. 146 a, Phileb. 46 a κακόν and 

64 © συμφορά. 

® ἰδέαν : cf. Introd. p. x. 

* Cf. 445 c. For διαφανεῖ ef. Tim. 60 a, 67 a, Laws 634 ο, 
and infra on 548 c, p. 253, note g. 

i δυναστεῖαι: cf. Laws 680 8, 681 pv. But the word 

usually has an invidious suggestion. See Newman on 

Aristot. Pol. 1272 Ὁ 10. Cf. ibid. 1292 Ὁ 5-10, 1293. a 31, 
1298 a 32; also Lysias ii. 18, where it is opposed to demo- 
cracy, Isoc. Panath. 148, where it is used of the tyranny of 
Peisistratus, ibid. 43 of Minos. » Cf. Panegyr. 39 and Norlin 

_on Panegyr. 105 (Loeb). . Isocrates also uses it frequently 

of the power or sovereignty of Philip, Phil..3, 6, 69, 133, 
ete. Cf. also Gorg. 492 8, Polit. 291 ν. 
* Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 35 thinks that»Plato 



οὐκ ἐλάττους περὶ τοὺς. βαρβάρους 7 τοὺς “Ἕλληνας. 
Πολλαὶ: γοῦν καὶ ἄτοποι, ἔφη, λέγονται. > see, ΤῈ 
Il. Otc? οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ , ἀνθρώπων | 
| εἴδη, τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων * εἶναι, ὅσαπερ καὶ | 
πολιτειῶν; ἢ οἴει ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς 
πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν 
Ε ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἃ ἂν. ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα τἄλλα 
ἐφελκύσηται; Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγ᾽ , ἔφη, ἃ ἄλλοθεν ἢ 
᾿ ἐντεῦθεν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πέντε, κ καὶ αἱ 
ΙΪ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κατασκευαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε ἂν εἶεν. 
\ Τώμην;͵, Tov μὲν. δὴ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ὅμοιον δι- 
| εληλύθαμεν ἤδη, ὃν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον. ὀρθῶς 
545 φαμὲν εἶναι. Διεληλύθαμεν. “Ap οὖν τὸ μετὰ 
τοῦτο διιτέον τοὺς χείρους, τὸν φιλόνικόν͵ τε καὶ 
φιλότιμον, κατὰ τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἑστῶτα πολιτείαν, 
καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὸν αὖ καὶ δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τὸν 
τυραννικόν, ἵνα τὸν ἀδικώτατον ἰδόντες ἀντιθῶμεν | 
TO δικαιοτάτῳ καὶ ἡμῖν τελέα Ὰ σκέψις ἢ, πῶς : 
more ἡ ἄκρατος δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν τὴν 
ἄκρατον ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας τε πέρι τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ 

α Plato, as often, is impatient of details, for which he was 
rebuked by Aristotle. Cf. also Tim. 57 τ, 67. c, and the 
frequent leaving of minor matters to future legislators in the 
Republic and. Laws, Vol. I. p. 294, note 6, on 4128. . 

ὃ For the correspondence of individual and state cf. also 
435 Ἐ, 445 cop, 579 c and on 591 πε. Cf. Laws 829 a, Isoc: 
Peace 120. 

¢ Or ‘“‘stock or stone,” 2.6. inanimate, insensible things. 
For the quotation ἐκ δρυός» ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας of. Odyssey 
xix. 163, Jl. xxii. 126 aliter, Apol. 34 Ὁ ol 
Phaedrus 275 Bs also Stallbaum ad loc. 

4 The “ mores,” 435 2,436.4. Of. Bagehot, Physics and. 
Politics, p. 206: “A lazy nation may be changed into an 
industrious, a rich into a poor, a religious into a profane, 


Thompson on 



could find in even greater numbers among the bar- 
barians than among the Greeks.*”” “Certainly many 
strange onés are reported,”’ he said. 

_ IIL. “ Are you: aware, then,” said I, “ that there 
must be as many types of character among men as 
there are forms of government’? Or do you suppose 
that constitutions spring from the proverbial oak 
or rock © and not from the characters ὅ of the citizens, 
which, as it were, by their momentum and weight 
in the scales* draw other things after them?” 
“They could not possibly come from any other 
source,” he said. “ Then if the forms of government 
are five, the patterns of individual souls must be 
five also.” “‘ Surely.”’ “‘ Now we have already de- 
scribed the man corresponding to aristocracy 7 or the 
government of the best, whom we aver to be the 
truly good and just man.” “We have.” “ Must 
we not, then, next after this, survey the inferior 
types, the man who is contentious and covetous of 
honour,’ corresponding to the Laconian constitution, 
and the oligarchical man in turn, and the democratic 
and the δ Se order that," after observing the most 
unjust of all, we may oppose him to the most just, 
and complete our inquiry as to the relation of pure 
justice and pure injustice in respect of the happiness 
and unhappiness of the possessor, so that we may 
as if by magic, if any single cause, though slight, or an 
comb “πρότασις of Bien cade Senter to 
~— the favourite and detested types of character.” 

4 For the metaphor cf. also 550 Ἑ and on 556 FE. 

1 ἀριστοκρατία is by both Plato and Aristotle some- 
times technically, sometimes etymologically as the govern- 
ment of the best, whoever they may be. Cf. 445 pb, and 
Menex. 238 c-p (What Plato Said, p. 539). 

5“. Of. Phaedr. 256 c 1, swpra 475 a, S47 5. 

® Cf. on 544 a, p. 237, note g. 

VOL. II R 241 

a a Ae 




ἀθλιότητος, ἵνα ἢ Θρασυμάχῳ πειθόμενοι διώ- 
κωῶωμεν ἀδικίαν ἢ τῷ νῦν προφαινομένῳ λόγῳ 
δικαιοσύνην; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, “οὕτω 
ποιητέον. *Ap’ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἠρξάμεθα. ἐν ταῖς 
πολιτείαις «πρότερον σκοπεῖν τὰ ἤθη ἢ ἐν τοῖς 
ἰδιώταις, ὡς ἐναργέστερον ὄν, καὶ νῦν οὕτω πρῶ- 
τον μὲν τὴν φιλότιμον σκεπτέον πολιτείαν: 6 ὄνομα 
γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον ἄλλο: ἢ τιμοκρατίαν ἢ 
τιμαρχίαν αὐτὴν κλητέον" πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὸν 
τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα σκεψόμεθα, ἔπειτα ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ 
ἄνδρα ὀλιγαρχικόν, αὖθις δὲ εἰς δημοκρατίαν 
ἀποβλέψαντες "θεασόμεθα ἄνδρα δημοκρατικόν, τὸ 
δὲ τέταρτον εἰς τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἐλθόντες καὶ 
ἰδόντες, πάλιν εἰς τυραννικὴν ψυχὴν βλέποντες, 
πειρασόμεθα περὶ ὧν προὐθέμεθα. ἱκανοὶ κριταὶ 
γενέσθαι; Κατὰ λόγον γέ τοι ἄν, ἔφη, οὕτω 
γίγνοιτο ἥ τε θέα καὶ ἡ κρίσις. 

* In considering the progress of degeneration portrayed in 
the following pages, it is too often forgotten that Plato is 
describing or satirizing divergences from an ideal rather 
than an historical process. Cf. Rehm, Der Untergang Roms 
im abendlindischen Denken, p. 11: “Plato gibt eine zum 
Mythos gesteigerte Naturgeschichte des Staates, so wie 
Hesiod eine als Mythos zu verstehende Natur-, d.h. Entar- 
ag geschichte des Menschengeschlechts gibt. a iis Sidne 

ay, on Bury, The Idea of Progress, in‘ ᾿ Methods 
Stiense edited by Stuart A. Rice, p. 289: ve ie ‘was 
a widely spread belief in an earlier ‘ golden age’ of simplicity, 
which had been followed 7 a degeneration and decay of 
the human race, Plato’s theory of degradation set forth 
a gradual deterioration through the successive stages of 
timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and despotism. ‘The Greek 
theory of ‘cycles,’ with its endless, monotonous iteration, 
excluded the possibility of permanent advance or ‘ progress.’ ” 

Kurt Singer, Platon der Griinder, p. 141, says that the 

timocratic state reminds one of late Sparta, ‘the democratic 



either follow the counsel of Thrasymachus and 
pursue injustice or the present argument and pursue 
pereret ” “ Assuredly,” he said, “that is what we | 
have to do.*” “ Shall we, then, as we began by ex- 
amining moral qualities in states before individuals, 
‘as being more manifest there, so now consider first 
the constitution based on the love of honour? I do 
not know of any special name ὃ for it in use. We must 
eall it either timocracy® or timarchy.. And then in 
connexion with this we will consider the mam οὗ that 
type, and thereafter oligarchy and the oligarch, and 
again, fixing our eyes on democracy, we will con- 
template the democratic man; and fourthly, after 
coming to the city ruled by a tyrant and observing 
it, we will in turn take a look into the tyrannical soul,? 
and so try to make ourselves competent judges οὗ 
the question before 5. ““That would be at least’ 
a systematic and consistent way of conducting the 
observation and the decision,” he said. 

of Athens after Pericles, the oligarchic is related to Corinth, 
and the tyrannical has some Syracusan features. , Cicero, 
De div. ii., uses this book of the Republic to console himself 
for the revolutions in the Roman state, and Polybius’s theory 
of the natural succession of governments is derived from it, 
with modifications (Polyb. vi. 4. 6 ff. Cf. vi. 9. 10 αὕτη 
πολιτειῶν dvaxixdwors). Aristotle objects that in a cycle the 
ideal state should follow the tyranny. 

ὃ Cf. on 544 c, p. 238, note ὃ. 

“6 In Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1160 a 33-34, the meaning is ‘‘ the 
rule of those who possess a property qualification.” 
4 ΟἹ 511 az. © Of. 582 a ff. 

7 For the qualified assent οὐ Hamlet 1. i. 19 ““ What? is 
Horatio there? A piece of him.’ It is very frequent in the 
Republic, usually with γοῦν. Cf. 442 v, 469 B, 476 c, 501 c, 
587 c, 584 a, 555 B, 604 p, and Vol. I. p. 30, note a, on 334 4; 
also 460 c and 398 8, where the interlocutor adds a con- 
dition, 392 5, 405 8, 556 ©, 581 B, and 487 a, where he uses 
the corrective μὲν οὖν. 

: 243 


Ill. Φέρε τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πεϊρώμεθα λέγειν, 
τίνα ,Τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐξ ἀριστο- 
D κρατίας. ἢ τόδε μὲν ἁπλοῦν, ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία 
μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν 
ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται" ὁμονοοῦντος δέ, 
κἂν πάνυ ὀλίγον ἦ, ἀδύνατον κινηθῆν αι; Ἔστι 

γὰρ οὕτως. Πῶς οὖν δή, εἶπον, ὦ Prasiain, ἡ 
πόλις ἡμῖν κινηθήσεται, καὶ πῇ στασιάσουσιν of 
ἐπίκουροι καὶ of ἄρχοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ 
πρὸς ἑαυτούς; ἢ βούλει, ὥσπερ. Ὅμηρος, εὐχώ- 
μεθα ταῖς Μούσαιο. εἰπεῖν ἡμῖν ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον 
E στάσις ἔμπεσε, καὶ φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς ws 
πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας, 
ὡς δὴ σπουδῇ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν; 
546 Πῶς; Ὧδέ πως χαλεπὸν μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν 
οὕτω ξυστᾶσαν: ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορά 
ἐστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἡ τοιαύτη ξύστασις τὸν ἅπαντα μενεῖ 

/ > ‘ / 7 \ Ὁ“ > , 
χρόνον, ἀλλὰ λυθήσεται: λύσις δὲ ἥδε. οὐ μόνον 
φυτοῖς ἐγγείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζώοις φορὰ 
καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνονται, ὅταν 
περιτροπαὶ ἑκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς ξυνάπτωσι, 
βραχυβίοις μὲν βραχυπόρους, ἐναντίοις δὲ ἐναντίας" 

2 For the idea that the state is destroyed only by factions 
in the ruling class ef. also Laws 6838. Cf. 465 8, Lysias 
xxv. 21, Aristot. Pol. 1305 b, 1306 a 10 ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλίγα χία 
οὐκ ebdud bOopos ἐξ αὑτῆς, 1302 a 10, Polybius, Teubner, volt li. 
p. 298 (vi. 57). Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. Ῥ. 521, says that 
Aristotle “‘does not remark on. Plato’s observation... 
though he cannot have agreed with it.” Cf Halévy, Notes 
et souvenirs, p. 153 “‘ histoire est la pour démontrer claire- 
ment que, depuis un siécle, nos gearcmenierts n’ont jamais 
été renversés que par eux-mémes’’; Bergson, Les Deux 
Sources de la morale et de la religion, p. 303: “* Mais 


πὰρ ον τῶν 

He Se. 4... 


IIL. “ Come, then,” said I, “let us try to tell in 
what way a timocracy would arise out of an aristo- 
cracy. Or is this the simple and unvarying rule, 
that in every form of government revolution takes 
its start from the ruling class itself,¢ when dissension 
arises in that, but so long as it is at one with itself, 
however small it be, innovation is impossible ?” 
““Yes, that is 50. “‘ How, then, Glaucon,” I said, 
“will disturbance arise in our city, and how will our 
helpers and rulers fall out and be at odds with one 
another and themselves? Shall we, like Homer, in- 
voke the Muses ® to tell ‘ how faction first fell upon 
them,’ and say that these goddesses playing with us 
and teasing us as if we were children address us in 

smock-serious tragic’ style?” “How?” “‘Some- 
what in this fashion. Hard in truth 4 it is for a state 
thus constituted to be shaken and disturbed; but 
since for everything that has come into being destruc- 
tion is appointed,’ not even such a fabric as this will 
abide for all time, but it shall surely be dissolved, and 
this is the manner of its dissolution. Not only for 
plants that grow from the earth but also for animals 
that live upon it there is a cycle of bearing and barren- 
ness’ for soul and body as often as the revolutions of 
their orbs come full circle, in brief courses for the 
short-lived and oppositely for the opposite ; but the 
Vinstinct résiste. I] ne commence ἃ céder que lorsque la 
classe supérieure elle-méme l’y invite.”’ 

ὃ For the mock-heroic style of this invocation ¢f. Phaedr. 
237 a, Laws 885 c. 

© Of. 413 8, Meno 76 π, Aristot. Meteorol, 353 Ὁ 1, 
Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 146. 

4 Of. Ale. I. 104 ε. 

4 Cf. What Plato Said, p. 627 on Laws 677 a; also Polyb. 
vi. 57, Cie. De rep. ii. 25. 

7 Cf. Pindar, Nem. vi. 10-12 for the thought. 



γένους δὲ ὑμετέρου edyovias τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίπερ 
Β ὄντες σοφοί, οὗς ἡγεμόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε, 
οὐδὲν μᾶλλον λογισμῷ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως τεύξονται, 
ἀλλὰ πάρεισιν αὐτοὺς καὶ “γεννήσουσι παῖδάς ποτε 
οὐ δέον. ἔστι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῷ περίοδος, 

ἀριθμὸς περιλαμβάνει τέλειος, ἀνθρωπείῳ δὲ ᾿ 
ᾧ πρώτῳ αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευό- 
μεναι, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις, τέτταρας δὲ ὅρους λα- 
βοῦσαι ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνομοιούντων καὶ 
αὐξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, πάντα , Tpoonyopa καὶ 
ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν" ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν 
πεμπάδι συζυγεὶς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται τρὶς 
αὐξηθείς, τὴν μὲν ἴσην ἰσάκις, ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις, 
τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ, προμήκη δέ, ἑκατὸν μὲν 
ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ ,διαμέτρων. ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομέ- 
νῶν ἑνὸς ἑκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυοῖν, ἑκατὸν δὲ 
κύβων τριάδος. ξύμπας δὲ οὗτος ἀριθμὸς γεω- 
μετρικὸς τοιούτου κύριος, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χει- 
D ρόνων γενέσεων, ἃς ὅταν ἀγνοήσαντες ὑμῖν οἱ 
φύλακες συνοικίζωσι νύμφας νυμφίοις παρὰ καιρόν, 
οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ᾽ εὐτυχεῖς παῖδες ἔσονται" ὧν 
καταστήσουσι μὲν τοὺς ἀρίστους ot πρότεροι, ὅμως 
δὲ ὄντες ἀνάξιοι, εἰς τὰς τῶν πατέρων αὖ δυνάμεις 
ἐλθόντες, ἡμῶν πρῶτον ἄρξονται ἀμελεῖν φύλακες 
ὄντες, παρ᾽ ἔλαττον τοῦ δέοντος ἡγησάμενοι τὰ 
μουσικῆς, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς: ὅθεν ἀ- 

« Cf. Tim. 28 a δόξῃ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως. 

ὃ For its proverbial obscurity cf. Cie. Ad Att. vii. 13 

‘est enim numero Platonis obscurius,’’ Censorinus, De die 
natali xi. See supra, Introd. p. xliv for literature on this 

“number.” ° προσήγορα: cf. Theaet. 146 a. 
4 Cf. 534 τ: also Theaet. 202 B ῥητάς. 
* Cf. 409 ν. 



i ge 

7 ee 



laws of prosperous birth or infertility for your race, 
the men you have bred to be your rulers will not for 
all their wisdom ascertain by reasoning combined 

__ with sensation,’ but they will escape them, and there 
will be a time when they will beget children out of 

season. Now for divine begettings there is a period 

comprehended by a perfect number,? and for mortal 
by the first in which augmentations dominating and 

_ dominated when they have attained to three dis- 

‘tances and four limits of the assimilating and the 
dissimilating, the waxing and the waning, render 

all things conversable 5 and commensurable with one 

_ another, whereof a basal four-thirds wedded to the 

pempad yields two harmonies at the third augmenta- 
tion, the one the product of equal factors taken one 

_ hundred times, the other of equal length one way but 

oblong,—one dimension of a hundred numbers deter- 

_ mined by the rational diameters of the pempad lack- 

ing one in each case, or of the irrational ὦ lacking two ; 
the other dimension of a hundred cubes of the triad. 
And this entire geometrical number is determinative 
of this thing, of better andinferior births. And when 
-vour guardians, missing this, bring together brides and 
bridegrooms unseasonably,° the offspring will not be 

_ well-born or fortunate. Of such offspring the previ- 

ous generation will establish the best, to be sure, in 
office, but still these, being unworthy, and having 

entered in turn’ into the powers of their fathers, will 

first as guardians begin to neglect us, paying too 
little heed to music’ and then to gymnastics, so that 

oat ad: ef. my note in Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928) pp. 285- 
2 This does not indicate a change in Plato’s attitude toward 
music, as has been alleged. 





/ / Cc A ates > ) 
μουσότεροι γενήσονται ὑμῖν of νέοι. ἐκ δὲ τούτων 
ἄρχοντες οὐ πάνυ φυλακικοὶ καταστήσονται πρὸς 
τὸ δοκιμάζειν τὰ Ἡσιόδου τε καὶ τὰ παρ᾽ 
ὑμῖν γένη, χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν 
καὶ σιδηροῦν: ὁμοῦ δὲ μιγέντος σιδηροῦ ἀργυρῷ 
καὶ χαλκοῦ χρυσῷ ἀνομοιότης ἐγγενήσεται. καὶ 
ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος, ἃ γενόμενα, οὗ ἂν ἐγγέ- 
νῆται, ἀεὶ τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἔχθραν. ταύτης τοι 
γενεᾶς χρὴ φάναι εἶναι στάσιν, ὅπου ἂν γίγνηται 
ἀεί. Kat ὀρθῶς γ᾽, ἔφη, αὐτὰς ἀποκρίνεσθαι φή- 
σομεν. Καὶ γάρ, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη Μούσας γε 
οὔσας. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν αἱ 
Μοῦσαι; Στάσεως, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, γενομένης εἱλκέτην 
ἄρα ἑκατέρω τὼ γένει, τὸ μὲν σιδηροῦν καὶ χαλ- 
κοῦν ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ γῆς κτῆσιν καὶ οἰκίας 
χρυσίου τε καὶ ἀργύρου, τὼ δ᾽ αὖ, τὸ χρυσοῦν τε 
καὶ ἀργυροῦν, ἅτε οὐ πενομένω, ἀλλὰ φύσει ὄντε 
πλουσίω, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν 
ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν ἠγέτην: βιαζομένων δὲ καὶ 
ἀντιτεινόντων ἀλλήλοις, εἰς μέσον ὡμολόγησαν 
γῆν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας κατανειμαμένους ἰδιώσασθαι, 

\ \ \ / \ ee 27 A « > / 
τοὺς δὲ πρὶν φυλαττομένους ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὡς ἐλευθέ- 
ρους φίλους τε καὶ τροφέας δουλωσάμενοι τότε 
περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας ἔχοντες αὐτοὶ πολέμου 
τε καὶ φυλακῆς αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι, 
” Ὁ ¢ / > “ , > 
ἔφη, αὕτη ἡ μετάβασις ἐντεῦθεν γίγνεσθαι. Οὐκ- 
obv, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐν μέσῳ τις ἂν εἴη ἀριστοκρατίας 

«ΟἿ supra 415 a-B. > Of. Theaet. 159 a. 
¢ Cf. Homer, Il. vi. 211. 
4 ye vi termini. Cf. 379 a-B. 
¢ Of. supra 416 £-417 a, 521 a, Phaedrus 279 B-c, 



young men will deteriorate in their culture; 
and the rulers selected from them will not approve 
emselyes. very efficient guardians for testing 
iod’s and our races of gold, silver, bronze and 
ron.* And this intermixture of the iron with the 
silver and the bronze with the gold will engender 
eness ὃ and an unharmonious unevenness, things 
at always beget war and enmity wherever they 
arise. “ΟΥ̓ this lineage,° look you,’ we must aver the 
‘dissension | to be, wherever it occurs and always.” 
ἜΑ rightly too, ** he said, “ we shall affirm that the 
“Muses answer.” ‘“* They must needs,”’ I said, “‘ since 
‘they are? Muses.” “ Well, then,” said he, “ what do 
ef Muses say next?” When strife arose,” said 
“the two groups were pulling against each other, 
iron and bronze towards money-making and the 
See of land and houses and gold and silver, 
the other two, the golden and silvern, not being 
r, but by nature rich in their souls,’ were trying to 
aw them | back to virtue and their original consti- 
ution, and thus, striving and contending against one 
tee they compromised? on the planof distributing 
and taking for themselves the land and the houses, 
enslaving and subjecting as perioeci and serfs? their 
former friends* and supporters, of whose freedom 
eney ey had been the guardians, and occupying them- 
lves with war and keeping watch over these 
subjects.” “TI think,” he said, “that this is the 
| -point of the transformation.” “Would not 
this polity, then,” said I, “‘ be in some sort inter- 
7 For els μέσον ef. Protag. 338 a; infra 572 Ὁ, 558 5. 
_ * An allusion to Sparta. On slavery in Plato cf. Newman 
. p. 143. Cf. 549 a, 578-579, Laws 776-777 ;. Aristot. Pol. 

1259 a 21 f., 1269 a 36 f., 1330 a 29. 
ΠΟΥ 417 an. 



τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία; Πάνυ μὲ 
IV. Μεταβήσεται μὲν δὴ οὕτω" jessie δὲ 
D πῶς οἰκήσει; ἢ φανερὸν ὅ ὅτι τὰ μὲν μιμήσεται τὴν 
προτέραν πολιτείαν, τὰ δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἅτ᾽ 
μέσῳ οὖσα, τὸ δέ τι καὶ αὑτῆς ἕξει ἴδιον; Οὕτως, 
ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν τιμᾶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας. καὶ 
γεωργιῶν ἀπέχεσθαι τὸ προπολεμοῦν αὐτῆς “καὶ 
χειροτεχνιῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου χρηματισμοῦ, ξυσ-. 
σίτια δὲ κατεσκευάσθαι καὶ γυμναστικῆς τε καὶ 
τῆς τοῦ πολέμου ἀγωνίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πᾶσι τοῖς 
τοιούτοις τὴν προτέραν μιμήσεται; Nad. . Τῷ δέ 
E γε φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς. ἄγειν, 
ἅτε οὐκέτι κεκτημένην ἁπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀτενεῖς τοὺς 
τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μικτούς, ἐπὶ δὲ θυμοειδεῖς 
τε καὶ ἁπλουστέρους ἀποκλίνειν, τοὺς πρὸς πό- 
548 λεμον μᾶλλον πεφυκότας ἢ ἢ πρὸς εἰρήνην, καὶ “Τοὺς 
περὶ ταῦτα δόλους τε καὶ μηχανὰς ἐντίμως ἔχειν, 
καὶ πολεμοῦσα τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διάγειν, αὐτὴ ἑ ἑαυτῆ 
αὖ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἴδια ἕξει; Ναί. 
᾿Επιθυμηταὶ δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, χρημάτων οἱ 
τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, 
καὶ τιμῶντες ἀγρίως ὑπὸ σκότου χρυσόν τε καὶ 
ἄργυρον, ἅτε κεκτημένοι ταμιεῖα καὶ οἰκείους 
θησαυρούς, of θέμενοι ἂν αὐτὰ κρύψειαν, καὶ αὖ 
περιβόλους οἰκήσεων, ἀτεχνῶς νεοττιὰς ἰδίας, 

« Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1328 b 41 and Newman i. pp. 107-108. 

> Cf. supra 416 £, 458 c, Laws 666 B, 762 c, 780 a-B, 781 c, 
806 ©, 839 c, Critias 112 c. 

“ Cf. 397 8, Isoc. ii, 46 ἁπλοῦς δ᾽ ἡγοῦνται τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ 
ἔχοντας. Cf. the psychology of Thucyd, iii. 83. 

4 This was said to be characteristic of Sparta. Cf. 
Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1270 a 13, Xen. Rep. Lac. 14. 2-3 — 


| τ edi: ite between aristocracy and oligarchy?” “ By 

Il means.’ 

IV. “ΒΥ this change, then, it would arise. But after 
e change what will be its way of life? Is it not ob- 
s that in some things it will imitate the preceding 
ty, in some the oligarchy, since it is intermedi- 
e, and that it will also have some qualities peculiar 
itself ? ” “ Thatisso,”’ he said. ‘““ Then in honour- 
ng its rulers and in the abstention of its warrior class 
rom farming * and handicraft and money-making in 
re -neral, and in the provision of common public tables” 
nd the devotion to physical training and expertness 
τὶ the game and contest of war—in all these traits it 
vill copy the preceding state?”’ “Yes.” “‘ Butinits 
fear to admit clever men to office, since the men it has 
a this kind are no longer simple and strenuous but of 
; aixed strain, and in its inclining rather to the more 

“stratagems and contrivances of war and occupying 
ae with war most of the time—in these respects 

itself?” “Yes.” ‘Such men,” said I, “ will be avid 
_ of wealth, like those in an oligarchy, and will cherish 
a fierce secret lust for gold ¢ and silver, owning store- 
ἷ uses 5 and private treasuries where they may hide 

them away, and also the enclosures’ of their homes, 
literal private love-nests% in which they can lavish 

and 7. 6, and the Chicago Dissertation of P. H. Epps, 
The Place of Sparta in Greek History and Civilization, 
"pp. 180-184. 

© Of. 416 νυ. 

ΟἿ Cf. Laws 681 a, Theaet. 174 &. 

__ * γερττιάς suggests Horace’s “ἔπ nidum servas” (Epist. i. 
10. 6). Cf. also Laws 776 a. 

ἱ 251 

spirited and simple-minded type, who are better | 
“suited for war than for peace, and in honouring the 

the most part its qualities will be peculiar to | 



Β ἐν αἷς ἀναλίσκοντες γύναιξί τὲ καὶ οἷς ἐθέλοιεν. 

ἄλλοις πολλὰ ἂν δαπανῷντο. ᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη. 
Οὐκοῦν καὶ φειδωλοὶ χρημάτων, ἅτε τιμῶντες καὶ 
οὐ φανερῶς κτώμενοι, φιλαναλωταὶ δὲ ἀλλοτρίων. 
δι᾿ ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ λάθρᾳ τὰς ἡδονὰς καρπούμενοι, 
ὥσπερ παῖδες πατέρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες, 
οὐχ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι διὰ 
τὸ τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων TE καὶ, | 
C φιλοσοφίας ἠμεληκέναι καὶ πρεσβυτέρως Yuba 
στικὴν μουσικῆς τετιμηκέναι. ᾿Παντάπασιν, ε a 

λέγεις μεμιγμένην πολιτείαν ἐκ κακοῦ, τε. 
ἀγαθοῦ. Μέμικται γάρ, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ- διαφανέστατον 
δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἕν τι μόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς 
κρατοῦντος, φιλονικίαι καὶ φιλοτιμίαι. Σφόδρα, 
γε, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, αὕτη μὲν ἡ 
πολιτεία οὕτω γεγονυῖα καὶ τοιαύτη ἄν τις εἴη, ὡς 
D λόγῳ σχῆμα πολιτείας ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς. 
ἀπεργάσασθαι, διὰ τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ 
τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τόν τε δικαιότατον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώ- 
τατον, ἀμήχανον δὲ μήκει ἔργον εἶναι πάσας μὲν 

«ΟἹ, Laws 806 a-c, 687 B-c, Aristot. Pol. 1269 Ὁ 3, and 
Newman ii. p. 318 on the Spartan women. Cf. Epps, op. cit. — 
pp. 322-346. wae 4 

Ὁ φιλαναλωταί, though different, suggests Sallust’s “‘alieni — 
appetens sui profusus”’ (Cat. 5). Cf. Cat. 52 ““publice eges- — 
tatem, privatim opulentiam.” PUT) 

© Of. 587 a, Laws 636 v, Symp. 187 8, Phaedr. 251 Ἐ. { 

4 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1270 Ὁ 34 with Newman’s note; and © 
Euthyphro 2 c “ tell his mother the state.” 

¢ Cf. Laws 720 p-e. This is not inconsistent with Polit. 
293 a, where the context and the point of view are different. — 

7 This is of course not the mixed government which Plato — 
approves Laws 691-692, 712 p-n, 759 5. Cf. What Plato 
Said, p. 629. 

9 For διαφανέστατον cf. 544 ν. The expression διαφανέστα- 



neir wealth on their women® and any others they 
| please with great expenditure.” ‘‘ Most true,’’ he 
id.. “ And will they not be stingy about money, 
166. they prize it.and are not allowed to possess it 
openly, prodigal of others’ wealth? because of their 
petites, enjoying‘ their pleasures stealthily, and 
running away from the law as boys from a father,4 
since the ‘have not been educated by persuasion® but 
by force because of their neglect of the true Muse, the 
companion of discussion and philosophy, and because 
of their preference of gymnastics to music?” “‘ You 
perfectly describe,” he said, “ἃ polity that is a 
nixture/’ of good and evil.” “‘ Why, yes, the elements 
ave been mixed,” I said, “but the most con- 


' spicuous?’ feature in it is one thing only, due to the 
ara of the high-spirited element, namely 
‘contentiousness and covetousness of honour.””’ “ Very 
mucho,’ said he. ‘‘ Such, then, would be the origin 
_and nature of this polity if we may merely outline the 
᾿ figure of a constitution in words and not elaborate it 
precisely, since even the sketch will suffice to show us 

‘the most just and the most unjust type of man, and it 
would be an impracticable task to set forth all forms* 

tov . . . ἕν τι μόνον, misunderstood and emended by Apelt, 
_ is coloured by an idea of Anaxagoras expressed by Lucretius 
: i. 877-878: oa 

: u 

ΠΤ apparere unum cuius sint plurima mixta. 
Anaxag, fr. 12 in fine, Diels 1.3 p. 405 ἀλλ᾽ ὅτων πλεῖστα En, 
ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἕν ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἦν. ΟἽ. Phaedr. 238 a, 
‘Cratyl. 393 p, misunderstood by Diimmler and emended 
igh ἐγκρατής) with the approval of Wilamowitz, Platon, 
. p. 

- * There is no contradiction between this and Laws 870 c 
_ if the passage is read carefully. 
τ # Of. on 544 dD, p. 240, note a. 



πολιτείας, πάντα δὲ ἤθη μηδὲν παραλιπόντα 
διελθεῖν. Καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη. 

V. Tis οὖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν ἀνήρ; 
πῶς τε γενόμενος ποῖός τέ τὶς ὦν; Οἶμαι μέν, 
ἔφη ὃ ᾿Αδείμαντος, ἐγγύς τι αὐτὸν Γλαύκωνος 

Ε τουτουῖ τείνειν ἕνεκά γε φιλονικίας. ἴσως, ἦν δ᾽ 
ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε: ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ τάδε οὐ κατὰ τοῦ- 
τον ,πεφυκέναι. Τὰ ποῖα; Αὐθαδέστερόν τε δεῖ 
αὐτόν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἶναι καὶ ὑποαμουσότερον, 
φιλόμουσον δὲ καὶ φιλήκοον μέν, ῥητορικὸν 

549 οὐδαμῶς. καὶ δούλοις μέν τις ἂν ἄγριος «εἴη, ὁ 
τοιοῦτος, οὐ καταφρονῶν δούλων, ὥσπερ. ὁ ἑκανῶς 
πεπαιδευμένος, ἐλευθέροις δὲ ἥμερος, ἀρχόντων δὲ 
σφόδρα ὑπήκοος, φίλαρχος δὲ καὶ φιλότιμος, οὐκ 
ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν ἀξιῶν ἄρχειν οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ τοιούτου 
οὐδενός, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ ἔργων τῶν τε πολεμικῶν καὶ 
τῶν περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, φιλογυμναστής τέ τις ὧν 
καὶ ,Φιλόθηρος. Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο τὸ ἦθος 
ἐκείνης. τῆς πολιτείας. Οὐκοῦν καὶ χρημάτων, 
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὃ τοιοῦτος νέος μὲν ὧν καταφρονοῖ ἄν, 
ὅσῳ δὲ πρεσβύτερος γίγνοιτο, μᾶλλον. ἀεὶ ἀσπά- 
ζοιτο ἂν τῷ τε μετέχειν τῆς τοῦ φιλοχρημάτου 
φύσεως καὶ μὴ εἶναι εἱλικρινὴς πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ 



«ΟἿ. Phaedo 65 a, Porphyry, De abst. i. 27, Teubner, p. 59 
ἐγγὺς τείνειν ἀποσιτίας. 

> αὐθαδέστερον. The fault of Prometheus (Aesch. P. V. 1034, 
1037) and Medea must not be imputed to Glaucon. . 

¢ Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, who imitates or 
parodies Plato throughout, e.g. p. 83 ‘A little inaccessible 
to ideas and light,” and pp. 54-55 “ The peculiar vexsea.t Alt of 
aristocracies of Teutonic origin appears to come from their 
never having had any ideas to trouble them.” 

4 Cf. 475 νυ, 535 Ὁ, Lysis 906 Ὁ: 

¢ Cf. p. 249, note g, on 547 c, and Newman ii. p. 317, In 



of government without omitting any, and all customs 
and qualities of men.” “ Quite right,” he said. 
_-V. ‘ What, then, is the man that corresponds to 
this constitution? What is his origin and what his 
nature?” “I fancy,” Adeimantus said, “that he 
comes rather close ® to Glaucon here in point of con- 
tentiousness.” “Perhaps,” said I, “in that, but I 
do not think their natures are alike in the following 
respects.” “In what?” “‘ He will have to be some- 
what self-willed ὃ and lacking in culture, yet a lover 
of musi¢ and fond of listening? to talk and speeches, 
though by no means himself a rhetorician ; and to 
slaves such a-one would be harsh,’ not scorning them 
as the really educated do, but he would be gentle 
with the freeborn and very submissive to officials, a 
| lover of office and of honour, not basing his claim to 
| office? on ability to speak or anything of that sort 
but on his exploits in war or preparation for war, and 
he would be a devotee of gymnastics and hunting.” ” 
“Why, yes,” he said, “that is the spirit of that 
polity.*” ‘‘ And would not such a man be disdain- 
ful of wealth too in his youth, but the older he grew 
the more he would love it because of his partici- 
_ pation in the covetous nature and because his virtue 
_ i. p. 143, n. 3 he says that this implies slavery in the ideal 
: state, in spite of 547 c. 
4 Of. Lysias xix. 18. Lysias xxi. portrays a typical φιλό- 

τῆσε, Cf. Phaedr. 256 c, Eurip. [.A. 527. He is a 

enophontic type. Cf. Xen. Oecon. 14. 10, Hiero 7. 3, 

Agesil. 10.4. Isoc. Antid. 141 and 226 uses the word in a 
good sense. Cf.‘ But if it be a sin to covet honour,” Shakes. 
Η. V. rv. ili. 98. 

σ΄ f the ἀξιώματα of Laws 690 a, Aristot. Pol. 1280 a 8 ff., 
1282 b 26, 1283-1284. 

* Cf. Arnold on the “ barbarians ” in Culture and Anarchy, 
pp. 78, 82, 84. 

* For the ἦθος of a state cf. Isoc. Nic. 31. 



is hace ΣΝ 

τὸ ἀπολειφθῆναι τοῦ ἀρίστου “φύλακος; Tivos; 

ἢ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ ὁ ᾿Αδείμαντος. Λόγου, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, pons 

κεκραμένου: Os μόνος ἐγγενόμενος σωτὴρ τὴρ ape 
διὰ βίου ἐνοικεῖ τῷ ἔχοντι. Καλῶς, ΜΗ λέγεις. 

Καὶ ἔστι μέν γ᾽, ἣν ὃ δ᾽ ey, τοιοῦτος ὁ τιμο- | 
κρατικὸς νεανίας, τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἐοικώς. Πάνυ 

μὲν οὖν. Diyverae δέ γ᾽ >, εἶπον, οὗτος ὧδέ. πὼς" 
ἐνίοτε πατρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὧν νέος υἱὸς ἐν. πόλει 
οἰκοῦντος οὐκ εὖ πολιτευομένῃ, φεύγοντος τάς τε 
τιμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δίκας καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πᾶσαν 
φιλοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐθέλοντος ἐλαττοῦσθαι, ὥστε 
πράγματα μὴ ἔχειν. IA δή, ἔφη, γίγνεται;. ; Ὅταν, 
ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, “πρῶτον μὲν τῆς μητρὸς ἀκούῃ “ἀχθομέ- 
vns, ὅτι οὐ τῶν ἀρχόντων αὐτῇ ὁ ἀνήρ ἐστι, καὶ 
ἐλαττουμένης διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ψυναιξίν, 
ἔπειτα ὁρώσης μὴ σφόδρα περὶ χρήματα σπουδά- 
ζοντα μηδὲ μαχόμενον καὶ λοιδορούμενον ἰδίᾳ τε 
ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ῥᾳθύμως πάντα 
τὰ τοιαῦτα φέροντα, καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν τὸν νοῦν προσ- 

@ The Greek words λόγος and μουσική are eens h 
Cf. also 560 8. For μουσική cf. 546 pv. Newman i. a 
fancies that this is a return to the position of Boo 
from the disparagement of music in 522 a. Cf. Cony 3 
Plato's Thought, p. 4 on this supposed ABA development of 
Plato’s opinions. 

> δέ ¥ marks the transition from the description of the 
type to its origin. Cf. 547 », 553 B, 556 B, 557 B, 560 D, 
561 5, 563 8, 566 x. Ritter, pp. 69-70, comments on its 
frequency in this book, but does not note the reason. There 
are no cases in the first five pages. 

¢ Of. Lysias xix. 18 ἐκείνῳ μὲν yap ἣν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, 

with the contrasted type ἀνήλωσεν ἐπιθυμῶν τιμᾶσθαι, Isoc. 
Antid. 227 ἀπραγμονεστάτους μὲν ὄντας ἐν τῇ πόλει. ΟἿ. 
πολυπραγμοσύνη 444. Β, 484 B, Isoc. Antid. 48, Peace 108, 80, 



is not sincere and pure since it lacks the—best 
guardian?” ‘‘ What guardian?” said Adeimantus. 
“ Reason,’ said I, ‘“‘ blended with culture,* which is 
the only indwelling preserver of virtue throughout 
life in the soul that esses it.”” “‘ Well said,”’ he 
replied. “This is the character,” I said, “ of the 
timocratic youth, resembling the city that bears his 
name.” “By allmeans.” “His origin ὃ is somewhat on 
this wise : Sometimes he is the young son of a good 
father who lives in a badly governed state and avoids 
honours and office and law-suits and all such meddle- 
someness © and is willing to forbear something of his 
rights? in order to escape trouble.*’’ “‘ How does he 
originate?” he said. ‘‘ Why, when, to begin with,” 
I said, “ he hears his mother complaining‘ that her 
husband is not one of the rulers and for that reason 
she is slighted among the other women, and when she 
sees that her husband is not much concerned about 
money and does not fight and brawl in private law- 
suits and in the public assembly, but takes all such 
matters lightly, and when she observes that he is self- 

and 26, with Norlin’s note (Loeb). Cf. also Aristoph. 
Knights 261. 

ἀ ἐλαττοῦσθαι: ef. Thuc. i. 77. 1, Aristot, Eth. Nic. 1198 Ὁ 
26-32, Pol. 1319 a 3. 

* For πράγματα ἔχειν cf. 370 a, Gorg. 467 p, Ale. I. 119 5, 
Aristoph. Birds 1026, Wasps 1392. Cf. πράγματα παρέχειν, 
Rep. 505 a, 531 8, Theages 121 pv, Herod. i. 155, Aristoph. 
Birds 931, Plutus 20, 102. 

? Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 434 with some exaggeration 
says that this is the only woman character in Plato and is 
probably his mother, Perictione. Pohlenz, Gétt. Gel. Anz. 
1921, p. 18, disagrees. For the complaints cf. Gerard, Four 
Years in Germany, p. 115 “ Now if a lawyer gets to be about 
forty years old and is not some kind of a Rat his wife begins 
to nag him...” 

VOL. II 5 257 


: fei 
᾿ ἔχοντα det αἰσθάνηται, ἑαυτὴν δὲ μήτε πάνυ 
| ~ , ε ΕΝ ἢ o 
᾿ τιμῶντα μήτε ἀτιμάζοντα: ἐξ amdvrwy τούτων 
| ἀχθομένης τε καὶ λεγούσης ὡς ἄνανδρός τε αὐτῷ 
| 6 πατὴρ καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ ὅσα καὶ 
Ἔ οἷα φιλοῦσιν ai γυναῖκες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμνεῖν. 
: Κ \ ἐλ᾽ " = AS , AAd \o¢ 
’ Kat μάλ᾽, ἔφη ὁ ᾿Αδείμαντος, πολλά τε καὶ ὅμοια 
| a > 
ἑαυταῖς. Οἶσθα οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ οἱ οἰκέται 
~ / -“ ~ 
τῶν τοιούτων ἐνίοτε λάθρᾳ πρὸς τοὺς υἱεῖς τοιαῦτα 
λέγουσιν, of δοκοῦντες εὖνοι εἶναι, καὶ ἐάν τινα 
mw a > ir / es \ > / 
ἴδωσιν ἢ ὀφείλοντα χρήματα, ᾧ μὴ ἐπεξέρχεται ὁ 
Ψ Μ » 3 ~ ,ὔ a 
πατήρ, ἤ τι ἄλλο ἀδικοῦντα, διακελεύονται ὅπως, 
ἐπειδὰν ἀνὴρ γένηται, τιμωρήσεται πάντας τοὺς 
͵ὔ 4 > \ ~ Ν ~ ‘ 
550 τοιούτους Kal ἀνὴρ μᾶλλον ἔσται τοῦ πατρός καὶ 
ἐξιὼν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούει καὶ ὁρᾷ, τοὺς μὲν τὰ 
αὑτῶν πράττοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει ἠλιθίους τε καλου- 
μένους καὶ ἐν σμικρῷ λόγῳ ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ μὴ τὰ 
αὑτῶν τἰμωμένους τε καὶ ἐπαινουμένους. τότε δὴ 
ὁ νέος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκούων τε καὶ ὁρῶν, καὶ 
~ , : ~ 
αὖ τοὺς τοῦ πατρὸς λόγους ἀκούων τε καὶ ὁρῶν 
τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἐγγύθεν παρὰ τὰ τῶν 
»” ς / e. Ὁ 3 / , ~ \ 
ἄλλων, ἑλκόμενος ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, TOD μὲν 
“- a =~ , 
B πατρὸς αὐτοῦ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐν TH ψυχῇ ἄρδοντός 
\ ” ~ \ » / > A 
τε καὶ αὔξοντος, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τό τε ἐπιθυμητικὸν 

«ΟἹ Symp. 174 τὸ, Isoc. Antid. 227. 

» Cf. the husband in Lysias i. 6. 

© λίαν ἀνειμένος : one who has grown too slack or negligent. 
Cf. Didot, Com. Fr. p. 728 ris ὧδε μῶρος καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος ; ! 
Porphyry, De abst. ii. 58. 

4 Of, Phaedo 60 a. For Plato’s attitude towards women 
cf. What Plato Said, p. 632, on Laws 731 τ. δ 

© ὑμνεῖν. Cf. Euthydem. 297 Ὁ, Soph. Ajax 292. Com- | 
mentators have been troubled by the looseness of Plato’s 
style in this sentence. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 385. 

258 | 


absorbed? in his thoughts and neither regards nor 
ug: eg 
i her overmuch,” and in consequence of all 

_ this laments and tells the boy that his father is too 

slack © and no kind of a man, with all the other com- 

_ plaints with which women? nag? insuchcases.”’ “ Many 

Se OO — SS 

indeed,” said Adeimantus, “ and after their kind.’ ” 
«You are aware, then,” said I, “ that the very house- 

slaves of such men, if they are loyal and friendly, | 

privately say the same sort of things to the sons, and 

if they observe a debtor or any other wrongdoer whom 

the father does not prosecute, they urge the boy to 
punish all such when he grows to manhood and prove 
himself more of a man than his father, and when 
the lad goes out he hears and sees the same sort of 
thing.?» Men who mind their own affairs” in the city 
are spoken of as simpletons and: are held. in slight 
esteem, while meddlers who mind other people’s affairs 




are honoured and praised. Thenitis‘thatthe youth, ὦ 

hearing and seeing such things, and on the other hand 
listening to the words of his father, and with a near 

view of his pursuits contrasted with those of other | 

men, is slated OF both, his father watering and 
fostering the growth of the rational principle? in his 
soul and theothers the appetitive and the passionate*; 

7 Cf. Aristoph. Thesm. 167 ὅμοια γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει. 
9 ἕτερα τοιαῦτα: οὖ, on 488 B; also Gorg. 481 π, 482 A, 

514 pv, Euthyd. 298 ©, Protag. 326 a, Phaedo 58 pv, 80 D, — 

. 201 Ἑ, etc. 

* Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm. 161 8. 

ὁ τότε δή: ε΄. 551 a, 566 c, 330 BE, 573 a, 591 a, Phaedo 
pe 96 Β and pv, Polit. 272 ©. Cf. also τότ᾽ ἤδη, on 
565 c. 

i Cf. on 439 νυ, Vol. I. p. 397, note d. 

* For these three principles of the soul ¢f. on 435 a ff., 
439 p-z ff., 441 a. 



καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι 
τὴν φύσιν, ὁμιλίαις δὲ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων κακαῖς. 
κεχρῆσθαι, εἰς τὸ μέσον. ἑλκόμενος ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων 
τούτων ἦλθε, καὶ "τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν παρέδωκε 
τῷ μέσῳ τε καὶ φιλονίκῳ καὶ θυμοειδεῖ, ᾿ καὶ 
ἐγένετο ὑψηλόφρων. τε καὶ φιλότιμος a το tr re 
μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς τὴν τούτου γένεσιν διεληλυθέναι. 
σ Ἔχομεν ἄ ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τήν τε δευτέραν πολιτείαν 
καὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἄνδρα. Ἔχομεν, vA 4 
VI. Οὐκοῦν pera τοῦτο, τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου, τς 
γωμεν ἄλλον ἄλλῃ πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένον, μᾶλλον 
δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν προτέραν τὴν πόλιν; Πάνυ 
μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ein δέ γ᾽ ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ὀλιγαρχία 
ἡ μετὰ τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. Λέγεις δέ, ἦ δ᾽ 
ὅς, τὴν ποίαν κατάστασιν ὀλιγαρχίαν; Τὴν ἀπὸ 
τιμημάτων, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πολιτείαν, ἐν ἡ οἱ μὲν 
D πλούσιοι ἄρχουσι, πένητι δὲ. οὐ μέτεστιν ἀρχῆς. 
Μανθάνω, 7) ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐκοῦν ὡς μεταβαίνει πρῶτον 
ἐκ τῆς τιμαρχίας εἰς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, p ῥητέον; Ναί. 
Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ τυφλῷ YE, δῆλον ὡς 
μεταβαίνει. Πῶς; Τὸ ταμιεῖον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐκεῖνο 
ἑκάστῳ χρυσίου πληρούμενον ἀπόλλυσι τὴν τοιαύ- 
τὴν πολιτείαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δαπάνας αὑτοῖς 
ἐξευρίσκουσιν, καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἐπὶ τοῦτο map- 
E ἄγουσιν, ἀπειθοῦντες αὐτοί τε καὶ γυναῖκες αὐτῶν. 
Εἰκός, ἔφη. "Ἐπειτά γε, οἶμαι, ἄλλος ἄλλον ὁρῶν 

3 Cf, the fragment of Menander, PNG? ἤθη χρήσθ᾽ 
ὁμιλίαι κακαί, quoted in 1 Cor. xv. 33 (Kock, C.A.F, iii. 
No. 218). Cf. also Phaedr. 250 a ὑπό τινων ὁμιλιῶν, Aesch. 
Seven Against Thebes 599 ἔσθ᾽ ὁμιλίας κακῆς κάκιον οὐδέν, 

> Of, p. 249, note f. 

᾿ 1.0}. infra 553 B-c, 608 B. 

ἃ ὑψηλόφρων is a poetical word. Cf. Eurip. 1.4. 919 


_ and as he is not by nature of a bad disposition but has 

fallen into evil communications,* under these two 
solicitations he comes to a compromise? and turns over 

_ the government in his soul ¢ to the intermediate prin- 

. of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man 
hau. of soul? and covetous of honour.®”” “ You 
have, I think, most exactly described his origin.” 

“ Then,”. _said I, “we have our second polity and 
second ty eofman.” “ We have,” he said. 

VIN we then, as Aeschylus’ would say, tell 
of another ainipion before another gate, or rather, 
in accordance with our plan,’ the city first?”’ “ That, 
by all means,” he said. “‘ The next polity, I be- 

lieve, would be oligarchy.” “And what kind of a 4 

régime,” said he, “do you understand by a pin 51 » ἢ 

“That based on ἃ. property qualification,’ ” of *, δ 
“ wherein the rich hold office and the poor man ey 

excluded.”’ “1 understand,” said he. “ Then, is 

not the first thing to speak of how democracy passes 
over into this?” “ Yes. ° “ And truly” satd T, “the 
manner of the change is plain even to the pro- 
verbial blind man.*” “How so?” “That treasure- 
house 7 which each possesses filled with gold destroys 
that polity ; for first they invent ways of expenditure 
for themselves and pervert the laws to this end, and 
neither they nor their wives obey them.” “‘ That is 
likely,” he said. “ And then, I take it, by observing 

* Cf. p. 255, note αὶ 

7 Seven Against Thebes 451. λέγ ἄλλον ἄλλαις ἐν πύλαις 

* Cf. Laws 743 c, and Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 345. 

* Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1160 a 33, Isoc. Panath. 131, 
Laws 698 8. aliter. 

* Cf. 465 v, Soph. 241 pv. 

4 Cf. 548 a, 416 ν. 





καὶ εἰς ζῆλον ἰὼν τὸ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον αὑτῶν 
ἀπειργάσαντο. Εἰκός. Τοὐντεῦθεν τοίνυν, εἶπον, 
προϊόντες εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι, ὅσῳ 
ἂν τοῦτο τιμιώτερον ἡγῶνται, τοσούτῳ ἀρετὴν 
ἀτιμοτέραν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω πλούτου ἃ ) ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν, 
ὥσπερ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ κειμένου ἑκατέρου ἀεὶ 
τοὐναντίον ῥέποντε; Καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη. Τιμωμένου 
δὴ πλούτου ἐν πόλει καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἀτιμοτέρα 
ἀρετή τε καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί. Δῆλον. ᾿Ασκεῖται δὴ τὸ 
ἀεὶ τιμώμενον, ἀμελεῖται δὲ τὸ ἀτιμαζόμενον. 
Οὕτως. ᾿Αντὶ δὴ φιλονίκων καὶ φιλοτίμων ἀν- 
δρῶν φιλοχρηματισταὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι τελευ- 
τῶντες ἐγένοντο, καὶ τὸν μὲν πλούσιον ἐ ἐπαινοῦσί τε 
καὶ θαυμάζουσι καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγουσι, τὸν δὲ 
πένητα ἀτιμάζουσιν. Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν τότε δὴ 
νόμον᾽ τίθενται ὅρον πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχικῆς ταξά- 
μενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων, οὗ μὲν μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχία, 
πλέον, οὗ δ᾽ ἧττον, ἔλαττον, ᾿προειπόντες ἀρχῶν 
μὴ μετέχειν, ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἢ οὐσία εἰς τὸ ταχθὲν 
τίμημα, ταῦτα δὲ ἢ βίᾳ μεθ᾽ ὅπλων διαπράττονται, 
ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτου φοβήσαντες κατεστήσαντο τὴν 
τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; Οὕτω μὲν 

α εὶς τὸ πρόσθεν : cf. 457 a, 604 5, Prot. 339 vp, Symp. 174 Ὁ, 
Polit. 272 νυ, Soph. 258 c, 261 5, Ale. I. 132 5, Protag. 357 υ 
where ἧς is plainly wrong, Aristoph. Knights 751. 

δ Of. 591 v, Laws 742 5, 705 5, $31 ὁ ff., 836 a, 919 B 
with Rep. 421 p; also Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 37-38. 

“ Cf. on 544 ©, Demosth. v. 12. 

4 This sentence has been much quoted. Cf. Cic. Tuse. i. 
2 “honos alit artes . . . iacentque ea semper, quae apud 
quosque inprobantur.”” Themistius and Libanius worked it 
into almost every oration. Cf. Mrs. W. C. Wright, The 
Emperor Julian, p. 70, n. 8. Cf. also Stallbaum ad loc. 
For ἀσκεῖται ef. Pindar, Ol. viii. 22. 



_ and emulating one another they bring the majority 

of them to this way of thinking.” ‘‘ That is likely,” 
he said. “‘Andso, as time goes on, and they advance® 
in the pursuit of wealth, the more they hold that in 
honour the less they honour virtue. May not the 
opposition of wealth and virtue” be conceived as if 
each lay in the scale ὁ of a balance inclining opposite 
ways?” “Yes, indeed,” he said. “So, when 
wealth is honoured in a state, and the wealthy, virtue 
and the good are less honoured.” “ Obviously.” 
“And that which men at any time honour they 
1586, and what is not honoured is neglected.” 
“Tt is 80. “Thus, finally, from being lovers of 
victory and lovers of honour they become lovers of 
gain-getting and of money, and they commend and 
admire the rich man and put him in office but despise 
the man who is poor.” “Quite so.” “And is it not 
then that they pass a law defining the limits * of an 
oligarchica] polity, prescribing’ a sum of money, a 
larger sum where it is more’ of an oligarchy, where 
it is less a smaller, and proclaiming that no man shall 
hold office whose property does not come up to the 
required valuation? And this law they either put 
through by force of arms, or without resorting to that 
they establish their government by terrorization.” 
Is not that the way of it?’ “It is.” “ The 
4 ὅρον: ε΄. 551 c, Laws 714 c, 962 pv, 739 pv, 626 8, 
Menex. 238 v, Polit. 293 π, 296 £, 292 c, Lysis 209 c, 
Aristot. Pol. 1280 a 7, 1271 a 35, and Newman i. p. 220, 
Eth. Nic. 1138 Ὁ 23. Cf. also τέλος Rhet. 1366 a 3. For 
the true criterion of office-holding see Laws 715 c-p and 
Isoc. xii. 131. For wealth as the criterion ef. Aristot. Pol. 
1273 a 37. 
7 Por ταξάμενοι ef. Vol. I. p. 310, note ς, on 416 £. 

* Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1301 b 13-14. 
» Cf. 557 A. 




οὖν. Ἢ μὲν δὴ κατάστασις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν αὕτη. 

Ναί, zn ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ ὁ τρόπος τῆς πολιτείας, 

καὶ ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἔφαμεν αὐτὴν ἁμαρτήματα 
C ἔχειν; 

VI. Πρῶτον μέν, ἔφην, τοῦτο αὐτό, ὅρος 
αὐτῆς οἷός ἐστιν. ἄθρει γάρ, εἰ νεῶν οὕτω τις 
ποιοῖτο κυβερνήτας ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, τῷ δὲ πένητι, 
εἰ καὶ κυβερνητικώτερος εἴη, μὴ ἐπιτρέποι. 
Πονηράν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοὺς ναυτίλ- 
λεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ ἄλλου οὕτως ὁτουοῦν 
[ἢ Twos}! ἀρχῆς; Οἶμαι ἔγωγε. Πλὴν πόλεως, 
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἢ καὶ πόλεως πέρι; Πολύ γ᾽, ἔφη, 

μάλιστα, ὅσῳ χαλεπωτάτη καὶ μεγίστη ἡ ἀρχή. 

Ἕν μὲν δὴ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον ὀλιγαρχία ἂν ἔχοι 
ἁμάρτημα. Φαίνεται. Τί δαί; τόδε dpa τι τού- 
του ἔλαττον; Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ μὴ “μίαν ἀλλὰ δύο 
ἀνάγκῃ εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν, τὴν μὲν πενήτων, 
τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκοῦντας ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀεὶ 
ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἀλλήλοις. Οὐδὲν pa A’, ἔφη, 

| ἔλαττον. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε καλόν, τὸ ἀδυνά- 
| tous εἶναι ἴσως πόλεμόν τινα πολεμεῖν διὰ τὸ 
| ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἢ χρωμένους τῷ πλήθει ὧπλι- 
E σμένῳ δεδιέναι μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἢ μὴ 

1 4 τινος bracketed by Stallbaum, Burnet, and Hermann: 

ἧστινος ci. Ast. 

«ΟἿ supra 488, and Polit. 299 s-c, What Plato Said, p. — 
521, on Huthydem. 291 pv. 

> ’Stallbaum says that ἐπιτρέποι is used absolutely as in 
575 pv, Symp. 213 x, Lysis 210 5, etc. Similarly Latin per- 
mitto. Cf. Shorey on Jowett’s translation of Meno 92 a-n, 
A.J.P. xiii. p. 867. See too Diog. L. i. 65. 

¢ Men are the hardest creatures to govern. Cf. Polit. 
292 p, and What Plato Said, p. 635, on Laws 766 4. 



_ establishment then, one may say, is in this wise.” 

es,” he said; “ but what is the character of this 
constitution, and what are the defects that we said 
it had?” 

VII. “Τὸ begin with,” said I, “ consider the nature 
of its constitutive and defining principle. Suppose 
men should appoint the pilots ¢ of ships in this way, by 

qualification, and not allow? a poor man to 
navigate, even if he were a better pilot.” “ A sorry 
voyage they would make of it,” he said. “‘ And is 
not the same true of any other form of rule?” “I 
think so.” “Except of a city,” said I, “ or does it 

_ hold for a city ἴοο ὃ “ Most of all,” he said, “ by 

_ asmuch as that is the greatest and most difficult ¢ rule 

of all.” ‘‘ Here, then, is one very great defect in 
oligarchy.”’ ‘‘So it appears.’’ “ Well, and is this 
a smaller one ?”’ “What?” “That such a city 
should of necessity be not one, but two, a city of 
the rich and a city of the poor, dwelling together, 
and always plotting® against one another.” “No, | 
by Zeus,” said he, “it is not a bit smaller.” “Nor, | 
further, can we approve of this—the likelihood that + 
they will not be able to wage war, because of the | 
necessity of either arming and employing the multi- | 
tude,’ and fearing them more than the enemy, or else, 
if they do not make use of them, of finding themselves \ 

4 For the idea that a city should be a unity ef. Laws 739 Ὁ 
and supra on 423 a-s. Cf. also 422 © with 417 a-s, Livy 
ii. 24 “ adeo duas ex una civitate discordia fecerat.”” Aristot. 
Pol. 1316 Ὁ 7 comments ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι 
τὴν ὀλιγαρχικήν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων... and tries to prove 
the point by his topical method. 

* Of. 417 5. 

* For the idea that the rulers fear to arm the people c/. 
Thue. iii. 27, Livy iii. 15 “‘consules et armare plebem et 
inermem pati timebant.” 




PLATO | | 

χρωμένους ὡς ἀληθῶς. ὀλιγαρχικοὺς φανῆναι ἐν 
αὐτῷ τῷ μάχεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα χρήματα μὴ ἐθέλειν 
εἰσφέρειν, ἅτε φιλοχρημάτους. Οὐ καλόν. Τί δέ; 
6 πάλαι ἐλοιδοροῦμεν, τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν γεωρ- 
γοῦντας καὶ χρηματιζομένους καὶ πολεμοῦντας 
ἅμα τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἢ δοκεῖ 
ὀρθῶς ἔχειν; Οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν. Ὅρα δή, τούτων 
πάντων τῶν κακῶν εἰ τόδε μέγιστον αὕτη πρώτη 
παραδέχεται. Τὸ ποῖον; Τὸ ἐξεῖναι πάντα τὰ 
αὑτοῦ ἀποδόσθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ κτήσασθαι τὰ τούτου, 
καὶ ἀποδόμενον οἰκεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει μηδὲν ὄντα τῶν 
τῆς πόλεως μερῶν, μήτε χρηματιστὴν μήτε δημιουρ- 
γὸν μήτε ἱππέα μήτε ὁπλίτην, ἀλλὰ πένητα καὶ 
ἄπορον κεκλημένον. Πρώτη, ἔφη. Οὔκουν δια- 
κωλύεταί γε ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις τὸ τοιοῦτον" 
οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἱ μὲν ὑπέρπλουτοι ἦσαν, οἱ δὲ παν- 
τάπασι πένητες. ᾿Ορθῶς. Τόδε δὲ ἄθρει: ἄρα 
ὅτε πλούσιος ὧν ἀνήλισκεν ὃ τοιοῦτος, μᾶλλόν τι 
τότ᾽ ἦν ὄφελος τῇ πόλει εἰς ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; 
a 95.) \ A > , > a . 3 pO 
ἢ ἐδόκει μὲν τῶν ἀρχόντων εἶναι, TH δὲ ἀληθείᾳ 
οὔτε ἄρχων οὔτε ὑπηρέτης ἦν αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τῶν 
¢ “2 3 / “ ” 39 7 4, 4 
ἑτοίμων ἀναλωτής; Οὕτως, ἔφη: ἐδόκει, ἦν δὲ 
οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀναλωτής. Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 

* He plays on the word. In 565 c ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικούς 
is used in a different sense. Cf. Symp. 181 4 ὡς ἀληθῶς 
πάνδημος, Phaedo 80 Ὁ εἰς “Αἰδου ws ἀληθῶς. 

> Cf. supra 374 B, 434 a, 448 »-ε. For the specialty of 
function cf. What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm. 161 x. 

¢ So in the Laws the householder may not sell his lot, 

Laws 741 s-c, 744 p-e. Cf. 755 a, 857, Aristot. Pol. 
1270 a 19, Newman i. p. 376. 



on the field of battle, oligarchs indeed,* and rulers 
over a few... And to this must be added. their reluc- 

tance to contribute money, because they are lovers 
of money.” “No, indeed, that is not admirable.” 
“ And what of the trait we found fault with long ago” 
—the fact that in such.a state the citizens are busy- 
bodies and jacks-of-all-trades, farmers, financiers 
andsoldiersallinone ? Do you think that is right ? ” 
“ By no manner of means.” “* Consider now whether 
this polity is not the first that admits that which is the 
greatest of allsuch evils.” “What?” “ The allow- 
ing a man to sell all his possessions,° which another 

_ is permitted to acquire, and after selling them to go 
_ on living in the city, but as no part of it,? neither a 

money-maker, nor a craftsman, nor a knight, nor 
a foot-soldier, but classified only as a pauper® and a 
dependent.” “This is the first,’ he said. ““ There 
certainly is no prohibition of that sort of thing in 
oligarchical states. Otherwise some of their citizens 
would not be excessively rich, and others out and 
out paupers.” “‘Right.”’ “ But observe this. When 
such a fellow was spending his wealth, was he then of 
any more use to the state in the matters of which we 
were speaking, or did he merely seem to belong to the 
ruling class, while in reality he was neither ruler nor 
helper in the state, but only a consumer of goods‘ ?”’ 
“Tt is so,” he said; “‘ he only seemed, but was just 
a spendthrift.” “‘ Shall we, then, say of him that as 

4 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1326 a 20, Newman i. pp. 98 and 109. 
Cf. Leslie Stephen, U#il. ii: 111 “‘ A vast populace has 
grown up outside of the old order.” 

* Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1266 Ὁ 13. 

7 ἑτοίμων : “things ready at hand.” Cf. 573 a, Polyb. vi. 
(Teubner, vol. ii. p. 237); Horace Epist. i. 2. 27 “ fruges 
consumere nati.” 


PLATO δον. 

φῶμεν αὐτόν, ὡς ἐν κηρίῳ κηφὴν ἐγγίγνεται, 
σμήνους νόσημα, οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν οἰκίᾳ 
κηφῆνα ἐγγίγνεσθαι, νόσημα πόλεως; Πάνυ μὲν 
οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ᾿Αδείμαντε, 
τοὺς μὲν πτηνοὺς κηφῆνας πάντας ἀκέντρους ὁ 
θεὸς πεποίηκεν, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς τούτους ἐνίους μὲν 
αὐτῶν ἀκέντρους, ἐνίους δὲ δεινὰ κέντρα ἔχοντας; 
και εκ μεν τῶν ἀκεντρὼν πτωχοὶ πρὸς τὸ γηρας 
τελευτῶσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κεκεντρωμένων πάντες 
ὅσοι κέκληνται κακοῦργοι; ὑουκγάονος ἔφη. 
Δῆλον ἄρα, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐν πόλει, οὗ ἂν ἴδῃς πτω- 
χούς, ὅτι εἰσί που ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἀποκεκρυμ- 
μένοι κλέπται τε καὶ βαλαντιατόμοι καὶ ἱερόσυλοι 
καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν δημιουργοί. 
Δῆλον, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις πό- 
λεσι πτωχοὺς οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἐνόντας ᾿ ᾿Ολίγου γ᾽, ἔφη, 
πάντας τοὺς ἐκτὸς τῶν ἀρχόντων. Μὴ οὖν oto- 
E μεθα, ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ κακούργους πολλοὺς ἐν 
αὐταῖς εἶναι κέντρα ἔχοντας, ots ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ 
κατέχουσιν at ἀρχαί; Οἰόμεθα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. 
*Ap’ οὖν οὐ δι᾽ ἀπαιδευσίαν καὶ κακὴν τροφὴν καὶ 
κατάστασιν τῆς πολιτείας φήσομεν τοὺς τοιούτους 
αὐτόθι ἐγγίγνεσθαι; Φήσομεν. ᾿Αλλ’ οὖν 

τοιαύτη γέ τις ἂν εἴη ἡ ὀλιγαρχουμένη πόλις καὶ 
τοσαῦτα κακὰ ἔχουσα, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω. Σχεδόν 

« Of. Laws 901 a, Hesiod, Works and Days 8500 ἔ,, Aristoph. 
Wasps 1071 ff., Eurip. Suppl. 242, Xen. Oecon. 17. 15, and 
Virgil, Georg. iv. 168 “‘ignavum fucos pecus a praesepibus 

The sentence was much quoted. Stallbaum refers to 
Ruhnken on Tim. 157 ff. for many illustrations, and to 
Petayius ad Themist. Orat. xxiii. p. 285 pv. Cf. Shelley, 
Song to the Men of England: 




_ the drone? springs up in the cell, a pest of the hive, 
so such a man grows up in his home, a pest of the 

state?” “ By all means, Socrates,’ he said. “ And 
has not God, Adeimantus, left the drones which have 
wings and fly stingless one and all, while of the drones 
here who travel afoot he has made some stingless but 
has armed others with terrible stings? And from the 
stingless finally issue beggars in old age,” but from 
those furnished with stings all that are denominated ¢ 
malefactors?”’ ‘Most true,” he said. “It is 
plain, then,” said I, “‘ that wherever you see beggars 
in a city, there are somewhere in the neighbourhood 

_ concealed thieves and cutpurses and temple-robbers 

τ ΩΝ 

and similar artists in crime.” “Clearly,” he said. 
“‘ Well, then, in oligarchical cities do you not see 
beggars?” “‘ Nearly all are such,” he said, “ except 
the ruling class.” “‘ Are we not to suppose, then, that 
there are also many criminals in them furnished with 
stings, whom the rulers by their surveillance forcibly ¢ 
restrain?’ ‘“‘ We must think so,” he said. “‘ And 
shall we not say that the presence of such citizens is 
the result of a defective culture and bad breeding 
and a wrong constitution of the state?” “We 
shall.” “Well, at any rate such would be the char- 
acter of the oligarchical state, and these, or perhaps 
even more than these, would be the evils that afflict 

Wherefore, Bees of England, forge 

Many a weapon, chain and scourge, 

That these pee τος drones may spoil 

The forced produce of your toil ? 

> Cf. 498 a, Laws 653 a; also the modern distinction be- 
tween defectives and delinquents. 

© κέκχηνται : ef. 344 B-c. 

4 βίᾳ is so closely connected with κατέχουσιν that the double 
dative is not felt to be awkward. But Adam takes ἐπιμελείᾳ 
as an adverb. 



553 τι, “ἔφη. ᾿Απειργάσθω δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ αὕτη, ἣν δ᾽ 
ἐγώ, 7 πολιτεία, ἣν ὀλιγαρχίαν καλοῦσιν, ἐκ 
τιμημάτων ἔχουσα͵ τοὺς ἄρχοντας.. τὸν δὲ τῆν πη 
ὅμοιον μετὰ ταῦτα σκοπῶμεν, ὥς τε γίγνεται of 
τε γενόμενος ἔστιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. ᾿ 

VIII. *Ap’ οὖν ὧδε μάλιστα εἰς ὀλιγαρχικὸν 
ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρατικοῦ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλει; ; Πῶς; 
Ὅταν αὐτοῦ παῖς “γενόμενος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ζηλοῖ 
τε τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου ἴχνη διώκῃ, ἔ ἔπειτα 

Β αὐτὸν ἴδῃ ἐξαίφνης πταίσαντα ὥσπερ πρὸς ἕρματι 
πρὸς τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐκχέαντα τά τε αὑτοῦ καὶ 
ἑαυτόν, ἢ στρατηγήσαντα ἤ τιν᾽ ἄλλην μεγάλην 
ἀρχὴν ἄρξαντα, εἶτα εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα, 
βλαπτόμενον ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν, ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ. 
ἐκπεσόντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν 
ἀποβαλόντα. Ἑἰκός γ᾽, ἔφη. ᾿Ιδὼν δέ γε, ὦ 
φίλε, ταῦτα καὶ παθὼν καὶ ἀπολέσας τὰ ὄντα 
δείσας, οἶμαι, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὠθεῖ ἐκ τοῦ 
σ θρόνου τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῆ φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ 
τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ταπεινωθεὶς ὑπὸ πενίας 
πρὸς χρηματισμὸν τραπόμενος. γλίσχρως καὶ κατὰ 
σμικρὸν φειδόμενος καὶ ἐργαζόμενος χρήματα 

2 Cf. on 550 c, p. 261, note h. 

> Cf. 410 5; Homer, Od. xix. 436 tyvy ἐρευνῶντος, ii. 406, 
iii. 30, v. 193, vii. 38 μετ᾽ ἴχνια βαῖνε. 

© For πταίσαντα ef. Aesch. Prom. 926, dg. 1624 (Butl. 

4 Of. Aesch. Ag. 1007, Humen. 564, Thue. vii. 25. 7, and 
Thompson on Phaedr. 255 Ὁ. 

4 Lit. “spilling.” Cf. Lucian, Timon 23, Shakes, Merchant 
of Venice, τ. i. 31 ff.: 



| it.” “ Pretty nearly these,” hesaid. ‘‘ Then,’ I said, 
“let us regard as disposed of the constitution called 
oligarchy, whose rulers are determined by a property 
qualification.* And next we are to consider the man 
who resembles it—how he arises and what after that 
his character is.” ‘‘ Quite so,” he said. ᾿ 
‘VIII. “ Is not the transition from that timocratic 
outh to the oligarchical type mostly on this wise ἢ τ᾿ 
“How?” “Whenason born to the timocratic man at 
first emulates his father, and follows in his footsteps ὃ ; 
and then sees him suddenly dashed,* as a ship on a 
-reef,? against the state, and making complete wreck- 
age® of his possessions and himself—perhaps he 
has been a general, or has held some other important 
office, and has then been dragged into court by mis- 
chievous sycophants and put to death or banished? or 
_ outlawed. and has lost all his property soles 
likely,” he said. “And the son, my friend, after seeing 
and suffering these things, and losing his property, 
“eg timid, I fancy, and forthwith thrusts headlong? 
m his bosom’s throne” that principle of love of 
honour and that high spirit, and being humbled by 
poverty turns to the getting of money, and greedily * 
and stingily and little by little by thrift and hard 
gas rous Γ' 
Would scatter all her ieee the 5 
Enrobe the roaring waters with my silks. 
7 For ἐκπεσόντα cf. 560 a, 566 a. In Xen. An. vii. 5. 13 
it is used of shipwreck. Of. ἐκβάλλοντες 488 c. 
9 Cf. Herod. vii. 136. 
* Cf. Aesch. Ag. 983, Shakes. Romeo and Juliet v. i. 3: 
My bosom’s lord sits lightly in his throne, 
and supra 550 B. 
* For γλίσχρως ef. on 488 a, Class. Phil. iv. p. 86 on Diog. 
L. iv. 59, Aelian, Epist. Rust. 18 γλίσχρως τε καὶ κατ᾽ ὀλίγον. 


ξυλλέγεται. ἄρ᾽ οὐκ οἴει τὸν τοιοῦτον τότε εἰς 
μὲν τὸν θρόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν τε καὶ 
φιλοχρήματον. ἐγκαθίζειν. καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα ποιεῖν 
ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτοὺς καὶ ἀκινάκας 
παραζωννύντα; Ἔγωγ᾽ » ἔφη. Τὸ δέ γε, οἶμαι, 
D λογιστικόν τε καὶ θυμοειδὲς χαμαὶ ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν 
παρακαθίσας ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνῳ καὶ καταδουλωσάμενος, 
τὸ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐᾷ λογίζεσθαι οὐδὲ σκοπεῖν ἀλλ᾽ 
ἢ ὁπόθεν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων χρημάτων πλείω ἔ “ἔσται, τὸ 
δὲ αὖ "θαυμάζειν καὶ τιμᾶν μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πλοῦτόν 
τε καὶ πλουσίους, καὶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι. μηδ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἑνὶ 
ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσει καὶ ἐάν τι ἄλλο «εἰς 
τοῦτο $60. Οὐκ € ἔστ᾽ ἄλλη, ἔφη, μεταβολὴ οὕτω 
ταχεῖά τε καὶ ἰσχυρὰ ἐκ φιλοτίμου ὮΝ εἰς 
E φιλοχρήματον. *Ap’ οὖν οὗτος, ἦν ἐγώ, 
ὀλιγαρχικός ἐστιν; Ἢ γοῦν μεταβολὴ iis ἐξ 
ὁμοίου ἀνδρός ἐστι τῇ πολιτείᾳ, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ὀλιγαρχία 
δδ4 μετέστη. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ εἰ ὅμοιος ἂν εἴη. Σκο- 

ΙΧ. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν τῷ χρήματα περὶ 
πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι ὅμοιος ἂν εἴη; Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; 
Καὶ μὴν τῷ γε φειδωλὸς εἶναι καὶ ἐργάτης, τὰς 
ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας μόνον τῶν παρ᾽ αὑτῷ 
ἀποπιμπλάς, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀναλώματα μὴ παρ- 
εχόμενος, ἀλλὰ δουλούμενος τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας 
ὡς ματαίους. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Αὐχμηρός γέ τις, ἦν 
δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὧν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς περιουσίαν ποιούμενος, 

4 ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν: cf. Protag. 315 8, Tim. 46 c, Critias 
117 c, ete., Herod. iv. 175. 

> Cf. 554 a, 556 c, Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 4 μηδὲ πρὸς ἕν ἄλλο 
σχολὴν ποιεῖται ἢ ὁπόθεν αὐτός τι κερδανεῖ, and Aristot. Pol. 
1257 Ὁ 4-7, and supra 380 ο, See too Inge, Christian Ethics, 



| work collects property.. Do you not suppose that such 
a one will then establish on that throne the principle 
of appetite and avarice, and set it up as the great 
king in his soul, adorned with tiaras and collars of 
gold, and girt with the Persian sword?” “I do,” 
he said.“ And under this domination he will force 
_ the rational and high-spirited principles to crouch 
lowly to right and left* as slaves, and will allow the 
one to calculate and consider nothing but the ways of 
| making more money from a little,” and the other to 
| admire and honour nothing but riches and rich men, 
_ and. to take pride in nothing but the possession of 
| wealth and whatever contributes to ἐμὲ ἢ “ There 
is no other transformation so swift and sure of the 
| ambitious youth into the avaricious type.”” “Is this, 
| then, our oligarchical man?” said 1. “ He is de- 
_ veloped, at any rate, out of a man resembling the 
_ constitution from which the oligarchy sprang.” “* Let 
us see, then, whether he will have a like character.” 
“ Let us see.” 
ΠΝ. “Would he not, in the first place, resemble 
it in prizing wealth above everything?” “ Inevi- 
tably.” ‘‘ And also by being thrifty and laborious, 
satisfying only his own necessary ° appetites and 
desires and not providing for expenditure on other 
things, but subduing his other appetites as vain and 
table?” “‘ By all means.” “He would be a 
squalid? fellow,” said I, “ looking for a surplus. of 

p. 220; “ The Times obituary notice of Holloway (of the pills) 
will suffice. *‘ pp ae 2 a an art by itself; it demands 
for success the devotion of the whole man,*”’ ete. For the 
phrase σκοπεῖν ὁπόθεν ef. Isoc. Areop. 83, Panegyr. 133-134 
σκοπεῖν ἐξ ὧν. 
, Ὁ Κλ τὸ gt ety bead 
ἃ αὐχμηρός: ef. Symp. 908 v. 
VOL. II T 273 

~PLATO — iT 

B θησαυροποιὸς ἀνήρ: obs δὴ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος" 
ἢ οὐχ οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ ὅμοιος; 
: \ a » a 23 Pitas $s 
Ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἔφη, δοκεῖ: χρήματα γοῦν μάλιστα 
ἔντιμα τῇ τε πόλει καὶ παρὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ. Οὐ γάρ, 
οἶμαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, παιδείᾳ ὃ τοιοῦτος προσέσχηκεν. 
Οὐ δοκῶ, ἔφη: οὐ γὰρ ἂν τυφλὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ 
χοροῦ ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα. Ed, ἦν δ᾽ 



ἐγώ. τόδε δὲ σκόπει: κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίας ἐν 
αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ἀπαιδευσίαν μὴ φῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι, 
τὰς μὲν πτωχικάς, τὰς δὲ κακούργους, κατεχο- 
μένας βίᾳ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας; Καὶ μάλ᾽, 
ἔφη. Οἶσθ’ οὖν, εἶπον, of ἀποβλέψας κατόψει 
ar \ , a » » ae. =e 
αὐτῶν tas κακουργίας; Ilot; ἔφη. Eis tas τῶν 
ὀρφανῶν ἐπιτροπεύσεις καὶ εἴ πού τι αὐτοῖς 
τοιοῦτον ξυμβαίνει, ὥστε πολλῆς ἐξουσίας Aa- 
βέσθαι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. ᾿Αληθῆ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐ τούτῳ 
δῆλον, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβολαίοις ὁ τοιοῦτος, 
ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι, ἐπιεικεῖ τινὶ 

ε ~ / ’ὔ EA A > , > 4 
ἑαυτοῦ Bia κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνούσας, 

1 ἐτίμα μάλιστα Schneider. The ἔτι μάλιστα of the MSS. is 

® For περιουσίαν cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 50 and 
Theaet. 154 5. 

δ Of. Phaedr. 256 ©, Meno 90 λ-8β by implication. 
Numenius (ed. Mullach iii, 158) relates of Lacydes that he 
was ‘‘a bit greedy (ὑπογλισχρότερος) and after a fashion a 
thrifty manager (oixovoyuxds)—as the expression is—the sort 
approved by most people.”” Emerson, The Young American, 
* They μὸς ὐγωνῆνδ ἢ conventional virtues, whatever will earn 
and preserve property.” But this is not always true inan en- 
vious democracy : οὐ Isoc. xv. 159-160 and America to-day. 



profit* in everything, and a hoarder, the type the 
_ multitude approves. Would not this be the char- 
_ acter of the man who corresponds to such a polity ? ” 
_ “ I certainly think so,” he said. “ Property, at any 

rate,is the thing most esteemed by that state and that 
_ kind of man.” “ That, I take it,” said I, “ is because 
_ he has never turned his thoughts to true culture.” 
_“ T think not,” he said, “εἶξε he would not have made 
the blind © one leader of his choir and first in honour.*” 
“Well said,” I replied. “‘ But consider this. Shall 
we not say that owing to this lack of culture the appe- 
tites of the drone spring up in him, some the beggarly, 
others the rascally, but that they are forcibly re- 
strained by his general self-surveillance and self- 
control*?”’ ‘“* We shall indeed,” he said. “Do you 
know, then,’ said I, “to what you must look to 
_ discern the rascalities of such men?’ “Τὸ what?” 
_ he said. “Τὸ guardianships of orphans‘ and any 
such opportunities of doing injustice with impunity.” 
“True.” “‘ And is it not apparent by this that in 
other dealings, where he enjoys the repute of a 

τάξις A just man, he by some better? element in 
_ himself forcibly keeps down other evil desires dwelling 
* Plato distinctly refers to the blind god Wealth. Cf. 

Aristoph. Plutus, Eurip. fr. 773, Laws 631 σ᾽ πλοῦτος οὐ 
τυφλός which was often quoted. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 624, 

Otto, p. 60. 

4 Cf. Herod. iii. 34, vii. 107. 

* Cf. supra 552 © ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ. For ἄλλης of. 368 B ἐκ 
τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου. 

7 For the treatment of inferiors and weaker persons as a 
test of character ef. Laws 777 p-e, Hesiod, Works and Days, 
330, and Murray, Rise of the Greek Epic, pp. 84-85, who, 
however, errs on the meaning of αἰδώς. For orphans ¢f. also 
Laws 926-928, 766 c, 877 c, 909 c-p. 

9 ἐπιεικεῖ is here used generally, and not in its special sense 
of “‘ sweet reasonableness.” 




ov πείθων, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον, οὐδ᾽ seer 

ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκῃ καὶ φόβῳ, περὶ τῆς ἴλης οὐ 
τρέμων; Καὶ πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη. Καὶ νὴ Δία, "ἦν, δ᾽ 
ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, τοῖς πολλοῖς γε αὐτῶν εὑρήσεις, ὅταν 
δέῃ τἀλλότρια ἀναλίσκειν, τὰς τοῦ κηφῆνος. ξυγ- 
γενεῖς ἐνούσας ἐπιθυμίας. Καὶ hada, i) δ᾽ ὅς, 
σφόδρα. Οὐκ dp’ ἂν εἴη ἀστασίαστος ὃ τοιοῦτος 
ἐν ἑαυτῷ, οὐδὲ εἷς ἀλλὰ διπλοῦς τις, ἐπιθυ ας δὲ 
E ἐπιθυμιῶν ὡς τὸ πολὺ κρατούσας ἂν ἔχοι βελτίους 
χειρόνων. "Ἔστιν οὕτως. Διὰ ταῦτα δή, οἶμαι, 
εὐσχημονέστερος ἂν πολλῶν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἴη" 
ὁμονοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς 
ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴ πόρρω ποι ἐκφεύγοι ἂν αὐτόν. 
Δοκεῖ μοι. Καὶ μὴν ἀνταγωνιστής γε ἰδίᾳ ἐν 

555 πόλει ὁ φειδωλὸς φαῦλος ἤ τινος νίκης ἢ 
φιλοτιμίας τῶν καλῶν, χρήματά τε οὐκ ἐθέλων 
εὐδοξίας ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγώνων ava- 
λίσκειν, δεδιὼς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἀναλωτικὰς 
ἐγείρειν καὶ ξυμπαρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ ξυμμαχίαν τε καὶ 
φιλονικίαν, ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἑαυτοῦ πολεμῶν ὀλιγ- 
αρχικῶς τὰ πολλὰ ἡ ἡττᾶται καὶ i πλουτεῖ. Καὶ i μάλα, 
ἔφη. "Ext οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀπιστοῦμεν, μὴ κατὰ 
τὴν ὀλιγαρχουμένην πόλιν ὁμοιότητι τὸν φειδωλόν 

Β τε καὶ χρηματιστὴν τετάχθαι; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. 
Χ. Δημοκρατίαν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, μετὰ τοῦτο 
« For ἐνούσας cf. Phileb. 16 Ὁ, Symp. 187 8. 

> Of. 463 ν. For the idea here ef. Phaedo 68-69, What 
Plato Said, p. 527. ξ 

© For the idea “ at war with himself,” cf. supra 440 B and & © 
(crdows), Phaedr, 237 Ὁ-Ἐ, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1099 a 12 ἢ 

4 Cf. 397 . 

¢ Of. on 443 p-x, Vol. I. p. 414, note ὁ: also Phaedo 61 a, 
and What Plato Said, p. 485, on Laches 188 Ὁ. 

7 ὀλιγαρχικῶς keeps up the analogy between the man and 



within,* not persuading them that it ‘is better not’? 
_ nor taming them by reason, but by compulsion and 
_ fear, trembling for his possessions. generally.” 
“ Quite so,” he said. “ Yes, by Zeus,” said I, “ my 
friend. In most of them, when there is occasion to 
_ spend the money of others, you will discover the 
_ existence of drone-like appetites.” ‘“‘ Most emphati- 
eally.” “Such a man, then, would not be free from 
internal dissension.* - He would not be really one, but 
in some sort a double? man. Yet for the most part, 
his better desires would have the upper hand over the 

worse.” “‘Itisso.” “And for this reason, I presume, 
_ such a man would be more seemly, more respectable, 
than many others; but the true virtue of a soul in 
unisonand harmony ¢ withitself would escape him and 
dwell afar.” “‘ I thinkso.” “ And again, the thrifty 
stingy man would be a feeble competitor personally 

in the city for any prize of victory or in any other 
_ honourable emulation. He is unwilling to spend 
money for fame and rivalries of that sort, and, fearing 
to awaken his prodigal desires and call them into 
alliance for the winning of the victory, με fights 
in true oligarchical ‘ fashion with a small part of his 
resources and is defeated for the most part and—finds 
himself rich!*” “Yes indeed,” he said. ‘‘ Have 
we any further doubt, then,” I said,“ as to the cor- 
respondence and resemblance” between the thrifty 
money-making man and the oligarchical state?” 

*“ None,” he said. 

X. “ We have next to consider, it seems, the origin 
the state. Cf. my “Idea of Justice,” Ethical Record, Jan. 
1890, pp. 188, 191, 195. 

5 i.e. he sayes the cost of a determined fight. For the 

effect of surprise cf. on 544 c, p. 239, note αὶ 
ὁμοιότητι: ef. 576 c. 



σκεπτέον, τίνα τε γίγνεται τρόπον γενομένη TE 
ποῖόν τινα ἔχει, ἵν᾿ αὖ τὸν τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρὸς 
τρόπον γνόντες παραστησώμεθ᾽ αὐτὸν εἰς κρίσιν. 
Ὁμοίως γοῦν ἄν, ἔφη, ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς πορευοίμεθα. 
Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, μεταβάλλει μὲν τρόπον τινὰ 
τοιόνδε ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν, dv ἀπληστίαν 
τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ ὡς πλουσιώτατον 
C δεῖν γίγνεσθαι; Πῶς δή; “Are, οἶμαι, ἄρχοντες 
ἐν αὐτῇ οἱ ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸ πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι, οὐκ 
ἐθέλουσιν εἴργειν νόμῳ τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἂν ἀκόλαστοι 
γίγνωνται, μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἀναλίσκειν τε καὶ 
ἀπολλύναι τὰ αὑτῶν, ἵνα ὠνούμενοι τὰ τῶν τοι- 
οὕτων καὶ εἰσδανείζοντες ἔτι πλουσιώτεροι καὶ 
ἐντιμότεροι γίγνωνται. Ἰαντός γε μᾶλλον. Οὐκ- 
οῦν δῆλον ἤδη τοῦτο ἐν πόλει, ὅτι πλοῦτον τιμᾶν 
καὶ σωφροσύνην ἅμα ἱκανῶς κτᾶσθαι ἐν τοῖς 
πολίταις ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου 
ἀμελεῖν ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου; ᾿Ἐπιεικῶς, ἔφη, δῆλον. 
Παραμελοῦντες δὴ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ἐφιέντες 
ἀκολασταίνειν οὐκ ἀγεννεῖς ἐνίοτε ἀνθρώπους 
πένητας ἠνάγκασαν γενέσθαι. Μάλα γε. Καθ- 
nvra δή, οἶμαι, οὗτοι ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκεντρωμένοι 
τε καὶ ἐξωπλισμένοι, of μὲν ὀφείλοντες χρέα, οἱ 
δὲ ἄτιμοι γεγονότες, of δὲ ἀμφότερα, μισοῦντές τε 
καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς κτησαμένοις τὰ αὑτῶν 
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, νεωτερισμοῦ ἐρῶντες. Ἔστι 

«ΟἹ, Phileb. 55 c els τὴν κρίσιν, Laws 856 c, 948 c. 
> The σκοπός or ὅρος. Cf. on 551 a, p. 263, note e, and 
Aristot. Eth. Nie. 1094 a 2. 




- and nature of democracy, that we may next learn the 

character of that type of man and range him beside 
the others for our judgement.*”’ “ That would at least 
be a consistent procedure.” “‘ Then,” said I, “‘ is not 
the transition from oligarchy to democracy effected 
in some such way as this—by the insatiate greed for 
that which it set before itself as the good,” the attain- 
ment of the greatest possible wealth ?”’ “ In what 
way?” ‘‘ Why, since its rulers owe their offices to 
their wealth, they are not willing to prohibit by law 
the prodigals who arise among the youth from spend- 
ing and wasting their substance. Their object is, by 
lending money on the property of such men, and buy- 
ing it in, to become still richer and more esteemed.” 
“ By all means.” “ And is it not at once apparent 
in a state that this honouring of wealth is incom- 
patible with a sober and temperate citizenship,° but 
that one or the other of these two ideals is inevitably 
neglected.”’ “ That is pretty clear,” he said. “* And 
such negligence and encouragement of licentiousness@ 
in oligarchies not infrequently has reduced to poverty 
men of noignoble quality.” “It surely has.”” “And 
there they sit, I fancy, within the city, furnished with 
stings, that is, arms, some burdened with debt, others 
disfranchised, others both, hating and conspiring 
against the acquirers of their estates and the rest of 
the citizens, and eager for revolution.’” “ Tis so.” 

¢ Ackermann, Das Christliche bei Plato, compares Luke 
xvi. 13 “‘ Ye cannot serve God and Mammon.” (Cf. also 
Laws 742 p-x, 727 πὶ f., 831 c. 

4 ἀκολασταίνειν : ef. Gorg. 478 a, Phileb. 12 v. 

* Cf. Laws 832 α οὐκ ἀφυεῖς. For the men reduced to 
poverty swelling the number of drones ¢f. Eurip. Herc. Fur. 
588-592, and Wilamowitz ad loc. 

7 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1305 Ὁ 40-41, 1266 Ὁ 14. 



ταῦτα. Oi δὲ δὴ χρηματισταὶ ἐγκύψαντες, οὐδὲ 
δοκοῦντες. τούτους ὁρᾶν, τῶν λοιπῶν τὸν ἀεὶ ὑπ- 
είκοντα ἐνιέντες ἀργύριον τιτρώσκοντες, καὶ τοῦ 
πατρὸς ἐκ όνους τόκους πολλαπλασίους. 'κομιζό- 
δῦθ μενοι, πολὺν τὸν κηφῆνα καὶ πτωχὸν ἐμποιοῦσι, τῇ 
πόλει. Πῶς “γάρ, ἔφη, οὐ πολύν; Οὔτε γ » ἐκεῖ F 
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸ τοιοῦτον κακὸν ἐκκαόμενον ἀπχουοι 
ἀποσβεννύναι, εἴργοντες τὰ αὑτοῦ ὅποι τις βού- 
λεται τρέπειν, οὔτε τῆδε, ἧ αὖ κατὰ ἕτερον. νόμον 
τὰ τοιαῦτα λύεται. Kara δὴ τίνα; % 5. μετ᾽ 
ἐκεῖνόν ἐστι δεύτερος καὶ “ἀναγκάζων. ἀρετῆς 
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτοῦ 
κινδύνῳ τὰ πολλά τις τῶν ἑκουσίων ξυμβολαίων 
Β προστάττῃ ξυμβάλλειν, χρηματίζοιντο μὲν. “ἂν 
TTov ἀναιδῶς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐλάττω δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῇ 
φύοιτο τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν, οἵων νῦν δὴ εἴπομεν. 
Καὶ πολύ γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. Noy δέ γ᾽ ὴ ἔφην ἐγώ, διὰ 
πᾶντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς μὲν ἡ ἀρχομένους οὕτω 
διατιθέασιν ἐ ἐν τῇ πόλει οἱ ἄρχοντες" σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς 
καὶ τοὺς αὑτῶν ap οὐ τρυφῶντας μὲν τοὺς νέους 
καὶ ἀπόνους καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς 
C τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονάς 

@ Cf. Persius, Sat. ii. 61 “ὁ curvae in terras animae, et 
caelestium inanes,’’ Rossetti, Niniveh, in jine, ‘* That set 
gaze never on the sky,”’ Dante, Purg. xix. 71-73: 

Vidi gente per esso che piangea, 
Giacendo a terra tutta volta in giuso. 
Adhaesit pavimento anima mea, etc. 

Cf. infra 586 a κεκυφότεςς Cf. also on 553 τὸ for the general 

> Cf. Buthyph. 5 c, Polit. 287 a, Aristoph. Peace 1051, 
Plut. 837, Eurip. Hippol. 119, 1.1. 956, Medea 67, Xen. 
Hell. iv. 5. 6. 

© Or, as Ast, Stallbaum and others take it, ‘‘ the poison of 



“ But these money-makers with down-bent heads,* 
_ pretending not even to see” them, but inserting the 
sting of their money “ into any of the remainder who 
» not resist,.and harvesting from them in interest 
_as it were a manifold progeny of the parent sum, 
foster the drone and pauper element in the state.” 
_“ They-do indeed multiply it,” he said. “‘ And they 
_ are not willing to quench the evil as it bursts into flame 
_ either by way of a law prohibiting a man from doing 
as he likes with his own,? or in this way, by a second 


law that does away with such abuses.” “* What law?” 
“ The law that is next best, and compels the citizens 
to pay heed to virtue.* For if a law commanded that 
most voluntary contracts’ should be atthe contractor's 
risk, the pursuit of wealth would be less shameless 
in the state and fewer of the evils of which we spoke 
just now would grow up there.’ ‘Much fewer,” 
he said. ‘‘ it is, and forall these reasons, this 
is the plight to which the rulers in the state reduce 
their subjects, and as for themselves and their off- 
spring, do they not make the young spoiled? wantons 
averse to toil of body and mind, and too soft to stand 

their money.”’ τιτρώσκοντες 5 the poisonous sting, 
especially as Plato has been speaking of hives and drones, 
For ἐνιέντες cf. Eurip. Bacchae 851 ἐνεὶς . . . λύσσαν, “* im- 
penuné madness.’ In the second half of the sentence the 

gure is changed, the poison becoming the parent, i.e. the 
principal, which breeds interest, ¢f. 507 a, p. 96. 

* Cf. on 552 a, Laws 922 £-923 a. 

* Cf. Protag. 327 Ὁ ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, Symp. 
185 B, and for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ef. What Plato Said, p. 464, on 
Apol. 29 p-r. 

7 For refusing to enforce monetary contracts cf. Laws 
742 c, 849 ©, 915 ©, and Newman ii. p. 254 on Aristot. 

_ Pol. 1263 Ὁ 21. 

* Cf. What Plato Said, p. 483, on Laches 179 pb, and 

Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 23. ; 



τε καὶ λύπας Kal ἀργούς; Τί μήν; Αὐτοὺς δὲ. 
πλὴν χρηματισμοῦ τῶν ἄλλων ἠμεληκότας, καὶ 
οὐδὲν πλείω ἐπιμέλειαν πεποιημένους ἀρετῆς ἢ 
τοὺς πένητας; Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὕτω δὴ παρ- 
εσκευασμένοι ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν ἀλλήλοις͵ οἵ τε 
ἄρχοντες καὶ ot ἀρχόμενοι ἢ ἐν ὁδῶν πορείαις ἢ ἐ ἐν 
ἄλλαις τισὶ κοινωνίαις, ἢ κατὰ θεωρίας ἢ κατὰ 
στρατείας, ἣ ξύμπλοι γιγνόμενοι. ἢ συστρατιῶται, 
ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινδύνοις ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι, 
μηδαμῇ ταύτῃ καταφρονῶνται οἱ πένητες ὑπὸ τῶν 
πλουσίων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἰσχνὸς ἀνὴρ. πένης, 
ἡλιωμένος, παραταχθεὶς ἐν μάχῃ πλουσίῳ, ἐσκια- 
τροφηκότι, πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας, ἴδῃ 
ἄσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν, ἄρ᾽ οἴει αὐτὸν 
οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ πλουτεῖν τοὺς 
τοιούτους, καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλῳ παραγγέλλειν, ὅταν 
ἰδίᾳ ξυγγίγνωνται, ὅτι ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶ παρ᾽ 
οὐδέν"; Ed οἶδα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὕτω 
ποιοῦσιν. Οὐκοῦν ὥσπερ σῶμα νοσῶδες μικρᾶς 
ῥοπῆς ἔξωθεν δεῖται. προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ 
κάμνειν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει 
αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ κατὰ ταὐτὸ ἐκείνῳ 
διακειμένη πόλις ἀπὸ σμικρᾶς προφάσεως, ἔξωθεν 
ἐπαγομένων ἢ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐξ ὀλιγαρχουμένης 

1 ἄνδρες ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶ map οὐδέν Baiter: γὰρ οὐδέν AFDM: 
ἅνδρες ἡμέτεροι" Adam. 

@ Cf. 429 c-p, Laches 191 p-£, Laws 633 Ὁ. 

> Cf. Tucker on Aesch. Suppl. 726. 

© Cf. Soph. Ajax 758 περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα. 

4 For a similar. picture cf. Aristoph. Frogs 1086-1098. 

Cf. also Gorg. 518 c, and for the whole passage Xen. Mem. 
iii. 5. 15, Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 24-25. 

* The poor, though stronger, are too cowardly to use force. 
For κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ cf. Lysias ii. 65 κακίᾳ τῇ αὑτῶν, Rhesus 



up against pleasure and pain,? and mere idlers?” 
“Surely.” “And do they not fasten upon them- 
selves the habit of neglect of everything except the 

_ making of money, and as complete an indifference to 

virtue as the paupers exhibit ?”” “ Little they care.”’ 
“And when, thus conditioned, the rulers and the 
ruled are brought together on the march, in way- 
faring, or in some other common undertaking, either 
a religious festival, or a campaign, or as shipmates or 
fellow-soldiers or, for that matter, in actual battle, and 
observe one another, then the poor are not in the least 
scorned by the rich, but on the contrary, do you not 
suppose it often happens that when a lean, sinewy, 
sunburnt ὃ pauper is stationed in battle beside a rich 
man bred in the shade, and burdened with superfluous 
flesh,° and sees him panting and helpless*—do you not 
suppose he will think that such fellows keep their 
wealth by the cowardice ὁ of the poor, and that when 
the latter are together in private, one will pass the 
word to another ‘our men are good for nothing ’?”’ 
“Nay, I know very well that they do,’ saidhe. “ And 
justas an unhealthy body requires but a slight impulse’ 
from outside to fall into sickness, and sometimes, even 
without that, all the man is one internal war, in like 
manner does not the corresponding type of state need 
onlya slight occasion.’ the one party bringing in” allies 

813-814 τῇ Φρυγῶν κακανδρίᾳ, Phaedrus 248 8, Symp. 182 Ὁ, 

Crito 45 ©, Eurip. Androm. 967, Aristoph. Thesm. 868 τῇ 
κοράκων πονηρίᾳ. 

ὦ Sheik . O.T. 961 σμικρὰ παλαῖα σώματ᾽ εὐνάζει ῥοπή, 
μὰ slight impulse puts aged bodies to βἴεερ,᾽" Demosth. 
Olynth. ii. 9 and 21. Cf. 544 τ. 

9“ Cf. Polyb. vi. 57. Montaigne, apud Héffding, i. 30 
“ Like every other being each illness has its appointed time 
of development and close—interference is futile,” with Tim. 
89 B. » Cf. Thue. i. 3, ii. 68, iv. 64, Herod. ii. 108. 



πόλεως ξυμμαχίαν ἢ τῶν ἑτέρων ἐκ δημοκρατου- 

᾿ μένης, νοσεῖ τε καὶ αὐτὴ αὑτῇ μάχεται, ἐνίοτε δὲ 
557 καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω στασιάζει; Kal σφόδρα γε. 
Δημοκρατία δή, οἶμαι, γίγνεται, ὅταν of πένητες 
νικήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείνωσι τῶν ἑτέρων, τοὺς 

δὲ ἐκβάλωσι, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἐξ ἴσου μεταδῶσι 
πολιτείας τε καὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἀπὸ 
κλήρων αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν αὐτῇ γίγνονται. "Ἔστι γάρ, 
ἔφη, αὕτη ἡ κατάστασις δημοκρατίας, ἐάν τε καὶ 
δι᾿ ὅπλων γένηται ἐάν τε καὶ διὰ φόβον ὑπεξ- 
ελθόντων τῶν ἑτέρων. dita 
XI. Τίνα δὴ οὖν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, οὗτοι τρόπον 

Β οἰκοῦσι; καὶ ποία τις ἡ τοιαύτη αὖ πολιτεία; 
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι 6 τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ δημοκρατικός τις 
ἀναφανήσεται. Δῆλον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν 
δὴ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστὴ καὶ 
παρρησίας γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν 

ὅ τί τις βούλεται; Λέγεταί γε δή, ἔφη. “Ὅπου 
δέ γε ἐξουσία, δῆλον ὅτι ἰδίαν ἕκαστος ἂν κατα- 
σκευὴν τοῦ αὑτοῦ βίου κατασκευάζοιτο ἐν αὐτῇ, 

α στασιάζει is applied here to disease of body. Of. Herod. 
v.28 νοσήσασα és τὰ μάλιστα στάσι, ‘* grievously ill of faction.” 
Cf. supra on 554 pv, p. 276, note ὁ. 

» Of. 488 c, 560 a, Gorg. 466 c, 468 p, Prot. 325 8. Exile, 
either formal or voluntary, was always regarded as the proper — 
thing for the defeated party in the Athenian democracy. | 
The custom even exists at the present time. Venizelos, for — 
instance, has frequently, when defeated at the polls, chosen 
to go into voluntary exile. But that term, in modern as. in 
ancient Greece, must often be interpreted cum grano salis. 

© ἐξ ἴσου : one of the watchwords of democracy. C/. 561 Β 



from an oligarchical state, or the other from a demo- 
cratic, to become diseased and wage war with itself, 
-and sometimes even apart from any external im- 
_ pulse faction arises*?’’ “‘ Most emphatically.”’ “‘ And 
ἃ democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the 
poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the 
other party, drive out® others, and grant the rest 
of the citizens an equal share 5 in both citizenship 
and offices—and for the most part these offices are 
assigned by lot.?” “* Why, yes,” he said, “that is the 
constitution of democracy alike whether it is estab- 
lished by force of arms or by terrorism 5 resulting in 
_ the withdrawal of one of the parties.” 
_ XI. “* What, then,” said I, “is the manner of their 
life and what is the quality of such a constitution ? 
For it is plain that the man of this quality will turn 
out to be a democratic sort of man.”” “It is plain,” 
he said. “Τὸ begin with, are they not free? and 
is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom 
of speech? and has not every man licence’ to 
do as he likes?’’. “So it is said,’ he replied. 
““And where there is such licence, it is obvious 

that everyone would arrange a plan? for leading his 

and c, 599 5, 617 c, Laws 919 νυ, Ale. I. 115 τ, Crito 50 £, 
Isoc. Archid. 96, Peace 3. 

4 But Isoc. Areop. 22-23 considers the lot undemo- 
cratic because it might result in the establishment in office 
of men with oligarchical sentiments. See Norlin ad loc. 
For the use of the lot in Plato cf. Laws 759 5, 757 ©, 690 c, 
741 of 856 p, 946 5, Rep. 460 4, 461 ©. Cf. Apelt, p. 520. 

7 551 B. 

7 &ovcia: cf. Isoc. xii. 131 τὴν δ᾽ ἐξουσίαν ὅ τι βούλεται τις 
ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii. 
Doing as One Likes. 

5 κατασκευή is a word of all work in Plato. Cf. 419 a, 
449 a, 455 a, Gorg. 455 π, 477 5, etc. 



ἥτις ἕκαστον ἀρέσκοι. Δῆλον. Παντοδαποὶ δὴ 
Cav, οἶμαι, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ μάλιστ᾽ ἐγ- 
γίγνοιντο ἄνθρωποι. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Κινδυνεύει, 
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι" 
ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλ-: 
μένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἤθεσι πεποικιλμένη 
καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο" καὶ ἴσως μέν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ 
ταύτην, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδές τε καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ 
ποικίλα θεώμενοι, καλλίστην ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαν. 
D Καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη. Καὶ ἔστι γε, ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ᾽ 
ἐγώ, ἐπιτήδειον ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ πολιτείαν. Τί δή; 
Ort πάντα γένη πολιτειῶν ἔχει διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, 
καὶ κινδυνεύει τῷ βουλομένῳ πόλιν κατασκευάζειν, 
ὃ νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς ἐποιοῦμεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς 
δημοκρατουμένην ἐλθόντι πόλιν, ὃς ἂν αὐτὸν 
ἀρέσκῃ τρόπος, τοῦτον ἐκλέξασθαι, ὥσπερ εἰς 
παντοπώλιον ἀφικομένῳ πολιτειῶν, καὶ ἐκλεξα- 
μένῳ οὕτω κατοικίζειν. “lows γοῦν, ἔφη, οὐκ 
E ἂν ἀποροῖ παραδειγμάτων. Τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγ- 
Knv, εἶπον, εἶναι ἄρχειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει, μηδ᾽ 

* παντοδαπός usually has an unfavourable connotation in 
Plato. Cf. 431 B-c, 561 pv, 567 π, 559 p, Symp. 198 8, 
Gorg. 489 c, Laws 788 5, etc. Isoc. iv. 45 usesitina 
favourable sense, but in iii. 16 more nearly as Plato does. ‘|G 

For the mixture of things in a democracy cf. Xen. Rep. 
Ath. 2. 8 φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι. .. ᾿Αθηναῖοι δὲ κε- 
κραμένῃ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων ; and Laws 
681 p. Libby, Introduction to History of Science, p. 273, 
says “‘ Arnold failed in his analysis of American civilization 
to confirm Plato’s judgement concerning the variety of 
natures to be found in the democratic state.” De Tocqueville 
also, and many English observers, have commented on the 
monotony and standardization of American life. 



_own life in the way that pleases him.”’ “‘Obvious.” 

“ All sorts¢ and conditions of men, then, would | 
_arise in this polity more than in anyother?” “Of | 
course.” “ Possibly,” said I, “this is the most 
beautiful of polities ; as a garment of many colours, 
embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked 

and diversified with every type of character, would 

appear the most beautiful. And perhaps,” I said, 

““many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like | 

and women?’ when they see bright-coloured | 
_things.” “Yesindeed,”’ hesaid. ‘Yes,’ said I, “and 

it is the fit place, my good friend, in which to look for a 
_ constitution.” ‘‘Whyso?” “Because, owing to this 
licence, it includes all kinds, and it seems likely that 

anyone who wishes to organize a state, as we were just 

now doing, must find his way to a democratic city and 
select the model that pleases him, as if in a bazaar ° of 
constitutions, and after making his choice, establish 
his own.” ‘‘ Perhaps at any rate,” he said, “ he 
would not be at a loss for patterns.’’ “ And the 
freedom from all compulsion to hold office in such a 

> For the idea that women and children like many colours 
ef. Sappho’s admiration for Jason’s mantle mingled with all 
manner of colours (yr. Graec. i. 196). For the classing 
oe of women and boys ¢f. Laws 658 pv, Shakes. As 
ou Like It, ut. ii. 435 “‘ As boys and women are for the 
most part cattle of this colour,”’ Faguet, Nineteenth Century 
“ Lamartine a été infiniment aimé des adolescents sérieux et 
des femmes distinguées,”’ 
¢ Cf. Plutarch, Dion 53. Burke says “‘A republic, as 
an ancient philosopher has observed, is no one species of 
government, but a magazine of every spore Cf. Laws 
789 8 for an illustration of the point. Filmer, Patriarcha, 
misquotes this, saying “The Athenians sold justice... ., 
which made Plato call a popular estate a fair where every- 
thing is to be sold.” 


{av ἧς ἱκανὸς ἄρχειν, μηδὲ αὖ ἄρχεσθαι, ἐὰν. μὴ. | 
| βούλῃ, μηδὲ πολεμεῖν πολεμούντων, μηδὲ. εἰρήνην 
ἄγειν τῶν ἄλλων ᾿ἀγόντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιθυμῇς ᾿ 
εἰρήνης, μηδ᾽ αὖ, ἐάν τις ἄρχειν νόμος. σε δια- 
κωλύῃ ἢ "und tet μηδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἄρχειν. καὶ 
558 δικάζειν, ἐ ἐὰν αὐτῷ σοι ἐπίῃ, ἄρ᾽ οὐ θεσπεσία καὶ 
ἡδεῖα ἡ ἡ τοιαύτη διαγωγὴ ἐ ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα; Ἴσως, y 
ἔφη, ἔν γε τούτῳ. Τί δαί; ἡ πῤᾳότης. ἐνίων τῶν 
δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ἢ οὔπω εἶδες ἐν τοιαύτῃ 
πολιτείᾳ, ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων θανάτου, 
ἢ φυγῆς, οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτῶν μενόντων. τε καὶ 
ἀναστρεφομένων ἐ ἐν μέσῳ, καὶ ὡς οὔτε φροντίζοντο aS 
οὔτε ὁρῶντος οὐδενὸς περινοστεῖ ὥσπερ ἥρως; 
Καὶ πολλούς γ᾽, ἔφη. “i δὲ συγγνώμη. καὶ οὐδ᾽ 
Β ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ καταφρόνησις 
ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν σεμνύνοντες, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν 
φκίζομεν, ὡς εἰ μή τις “ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔ ἔχοι, 
οὔποτ᾽ ἂν γένοιτο ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ παῖς ὧν 
εὐθὺς παίζοι ἐν καλοῖς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύοι τὰ τοιαῦτα 


2 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1271 ἃ 12 δεῖ yap καὶ Bévivioabe: eal μὴ } 
βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cf. 347 B-c. ; 
Ὁ Cf. Laws 955 5-0, where a penalty is pronounced for 
making peace or war privately, and the parody in Aristoph. 

Acharn. passim. 

ὁ διαγωγή: cf. 344 ©, where it is used more seriously of the 
whole conduct of life. Cf. also Theaet. 177 a, Polit. 274 το, 
Tim. 71 pv, Laws 806 ©. Aristot. Met. 981 Ὁ 18 and 982 Ὁ 24 
uses the word in virtual anaphora with pleasure. See too 
Zeller, Aristot. ii. pp. 307-309, 266, n. 5. 

4 Cf. 562 Ὁ. For the mildness of the Athenian demo- 
cracy cf. Aristot. Ath. Pol. 22. 19, Demosth. xxi. 184, xxii. 51, 
xxiv. 51, Lysias vi. 34, Isoc. Antid. 20, Areopagit. 67-68, 
Hel. 37; also Menex. 243 πὶ and also Huthydem. 303 p δημοτικόν 



city, even if you are qualified,* or again, to submit to 
rule, unless you please, or to make war when the rest 
_are at war,” or to. keep the peace when the others do 
So, unless you Senne piece ; and again, the liberty, in 
defiance of any law that forbids you, to. hold office and 
sit on juries none. the less, if it occurs to you to do so, 
is not all that a heavenly and delicious entertainment ὃ 
for the time being?” “ Perhaps,” he said, “‘ for so 
long.” “And is not the placability ὁ of some convicted 
criminals exquisite*? Or have you never seen in 
such a state men condemned to death or exile who 
none the less stay on, and go to and fro among 
the people, and as if no one saw or heeded him, the 
man slips in and out’ like a revenant’?”’ “‘ Yes, 
many, he said.. “And the tolerance of demo- 
cracy, its superiority* to all our meticulous require- 
ments, its disdain for our solemn? pronouncements 7 
made when we were founding our city, that except 
in the case of transcendent * natural gifts no one could 
ever become a good man unless from childhood his 
play and all his pursuits were concerned with things 
τι καὶ πρᾷον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Here the word π᾿ is ironi 
transferred to the ssa himself. SRE ET en 
4 κομψή: of. 376 a, Theaet. 171 a. 
7 For περινοστεῖ cf. Lucian, Bis Ace. 6, Aristoph. Plut. 
121, 494, Peace 762. 
__ ’ His being unnoticed accords better with the rendering 
“spirit,” “one returned from. the dead” (a perfectly 
ible meaning for ἥρως. Wilamowitz,. Platon, i. p. 435 
ates “ Geist’) than with that of a hero returning from 
the wars. Cf. Adamadloc. - 
_* For οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία ef. on 532 Β ἔτι ἀδυναμία. 
* σεμνύνοντες here has an ironical or colloquial tone— 
“ high-brow,” “ top-lofty.” 
7 Cf. 401 B-c, 374 c and on 467 a, Laws 643 8, Delacroix, 
Psychologie de Vart, p. 46. 
© For ὑπερβεβλημένη cf. Laws 719 Ὁ, Eurip. Alcest. 153. 

VOL. II U 289 




πάντα, ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς καταπατήσασ᾽ ἅπαντα 
“- γα κ ,ὔ 2 ε 4.0. ” i? iF ἢ 
ταῦτα οὐδὲν φροντίζει, ἐξ ὁποίων ἄν τις ἐπιτη- 
| δευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ ἰὼν πράττῃ, ἀλλὰ τιμᾷ, 
Ο ἐὰν φῇ μόνον εὔνους elvar τῷ πλήθει. Πάνυ ἢ 
»" pfia0k pow oy Ἢ: Ὡς τὸ SW RET 
ἔφη, γενναία." Ταῦτά τε δή, ἔφην, ἔχοι ἂν καὶ 
j ἄλλα ἀδελφὰ δημοκρατία, Kat εἴη, ὡς 

τούτων α ἀδελφὰ δημοκρατία, καὶ εἴη, ὡς 
ἔοικεν, ἡδεῖα πολιτεία καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ποικίλη, 
ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις δια- 
νέμουσα. Kai μάλ᾽, ἔφη, γνώριμα λέγεις. ΐ 
ΧΙ. ἔάλθρει δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τίς ὁ τοιοῦτος ἰδίᾳ. 
ἢ πρῶτον σκεπτέον, ὥσπερ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐσκεψά- 
μέθα, τίνα τρόπον γίγνεται; Nai, ἔφη. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν 
οὐχ ὧδε; τοῦ φειδωλοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ 

Ὁ γένοιτ᾽ ἄν, οἶμαι, υἱὸς ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ τεθραμμε 
3 “ > , "Μ ΄ \ », / ei ᾿- 
ev τοῖς ἐκείνου ἤθεσιν; Τί γὰρ οὔ; Bia δὴ καὶ 
οὗτος ἄρχων τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ ἡδονῶν, ὅσαι ἀνα- 
λωτικαὶ μέν, χρηματιστικαὶ δὲ μή, at δὴ οὐκ 
ἀναγκαῖαι κέκληνται. Δῆλον, ἔφη. Βούλει οὖν, 
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἵνα μὴ σκοτεινῶς διαλεγώμεθα, πρῶτον 
ὁρισώμεθα τάς τε ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τὰς 
fis, B 5A δ᾽ “ O > - Ad > a i ’ 
μή; Βούλομαι, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. Οὐκοῦν ds τε οὐκ ἂν οἷοί 
1 γενναία M, γενναῖα AFD. 

@ μεγαλοπρεπῶς is often ironical in Plato. Cf. 362c, Symp. — 
199 c, Charm. 175 c, Theaet. 161 c, Meno 94 8, Polit. 277 8, 
Hipp. Maj. 291 &. 

δ In Aristoph. Knights 180 ff. Demosthenes tells the 
sausage-seller that his low birth and ignorance and his trade 
are the very things that fit him for political leadership. . 

¢ Cf. Aristoph. Knights 732 f., 741 and passim. Andoc. iv. 
16 εὔνους τῷ δήμῳ. Emile Faguet, Moralistes, iii. p. 84, says of 
Tocqueville, “Il est bien je crois le premier qui ait dit que la 
démocratie abaisse le niveau intellectuel des gouvernements.” 
For the other side of the democratic shield see Thucyd. ii. 39. 

4 For the ironical use of γενναία cf. 544, Soph. 231 5, 
Theaet. 209 Ἑ. 



fair and good,—how superbly *it tramples under foot 
all such ideals, caring nothing from what practices ὃ 
and way of life a man turns to politics, but honouring 
him if only he says that he loves the people!°” 
“Tt is a noble? polity, indeed!” he said. ‘‘ These 
and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit, 
and it would, it seems, be a delightfule form of 
government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind 
of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals 
alike!7”’’ “Yes,” he said, “‘ everybody knows that.” 

XII.“ Observe, then, the corresponding private 
character. Or must we first, as in the case of the 
polity, consider the origin of the type?” ‘“‘ Yes,” 

e said. “15 not this, then, the way of it? Our 
thrifty 5 oligarchical man would have a son bred in 
his father’s ways.” Ὃν not?” ‘ And he, too, 
would control by force all his appetites for pleasure 
that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those 
which are denominated unnecessary.” ‘‘ Obviously.” 
* And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first 
define” our distinction between necessary and. un- 
necessary appetites*?”’’ “‘ Let us do so.” “ Well, 

* ἡδεῖα: of. Isoc. vii. 70 of good government, τοῖς χρωμένοις 

ἢ Cf. What Plato Said, p. 634, on Laws 744 B-c, and ibid. 
p. 508 on Gorg. 508 a, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1131 a 23-24, New- 
man, i. p. 248, Xen. Cyr. ii. 2. 18. 

_* Cf. 572 c, Theogn. 915 f., Anth. Pal. x. 41, Democri 
fr. 227 and 228, Diels 1.3 p. 106, and Epicharm. fr. 45, 
Diels 1.3 p. 126. 

ἘΠῊΝ Plato Said, p. 485, on Laches 190 Β, and p. 551, 
on Phaedr. 237 τ. 

* Cf. 554 a, 571 B, Phaedo 64 »-π, Phileb. 62 x, Aristot. 
Eth. Nie. 1147 b 29. The Epicureans made much of this 
distinction.. Cf. Cie. De fin. i, 13. 45, Tuse. v. 33, 93, 
Porphyry, De abst. i. 49. Ath. xii. 511 quotes this passage 
and says it anticipates the Epicureans. 




τ᾽ εἷμεν ἀποτρέψαι, δικαίως ἂν ἀναγκαῖαι καλοῖντο, 
K καὶ ὅσαι ἀποτελούμεναι ὠφελοῦσιν ἡμᾶς; τούτων 
γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίεσθαι ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη" | 
559 7 ov; Kat μάλα. Δικαίως δὴ τοῦτο ἐπ᾽ αὐταῖς 
ἐροῦμεν, τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. Δικαίως. Τί δαί; ἅς γέ 
τις ἀπαλλάξειεν ἄν, εἰ μελετῷ ἐκ νέου, καὶ πρὸς 
οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐ ἐνοῦσαι δρῶσιν, αἱ δὲ καὶ τοὐναντίον, 
πάσας ταύτας εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαίους φαῖμεν. εἶναι, ἄρ᾿ 
οὐ καλῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; Καλῶς μὲν οὖν. Προ- 
ελώμεθα δή τι παράδειγμα ἑκατέρων, αἵ εἰσιν, wa 
τύπῳ λάβωμεν αὐτάς; Οὐκοῦν χρή. *Ap” οὖν 
οὐχ ἡ τοῦ φαγεῖν μέχρι ὑγιείας τε καὶ εὐεξίας κι ἶ 
Β αὐτοῦ. σίτου τε καὶ ὄψου ἀναγκαῖος ἂν εἴη; Οἶμαι. 
Ἢ μέν γέ που τοῦ σίτου κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἀναγκαία, 
H τε ὠφέλιμος ἧ τε παῦσαι ζῶντα οὐ. δυνατή", ‘ 
Nai. Ἣ δὲ ὄψου, εἴ πῇ τινα ὠφέλειαν πρὸς 
εὐεξίαν παρέχεται. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δέ; ἡ 
πέρα τούτων καὶ ἀλλοίων ἐδεσμάτων ἢ τοιούτων 
ἐπιθυμία, δυνατὴ δὲ κολαζομένη ἐκ νέων καὶ 
παιδευομένη ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, καὶ 
βλαβερὰ μὲν σώματι, βλαβερὰ δὲ ψυχῇ πρός τε 
© φρόνησιν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἄρα γε ὀρθῶς οὐκ 
ἀναγκαία ἂν καλοῖτο; ᾿Ορθότατα μὲν οὖν. Οὐκ- 
οῦν καὶ ἀναλωτικὰς φῶμεν εἶναι ταύτας, ἐκείνας 
δὲ χρηματιστικὰς διὰ τὸ χρησίμους πρὸς τὰ ἔργα 
εἶναι; Τί μήν; Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων. 
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φήσομεν; Οὕτω. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν καὶ 

1 παῦσαι ζῶντα οὐ δυνατή Hermann, παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή 
AFD, μὴ παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή Mon., Burnet, παῦσαι πεινῶν- 
ras Athenaeus, παύσασθαι ζῶντος ἀδυνατεῖ Wilamowitz (Platon, 
ii, pp. 385-386). 



_ then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may 
be properly called necessary, and likewise those 
whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not ? 
For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction. 
Is not that so?” “ Most assuredly. » “Then we 
htly use the word ‘necessary’ of them?” 

“Righty” “ And what of the desires from which a 
man pea free himself by discipline from youth up, 
and whose presence in the soul does no good and in 
some cases baat ? Should we not fairly call all such 
unnecessary?” “‘ Fairly indeed.” ‘“ Let us select 
an example of either kind, so that we may apprehend 
the type.*” “Let us do so.” “ Would not the 
_ desire of eating to keep in health and condition and 
the appetite for mere bread and relishes” be neces- 
sary?’ “I think so.” “The appetite for bread 
is in both respects, in that it is beneficial 
os in that if it fails we αἷς. “Yes.” ‘‘ And the 
desire for relishes, so far as it conduces to fitness ? ” 
“ By all means.” “‘ And should we not rightly pro- 
nounce unnecessary the appetite that exceeds these 
and seeks other varieties of food, and that by cor- 
rection ¢ and training from youth up can be got rid 
of in most cases and is harmful to the body and a 
hindrance to the soul’s attainment of intelligence and 
sobriety?” “‘Nay, most rightly.” “And may we not 
call the one group the spendthrift desires and the 
other the ‘profitable ,? because they help production?”’ 
“Surely.” “‘ And we shall say the same of sexual 
and other appetites?” ‘The same.’ ‘* And were 

* Or “ grasp them in outline.” 
» For ὄψον cf. on 372 c, Vol. I. p. 158, note a. 
¢ For κολαζομένη cf. 571 8, Gorg. 505 w, 491 ε, 507 

For the thought cf. also supra 519 a-B. 
_ 4 Lit. “money-making.” Cf. 558 p. 


560 7 


ὃν νῦν δὴ κηφῆνα ὠνομάζομεν, τοῦτον ἐλέγομεν — 
τὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν γέμοντα 

καὶ ἀρχόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, "τὸν δὲ 
ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίῶν φειδωλόν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν: 
᾿Αλλὰ τί μήν; 

XIII. [ddw τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λέγωμεν, ὡς ἐξ 
ὀλιγαρχικοῦ δημοκρατικὸς γίγνεται. φαίνεται δέ 
μοι τά γε πολλὰ ὧδε γίγνεσθαι. Πῶς; Ὅταν 
νέος τεθραμμένος ὡς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀπαιδεύτως 

τε καὶ φειδωλῶς, γεύσηται κηφήνων μέλιτος καὶ 

ξυγγένηται αἴθωσι θηρσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς, παντοδαπὰς 
ἡδονὰς καὶ ποικίλας καὶ παντοίως ἐχούσας δυνα- 

μένοις σκευάζειν, ἐνταῦθά που οἴου εἶναι, ἀρχὴν 
αὐτῷ μεταβολῆς ὀλιγαρχικῆς τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰς, 
δημοκρατικήν.' Πολλὴ payee ἔφη. “Ap οὖν, 

ὥσπερ ἡ πόλις μετέβαλλε βοηθ nodons τῷ ἑτέρῳ 
μέρει ξυμμαχίας ἔξωθεν ὁμοίας ὁμοίῳ, οὕτω καὶ 
ὁ νεανίας μεταβάλλει βοηθοῦντος αὖ εἴδους 

ἐπιθυμιῶν ἔξωθεν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν παρ᾽ ἐκείνῳ Ι 

ξυγγενοῦς τε καὶ ὁμοίου; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 
Καὶ ἐὰν μέν, οἶμαι, ἀντιβοηθήσῃ τις τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ 
ὀλιγαρχικῷ ξυμμαχία, ἤ ποθεν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς 
ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων νουθετούντων τε καὶ 
κακιζόντων, στάσις δὴ καὶ ἀντίστασις καὶ μάχη 

1 So ss.: μεταβολῆς... . ὀλιγαρχικῆς Burnet, μεταβολῆς ὀλι- 
γαρχίας.. .. δημοκρατίαν, or insert πολιτείας after ἑαυτῷ Adam. 
Jowett and Campbell suggest inserting ἐξ after μεταβολῆς. 

@ For preorrs ef. 577 Ὁ, 578 a, 603 pv, 611 B, Gorg. 525 a, 

522 ἘἙ, € 

5 ie occurs only here in Plato. It iscommon in Pindar 
and tragedy. Ernst Maass, “ Die Ironie des Sokrates,” 
Sokrates, 11, p. 94 “ Platon hat an jener Stelle des Staats, 
von der wir ausgingen, die schlimmen Erzieher gefahrliche 
Fuchsbestien genannt.” (Cf. Pindar, Ol. xi. 20.) 



Ss et 


ΜῈ not saying that the man whom we nicknamed the 
drone is the man who teems? with such pleasures and 
appetites, and who is governed by his unnecessary 
desires, while the one who is ruled by his necessary 
pensiiies is the thrifty oligarchical man?” “‘ Why, 
surely.” | | 

 XIUOT. “ To return, then,” said I, “‘ we have to tell 
how the democratic man develops from the olig- 
archical type. I think it is usually in this way.” 
“How?” ‘* When a youth, bred in the illiberal and 
niggardly fashion that we were describing, gets a taste 
of the honey of the drones and associates with fierce ® 
and cunning creatures who know how to purvey 
pleasures of every kind and variety * and condition, 
there you must doubtless conceive is the beginning of 
the transformation of the oligarchy in his soul into 
democracy.”’. ““ Quite inevitably,” he said. ‘“ May 
we not say that just as the revolution in the city was 
brought about by the aid of an alliance from outside, 
coming to the support of the similar and correspond- 
ing party in the state, so the youth is revolutionized 
when a like and kindred? group of appetites from out- 
side comes to the aid of one of the parties in his soul?” 
“By all means,” he said. ‘ And if, I take it, a 
counter-alliance* comes to the rescue of the olig- 
archical part of his soul, either it may be from his 
father or from his other kin, who admonish and re- 
proach him, then there arises faction’ and counter- 

© Cf. on 557 c, p. 286, note a. 
4 Cf. 554 νυ. 

“ For the metaphor cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24 ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ 
χρωμένω συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν, “they 
[Critias and Alcibiades] found in him [Socrates] an ally who 
gave them strength to conquer their evil passions.” (Loeb ir.) 
“7 Cf. supra on 554 b, p. 276, note 6. 


ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸν τότε γίγνεται. Τί μήν; Καὶ 
ποτὲ μέν, οἶμαι, τὸ δημοκρατικὸν ὑπεχώρησε. τῷ 

ὀλιγαρχικῷ, καί tives τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν | 

διεφθάρησαν, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξέπεσον, αἰδοῦς. ἘΣ 
ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ, καὶ κατεκοσμήθη 

πάλιν. Γίγνεται γὰρ ἐνίοτε, ἔφη. «Αὖθις δέ, 
οἶμαι, τῶν ἐκπεσουσῶν͵ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄλλαι ὑπο- 
Β πρεφόμεναι ξυγγενεῖς δι᾽ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τροφῆς 
πατρὸς πολλαί τε καὶ ἰσχυραὶ ἐγένοντο. Φιλεῖ 
γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν εἵλκυσάν τε 
πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ὁμιλίας, καὶ λάθρᾳ ἐυγγεγνόμενδα 

πλῆθος ἐ ἐνέτεκον. Τί μήν; Τελευτῶσαι δή, οἶμαι, 

κατέλαβον τὴν τοῦ νέου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν, 

αἰσθόμεναι κενὴν μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων 
καλῶν καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν, ot δὴ ἃ ἄριστοι φρουροί τε 
καὶ φύλακες ἐν ἀνδρῶν θεοφιλῶν εἰσὶ διανοίαις. 

Καὶ πολύ γ᾽, ἔφη. Pevdets δὴ καὶ ἀλαζόνες, 
οἶμαι, λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνων ἀναδρα- 
μόντες κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ τοιούτου. 
Σφόδρα γ᾽, ἔφη. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐ πάλιν τε εἰς ἐκείνους 
τοὺς "ἐλάφι μώ κα. ἐλθὼν φανερῶς κατοικεῖ, καὶ 
ἐὰν παρ᾽ οἰκείων τις βοήθεια τῷ «φειδωλῷ αὐτοῦ 

τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφικνῆται, κλήσαντες οἱ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι 
ἐκεῖνοι τὰς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους ἐν αὐτῷ πύλας 
οὔτε αὐτὴν τὴν ξυμμαχίαν παριᾶσιν οὔτε πρέσβεις 

α τινες... αἱ μὲν, αἱ δέ, For the partitive apposition 
ef. 566 ©, 584 pd, Gorg. 499 c. Cf. also Protag. 330 a, Gorg. 
450 c, Laws 626 ©, Eurip. Hec. 1185-1186. 

ὃ Cf. Tim. 90 A. 

¢ For the idea of guardians of the soul ef. Laws 961 p, 
supra 549. Cf. also on Phaedo 113 v, What Plato said, 
p. 536. 4 Of. Phaedo 92 v. 

¢ Plato, like Matthew Arnold, liked to use nicknames for 


te οι κα ὦ, 


faction and internal strife in the man with himself.” 
“Surely.” “ And sometimes, I suppose, the demo- 
eratie element retires before the oligarchical, some 
of its appetites having been destroyed and others? 
expelled, and a sense of awe and reverence grows 
up in the young man’s soul and order is restored.” 
“ That sometimes happens,” he said. “‘ And some- 
times, again, another brood of desires akin to those 
expell d are stealthily nurtured to take their place, 
owing to the father’s ignorance of true education, 
and wax numerous and strong.” “ Yes, that is wont 
to be the way of it.” ‘‘ And they tug and pull back 
to the same associations and in secret intercourse 
engender a multitude.” ‘‘ Yes indeed.” “And in 
the end, I suppose, they seize the citadel? of the young 
man’s soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by 
studies and honourable pursuits and true discourses, 
which are the best watchmen and guardians®¢ in the 
minds of men who are dear to the gods.” “ Much 
the best,” he said: “‘ And then false and braggart 
words? and opinions charge up the height and take 
their place and occupy that part of such a youth.” 
“They do indeed.” “ And then he returns, does he 
not, to those Lotus-eaters * and without disguise lives 
openly with them. And if any support ἢ comes from 
his kin to the thrifty element in his soul, those brag- 
gart discourses close the gates of the royal fortress 
within him and refuse admission to the auxiliary 
force itself, and will not grant audience as to envoys 

classes of people; cf. Rep. 415 p γηγενεῖς, Theaet. 181.4 
ῥέοντας, Soph. 248 a εἰδῶν φίλους, Phileb. 44 © τοῖς δυσχερέσιν. 
So Arnold in Culture and Anarchy uses Populace, Philistines, 
Barbarians, Friends of Culture, ete., Friends of Physical 
Science, Lit. and Dogma, p. 3. 

7 βοήθεια : ef. Aristot. De an. 404 a 19. 



πρεσβυτέρων λόγους ἰδιωτῶν" εἰσδέχονται, αὐτοί TE 

κρατοῦσι μαχόμενοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ ἠλιθιότητα 
ὀνομάζοντες ὠθοῦσιν ἔξω ἀτίμως φυγάδα, owdpo= 
σύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές τε καὶ προπηλακίζοντες 
ἐκβάλλουσι, μετριότητα δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην 
ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὖσαν πείθοντες 
ς , A an A RSs py tee. “" 
ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπι- 
θυμιῶν. Σῴφόδρα γε. Τούτων δέ γέ που κενώ- 

E σαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ. κατεχομένου τε 


ee) 1 See”. ‘ ’ \ 4 ‘ 
ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχὴν μεγάλοισι τέλεσι, 
τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη ὕβριν καὶ ἀναρχίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν 
καὶ ἀναίδειαν λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατ- 
ἄγουσιν ἐστεφανωμένας, ἐγκωμιάζοντες καὶ ὑπο- 
κοριζόμενοι, ὕβριν μὲν εὐπαιδευσίαν καλοῦντες, 
5 / > / 3 ,ὔ 
ἀναρχίαν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν, ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλο- 
/ 5 i \ > / > > a 
πρέπειαν, ἀναίδειαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν. dp’ οὐχ οὕτω 
> > > ’ ,ὔ Ἃ A > on Υ ἐν 
πως, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, νέος ὧν μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ ἐν 
ἀναγκαίοις ἐπιθυμίαις τρεφομένου τὴν τῶν μὴ 
ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλευθέρωσίν τε 
ow \ / > > Ὁ > Coon - 
καὶ ἄνεσιν; Kal μάλα γ᾽, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐναργῶς. Z 
1 Badham, followed by Apelt, reads δ᾽ ὥτων, See Adam’s 
note and Appendix IV. to Book VIII. 

« ΟἹ 414, Thucyd. iii. 82. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 435-436 
says that Plato had not used Thucydides. But οὐ Gomperz 
iii. 331, and What Plato Said, pp. 2-3, 6, 8. See Isoc. Antid. 
284 σκώπτειν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι δυναμένους εὐφυεῖς καλοῦσι, etc., 
Areop. 20 and 49, Aristot. δέ. Nic. 1180 b 25, Quintil. iii. 
7.25 and viii. 6. 36, Sallust, Cat. c. 52 ‘‘ iam pridem equidem 
nos vera vocabula rerum amisimus,” etc., Shakes., Sonnet 
Ixvi., “‘ And simple truth miscalled simplicity . . .,”’ Thomas 
Wyatt, Of the Courtier’s Life: 

As drunkenness good fellowship to call; . . . 
Affirm that favel hath a goodly grace 

In eloquence; and cruelty to name 

Zeal of justice and change in time and place, ete. 



_ to the words of older friends in private life. And 
_ they themselves prevail in the conflict, and naming 
reverence and awe ‘folly’? thrust it forth, a dis- 
honoured fugitive. And temperance they call ‘ want 
_ of manhood’ and banish it with contumely, and they 
teach that moderation and orderly expenditure are 
‘rusticity’ and ‘illiberality,’ and they combine with a 
gang of unprofitable and harmful appetites to drive 
‘them over the border.” ‘‘ They doindeed.” “ And 
when they have emptied and purged® of all these 
the soul of the youth that they have thus possessed? 
and occupied, and whom they are initiating with 
these magnificent and costly rites,’ they proceed to 
lead home from exile insolence and anarchy and 

_ prodigality and shamelessness,resplendent/ in a great 

attendant choir and crowned with garlands, and in 
celebration of their praises they euphemistically de- 
nominate insolence ‘good breeding,’ licence ‘liberty,’ 
prodigality ‘magnificence,’ and shamelessness “manly 
‘spirit. And is it not in some such way as this,” said 
I, “ that in his youth the transformation takes place 
from the restriction to necessary desires in his educa- 
tion to the liberation and release of his unnecessary 
and harmful desires?”’ ‘“* Yes, your description is 
most vivid,’ said he. “ Then, in his subsequent life, 
> ὑπερορίζουσι: cf. Laws 855 c ὑπερορίαν φυγάδα, 866 ». 

© Cf. 567 c and 573 8, where the word is also used ironi- 
cally, and Laws 735, Polit. 293 p, Soph. 226 v. 

4 κατέχομαι is used of divine “ possession” or inspiration 
in Phaedr. 244 ©, Ion 533 £, 536 B, etc., Xen. Symp. 1. 10. 

* Plato ently employs the language of the mysteries 
for literary effect. Cf. Gorg. 497 c, Symp. 210 a 218 B, 
Theaet. 155 2-156 a, Laws 666 8, 870 p-e, Phaedr. 250 B-c, 
249 c, Phaedo 81 a, 69 c, Rep. 378 a, etc., and Thompson 
on Meno 76 ε. 

7 Cf. Eurip. fr. 628. 5 (Nauck), Soph. El. 1130. 



δή, οἶμαι, μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἰς 
ἀναγκαίους ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἡδονὰς ἀναλίσκων καὶ 
χρήματα καὶ πόνους καὶ διατριβάς: ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν 
εὐτυχὴς ἢ καὶ μὴ πέρα ἐκβακχευθῇ, ἀλλά τι καὶ 
πρεσβύτερος γενόμενος, τοῦ πολλοῦ θορύβου παρ- 
ελθόντος, μέρη τε καταδέξηται τῶν ἐκπεσόντων. καὶ 
τοῖς ἐπεισελθοῦσι μὴ ὅλον ἑαυτὸν ἐνδῷ, εἰς ἴσον 
δή τι ,καταστήσας τὰς ἡδονὰς διάγει, τῇ παρα- 
πιπτούσῃ ἀεὶ ὥσπερ λαχούσῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχὴν 
παραδιδούς, ἕως ἂν πληρωθῇ, καὶ αὖθις ἄλλῃ, 
οὐδεμίαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἴσου τρέφων. Πάνυ 
μὲν οὖν. Kat λόγον γ᾽, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ οὐ 
προσδεχόμενος οὐδὲ “παριεὶς εἰς τὸ φρούριον, ἐάν 
τις λέγῃ ὡς αἱ μέν εἰσι τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν 
ἐπιθυμιῶν ἡδοναί, at δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν 
χρὴ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ κολάζειν τε καὶ 
δουλοῦσθαι: ἀλλ᾽ ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀνανεύει τε καὶ 
ὁμοίας φησὶν ἁπάσας εἶναι καὶ τιμητέας ἐξ ἴσου. 
Σφόδρα γάρ, ἔφη, οὕτω διακείμενος τοῦτο δρᾷ. 
Οὐκοῦν, jv δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ διαζῇ τὸ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν οὕτω 
χαριζόμενος τῇ προσπιπτούσῃ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, τοτὲ μὲν 
μεθύων καὶ καταυλούμενος, αὖθις δὲ ὑδροποτῶν 


il I a Nae COP a PB rt ne 

α Yor the ironical δή cf. 562 p, 568 5, 563D, 374. 5, 420 
and on 562 Ε, p. 307, note h. ‘ 
> Cf. Phaedr. 241 A μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ: — 
For this type of youth cf. Thackeray’s Barnes Newcome. 
For the lot cf. supra, p. 285, noted, on 557 a. 
Ἃ ¢ Notice the frequency of the phrase ἐξ ἴσου in this passage. 
if 557 A. 
4 An obvious reference to the Gorgias. Cf. Gorg. 494 x, 
Phileb. 13 8 ff., Protag. 353 Ὁ ff., Laws 733. 
¢ The Greek says ‘*‘ throws back his head ’’—the character- 



I take it, such a one expends money and toil and time 
no more on his necessary than on his unnecess 
_ pleasures. But if it is his good fortune that the 
_ period of storm and stress does not last too long, and 
_ as he grows older the fiercest tumult within him 
_ passes, and he receives back a part of the banished 
elements and does not abandon himself altogether 
to the invasion of the others, then he establishes and 
maintains all his pleasures on a footing of equality, 
_ forsooth,* and so lives turning over the guard-house ὃ 
_ of his soul to each as it happens along until it is sated, 
__ as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in 
| turn to another, disdaining none but fostering them 
 allequally.*” “Quite so.” ‘‘ And he does not accept 
_ or admit into the guard-house the words of truth 
when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise 
from honourable and good desires, and others from 
those that are base,? and that we ought to practise 
and esteem the one and control and subdue the 
others; but he shakes his head®¢ at all such admoni- 
tions and avers that they are all alike and to be 
equally esteemed.”’ “‘ Such is indeed his state of 
mind and his conduct.’ ““ And does he not,” said I, 
“also live out his life in this fashion, day by day in- 
dulging the appetite of the day, now wine-bibbing 
and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of 
the flute’ and again drinking only water and dieting ; 

istic negative gesture among Greeks. In Aristoph. Acharn. 
115 the supposed Persians give themselves away by nodding 
assent and dissent in Hellenic style, as Dicaeopolis says. 

7 For the word καταυλούμενος ef. 411 a, Laws 790 πὶ Lucian, 
Bis ace. 17, and for the passive Eur. 17. 367. Cf. also 
Philetaerus, Philaulus, fr. 18, Kock ii. p. 235, Eur. rh 187. 
3 μολπαῖσι δ᾽ ἡσθεὶς τοῦτ᾽ ἀεὶ θηρεύεται. For the type cf. Theo- 

_ phrastus, Char. 11, Aristoph. Wasps 1475 ff. 



De καὶ κατισχναινόμενος, τοτὲ δ᾽ αὖ γυμναζόμενος, 


| ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε ἀργῶν καὶ πάντων ἀμελῶν, τοτὲ δ᾽ ὡς 
[ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβων: πολλάκις δὲ πολιτεύεται, 
καὶ ἀναπηδῶν ὅ ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει" 
κἄν ποτέ τινας πολεμικοὺς ζηλώσῃ, “ταύτῃ φέρεται, 
ἢ “χρηματιστικούς, ἐπὶ τοῦτ᾽ αὖ, καὶ οὔτε τις τάξις 
οὔτε ἀνάγκη ἔπεστιν αὐτοῦ τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡδύν τε 
δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν τὸν βίον 
E τοῦτον χρῆται αὐτῷ διὰ “παντός. Slavrdracw, ἦ 
δ᾽ ὃ 5, διελήλυθας βίον ,ἰσονομικοῦ τινὸς ἀνδρός. 
Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ παντοδαπόν τε καὶ 
πλείστων ἠθῶν μεστόν, καὶ τὸν καλόν τε καὶ 
ποικίλον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τοῦτον τὸν 
ἄνδρα εἶναι: ὃν πολλοὶ ἂν καὶ πολλαὶ ζηλώσειαν τοῦ 
βίου, παραδείγματα πολιτειῶν τε καὶ τρόπων 
πλεῖστα ἐν αὑτῷ ἔχοντα. Οὕτω γάρ, ἔφη, ἔστιν. 
562 Τί οὖν; τετάχθω ἡμῖν κατὰ δημοκρατίαν ὁ 
τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ, ὡς δημοκρατικὸς ὀρθῶς ἂν προσ- 
αγορευόμενος; Τετάχθω, ἔφη. 

XIV. “et καλλίστη δή, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, πολιτεία τε 
καὶ ὃ κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ λοιπὰ ἂν ἡμῖν εἴη διελθεῖν, 
τυραννίς τε καὶ τύραννος. Κομιδῇ γ᾽ 5 ἔφη. Φέρε 
δή, τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, γίγνεται; 
ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας μεταβάλλει, σχεδὸν 
δῆλον. Δῆλον. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν τρόπον τινὰ τὸν αὐτὸν — 

« Cf. Protag. 319 Ὁ. 

> For 6 τι ἂν τύχῃ cf. on 536 a, p. 213, note f, ὅταν τύχῃ 
Eurip. Hippol. 428, 1.7. 722, Eurip. fr. 825 (Didot), ὅπου ἂν 
τύχωσιν Xen. Oec. 20. 28, ὃν ἂν τύχῃς Eurip. Tro. 68. 

5. ravrodarév: ef. on 557 c. 

4 Of. 557 Ὁ. 

¢ For the irony cf. 607 © τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν, supra 544 ¢ 
γενναία, 558 c ἡδεῖα. 



_ and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes 
_ idling and neglecting all things, and at another time 
seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And 
_ frequently he goes in for politics and bounces up “ and 
says and does whatever enters his head.’ And if 
_ military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, 
_ and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no 

order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this 

life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happi- 

_ ness and cleaves to it to the end.” “That is a perfect 

description,” he said, “οἵ a devotee of equality.” 

_ “ T certainly think,” said I, “‘ that he is a manifold *¢ 
_ man stuffed with most excellent differences, and that 


like that city 4 he is the fair and many-coloured one 

_ whom many a man and woman would count fortunate 

in his life, as containing within himself the greatest 
number of patterns of constitutions and qualities.” 
“Yes, that is so,” he said. “Shall we definitely 
assert, then, that such a man is to be ranged with 
democracy and would properly be designated as 
democratic?” ὁ“ Let that be his place,” he said. 
XIV. ‘And now,” said I, “ the fairest * polity and 
the fairest man remain for us to describe, the tyranny 
and the tyrant.” ‘‘ Certainly,” he said. “Come 
then, tell me, dear friend, how tyranny arises.’ That 
it is an outgrowth of democracy is fairly plain.” 
“Yes, plain.” “Is it, then, in a sense, in the same 

7 τίς τρόπος . . . γίγνεται is a mixture of two expressions 
that need not be pressed. Cf. Meno 96 νυ, Epist.. vii. 
3248. A. 6. Laird, in Class. Phil., 1918, pp. 89-90 thinks 
it means “* What τρόπος (of the many τρόποι in a democracy) 
develops into a τρόπος of tyranny; for that tyranny is a 
transformation of democracy is fairly evident.” That would 
be a ition of what Aristotle says previous thinkers 

_ overlooked in their classification of polities. 



ἔκ τε ὀλιγαρχίας δημοκρατία γίγνεται καὶ ἐκ 
Β δημοκρατίας τυραννίς; Πῶς; Ὃ προὔθεντο, ἣν 
δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἀγαθόν, καὶ δι’ οὗ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία καθ- 
ἰστατο--- τοῦτο δ᾽ ἣν πλοῦτος" ἦ γάρ; Nai. Ἢ 
4, ΄ 3 , " Lia Pyert = 
πλούτου τοίνυν ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέ- 
λεια διὰ χρηματισμὸν αὐτὴν ἀπώλλυ. ᾿Αληθῆ, 
> De restorer Tray 
ἔφη. “Ap” οὖν καὶ ὃ δημοκρατία ὁρίζεται ἀγαθόν, 
ἡ τούτου ἀπληστία καὶ ταύτην καταλύει; Λέγεις 
545.3 t NEY SEA 
δ᾽ αὐτὴν τί ὁρίζεσθαι; Τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, εἶπον. 
τοῦτο γάρ που ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ πόλει ἀκούσαις 
C ἂν ὡς ἔχει τε κάλλιστον καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ 
ταύτῃ ἄξιον οἰκεῖν ὅστις φύσει ἐλεύθερος. Λέ- 
γεται γὰρ δή, ἔφη, καὶ πολὺ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα. “Ap” 
La ΑΝ >. 3 / Ψ “- 1 Dey ak , 
οὖν, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅπερ ha viv δὴ ἐρῶν, ἡ τοῦ τοιού- 
του ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια καὶ ταύ- 
τὴν τὴν πολιτείαν μεθίστησί τε καὶ παρασκευάζει 
I a ~ μ᾿ - 

τυραννίδος δεηθῆναι; Πῶς; ἔφη. Ὅταν, οἶμαι, 
δημοκρατουμένη πόλις ἐλευθερίας διψήσασα κακῶν 
D οἰνοχόων προστατούντων τύχῃ, καὶ πορρωτέρω 
τοῦ δέοντος ἀκράτου αὐτῆς μεθυσθῇ, τοὺς ἄρχοντας 
δή, ἂν μὴ πάνυ πρᾶοι ὦσι καὶ πολλὴν παρέχωσι 
1 πλοῦτος Fy, ὑπέρπλουτος ADM, που πλοῦτος Campbell, 

εἴπερ τι πλοῦτος Apelt, ὑπέρπλουτος πλοῦτος Stallbaum. 


@ Their idea of good. Cf. supra 555 Β προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ. 
Of. Laws 962 © with Aristot. Pol. 1293 Ὁ 14 ff. Cf. also — 
Aristot. Pol. 1304 Ὁ 20 ai μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μετα- 
βάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν. Cf. also p. 263, 
note 8 on 551 B (ὅρος) and p. 139, note ¢ on 519 ὁ (σκοπός). | 

> Of. 552 5, and for the disparagement of wealth p. 262, 
note 6, on 550 Ἑ. 

¢ Zeller, Aristot. ii. p. 285, as usual credits Aristotle with 
the Platonic thought that every form of government brings 
ruin on itself by its own excess. 

4 Of. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 43 “The central 



_ way in which democracy arises out, of oligarchy that 

tyranny arises from democracy ἢ “‘ How is that ἢ ᾿ 

_ “The good that they proposed to themselves“and that 

was the cause of the establishment of oligarchy—it 
was wealth,® was it not?”’ “Yes.” “ Well, then, the 
insatiate lust for wealth and the neglect of everything 
else for the sake of money-making was the cause of 
its undoing.” “True,” he said. “ And is not the 
avidity of democracy for that which is its definition and 
criterion of good the thing which dissolves it * too?” 
‘* What do you say its criterion tobe?” “‘ Liberty,4” 

_ IT replied; “ for you may hear it said that this is best 

managed in a democratic city, and for this reason that 
is the only city in which a man of free spirit will care 
to live.e” ‘‘ Why, yes,” he replied, “ you hear that 
saying everywhere.” “Then, as I was about to 
observe, is it not the excess and greed of this and the 
neglect of all other things that revolutionizes this con- 
stitution too and prepares the way for the necessity of ἡ 
a dictatorship?” “How?” he said. “ Why, when a 
democratic city athirst for liberty gets bad cupbearers 
for its leaders? and is intoxicated by drinking too deep 
of that unmixed wine,’ and then, if its so-called 
governors are not extremely mild and gentle with it 

a of English life and politics is the assertion of personal 
r ΕΣ] 

* Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 29 says life would be impossible in 
Plato’s Republic. 

ja... ἐρῶν: of. 449 a, Theaet. 180 α. 

σ Or “ protectors,” “‘tribunes,” προστατούντων. Cf. infra 

on 565 c, p. 318, note ὦ. 

» Of. Livy xxxix. 26 “velut ex diutina siti nimis avide 
meram haurientes libertatem,’” Seneca, De benefic. i. 10 
““male dispensata libertas,” Taine, Letter, Jan. 2, 1867 
“nous avons proclamé et appliqué l’égalité . . . C’est un 
vin pur et généreux; mais nous ayons bu trop du ndtre.”’ 

VOL. 11 " Χ 808 


( τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, κολάζει αἰτιωμένη ὡς μιαρούς τε 
᾿ καὶ ὀλιγαρχικούς. Δρῶσι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο. Τοὺς 
δέ γε, εἶπον, τῶν ἀρχόντων κατηκόους προ- 
λ ,, ε 20 λ ὃ 5A \ nde a a ΚΕ 
πηλακίζει ὡς ἐθελοδούλους τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὄντας, 
τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας μὲν ἀρχομένοις, ἀρχομένους δὲ 
ἄρχουσιν ὁμοίους ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἐπαινεῖ τε 
Ε καὶ τιμᾷ. ἄρ᾽ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἐπὶ 
πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἰέναι; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Καὶ 
καταδύεσθαί γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, εἴς τε τὰς 
ἰδίας οἰκίας καὶ τελευτᾶν μέχρι τῶν θηρίων τὴν 
ἀναρχίαν ἐμφυομένην. Πῶς, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον 
λέγομεν; Οἷον, ἔφην, πατέρα μὲν ἐθίζεσθαι mardi — 
ὅμοιον γίγνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς υἱεῖς, υἱὸν δὲ 
πατρί, καὶ μήτε αἰσχύνεσθαι μήτε δεδιέναι τοὺς 
, “ voy A ? iy Poona 
563 γονέας, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ἢ: μέτοικον δὲ ἀστῷ καὶ 
ἀστὸν μετοίκῳ ἐξισοῦσθαι, καὶ ξένον ὡσαύτως. 
Γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη. Ταῦτά τε, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
\ ‘A , + / / ea 

καὶ σμικρὰ τοιάδε ἄλλα γίγνεται: διδάσκαλός. τε 
ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ φοιτητὰς φοβεῖται καὶ θωπεύει, 

4 μιαρούς is really stronger, ‘‘ pestilential fellows.” Cf. 
Apol. 23 ν, Soph. Antig. 746. It is frequent in Aristo- 

» For the charge of oligarchical tendencies ef. Isoc. Peace 
51 and 133, Areop. 57, Antid. 318, Panath. 148. 

“ Of. Symp. 184. ο, 183 a. Cf. the essay of Estienne de 
la Boétie, De la servitude volontaire. Also Gray, Ode for 
Music, 6 “ Servitude that hugs her chain.” 

ἃ For οὐδὲν ὄντας cf. 341 ο, Apol. 41 £, Symp. 216 π, Gorg. | 
512 c, Erastae 134 c, Aristoph. Eccles. 144, Horace, Sat. ~ 
ii. 7, 102 “nil ego,” Eurip. 1.4. 371, Herod. ix. 58 οὐδένες 

© Of. Laws 699 © ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν, Aristoph. Lysistr. 
543 ἐπὶ πᾶν ἱέναι, Soph. El. 615 εἰς πᾶν ἔργον. 

7 Cf. 568 c, Laws 942 v. 



and do not dispense the liberty unstintedly,it chastises 
_ them andaccuses them of being accursed? oligarchs: μὲ 
; “ Yes, that is what they do,” he replied. ““ But those 

_who obey the rulers,’ I said, “it reviles as willing | 

slaves ὁ and men of naught,? but it commends and 
subjects and subjects who are like rulers. Is it not 

should go to all lengths*?” “Οἵ course.” “ And 
this anarchical temper,” said I, “ my friend, must 

the very animals.’” “ Just what do we mean by 

ally tries to resemble the child and is afraid of his 
sons, and the son likens himself to the father and 
feels no awe or fear of his parents,’ so that he may be 
forsooth a free man.” And the resident alien feels him- 

foreigner likewise.”’ ‘‘ Yes, these things do happen,” 
he said. “ They do,” said I, ‘‘ and such other trifles 
as these. The teacher in such case fears and fawns 

? A common conservative complaint. Cf. Isoc. Areop. 49, 
Aristoph. Clouds, 998, 1321 ff., Xen. Rep. Ath. 1. 10, Mem. 
iii. 5. 15; Newman i. pp. 174 and 339-340. Cf. also Renan, 
Souvenirs, xviii.-xx., on American vulgarity and. liberty; 
Harold Lasswell, quoting Bryce, “‘ Modern Democracies,” 
in Methods of Social Science, ed. by Stuart A. Rice, p. 376: 
“The spirit of equality is alleged to have diminished the 
respect children owe to parents, and the young to the old. 
This was noted by Plato in Athens. But surely the family 
relations depend much more on the social, structural and 
religious ideas of a race than on forms of government”’; 
Whitman, ‘** Where the men and women think lightly of the 
laws . . . where children are taught to be laws to themselves 
. . . there the great city stands.” 

* Por the ironical wa δή cf. on 561 5. Cf. Laws 962 © 
ἐλεύθερον δή, Meno 86 τὸ and Aristoph. Clouds 1414. 


honours in public and private rulers who resemble © 


inevitable that in such a state the spirit of liberty Ὁ 

penetrate into private homes and finally enter into — 

that?’ he said. ‘“ Why,” I said, “ the father habitu- Ὁ 

self equal to the citizen and the citizen tohim, and the | 



φοιτηταΐ τε διδασκάλων ὀλιγωροῦσιν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ 
παιδαγωγῶν: καὶ ὅλως οἱ μὲν νέοι πρεσβυτέροις 
ἀπεικάζονται καὶ διαμιλλῶνται καὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ 
| ἐν ἔργοις, οἱ δὲ γέροντες ξυγκαθιέντες τοῖς νέοις 
Β εὐτραπελίας τε καὶ χαριεντισμοῦ ἐμπίπλανται, 
μιμούμενοι τοὺς νέους, ἵνα δὴ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀηδεῖς 
εἶναι μηδὲ δεσποτικοί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τὸ 
δέ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔσχατον, ὦ φίλε, τῆς ἐλευθερίας 
τοῦ πλήθους, ὅσον γίγνεται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει, 
ὅταν δὴ οἱ ἐωνημένοι καὶ αἱ ἐωνημέναι μηδὲν 
ἧττον ἐλεύθεροι ὦσι τῶν πριαμένων. ἐν γυναιξὶ 
δὲ πρὸς ἄνδρας καὶ ἀνδράσι πρὸς γυναῖκας ὅση ἡ 
ἰσονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία γίγνεται, ὀλίγου ἐπελαθό- 


C μεθ᾽ εἰπεῖν. Οὐκοῦν κατ᾽ Αἰσχύλον, ἔφη, ἐροῦ- 
εἶπο ig 





μεν 6 τι viv HAV ἐπὶ στόμα; law ye, 

καὶ ἔγωγε οὕτω λέγω τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν θηρίων 
τῶν ὑπὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὅσῳ ἐλευθερώτερά ἐστιν 
ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ, οὐκ ἄν τις πείθοιτο ἄπειρος. 
ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ αἵ τε κύνες κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν 
οἷαίπερ at δέσποιναι γίγνονταί τε δὴ καὶ ἵπποι καὶ 
ὄνοι, πάνυ ἐλευθέρως καὶ σεμνῶς εἰθισμένοι πορεύ- 
εσθαι, κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐμβάλλοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἀπαν- 
τῶντι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξίστηται καὶ τἄλλα πάντα οὕτω | 

σ Cf. Protag. 336 a, Theaet. 174 a, 168 8. 

Ὁ For εὐτραπελίας cf. 1806. xv. 296, vii. 49, Aristotle, Hth. 
Nic. 1108 a 24. In het. 1389 Ὁ 11 he defines it as remacdev- 
μένη ὕβρις. Arnold once addressed the Eton boys on the word. 

° Cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. 1. 10 τῶν δούλων δ᾽ αὖ καὶ τῶν μετοίκων 
πλείστη ἐστὶν ᾿Αθήνησιν ἀκολασία, Aristoph. Clouds init., and 
on slavery Laws 777 ©, supra p. 249, note g on 547 c and 
549 a, 

4 Nauck fr. 351. Cf. Plut. Amat. 763 5, Themist. Orat. 
iv. p. 52 B; also Otto, p. 39, and Adam ad loc. 




upon the pupils, and the pupils pay no heed to the |, 
teacher or to their overseers either. And in general | 
the young ape their elders and vie with them in / 
eech and action, while the old, accommodating ¢ 
Sbicsanhves to the young, are full of pleasantry ὃ and 
raciousness, imitating the young for fear they may 
e thought disagreeable and authoritative.’’ “ By all 
means, he said. “‘ And the climax of popular liberty, 
_ my friend,” I said,“‘is attained in such a city when the 
purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free® 
_ than the owners who paid for them. And I almost | 
_ forgot to mention the spirit of freedom and equal | 
_ rights in the relation of men to women and women to, 
men.” “Shall we not, then,” said he, “in Aeschylean 
phrase,? say ‘ whatever rises to our lips’?” “* Cer- 
tainly,” I said, “ so I will. Without experience of it | 
no one would believe how much freer the very beasts ¢ | 
subject to men are in such a city than elsewhere. The | 
dogs literally verify the adage’ and ‘like their mis- 
tresses become.’ And likewise the horses and asses 
are wont to hold on their way with the utmost free- 
dom and dignity, bumping into everyone who meets 
them and who does not step aside.’ And so all things 

. * Cf. 562.z, Julian, Misopogon, 355 8B. . . μέχρι τῶν ὄνων ἡ 
ἐστὶν ἐλευθερία παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς. καὶ τῶν καμήλων ; ἄγουσί τοι καὶ 
ταύτας οἱ μισθωτοὶ διὰ τῶν στοῶν ὥσπερ τὰς νύμφας, “... 
what great independence exists among the citizens, even 
down to the very asses and camels? The men who hire them 
out lead even these animals through the porticoes as though 
they were brides.” (Loeb tr.) Cf. Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. 
Teubner, p. 22, § 23 μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων Suxveiro αὐτοῦ 
ἡ νουθέτησις. 

7 Otto, Ρ. 119. Cf. “ΤΙΚε mistress, like maid.” + 

σ Eurip. Jon 635-637 mentions being jostled off the street 
by a worse person as one of the indignities of Athenian city 




Ὁ μεστὰ ἐλευθερίας γίγνεται. Τὸ ἐμόν γ᾽, ἔφη, ἐμοὶ 
λέγεις ὄναρ" αὐτὸς γὰρ εἰς ἀγρὸν πορευόμενος 
θαμὰ αὐτὸ πάσχω, Τὸ δὲ δὴ κεφάλαιον, ἦν δ᾽ 
ἐγώ, πάντων τούτων ξυνηθροισμένων ἐννοεῖς, ὡς 
ἁπαλὴν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν πολιτῶν ποιεῖ, ὥστε κἂν 
ὅτιοῦν δουλείας τις προσφέρηται, ἀγανακτεῖν. καὶ 
μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι; τελευτῶντες γάρ που οἷοθ' ὅτι 
οὐδὲ τῶν νόμων φροντίζουσι γεγραμμένων. ἢ 

E ἀγράφων, ἵνα δὴ μηδαμῇ μηδεὶς αὐτοῖς ἢ hemes ; 
Kat μάλ᾽, ἔφη, οἶδα. i Οἡ 

ΧΥ. Αὕτη μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ gide, 4 
ἀρχὴ οὑτωσὶ καλὴ καὶ νεανική, ὅθεν. ὩΣ d 
φύεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. Νεανικὴ δῆτα, ἔφη: ἀλλὰ 
τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; Ταὐτόν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ 
ὀλιγαρχίᾳ νόσημα ἐγγενόμενον ἀπώλεσεν αὐτήν, 
τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλέον τε καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἐκ 
τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐγγενόμενον καταδουλοῦται δημο- 
κρατίαν: καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἄγαν τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην 

* Cf. the reflections in Laws 698 f., 701 a-c, Bpist. viii. 
354 Ὁ, Gorg. 461 2; Isoc, Areop. 20, Panath. 131, Eurip. 
Cyclops. 120 ἀκούει δ᾽ οὐδὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδενός, Aristot. Pol. 
1295 Ὁ 15.f. 

Plato, by reaction against the excesses of the ultimate 
democracy, always satirizes the shibboleth “liberty ”’ in the 
style of Arnold, Ruskin and Carlyle. He would agree with 
Goethe (Eckermann i i. 219, Jan. 18, 1827) ‘‘ Nicht das macht 
frei, das wir nichts iiber uns erkennen wollen, sondern eben, 
dass wir etwas verehren, das iiber uns ist.” 

Libby, Introd. to Hist. of Science, p. 273, not understand- 
ing the irony of the passage, thinks much of it the unwilling 
tribute of a hostile critic. 



everywhere are just bursting with the spirit of 
: 2” “Tt is my own dream? you are telling me,” 
he said “ for it often happens to me when I go to 
_ the country. * “* And do you note that the sum total 
_of all these items when footed up is that they render | 
the souls of the citizens so sensitive ° that they chafe 
at the slightest suggestion of servitude? and will not | 
endure it? For you are aware that they finally pay 
no heed even to the laws® written or unwritten,’ so 
that forsooth they may have no master anywhere 
over them.” “ I know it very well,” said he. 

XV. “ This, then, my friend,” said I, “is the fine 
_and vigorous root from which tyranny grows, in my 
opinion.” “ Vigorous indeed,” he said; “‘ but what 
next?” “‘The same malady,” I said, "ἡ “that, arising 
in oligarchy, destroyed it, this more widely diffused 
and more violent as a yenulf of this licence, enslaves 
democracy. And in truth, any excess is wont to 
_ In Gorg. 484 4 Callicles sneers at equality from the point 

of view of the superman. Οὐ. also on 558 c, p. 291, note f; 
Hobbes, Leviathan xxi. and Theopompus’s account of 
democracy in Byzantium, fr. 65. Similar phenomena 
mex Be be observed in an American city street or 

* Cf. ΤΡ, Callimachus, Anth, Pal. vi. 310, and xii. 148 μὴ λέγε 
» » - τοὐμὸν ὄνειρον ἐμοί, Cic. Att. vi. 9. 8, Lucian, Somnium 
seu Gallus 7 ὥσπερ yap τοὐμὸν ἐνύπνιον ἰδών, Tennyson, 
“ Lucretius ”’: “ That was mine, my dream, I knew it.” 

* This sensitiveness, on which Grote remarks with approval, 
is characteristic of present-day American democracy. Cf. 
also Arnold, Culture and Anorchts p. 51 “And so if he is 
stopped from making Hyde Park a bear garden or the 
streets impassable he says he is being butchered by the 

4 Cf. Gorg. 491 © δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν, Laws 890 a. 

* Cf. Laws 701 8 νόμων ζητεῖν μὴ ὑπηκόοις εἶναι. 

4 ἐς For unwritten law οὐ. What Plato Said, p. 637, on Laws 
793 a. 



φιλεῖ εἰς τοὐναντίον μεταβολὴν ἀνταποδιδόναι, ἐν | 
564 ὥραις τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασι, καὶ δὴ καὶ 
ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἥκιστα. Εἰκός, ἔφη. ‘H yap 
ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἔοικεν οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι ἢ εἰς ἄ 
δουλείαν μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ πόλει. 
Εἰκὸς γάρ. Εἰκότως τοίνυν, εἶπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης 
πολιτείας τυραννὶς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας, 
| ἐξ οἶμαι τῆς ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας δουλεία: ere i 
᾿ τε καὶ ἀγριωτάτη. Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον. 
οὐ τοῦτ᾽ , οἶμαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἠρώτας, ἀλλὰ ποῖον. Ϊ 
᾿ Βνόσημα ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τε φυόμενον ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐν 
δημοκρατίᾳ δουλοῦται αὐτήν. ᾿Αληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. 
᾿Ἐκεῖνο τοίνυν, ἔφην, ἔλεγον, τὸ τῶν ἀργῶν τε καὶ 
δαπανηρῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος, τὸ μὲν ἀνδρειότατον | 
ἡγούμενον αὐτῶν, τὸ δ᾽ ἀνανδρότερον ἑπόμενον" ᾿ 

ods δὴ ἀφωμοιοῦμεν κηφῆσι, τοὺς μὲν κέντρα 
ἔχουσι, τοὺς δὲ ἀκέντροις. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ᾽, ἔφη. 
Τούτω τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ταράττετον ἐν πάσῃ 
πολιτείᾳ ἐγγιγνομένω, οἷον περὶ σῶμα φλέγμα τ 
Ο kat χολή: ὦ δὴ καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἰατρόν τε καὶ 
νομοθέτην πόλεως μὴ ἧττον ἢ σοφὸν μελυττουργὸν 

* Cf. Lysias xxv. 27, Isoc. viii. 108, vii. δ, Cie. De rep. i. 44 

“nam ut ex nimia potentia principum oritur interitus prin- 
cipum, sie hunc nimis liberum . . .” ete.; Emerson, History, 
“Α great licentiousness treads on the heels of a reformation.” 
Cf. too Macaulay on the comic dramatists of the Restoration ; 
Arnold, Lit. and Dogma, p. 322 ‘‘ After too much lorifica- 
tion of art, science and culture, too little; after Rabelais, 
George Fox; ” Tennyson: ᾿ 

He that roars for liberty 

Faster binds the tyrant’s power. 
See Coleridge’s Table Talk, p. 149, on the moral law of 

--- ee ae 


_ bring about a corresponding reaction“ to the opposite . 
_ in the seasons, in plants, in animal Aina ies an mee 
ecially in political societies.”’ “Probably,” he said. 
“And so the iobable outcome of too suck freedom 
is only too much slavery in the individual and the 
state.” “Yes, that is probable.” “Probably, then, 
tyranny develops out of no other constitution® than 
democracy—from the height of liberty, I take it, the 
fiercest extreme of servitude.’ ‘‘ That is reasonable,” 
he said. “That, however, I believe, was not your 
question,? but what identical* malady arising in demo- 
cracy as well as in oligarchy enslaves it?” ““You say 
truly,” he replied. “ That then,” I said, “ was what I 
had in mind, the class of idle and spendthrift men, 
the most enterprising and vigorous portion being 
leaders and the less manly spirits followers. We were 
likening them to drones,’ some equipped with stings 
and others stingless.” ‘“‘ And rightly too,” he said. 
“These two kinds, then,” I said, “ when they arise 
in any state, create a disturbance like that produced 
in the body?’ by phlegm and gall. And so a good 
physician and lawgiver must be on his guard from afar 

polarity. Emile Faguet says that this law of reaction is the 
only one in which he believes in literary criticism. 

δ᾽ For the generalization cf. Symp. 188 a-s. 

* Of. 565 τ. The slight exaggeration of the expression is 
solemnly treated by Apelt as a case of logical false con- 
version in Plato. 

4 Plato keeps to the point. Cf. on 531 c, p. 193, note i. 

4 ταὐτόν implies the tenes. Cf. Parmen. 130 v, Phileb: 
34 ky: Soph. 253. Cf. also Tim. 88 ο, Meno 72 c, 

Cf. 555 ν»-ε. 

9 Cf. the parallel of soul and body in 444 c f., Soph. 227 x, 
Crito 47 p f., Gorg. 504 B-c, 505 B, 518 a, 524 ». 

For φλέγμα ef. Tim. 83 ς, 85 a-B. 



πόρρωθεν εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως. μὴ 
ἐγγενήσεσθον, ἂν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, ὅπως ὅ τι τά- 
χιστα ξὺν αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κηρίοις ἐκτετμήσεσθον. 
Nai μὰ Δία, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, παντάπασί γε: Ὧδε τοίνυν, 
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λάβωμεν, ἵν᾽ εὐκρινέστερον ἴδωμεν 6 
βουλόμεθα. Πῶς; Τριχῇ διαστησώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ. 
δημοκρατουμένην πόλιν, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἔχει." & 
D μὲν γάρ που τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος ἐν αὐτῇ ἐμφύεται 
δι᾿ ἐξουσίαν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχουμένῃ. 
Ἔστιν οὕτως. Πολὺ δέ γε δριμύτερον ἐ ἐν ταύτῃ ἢ, ἢ 
ἐν ἐκείνῃ. Πῶς; "Exe? μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔντιμον 
εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπελαύνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀγύμναστον 
καὶ οὐκ ἐρρωμένον γίγνεται" ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δὲ 
τοῦτό που τὸ προεστὸς αὐτῆς, ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων, 
καὶ τὸ μὲν δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει, 
τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο περὶ τὰ βήματα προσίζον βομβεῖ τε καὶ 
E οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, ὥστε πάντα ὑπὸ 
τοῦ τοιούτου διοικεῖται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ 
χωρίς τινων ὀλίγων. Μάλα γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. "Αλλο 
τοίνυν τοιόνδε ἀεὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους. 
Τὸ ποῖον; Χρηματιζομένων mov πάντων οὗ 
κοσμιώτατοι φύσει ὡς τὸ πολὺ πλουσιώτατοι 
γίγνονται. ἙΕϊκός. Ἰ]λεῖστον δή, οἶμαι, τοῖς 
κηφῆσι μέλι καὶ εὐπορώτατον ἐντεῦθεν βλίττεται. 
Πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, παρά γε τῶν σμικρὰ ἐχόντων 

α μάλιστα μὲν. .. ἂν δέ: cf. 378 a, 414 ο, 461 c, 478 B, 
Apol. 34 a, Soph. 246 Ὁ. Ἵ 
> For εὐκρινέστερον cf. Soph. 242 c. 

© Cf. Phileb. 23 c, which Stenzel says argues an advance 



against the two kinds, like a prudent apiarist, first and 
chiefly * to prevent their springing up, but if they do 
_ arise to have them as quickly as may be cut out, cells 
and all.” * Yes, by Zeus,”’ he said, “‘ by all means.” 
“Then let us take it in this way,’ I said, “so that 
we may contemplate our purpose more distinctly.” ” 
“How?” “ Let us in our theory make a tripartite ° 
division of the democratic state, which is in fact its 
structure. One such class, as we have described, grows 
up in it because of the licence, no less than in the 
_ oligarchic state.”” ‘‘ Thatisso.’’ “ But it is far fiercer 
in this state than in that.” ‘‘Howso?” “There, be- 
cause it is not held in honour, but is kept out of office, 
it is not exercised and does not grow vigorous. But 
in a democracy this is the dominating class, with rare 
exceptions, and the fiercest part of it makes speeches 
and transacts business, and the remainder swarms 
and settles about the speaker’s stand and keeps up a 
buzzing? and tolerates? no dissent, so that everything 
with slight exceptions is administered by that class 
in sucha state.” “ Quite so,” he said. ‘‘ And so from 
time to time there emerges or is secreted from the 
multitude another group of this sort.” ‘‘ What sort?” 
he said. ‘“ When all are pursuing wealth the most 
orderly and thrifty natures for the most part become 
the richest.” “‘ It is likely.” “Then they are the 
most abundant supply of honey for the drones, and 
it is the easiest to extract.f”” “ Why, yes,” he said, 
“how could one squeeze it out of those who have 

over the Sophist, because Plato is no longer limited to a 
bipartite division. * Cf. 573 a. 

“ ἀνέχεται: ef. Isoc. viii. 14 ὅτι δημοκρατίας οὔσης οὐκ ἔστι 
παρρησία, etc. For the word cf. Aristoph. Acharn. 805 οὐκ 
ἀνασχήσομαι, Wasps 1337. 

7 For βλίττεται ef. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 794. 



τις βλίσειεν; ἹἸ]λούσιοι δή, οἶμαι, of τοιοῦτοι 
καλοῦνται, κηφήνων βοτάνη. Σχεδόν τι, ἔφη. 
565 XVI. Δῆμος δ᾽ ἂν εἴη τρίτον γένος, ὅσοι αὖὐτ- 
ουργοί τε καὶ ἀπράγμονες, οὐ πάνυ πολλὰ κεκτη- 
, a \ a , Δ, οἷν εὐ ἐκεί 
μένοι: ὃ δὴ πλεῖστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον ἐν 
yA av > lod ” art ΝΜ ) 
δημοκρατίᾳ, ὅταν περ ἀθροισθῇ. Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη 
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ θαμὰ ἐθέλει ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὴ μέλιτος 
3 ᾿ " ig? @ 
τι μεταλαμβάνῃ. Οὐκοῦν μεταλαμβάνει, ἦν ὃ 
ἐγώ, ἀεί, καθ᾽ ὅσον δύνανται οἱ προεστῶτες, τοὺς 
ἔχοντας τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφαιρούμενοι, διανέμοντες τῷ 
δήμῳ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοὶ ἔχειν. Μεταλαμβάνει 
Β γὰρ οὖν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, οὕτως. ᾿Αναγκάζονται δή, 
“- \ 
οἶμαι, ἀμύνεσθαι, λέγοντές τε ἐν TH δήμῳ Kat 
πράττοντες ὅπῃ δύνανται, οὗτοι ὧν ἀφαιροῦνται. 
Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Αἰτίαν δὴ ἔσχον ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων, 
κἂν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι νεωτερίζειν, ὡς ἐπιβουλεύουσι 
an / / > > , , / > i 
τῷ δήμῳ καί εἰσιν ὀλιγαρχικοί. Ti μήν; Odn-— 
οῦν καὶ τελευτῶντες, ἐπειδὰν ὁρῶσι τὸν δῆμον 

Beg is the significance of πλούσιοι here, lit. “the 

» For the classification of the population ¢f, Vol. I..pp. 161- 
168, Eurip. Suppl. 238 ff., Aristot. Pol. 1328 Ὁ ff., 1289 b 33, 
1290 b 40 ff., Newman i. p. 97. 

© ἀπράγμονες: cf. 620 c, Aristoph. Knights 261, Aristot. 
Rhet. 1381 a 25, Isoe. Antid. 151, 9927, But Pericles in Thuc. 
ii. 40 takes a different view. See my note in Class. Phil. xv. 
(1920) pp. 300-301. 

ἃ airoupyoi: cf. Soph. 223 pv, Eurip. Or. 920, Shorey in 
Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928) pp. 346-347. 

“ Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1318 f 12. 

7 Cf. Isoe. viii. 13 τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους. 

9 For τοὺς ἔχοντας cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 1295. 
For the exploitation of the rich at Athens cf. Xen. Symp. 4. 
30-32, Lysias xxi. 14, xix. 62, xviii. 20-21, 1806. Areop, 32 ff., 



little?”’..“‘The capitalistic? class is, I take it, the name 
by which they are designated—the pasture of the 
q bare Ὁ “ Pretty much so,” he said. 
“And the third class, composing . the 
ee “would comprise all quiet ¢ cultivators of their 
4 who possess little property. This is the 
and most potent group in a democracy when 
= meets in assembly.” “Yes, it is,” he said, * but it 
_ will not often do that,’ unless it gets a share of the 
honey.” “Well, does it not always share,” I said, “to 
the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in 
distributing’ to the people what they take from the 
well- # to keep the lion” 5 share for themselves*?” 
“Why, yes,” he said, “it shares in that sense. 
xe so, I suppose, those who are thus plundered. 
are compelled to defend themselves by speeches in 
the assembly and any action in their power.” “Of 
_ course.” “ And thereupon the charge is brought - 
_ against them by the other party, though they may 
_ have no revolutionary designs, that they are plotting 
against the people, and it is said that they are 
oligarchs.*” “Surely.” “And then finally, when 
_ they see the people, not of its own will’ but through 
Peace 131, Dem. De cor. 105 ff., on his triarchic law: and 
also Eurip. Herc. Fur. 588-592, Shakes. Richard II.1. iv. 49 f.: 

Whereto, when they shall know what men are rich. 
They Wen subscribe them for large sums “ hie 



Ι Lay Thoughts of a Dean, p. 

ΕΒ. 6p Risto ristoph. Knights 717-718, art sy ad Achilles 
in JI. ix. 363. 

_ _ 4 4,e. reactionaries. Cf. supra on 562 pv, p. 306, note 4, 
Aeschines iii. 168, and 566 c μισόδημος. The whole passage 
perhaps illustrates ‘the ‘disharmony ” between Plato’s upper- 

_ class sympathies and his liberal philosophy. 

_ 4 So the Attic orators frequently say that a popular jury 

| Was deceived. Cf. also Aristoph. Acharn, 515-516. 


tol oo ἃ 


οὐχ ἑκόντα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀγνοήσαντά τε καὶ erie τη σαν 

Cob ὑπὸ τῶν διαβαλλόντων, ἐπιχειροῦντα σφᾶς ἀ ἀδικεῖν, 

τότ᾽ ἤδη, εἴτε βούλονται. εἴτε μή, ὡς ἀληθῶς 

ὀλιγαρχικοὶ γίγνονται, οὐχ ἑκόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
τοῦτο τὸ κακὸν ἐκεῖνος ὁ κηφὴν ἐντίκτει κεντῶν 
αὐτούς. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. Εἰσαγγελίαι δὴ καὶ 
κρίσεις καὶ ἀγῶνες περὶ “ἀλλήλων γίγνονται., αἱ 
μάλα. Οὐκοῦν ἕνα τινὰ ἀεὶ δῆμος εἴωθε δια- 
φερόντως προΐστασθαι ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῦτον τρέφειν 
τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν; Εἴωθε γάρ. Τοῦτο μὲν 
ἄρα, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, δῆλον, ὅτι, ὅταν περ φύηται 
τύραννος, ἐκ προστατικῆς ῥίζης καὶ ΜῊ ἄλλοθεν 

ἐκβλαστάνει. Καὶ μάλα δῆλον. Tis ἀρχὴ οὖν 

μεταβολῆς ἐκ προστάτου ἐπὶ τύραννον; } ἢ δῆλον 
ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ταὐτὸν ἄρξηται δρᾶν ὃ προστάτης τῷ 
ἐν τῷ μύθῳ, ὃ ὃς περὶ τὸ ἐν ᾿Αρκαδίᾳ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς 
τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερὸν “λέγεται; Tis, ἔφη. ‘Os ἄρα 
ὃ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου, ἐν 
ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἑνὸς ἐγκατατετμημένου, 
ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας 
τὸν λόγον; "Eywye. Ap’ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ὃς ἂν 
δήμου προεστώς, λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον, 
μὴ ἀπόσχηται ἐμφυλίου αἵματος, ἀλλ᾽ ἀδίκως 

α Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1110 a1, in his discussion of voluntary 
and involuntary acts, says things done under compulsion or 
through misapprehension (δι᾿ ἄγνοιαν) are involuntary. 

> For τότ᾽ ἢδη cf. 569 a, Phaedo 87 x, Gorg. 527 Ὁ, Laches 
181 Ὁ, 184 a, and on 550 a, p. 259, note i. 

¢ So Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 80 iwayndo Onowy σύσταντες KaTa- 
λῦσαι τὸν δῆμον, Isoc. xv. 318 ὀλιγαρχίαν ὀνειδίζοντες. . . ἠνάγ- 
κασαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι ταῖς ἀϊτίαις. 

4 Cf. 562 v, Eurip. Or. 772 προστάτας, Aristoph. Knights 
1128. The προστάτης rod δήμου was the accepted leader of 
the democracy. Cf. Dittenberger, S./.@. 2nd ed. 1900, no. 476. 


_ judgements and lawsuits on either side.” ‘‘ Yes, / 


_ the oligarchy is nearer the id 
Plato is thinking of Athens and not of his own scheme. 
_ Cf. supra Introd. pp. xly-xlvi. 


misapprehension,* and being misled by the calum- , 

_ niators, attempting to wrong them, why then,? | 

whether they wish it or not,° they become in very 
deed oligarchs, not willingly, but this evil too is en- 
gendered by those drones which sting them.”’ “ Pre- 
cisely.” “‘ And then there ensue impeachments and 

᾿ππσν αν 

indeed.” “ And is it not always the way of a demos ἡ 

to put forward one man as its special champion and 
protector? and cherish and magnify him?” “Yes, 
it is.” “‘ This, then, is plain,” said I, “that when a 
eg arises he sprouts from a protectorate root ὁ and 

nothing else.” “Very plain.” “‘ What, then, 
is the starting-point of the transformation of a pro- 
tector into a tyrant? Is it not obviously when the 

_ protector’s acts begin to reproduce the legend that 
_ is told of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia’? ” 
_“ What is that?” he said. “ The story goes that he 

who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced 
up with those of other victims is inevitably trans- 

_ formed into a wolf. Have you not heard the tale?” — 

“Thave.” “ And is it not true that in like manner 
a leader of the people who, getting control of a docile 
mob,’ does not withhold his hand from the shedding of 

"The implications of this pesage contradict the theory that ἡ 

than the democracy. But 

* Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1310 Ὁ 14 οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων 
γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν, etc., ibid. 1304 Ὁ 20 ff. 
? Cf. Frazer on Pausanias viii. 2 (vol. iv. p. 189) and Cook’s 

Zeus, vol. i. p. 70. The archaic religious rhetoric of what 
_ follows testifies to the intensity of Plato’s feeling. Cf. the 
_ language of the Laws on homicide, 865 ff. 

ως Note the difference of tone from 5028. Cf. Phaedr. 




ἐπαιτιώμενος, οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσιν, εἰς δικαστήρια 
ἄγων͵ μιαιφονῇ, βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανίζων, γλώττῃ τε 
καὶ στόματι ἀνοσίῳ γευόμενος. φόνου ξυγγενοῦς, 
καὶ ἀνδρηλατῇ καὶ ἀποκτιννύῃ καὶ ὑποσημαίνῃ 
χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμόν, dpa τῷ 
τοιούτῳ ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἵμαρται ἢ 
ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ τυραννεῖν καὶ λύκῳ 
ἐξ ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. 

Οὗτος δή, ἔφην, 6 στασιάζων γίγνεται πρὸς τοὺς — 

ἔχοντας τὰς οὐσίας. Οὗτος. “Ap” οὖν ἐκπεσὼν 
μὲν καὶ κατελθὼν βίᾳ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τύραννος ἀπ- 
εἰργασμένος κατέρχεται; Δῆλον. Ἐὰν δὲ ἀδύ- 
νατοι ἐκβάλλειν αὐτὸν ὦσιν ἢ ἀποκτεῖναι διαβάλ- 
λοντες τῇ πόλει, βιαίῳ δὴ θανάτῳ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν 
ἀποκτιννύναι λάθρᾳ. Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, οὕτω 
γίγνεσθαι. Τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθ 

λητον. ἐπὶ τούτῳ πᾶντες οἱ εἰς τοῦτο mle penqinbee 
ἐξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς Twas τοῦ 
σώματος, ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ἢ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός. 
Καὶ μάλ᾽, ἔφη. Διδόασι δή, οἶμαι, δεΐσαντες μὲν 
ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου, θαρρήσαντες δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν. ΚΚαὶ 

μάλα. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ὅταν ἴδῃ ἀνὴρ χρήματα ἔχων 

9 Cf, Pindar, Pyth. ii. 892 : Lucan i. 331: 
nullus semel ore receptus 
pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces. 

> For ἀφανίζων ef. Gorg. 471 8. 
¢ The apparent contradiction of the tone here with Laws 
684 £ could be regarded mistakenly as another “disharmony.” 

Grote iii. p. 107 says that there is no case of such radical — 
measures in Greek history. Schmidt, Hthik der Griechen, | 

ii. p. 374, says that the only case was that of Cleomenes at 

Sparta in the third century. See Georges Mathieu, Les Idées | 





_ tribal blood,* but by the customary unjust accusations 
_ brings a citizen into court and assassinates him, 

blotting out a human life,and with unhallowed tongue 
and lips that have tasted kindred blood, banishes and 
slays and hints at the abolition of debts and the 

_ partition of lands*—is it not the inevitable consequence 
_ and a decree of fate? that such a one be either slain 
_ by his enemies or become a tyrant and be transformed 
_ from a man into a wolf?” . “ It is quite inevitable,” 

hesaid. “‘ Heitis,”’ I said, ‘* who becomes the leader 
of faction against the possessors of property.” “Yes, | 
he.” “* May it not happen that he is driven into 
exile and, being restored in defiance of his enemies, 
returns a finished tyrant?” “ Obviously.” ‘‘ And 
if they are unable to expel him or bring about his 
death by calumniating him to the people, they plot 
to assassinate him by stealth.” “ That is certainly 
wont to happen,” said he. “* And thereupon those who 
have reached this stage devise that famous petition’ 
of the tyrant—to ask from the people a bodyguard 
to make their city safe? for the friend of democracy.” 
“They do indeed,” he said. “ And the people 
προ it, I suppose, fearing for him but unconcerned 
for themselves.” ‘“‘ Yes, indeed.” ‘‘ And when he 
sees this, the man who has wealth and with his wealth 

politiques d’Isocrate, p. 150, who refers to Andoc. De myst. 
88, Plato, Laws 684, Demosth. Against Timoer. 149 (heliastic 
oath), Michel, Recueil d’inscriptions grecques, 1317, the oath 
at Itanos. 

4 Cf. 619 c. © Cf. 565 4. 

7 Cf. Herod. i. 59, Aristot. Rhet. 1357 Ὁ 30 ff. Aristotle, 
Pol. 1305 a 7-15, says that this sort of thing used to happen 
but does not now, and explains why. For πολυθρύλητον ef. 
Phaedo 100 85. 

5 For the ethical dative αὐτοῖς cf. on 343 a, Vol. I. p. 65, © 
note ¢. 

VOL. II Υ 321 

‘PLATO | 4H 

kal μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων αἰτίαν μισόδημος εἶναι, 
τότε δὴ οὗτος, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατὰ τὸν Κροίσῳ 
γενόμενον χρησμὸν ; 
πολυψήφιδα παρ᾽ Ἕρμν 
φεύγει, οὐδὲ μένει, οὐδ᾽ αἰδεῖται κακὸς εἶναι. 
Οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, δεύτερον αὖθις αἰδεσθείη. Ὃ δέ 
γε, οἶμαι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καταληφθεὶς θανάτῳ δίδοται. 
᾿Ανάγκη. Ὃ δὲ δὴ προστάτης ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸς 
δῆλον δὴ ὅτι μέγας μεγαλωστί, οὐ κεῖται, ἀλλὰ 
D καταβαλὼν ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἕστηκεν ἐν τῷ δίφρῳ 
τῆς πόλεως, τύραννος ἀντὶ προστάτου ἀποτετε- 
λεσμένος. Τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη. - 
XVII. Διέλθωμεν δὴ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἦν δ᾽ 
ἐγώ, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς πόλεως, ἐν ἧ ἂν ὃ 
τοιοῦτος βροτὸς ἐγγένηται; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, 
διέλθωμεν. *Ap’ οὖν, εἶπον, οὐ ταῖς μὲν πρώταις 
ἡμέραις τε καὶ χρόνῳ προσγελᾷ τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται 
πάντας, ᾧ ἂν περιτυγχάνῃ, καὶ οὔτε τύραννός 
E φησιν εἶναι, ὑπισχνεῖταί τε πολλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δη- 
μοσίᾳ, χρεῶν τε ἠλευθέρωσε, καὶ γῆν διένειμε 
δήμῳ τε καὶ τοῖς περὶ ἑαυτόν, καὶ πᾶσιν ἵλεώς τε 
καὶ πρᾶος εἶναι προσποιεῖται; ᾿Ανάγκη, ἔφη. 
Ὅταν δέ γε, oluat, πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς τοῖς 
μὲν καταλλαγῇ, τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ, καὶ ἡσυχία 
ἐκείνων γένηται, πρῶτον μὲν πολέμους τινὰς ἀεὶ ἢ 
κινεῖ, ἵν᾽ ἐν χρείᾳ ἡγεμόνος 6 δῆμος ἢ. Εἰκός | 

« For μισόδημος cf. Aristoph. Wasps 474, Xen. Hell. ii. | 
3. 47, Andoc. iv. 16, and by contrast φιλόδημον, Aristoph. 
Knights 787, Clouds 1187. > Herod. i. 55. 

¢ In Jl, xvi. 776 Cebriones, Hector’s charioteer, slain by 
Patroclus, κεῖτο μέγας μεγαλωστί, ‘‘ mighty in his mightiness.” 
(A. T. Murray, Loeb tr.) 


| the repute of. hostility to. democracy,* then’ in the 

"words of the oracle? delivered to Croesus, 
mw Necks By the pebble-strewn strand of the Hermos 
Hi Raita hesSigtt, be. stays not nor blushes to show. the 

"white feather.” | 
“No, for he would never get a second chance to 
blush.” “ And he whois caught, methinks, is de- 
_livered to his death.” “Inevitably.” “And then 
Ἷ ἴου that protector does not lie prostrate, 
_ ‘mighty with far-flung limbs,’ in Homeric overthrow,° 
but overthrowing many others towers in the car of 
state? transformed from a protector into a perfect and 
finished tyrant.” “‘ What else is likely ? ’’ he said. 

XVII. “Shall we, then, portray the happiness,” said 
I, “ of the man and the state in which such a creature 
arises?” “ By all means let us describe it,” he said. 
_“ Then at the start and in the first days does he not 
_smile* upon all men and greet everybody he meets and 

deny that he is a tyrant, and promise many things in 
private and public, and having freed men fom debts, 
and distributed lands to the people and his own associ- 
_ates, he affects a gracious and gentle manner to all?” 
* Necessarily,” he said. “ But when, I suppose, he 
has come to terms with some of his exiled enemies’ 
and has got others destroyed and is. no longer dis- 
turbed by them, in the first place he is always stirring 
ΠΡ some war’ so that the people may be in need of 

# For the figure ef. Polit. 266. More common in Plato 
is the fi of the ship in this connexion. of. on 488. 

* Cf. Eurip. 1.4. 333 ff., Shakes. Henry IV. Part I. tr. iii, 

246 “ This king of smiles, this Bolingbroke.” 

7 Not “foreign enemies” as almost all render it. Cf. my 
note on this passage in Class. Rev. xix. (1905) pp. 438-439, 
_ 573 B ἔξω ὠθεῖ, Theognis 56, Thuc. iv. 66 and viii. 64. 

___* Cf. Polit. 308 a, and in modern times the case of 
Napoleon. τ 

᾿ 323 

567 γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἵνα χρήματα εἰσφέροντες πῤίηνεεῖ 




γιγνόμενοι πρὸς τῷ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζωνται 

εἶναι καὶ ἧττον αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύωσιν; ς Δῆλον. 

Καὶ ἄν rye Twas, οἶμαι, ὑποπτεύῃ ἐλεύθερα φρονή- 

ματα ἔχοντας μὴ ἐπιτρέψειν αὐτῷ ἄρχειν, ὅπως 

ἂν τούτους μετὰ προφάσεως ἀπολλύῃ, ἐνδοὺς τοῖς 

πολεμίοις; τούτων πάντων ἕνεκα τυράννῳ ἀεὶ 
ἀνάγκη πόλεμον ταράττειν; ᾿Ανάγκη. Ταῦτα δὴ 
Β ποιοῦντα ἕτοιμον μᾶλλον ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολί- 
ταις; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν καί Twas τῶν 
ξυγκαταστησάντων καὶ ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων παρ- 
ρησιάζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, A 

ἐπιπλήττοντας τοῖς γιγνομένοις, οὗ ἂν τυγχάνω- 
σιν ἀνδρικώτατοι ὄντες; Εἰκός γε. “Ὑπεξαιρεῖν 

δὴ τούτους πάντας δεῖ τὸν τύραννον, εἰ μέλλει ᾿ 

ἄρξειν, ἕως ἂν μήτε φίλων μήτ᾽ ἐχθρῶν λίπῃ 

μηδένα, ὅτου τι ὄφελος. Δῆλον. ᾿Οξέως dpa δεῖ ΐ 

ὁρᾶν αὐτόν, τίς ἀνδρεῖος, τίς μεγαλόφρων, Tis 
φρόνιμος, τίς πλούσιος" καὶ οὕτως εὐδαίμων ἐστίν, 
ὥστε τούτοις ἅπασιν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, εἴτε βούλεται 
εἴτε μή, πολεμίῳ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύειν, ἕως ἂν 
καθήρῃ τὴν πόλιν. Καλόν γε, ἔφη, καθαρμόν. 
Ναί, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ σώμαπαι 

α For ταράττειν in this sense cf. Dem. De cor. 151 ἐγκλήματα 
καὶ πόλεμος. . . ἐταράχθη, Soph, Antig. 795 νεῖκος... ταράξας. 

> ξυγκαταστησάντων is used in Aesch. Prom. 307 of those 
who helped Zeus to establish his supremacy among the gods. 
See also Xen. Ages. 2. 31, Isoc. Panegyr. 126. 

¢ Cf. Thucyd. viii. 70, Herod. iii. 80. δή, as often in the 
Timaeus, marks the logical progression of the thought. Cf. 
Tim. 67 c, 69 a, 77 c, 82 B, and passim. 

4 Cf. on 560 pv, p. 299, note c. Aristotle says that in a 
democracy ostracism corresponds to this. Cf. Newman i. 



ele = 


- SD Rm ett 


aleader.” “That is likely.”” “ And also that being 
impoverished by war-taxes they may have to devote 
themselves to their daily business and be less likely 
to plot against him?” “ Obyiously.” “ And if, I 
presume, he suspects that there are free spirits who 
will not suffer his domination, his further object is 
_ to find pretexts for destroying them by exposing 
them tothe enemy? From all these motives a tyrant 
_ is compelled to be always provoking wars??”’ “ Yes, 
_ he is compelled to do 50. “‘ And by such conduct 
will he not the more readily incur the hostility of the 
citizens?” “Ofcourse.” “ And is it not likely that 
some of those who helped to establish® and now share 
in his power, voicing their disapproval of the course 
of events, will speak out frankly to him and to one 
another—such of them as happen to be the bravest?” — 
“Yes, it is likely.” “‘Then the tyrant must do away* 
with all such if he is to maintain his rule, until he has 
left no one of any worth, friend or foe.” ‘‘ Obvi- 
ously.”” “‘He must look sharp to see, then, who is 
brave, who is great-souled, who is wise, who is rich ; 
and such is his good fortune that, whether he wishes 
it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against 
them all until he purge the city.*” “A fine purga- 
tion,” he said. “ Yes,” said I, “just the opposite of 
that which physicians practise on our bodies. For 
Ῥ. 262. For the idea that the tyrant fears good or able and 
outstanding men ef. Laws $32 c, Gorg. 510 s-c, Xen. Hiero 

5. 1, Isoc. viii. 112, Eurip. Jon 626-628, Milton, Tenure of 
Kings, etc., init., Shakes., Richard I. ut. iv. 33 ff.: 

Go thou, and like an executioner 
Cut off the heads of too fast growing sprays 
That look too lofty in our commonwealth. 
All must be even in our government. 
But cf. Pindar, Pyth. iii. 71, of Hiero, οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς. 



coe \ . , 3 a , \ 
of μὲν yap τὸ χείριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείπουσι τὸ 
,ὔ « \ > / < ” 4 D5 5 
βέλτιστον, 6 δὲ τοὐναντίον. ‘Qs ἔοικε yap, αὐτῷ, 
ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ἄρξει. ΣΡ 
ἢ : BE A 
XVIII. _ μακαρίᾳ ἄρα, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀνάγκῃ 
γε A 
D δέδεται, ἣ προστάττει αὐτῷ ἢ μετὰ φαύλων τῶν 
“- ~ A 
πολλῶν οἰκεῖν καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μισούμενον ἢ μὴ 
ζῆν. Ἔν τοιαύτῃ, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐχί, ὅσῳ 
ba) > a / 5 / a. ~ 
ἂν μᾶλλον τοῖς πολίταις ἀπεχθάνηται ταῦτα δρῶν, 
τοσούτῳ πλειόνων καὶ πιστοτέρων δορυφόρων 
ὃ , aA A ” ᾿ > ει Ὁ , ie | 
εήσεται; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Tives οὖν οἱ πιστοὶ, καὶ 
πόθεν αὐτοὺς μεταπέμψεται; Αὐτόματοι, ἔφη, 
\ oo , 24 \ ἃ ΤΙ διδῶ ἥ 
πολλοὶ ἥξουσι πετόμενοι, ἐὰν τὸν μισθὸν διδῷ. — 
a a 4 
Κηφῆνας, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, νὴ τὸν κύνα, δοκεῖς ad τινάς 
νας, Y ἢ 
/ 4 \ ͵ > “ 
E μοι λέγειν ξενικούς τε καὶ παντοδαπούς. ᾿Αληθῆ 
γάρ, ἔφη, δοκῶ σοι. Τί δέ; αὐτόθεν; dp’ οὐκ ἂν 
ἐθελήσειεν; Πῶς; Τοὺς δούλους ἀφελόμενος τοὺς 
/ > ’ὔ “ = ‘ , 
πολίτας, ἐλευθερώσας, τῶν περὶ ἑαυτὸν δορυφόρων 
, , “1... 8 ye \ “ΜΓ, 
ποιήσασθαι. Σφόδρα γ᾽, ἔφη: ἐπεί τοι καὶ πιστὸ- 
7 A a / > > ΄ 4 3427-2 
Tato. αὐτῷ οὗτοί εἰσιν. Ἦ μακάριον, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, 
λέγεις τυράννου χρῆμα, εἰ τοιούτοις φίλοις τε καὶ 
568 πιστοῖς ἀνδράσι χρῆται, τοὺς προτέρους ἐκείνους 
> / > A 7 ” / ~ 
ἀπολέσας. ᾿Αλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, τοιούτοις γε χρῆται. 
Καὶ θαυμάζουσι δή, εἶπον, οὗτοι οἱ ἑταῖροι αὐτὸν 
καὶ ξύνεισιν οἱ νέοι πολῖται, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπιεικεῖς μισοῦσί 

1 τί δέ; αὐτόθεν Hermann, Adam: τίς δὲ αὐτόθεν; AFDM: 
τί δὲ αὐτόθεν Mon. (without punctuation): τοὺς δὲ αὐτόθεν 

« Cf. Laws 952 πὶ, Rep. 467 Ὁ. 

> Cf. the Scottish guards of Louis XI. of France, the Swiss 
guards of the later French kings, the Hessians hired by 
George III. against the American colonies, and the Asiatics 
in the Soviet armies. 



while they remove the worst and leave the best, he 

he said, “1 he is to keep his power.”’ 
XVIII. “ Blessed, then, is the necessity that binds 
him,” said I, “‘ which bids him dwell for the most part 

_with base companions who hate him, or else forfeit his 
life.” “‘ Such it is,” he said. ‘‘ And would he not, 
_ the more he offends the citizens by such conduct, have 
_ the greater need of more and more trustworthy body- 
guards?” “Οὗ course.” “‘ Whom, then; may he 
trust, and whence shall he fetch them?” “ Un- 
_bidden,” he said, “‘ they will wing their way * to him 
ἴῃ great numbers if he furnish their wage.” “‘ Drones, 
_by the dog,” I said, “ I think you are talking of again, 
_an alien? and motley crew.*”’. “ You think rightly,” 
he'said. “‘ But what of the home supply,’ would he 
not choose to employ that?”’ “How?” “By taking 
their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them and 
enlisting them in his bodyguard.”’ “* Assuredly,” he 
id, “since these are those whom he can most trust.” 
“Truly,” said I, “ this tyrant business ¢ is a blessed’ 
thing on your showing, if such are the friends and 
| “trusties” he must employ after destroying his former 
_associates.”’ ‘‘ But such are indeed those he does 
: make use of,” he said. ‘‘ And these companions 
admire him,” I said, “ and these new citizens are his 
_ associates, while the better sort hate and avoid him.” 

° παντοδαπούς: cf. on 557 ο. 
4 For αὐτόθεν cf. Herod. i. 64 τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ 
| Στρύμονος, Thue. i. 11, Xen. Ages. 1. 28. 
* For the idiomatic and colloquial χρῆμα cf. Herod. i. 36, 
_Enurip. Androm. 181, Theaet. 209 2, Aristoph. Clouds 1, 
Birds 826, Wasps 933, Lysistr. 83, 1085, Acharn. 150, Peace 
1192, Knights 1219, Frogs 1278. 
For the wretched lot of the tyrant εὖ. p. 368, note a. 


does the reverse.” “ Yes, for apparently he must,” | 





τε καὶ φεύγουσιν; Τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλουσιν; Οὐκ ἐτός, 
β' ἐγ ’ ν / Ld \ cal : 
ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἥ τε τραγῳδία ὅλως σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι — 

καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης διαφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ. Τί δή; Ὅτι 
καὶ τοῦτο πυκνῆς διανοίας ἐχόμενον ἐφθέγξατο, 
ὡς ἄρα σοφοὶ τύραννοί εἰσι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ. 
τ ν “ Ὁ ,ὔ A A 
καὶ ἔλεγε δῆλον ὅτι τούτους εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς οἷς 
ξύνεστιν. Kai ὡς ἰσόθεόν γ᾽, ἔφη, τὴν τυραννίδα 


> ͵ὔ A > ᾿ {ὦ 
ἐγκωμιάζει, καὶ ἕτερα πολλά, καὶ οὗτος καὶ οὗ 

ἄλλοι ποιηταί. Τοιγάρτοι, ἔφην, ἅτε σοφοὶ ὄντες 
οἱ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιηταὶ ξυγγιγνώσκουσιν ἡμῖν 
τε καὶ ἐκείνοις, ὅσοι ἡμῶν ἐγγὺς πολιτεύονται, 
ὅτι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ παραδεξόμεθα ἅτε 

τυραννίδος ὑμνητάς. Οἶμαι ἔγωγ᾽, ἔφη, ξυγγιγνώ- — 

σκουσιν ὅσοιπέρ γε αὐτῶν κομψοί. His δέ γε, 
οἶμαι, τὰς ἄλλας περιιόντες πόλεις, ξυλλέγοντες 

\ * ‘ A ‘ / \ A 
τοὺς ὄχλους, καλὰς φωνὰς Kal μεγάλας καὶ πιθανὰς 

μισθωσάμενοι εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ δημοκρατίας | 
μὲ \ ,ὔ / > “ Α 
ἕλκουσι τὰς πολιτείας. Mada γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ | 

προσέτι τούτων μισθοὺς λαμβάνουσι καὶ τιμῶνται, 
μάλιστα μέν, ὥσπερ τὸ εἰκός, ὑπὸ τυράννων, 
δεύτερον δὲ ὑπὸ δημοκρατίας: ὅσῳ δ᾽ ἂν ἀνωτέρω 
ἴωσι πρὸς τὸ ἄναντες τῶν πολιτειῶν, μᾶλλον 
ἀπαγορεύει αὐτῶν ἡ τιμή, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ἄσθματος 
ἀδυνατοῦσα πορεύεσθαι. Ilavu μὲν οὖν. 

® For οὐκ ἐτός cf. 4148. The idiom is frequent in Aristoph. 
Cf. e.g. Acharn. 411, 413, Birds 915, Thesm. 921, Plut. 404, 
1166, Feel. 245. 

ὃ This is plainly ironical and cannot be used by the 

admirers of Euripides. 
° Cf. πυκιναὶ φρένες Iliad xiv. 294, πυκινὸς νόος xv. 41, ete. 

4 Cf. Theages 125 8 f. The line is also attributed to 

Sophocles. Cf. Stemplinger, Das Plagiat in der griechi- 
schen Literatur, p. 9; Gellius xiii. 18, F. Diimmler, Aka- 
demika, p. 16. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 119 thinks this an 



“Why should they not?’’ “Not for nothing,*”’ said 
I,“ is tragedy in general esteemed wise, and Euripides 
beyond other tragedians.’”’ ‘‘ Why, pray?’’ “ Be- 
cause among other utterances of pregnant thought ° 
he said, ‘Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.?” 
He meant evidently that these associates of the 
are the wise.”’ “‘ Yes, he and the other poets,” 
he said, “call the tyrant’s power ‘likest God’s’* and 
praise it in many other ways.” ‘‘ Wherefore,’’ said 
I, “ being wise as they are, the poets of tragedy will 
rdon_us and those whose politics resemble ours 
for not admitting them/ into our polity, since they 
hymn the praises of tyranny.” “I think,” he said, 
“that the subtle minds? among them will pardon us.” 
“But going about to other cities, I fancy, collecting 
crowds and hiring fine, loud, persuasive voices,* they 
draw the polities towards tyrannies or democracies.” 
“ Yes, indeed.” ‘‘ And, further, they are paid and 
honoured for this, chiefly, as is to be expected, by 
tyrants, and secondly by democracy.‘ But the higher 
they go, breasting constitution hill, the more their 
honour fails, as it were from lack of breath’ unable to 
proceed.” “* Quite so.” 
allusion to Euripides and Agathon at the court of Archelaus 
of Macedon. 

Isocrates ix. 40, like the poets, praises the tyrants, but ii. 
3-5 contrasts their education unfavourably with that of the 
ordinary citizen. Throughout the passage he is plainly 
thinking of Plato. 

δ ΚΑ Vol. I. p. 119, note ¢, Eurip. Tro. 1169, Isoe. ii. 5. 

7 Cf. supra 394 υ. What Plato Said, p. 561, infra 598 ff. 

® κομψοί is used playfully or ironically. 

* Cf. See. 502 8 ff., Laws $17 c, and for the expression 

- D. 

* Cf. Laches 183 a-B. 

3 Cf. Shakes. Ant. and Cleop. τι. x. 25 “Our fortune on 
the sea is out of breath.” 



XIX. ᾿Αλλὰ δή, εἶπον, ἐνταῦθα. μὲν ἐξέβημεν: 
λέγωμεν. δὲ πάλιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῦ τυράννου στρατό- 
πεὸδον τὸ “καλόν τε καὶ πολὺ καὶ ποικίλον καὶ 
οὐδέποτε ταὐτόν, πόθεν θρέψεται. ae ἔφη, 
ὅτι, ἐάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα ἢ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ταῦτα 
3 / μὲ A, Ὁ, δον ἐν ~ " A ~ > 
ἀναλώσει ὅποι ποτὲ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐξαρκῇ, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀπ- 
ολομένων," ἐλάττους εἰσφορὰς ἀναγκάζων τὸν δῆμον 

E εἰσφέρειν. Τί δ᾽ ὅταν δὴ ταῦτα ἐπιλείπῃ; Δῆλον, ᾿ 


ἔφη, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν πατρῴων θρέψεται αὐτός τε κ 
οἱ συμπόται τε καὶ ἑταῖροι καὶ ἑταῖραι. Μανθάνω, 
ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ. ὅτι ὃ δῆμος 6 γεννήσας τὸν eget, 
θρέψει αὐτόν τε καὶ ἑταίρους. Πολλὴ αὐτῷ, ἔφη, 
ἀνάγκη. Πῶς δὲ λέγεις; εἶπον" ἐὰν δὲ ἀγανακτῇ | 
τε καὶ λέγῃ ὁ δῆμος, ὅτι οὔτε δίκαιον τρέφεσθαι 
ὑπὸ πατρὸς υἱὸν ἡβῶντα, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίόν ὑπὸ 
υἱέος πατέρα, οὔτε τούτου αὐτὸν ἕνεκα ἐγέννησέ 
τε καὶ κατέστησεν, ἵνα, ἐπειδὴ μέγας γένοιτο, 
τότε αὐτὸς δουλεύων τοῖς αὑτοῦ δούλοις. τρέφοι — 
ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ τοὺς δούλους μετὰ ξυγκλύδων. | 
ἄλλων, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶι s 
κἀγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλευθερωθείη 
ἐκείνου προστάντος, καὶ νῦν κελεύει ἀπιέναι ἐκ 
τῆς “πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἑταίρους, ὥσπερ 
πατὴρ υἱὸν ἐξ οἰκίας μετὰ ὀχληρῶν. ξυμποτῶν 
ἐξελαύνων; Γνώσεταί γε, νὴ Δία, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς, τότ 
ἤδη ὃ δῆμος, οἷος οἷον θρέμμα γεννῶν ἠσπᾶζετό 

1 καὶ τὰ Baiter, τὰ Μ88.: ἀπολομένων Α3,, ἀποδομένων ΔΕΏΜ, 
πωλουμένων οἷ. Campbell. See Adam, App. VI. 

9 Cf. on 572 5, p. 339, note ὁ. 
Ὁ Of. 574 νυ, Diels? p. 578, Anon. Iambl. 3. 
© Cf. Soph. O.T. 873 ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον. 



_ XIX. “ But this,” said I, “is a digression.* Let us 
return to that fair, multitudinous, diversified and 
ever-changing bodyguard of the tyrant and tell how 
it will be supported.” ‘‘ Obviously,” he said, “ if 
there are sacred treasures in the city he will spend 
these as long as they last and the property of those 
he has destroyed, thus requiring smaller contribu- 
tions from the populace.” “‘ But what when these 
resources fail®?” “‘ Clearly,” he said, “ his father’s 
estate will have to support him and his wassailers, his 
fellows and his she-fellows.” ‘‘ I understand,” I said, 

_ “that the people which begot the tyrant? will have 

to feed him and his companions.” “It cannot escape 

_ from that,” he said. ‘“‘ And what have you to say,” 

I said, “in case the people protests and says that it 
is not right that a grown-up son should be supported 
by his father, but the reverse, and that it did not beget 
and establish him in order that, when he had grown 
great, it, in servitude to its own slaves, should feed 
him and the slaves together with a nondescript rabble 
of aliens, but in order that, with him for protector, 
it might be liberated from the rule of the rich and 
the so-called ‘better classes,’ ὁ and that it now bids him 
and his crew depart from the city as a father expels® 
from his house a son together with troublesome 

_reyellers?” ‘‘ The demos, by Zeus,” he said,“ will then 

learn to its cost’ what it is and what? a creature it 

4 For καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ef. Aristoph. Knights 185, and Blaydes 
on 735. See also supra on 489 π, p. 27, note d. 

* Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 123. 

7 For the threatening γνώσεται cf. 362 a, 466 c, I. xviii. 
270 and 125, Theocr. xxvi. 19 τάχα γνώσῃ, and Lucian, 

_ Timon 33 εἴσεται. 

σ For the juxtaposition οἷος οἷον cf. Symp. 195 a, Sophocles 
El. 751, Ajax 557, 923, Trach. 995, 1045. 


PLATO > aise 

τε καὶ nde, Kal ὅτι ἀσθενέστερος ὧν. ἰσχυροτέ- 
ρους ἐξελαύνει. Πῶς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λέγεις; τολμή- 
σει τὸν πατέρα βιάζεσθαι, κἂν μὴ πείθηται, τύπ- 
τειν ὃ τύραννος; Ναί, ἔφη, ἀφελ ὀμενός γε τὰ 
ὅπλα. Πατραλοίαν, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λέγε τύραννον 
καὶ χαλεπὸν γηροτρόφον, καὶ ὡς dou τοῦτο δὴ 
ὁμολογουμένη ἂν ἤδη τυραννὶς εἴη, καὶ τὸ λεγό- 
μενον ὁ δῆμος φεύγων ἂν καπνὸν δουλείας ἐλευθέ- 
ρων εἰς πῦρ δούλων δεσποτείας ἂν ἐμπεπτωκὼς 
εἴη, ἀντὶ τῆς πολλῆς ἐκείνης καὶ ἀκαίρου ἐλευθε- ὦ 
ρίας τὴν χαλεπωτάτην τε καὶ πικροτάτην δούλων — 
δουλείαν μεταμπισχόμενος. Καὶ μάλα, ἔ “on, ταῦτα 
οὕτω γίγνεται. Te οὖν; εἶπον" οὐκ ἐμμελῶς 
ἡμῖν εἰρήσεται, ἐὰν φῶμεν ἱκανῶς διεληλυθέναι, ᾿ 
ὡς μεταβαίνει τυραννὶς ἐκ δημοκρατίας, γενομένη [ 
τε οἵα ἐστίν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς, ἔφη. 

«ΟἹ, infra on 874 ο, pp. 346-347, note ὁ. ᾿ 

» As we say, “ Out of the frying-pan into the fire.” of 
Anth. Pal. ix. 17.5 ἐκ πυρὸς ὡς aivos ᾽πεσες és φλόγα, Theo- — 
doret, Therap. iii. p. 773 καὶ τὸν καπνὸν κατὰ τὴν Winer ' 
ἔοικε, φύγοντες. εἰς αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ πῦρ ἐμπεπτώκαμεν. See Oito, ᾿ 
137; also Solon 7 (17) (Anth, Lyr., Bergk-Hiller, 9 ἢ 
'dmonds, Greek Elegy and Iambus, i. p. 122, ges Classical 



ἶ begot and cherished and bred to greatness, and that in 
its weakness it tries to expel the stronger.” ‘“ What 
_do you mean?” said I; “ will the tyrant dare to use 
_ force against his father, and, if he does not yield, to 
strike him*?” “Yes,” he said, “after he has once 
taken from him his arms.” “A very parricide,” said I, 
“you make the tyrant out to be, and a cruel nurse 
of old age, and, as it seems, this is at last tyranny open 
and avowed, and, as the saying goes, the demos trying 
to eseape the smoke of submission to the free would 
haye plunged into the fire® of enslavement to slaves, 
and in exchange for that excessive and unseasonable 
liberty ¢ has clothed itself in the garb of the most cruel 
and bitter servile servitude.?”’ “ Yes indeed,” he said, 
“that is just what happens.” “ Well, then,” said I, 
“ shall we not be fairly justified in saying that we 
have sufficiently described the transformation of a 
democracy into a tyranny and the nature of the 
tyranny itself?” ‘‘ Quite sufficiently,” he said. 
Library) εἰς δὲ μονάρχου δῆμος ἀιδρείῃ δουλοσύνην ἔπεσεν, 
Herod. iii. 81 τυράννου ὕβριν φεύγοντας ἄνδρας ἐς δήμου 
ἀκολάστου ὕβριν πεσεῖν, and for the idea Epist. viii. 354 Ὁ. 
- we Epist. viii. 354 νυ. 
4 For rhetorical style ef. Tim. 41 a θεοὶ θεῶν, Polit. 
303 ὁ σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς, and the biblical expressions, God 
of Gods and Lord of Lords, ¢.g. Deut. x. 17, Ps. exxxvi. 2-3, 

Dan. xi. 36, Rev. xix. 16. Cf. Jebb on Soph. 0.7. 1063 


θ ey 
571 1. Αὐτὸς δὴ λοιπός, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὁ TUE pene 
ἀνὴρ σκέψασθαι, πῶς τε μεθίσταται ἐκ κρα- 

τικοῦ, γενόμενός τε ποῖός τίς ἐστι καὶ Tia 7 ρόπο 
ζῇ, ἄθλιον ἢ PEEL Aounds γὰρ οὖν ἔτι yea Ὃς, 
ἔφη. Οἶσθ᾽ οὖν, ἣν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὃ ποθῶ ects Τὸ: 
ποῖον; Τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οἷαί τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰσίν, 
οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν ἱκανῶς διῃρῆσθαι. τούτου | 
Β ἐνδεῶς ἔχοντος, ἀσαφεστέρα ἔσται ἡ ζήτησις ο 
ζητοῦμεν. Οὐκοῦν, ve δ᾽ ὅς, ἔτ᾽ ἐν καλῷ'; ; Πάνυ. 
μὲν οὖν: καὶ σκόπει y δ ἐν αὐταῖς βούλομαι ἰδεῖν. 
ἔστι δὲ τόδε. τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ 
ἐπιθυμιῶν δοκοῦσί τινές μοι εἶναι παράνομοι, 
κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ἐγγίγνεσθαι παντί, \Glotaaee 
de ὑ ὑπό τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιθυμιῶν 
μετὰ λόγου ἐνίων ἐν ἀνθρώπων ἢ παντάπασιν 
ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἢ ὀλίγαι λείπεσθαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, 
Ο τῶν δὲ ἰσχυρότεραι καὶ πλείους. Λέγεις δὲ καὶ 
τίνας, ἔφη, ταύτας; Τὰς περὶ τὸν ὕπνον, ἦν δ᾽ 

1 ἐν καλῷ Μ and almost all editions: ἐγκαλῶ AFD, defended — 
by Apelt, Berl. Phil. Woch. 1895, p. 965. 

@ For ἐν καλῷ ef. Soph. El. 348, Eurip. Heracleid. 971, 
Aristoph. Heel. 321, Thesm. 292. 

> Cf. on 558 ν. 

ὁ For κολαζόμεναι cf. on 559 B, p. 293, note c. 

4 Of, Aristot. Bth. Nic. 1102 Ὁ 5 ff. ὁ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς 



I. “ There remains for consideration,” said I, “‘ the 
tyrannical man himself—the manner of his develop- 
‘ment out of the democratic type and his character and 
the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy.” 
“Why, yes, he still remains,” he said. “Do you 
know, then, what it is that I still miss?’ ““ What?” 
“ In the matter of our desires I do not think we suffi- 
ciently distinguished their nature and number. And 
‘so long as this is lacking our inquiry will lack clear- 
ness.’ “‘ Well,” said he, “‘ will our consideration of 
them not still be opportune*?”’ “By allmeans. And 
observe what it is about them that I wish to consider. 
Itis this. Of our unnecessary pleasures? and appetites 
there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably 
are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled? 
by the laws and the better desires in alliance with 
reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, 
or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, 
while in others the remnant is stronger and more 
numerous.” “‘What desires do you mean?”’ he said. 
“Those,” said I, “that are awakened in sleep? when 
ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ᾽ ὕπνον, etc.; also his Problem. 957 a 21 ff. 
Οἷς. De divin. i. 29 translates this passage. Cf. further 
Herod. vi. 107, Soph. O.T. 981-982. 
Hazlitt writes “We are not hypocrites in our sleep,” 

a modern novelist, “* In sleep all barriers are down.” 
The Freudians have at last discovered Plato’s anticipation 



ἐγώ, ἐγειρομένας, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄλλο τῆς ψυχῆς 
εὕδῃ, ὅσον λογιστικὸν καὶ ἥμερον καὶ ,ἄρχον 
ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ θηριῶδές τε καὶ “ἄγριον, ἢ σίτων ἢ 
μέθης πλησθέν, σκιρτᾷ τε καὶ ἀπωσάμενον τὸν 
ὕπνον ζητῇ ἰ ἰέναι καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι τὰ αὑτοῦ ἤθη: 
οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι πάντα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τολμᾷ ποιεῖν, ὡς 
ἀπὸ πάσης λελυμένον τε καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένον αἰσχύ- 

νῆς καὶ φρονήσεως. μητρί τε γὰρ, ἐπιχειρεῖν 

Ὁ μίγνυσθαι, ὡς οἴεται, οὐδὲν ὁ ὀκνεῖ, Ὁ TE ὁτῳοῦν 

ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν καὶ θηρίων, μις νεῖν τι ἣ 
ὁτιοῦν, “βρώματός τε ἀπέχεσθαι μηδενός: καὶ 
λόγῳ οὔτε ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει οὔτ᾽ ἀναισχυντίας. 
᾿Αληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ὅταν δέ γε, οἶμαι, 
ὑγιεινῶς τις ἔχῃ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ καὶ σωφρόνως, καὶ 
εἰς τὸν ὕπνον ἴῃ τὸ λογιστικὸν μὲν ἐγείρας ἑαυτοῦ. 
καὶ ἑστιάσας λόγων καλῶν καὶ σκέψεων, εἰς 
σύννοιαν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀφικόμενος, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν 
E82 μήτε ἐνδείᾳ δοὺς μήτε πλησμονῇ, ὅπως. ἂν 
ἘΠῚ τ 
of their main thesis. Cf. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in — 
Peace and War, p. 74: “It has been perhaps. Freud’s most — 
remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of this 
emergence of desires and memories from the unconscious 
into the conscious field.’’ ‘‘ The barriers of the Freudian 
unconscious are less tightly closed during sleep” senten- 
tiously observes an eminent modern psychologist. 
Valentine, The New Psychology of the Unconscious, p. xiii. 
and ibid. p. 93: ‘‘ Freud refers to Plato’s view that the 
virtuous man contents himself with dreaming that which the 
wicked man does in actual life, but I believe he nowhere shows 
a knowledge of the following passage in the Republic. . ..” 
Cf. ibid. p. 95: “* The | fae several aspects of the Freudian 
view of dreams, including the characteristic doctrine of the 
censor, was to be found in Plato. ‘The Freudian view 
becomes at once distinctly more respectable.” 1 



the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant _ 
part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, re- 
plete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling 
sleep, sally forth and satisfy its own 
Be @ You are aware that in such case there is 
thing it will not venture to undertake as being 
S ae from all sense of shame and all reason. It 
not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother 
or with anyone else, man, god or brute. It 
is fee for any foul deed of blood ; it abstains from no 
food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly” 
and shamelessness. ὌΝ Most true,” he said. “Βαΐ 
when, I suppose, a man’s condition is healthy and 
sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational 
part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, 
and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has 
neither starved nor indulged to repletion his appeti- 

r- bg of the ancients, like some superstitious moderns, ex- 
Ited the unconscious which reveals itself in dreams, 
nade it the source of prophecy. Cf. commentators on 
Aesch. Eumen. 104, Pindar, fr. 131 (96) Loeb, p. 589: 
εὕδει δὲ πρασσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὑδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς «ὀνείροις 
| δείκνυσι τέρπνων ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν, “but it 
sleepeth while the limbs are active; yet to them that sleep, 
in π ἢ dream it giveth presage of a decision of things 
€ or doleful.™ * (Sandys, Loeb tr.) Cf. Pausan. 
ix. 23, Cic. De div. i. ay Sir Thomas Browne, Religio 
M edici, pp. 105-107 (ed. J. A. Symonds). Plato did not 
share these superstitions. “Cf. the irony of Tim. 71 p-¥, 
und my review of Stewart’s “Myths of Plato,” Journal 
Philos. Psychol. and Scientific Methods, vol. iii., 1906, 
“pp. 495-498. 

_* The Greeks had no good word for instinct, but there are 
Passages in Plato where this translation is justified by the 
CO test for ἦθος, φύσις and such words. 

“ὃ For the idiom οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει ef. Soph. Trach. 90, Demosth, 
liv . 34. Cf. also 602 p and on 533 a, p. 200, note ὁ. 

VOL. II Ζ 337 


572 Κοιμηθῇ καὶ μὴ παρέχῃ. θόρυβον τῷ βελτίστι 

χαῖρον ἢ λυπούμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐᾷ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ adrc 
μόνον καθαρὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ ὀρέγεσθαί του καὶ 
αἰσθάνεσθαι ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἢ τι τῶν γεγονότων ἢ 
ὄντων ἢ καὶ μελλόντων, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ 
θυμοειδὲς πραὔνας καὶ μή τισιν εἰς ὀργὰς ἐλθὼν 
κεκινημένῳ τῷ θυμῷ καθεύδῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡσυχάσας μὲν 
τὼ δύο εἴδη, τὸ τρίτον δὲ κινήσας, ἐν ᾧ τὸ φρονεῖν 
ἐγγίγνεται, οὕτως ἀναπαύηται, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τῆς + 
ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ μάλιστα ἅπτεται κα 
ἥκιστα παράνομοι τότε at ὄψεις φαντάζονται τι 
ἐνυπνίων. ἸΙαντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οἶμαι οὕτως 
Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ἐπὶ πλέον ἐξήχθημεν εἰπεῖν" ὃ δι 
βουλόμεθα γνῶναι, τόδ᾽ ἐστίν, ὡς ἄρα δεινόν τι καὶ 
ἄγριον καὶ ἄνομον ἐπιθυμιῶν εἶδος ἑκάστῳ ἔνεστι, 
καὶ πάνυ δοκοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἐνίοις μετρίοις εἶναι" 
τοῦτο δὲ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γίγνεται ἔνδηλον. εἰ 
οὖν τὶ δοκῶ λέγειν καὶ ξυγχωρεῖς, ἄθρει. ᾿Α 
ξυγχωρῶ. Ἵ 


« Cf. Browning, Bishop Blougram’s Apology, “‘ And body 
gets its sop and holds its noise.’ ; ΝΣ 
Plato was no ascetic, as some have inferred from passages” 



in the Republic, Laws, Gorgias, and Phaedo. Cf. Herbert ἢ 

L. Stewart, ‘‘ Was Plato an Ascetic?” Philos. +3 τ}, 
pp. 603-613; Dean Inge, Christian Ethics, Ὁ. 90: “The 
asceticism of the true Platonist has always been sane and 
moderate; the hallmark of Platonism is a combination οὗ 
self-restraint and simplicity with humanism.” ; 
» Of. Ephesians iv. 26 ** Let not the sun go down upon 
your wrath.” é 3 
5 ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: cf. 382 B, 465 a, 470 c, 492 c, 590 a, 
Lysis 212 c, Laws 625 τ. ) 
4 This sentence contains 129 words. George Moore says. 
**Pater’s complaint that Plato’s sentences are long may be 

regarded as Pater’s single excursion into humour.” But 



tive ors lai it may be lulled to sleep? and not 
disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but 
‘may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and 
reach out towards and apprehend some of the things 
unknown to it, past, present or future ; and when he 
has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and 
does not after a quarrel fall asleep® with anger still 
awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the 
two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in 
which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are 
aware that in such case* he is most likely to apprehend 
truth, and the visions of his dreams are least likely 
to be lawless.” ὁ “1 certainly think so,” he said. 
“ This description has carried us too far,’ but the point 
that we have to notice is this, that in fact there 
exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most 
ble,’ a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of 
desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep. 
Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I 
say, and whether you admit it.” “* Well, I do.” 
ater is in fact justifying his own long sentences by Plato’ 
pees le. He “ais this passage Plato's ering ah 2 yer. a 
Be PinG always tela’ τὸ the polit after a digression. 
Cf. 543 c, 471 c, 544.8, 568 pv, 588 8, Phaedo 78 B, Theaet. 
77 c, Protag. 359 a, Crat. 438 a, Polit. 287 a-s, 263 c, 
B, Laws 682 £, 697 c, 864 ο, and many other 
. also Lysias ii. 61 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐξήχθην, Bemosth. 
cor. 211, Aristot. De an. 403 b 16, also p. 193, note i, 
and Plato’s carefulness in keeping to the point under dis- 
cussion in 858 ο, Theaet. 182 c, 206 c, Meno 93 a-s, Gorg. 
479 v-£, 459 c-p, etc. 
--? For the irony of the expression cf. Laws 633 p, Aesch. 
Eumen. 373, and for the thought Othello mu. iii, 138: 

who has a breast so pure 
bs But some uncleanly apprehensions 
Keep leets and law-days, and in session sit 
With meditations lawful? 




Il. Τὸν τοίνυν δημοτικὸν. ἀναμνή τι ol 

C ἔφαμεν εἶναι. ἣν δέ που γεγονὼς. ἐκ νέου 

φειδωλῷ. πατρὶ τεθραμμένος, τὰς χρὴ ατιστι ἃς 

ἐπιθυμίας τιμῶντι μόνας, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίους, 

ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἕνεκα. ae: 
μένας, ἀτιμάζοντι. ἢ γάρ; Ναί. Συγγενόμενο. 

ἐ κομψοτέροις ἀνδράσι καὶ μεστοῖς ὧν ᾿ ἄρτι. 
διήλθομεν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὁρμήσας εἰς. ὕβριν, Te di νῇ 
καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων εἶδος μίσει τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς Σ 
λίας, φύσιν δὲ τῶν διαφθειρόντων. βελτίω. Fan 

Da ἀγόμενος ἀμφοτέρωσε κατέστη εἰς μέσον ἀμφοῖν 
τοῖν τρόποιν, καὶ μετρίως δή, ὡς. ᾧετο, ἑκάστωι 
ἀπολαύων οὔτε ἀνελεύθερον οὔτε παράνομον. βίον 

ζῇ, δημοτικὸς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ γεγονώς. Ἢν γάρ. ἡ 
ἔφη, καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ δόξα περὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον. 
Θὲς τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ “ἐγώ, πάλιν τοῦ τοιούτου 701 
πρεσβυτέρου γεγονότος νέον υἱὸν ἐν τοῖς τούτου 
αὖ ἤθεσι τεθραμμένον. Τίθημι. Τίθει τοίνυν καὶ 
τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα περὶ αὐτὸν γιγνόμενα, ἅπερ καὶ 

E περὶ τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ, ἀγόμενόν τε eis πᾶσα 
παρανομίαν, ὀνομαζομένην δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγόντι »ν ἢ 
ἐλευθερίαν ἅπασαν, βοηθοῦντά τε ταῖς ἐν μέσῳ | 
ταύταις ἐπιθυμίαις πατέρα τε καὶ τοὺς «ἄλλου 
οἰκείους, τοὺς ὃν. αὖ παραβοηθοῦντας" ὅταν 
ἐλπίσωσιν οἱ δεινοὶ μάγοι τε καὶ τυραννοποι 
οὗτοι μὴ ἄλλως τὸν νέον καθέξειν, ἔρωτά τινο 
αὐτῷ μηχανωμένους ἐμποιῆσαι προστάτην τῶν 


Cf. 559 vf. q 
ὃ els μέσον : ef. p. 249, note αὶ 

© Tronical “δή. See p. 300, note a. Cf. modern satire onl 
“ moderate” drinking and “ moderate ”’ preparedness. b 
@ ὡς @ero is another ironical formula like ἵνα δή, ὡς dpa, ete, 



IL. “ Now recall ¢ our characterization of the demo- 
cratic man. His development was determined by 
his education from youth under a thrifty father who 
approved. only the acquisitive appetites and dis- 
approved the unnecessary ones whose object is enter- 
tainment and display. Is not that so?” “Yes 
“ And by association with more sophisticated men, 
teeming with the appetites we have just described, 
he is impelled towards every form of insolence and 
outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by 
his hatred of his father’s niggardliness. But since 
his nature is better than that of his corrupters, being 
drawn both ways he settles down in a compromise ὃ 
between the two tendencies, and indulging and en- 
j each in moderation, forsooth,° as he sup 

lives what he deems a life that is neither iiperat 
hor lawless, now transformed from an_ oli 
democrat.” ‘‘ That was and is our belief about ‘this 
” ** Assume,’ then, again,” said I, “ that such a 
manwhenhe i is older has ason bred in turn/ in his ways 
of life.” “Iso assume.” ~ And suppose the experi- 
e of his father to be repeated in his case. He is 
wn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by 
his seducers complete freedom. His father and his 
otherkin lend support to’ these compromise appetites 
while the others lend theirs to the opposite group. 
And when these dread magi” and king-makers come 
to realize that they have no hope of controlling the 
youth in any other way, they con